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A b s t r a c t
This thesis answers the question of whether the European Union (EU) Member 
States have changed their behaviour in order to coordinate EU common representation in 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The study begins in 1973, when European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) was expanded to include EU Member States coordination in 
the United Nations, and ends in 2005. The thesis uses archive records and interviews to 
measure the level of EU representation (issuing common statements) and voting cohesion.
The analysis of EU Member States’ coordination is divided into technical issues 
(ILO labour standards) coordinated through the European Community, and political issues 
coordinated through EPC/CFSP mechanisms. The hypotheses tested are that technical 
coordination is easier to achieve than political coordination, and over time the Community 
driven technical coordination will develop more than EPC/CFSP driven political 
coordination. The core findings are that technical coordination has developed unevenly 
across particular issue areas and through time, while in political coordination there is 
evidence of a strong commitment by the EU Member States to maintaining common 
foreign policy positions.
Liberal intergovernmental theory is shown to be the most useful for explaining EU 
Member State technical coordination. Key evidence includes an examination of the impact 
of treaties on common representation and voting cohesion, the continued importance of 
national interests and the European Court of Justice Opinion confirming the primacy of 
Member States in the ILO. Institutional theory was shown to be the most useful for 
understanding EU Member State political coordination. Three cases studies were used: the 
Arab-Israel dispute, apartheid in South Africa promoting core labour standards. Empirical
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research highlights the social norms and rules of the Geneva diplomats working on EU 
coordination. The overall conclusion is that the EU Member States remain first and 
foremost members of the ILO, and speaking for Europe is a secondary concern.
4/381
C o n t e n t s
Declaration of Originality............................................................................................ 2
Abstract..................................................................................................................... 3
Contents...................................................................................................................... 5
Detailed Contents.........................................................................................................6
List of Tables...............................  9
List of Appendices...................................................................................................... 11
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. 12
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................13
Part I: Introduction
1: Research question and hypothesis............................................................................14
2: Theoretical Framework.......................................................................................... 40
Part II: Technical Coordination
3: The Foundations of Technical Coordination........................................................... 72
4: EU Member State representation in technical coordination.................................... 102
5: EU Member State voting cohesion in technical coordination................................. 131
6: Technical Coordination: Synthesis and discussion.................................................. 162
Part III: Political Coordination
7: The Foundations of Political Coordination............................................................196
8: Political coordination in LLC plenary sessions........................................................220
9: Political coordination in the Committee on the Application of Standards...............247
10: Political Coordination: Synthesis and discussion...................................................278
Part IV: Conclusion
11: Conclusion..........................................................................................................304
Appendices...............................................................................................................326
Bibliography.............................................................................................................346
5/381
D e t a i l e d  C o n t e n t s
Part I: Introduction
Chapter 1: Research question and hypothesis.......................................................... 14
1. Research Questions ........................................................................................... 14
2. Definitions, Source material and methodology................................................. 19
3. Technical and political agenda items ................................................................ 29
4. A brief sketch of the IL O ..................................................................................35
5. Chapter Plan...............................  38
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework........................................................................... 40
1. Neofunctional theory..................................   41
2. Intergovernmental theory...................................................................................44
3. Liberal Intergovernmental theory.....................................................................48
4. Consociational theory.................................................... ;....................................52
5. Institutional theory............................................................................................  57
6. Summary............................................................................................................ 66
Part II: Technical Coordination
Chapter 3: The Foundations of Technical Coordination........................................72
1. Contested competency in the European Court of Justice............................... 73
2. European Union institutions and the ILO........................................................ 80
3. Time periods of the survey.................................................................................85
4. Theories tested and crosscutting issues concerning technical coordination 91
5. Summary............................................................................................................100
Chapter 4: EU Member State representation in technical coordination.............. 102
1. EU Representation by the Presidency and the Commission.......................  104
2. Quantitative measurement of EU Member State representation..................108
3. EU Member State representation by issue area............................................. 114
4. Implications for theory....................................................................................122
5. Summary......................................................................................................... 127
6/381
Chapter 5: EU Member State voting cohesion in technical coordination .......... 131
1. EU Member State representation and EU Member State voting cohesion. 132
2. EU Member State voting cohesion in the ILC ............................................. 135
3. EU Member States’ and voting deviation..................................................... 141
4. EU Member State voting behaviour and issue areas...................................  150
5. Summary..........................................................................................................154
Chapter 6: Technical Coordination: Synthesis and discussion............................ 162
1. Representation and voting cohesion over the survey................................... 162
2. The explanatory power of crosscutting issues................................................168
3. Theoretical explanations re-considered..........................................................181
4. Summary..........................................................................................................193
Part III: Political Coordination
Chapter 7: The Foundations of Political Coordination.........................................196
1. EPC and CFSP: A brief history......................................................................198
2. EU Member States’ political coordination in the United Nations ...............204
3. Applying theories to political coordination .................................................. 213
4. Summary.......................................................................................................... 219
Chapter 8: Political coordination in ILC plenary sessions ................................... 220
1. EU Member State representation and voting cohesion..............................  222
2. EU Member State representation on the issue of Arab workers................. 227
3. EU Member State representation on the issue of apartheid in South Africa 233
4. Summary........................................................................................................ 241
Chapter 9: Political coordination in the Committee on the Application of Standards 247
1. ILO Mechanisms for monitoring the application of standards................... 248
2. EU Member State statements in the CAS: 1973-2005................................... 250
3. EU Member States’ common statements...................................................... 255
4. Drafting CAS EU common statements: Geneva coordination mechanisms 265
5. Why EU Member States coordinate common statements in the CAS 270
6. Summary..........................................................................................................273
7/381
Chapter 10: Political Coordination: Synthesis and discussion.............................. 278
1. Changing behaviour of EU Member States.................................................... 279
2. Socialisation of diplomats and opportunities for norm entrepreneurship .... 286
3. Four theories reconsidered.................................   293
4. Summary.........................................................................................................  301
Part IV: Conclusion
Chapter 11: Conclusion........................................................................................... 304
1. The Member States and the Community......................................................... 305
2. The Institutions.................................................................................................310
3. Technical and political issues..:.........................................................................313
4. Elites and diplomats......................................................................................... 316
5. Summary............................................................................................................319
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 326
Bibliography.............................................................................................................346
8/381
L i s t  o f  T a b l e s
3.1 EU Member State and accession state ratifications of ILO conventions:
1986,1995,2004....................................................................................................... 101
4.1 EU Member State representation in technical committee meetings listed by
Presidency, Commission and Combined representation, 1973-2005, 
aggregated into five periods.......................................................................................128
4.2 Level of EU participation in technical committee meetings where EU
Member State representation took place, 1973- 2005, aggregated into five 
periods........................................................................................................................ 129
4.3 EU Representation in ILC technical committees listed by relevance to
Article 137 of the Treaty of the European Community, 1973-2005.......................130
5.1 EU Member State voting in the adoption of technical instruments onto the
ILO statute: 1973-2005............................................................................................. 156
5.2a EU Member State voting cohesion in ILC Record Votes (Technical Issues)
correlated against the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote ‘for’
as a percentage of all votes: 1973-1980.....................................................................157
5.2b EU Member State voting cohesion in ILC Record Votes (Technical Issues)
correlated against the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote ‘for’
as a percentage of all votes: 1981-1986.....................................................................157
5.2c EU Member State voting cohesion in ILC Record Votes (Technical Issues)
correlated against the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote ‘for’
as a percentage of all votes: 1987-1992.....................................................................157
5.2d EU Member State voting cohesion in ILC Record Votes (Technical Issues)
correlated against the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote ‘for’
as a percentage of all votes: 1993-1997.....................................................................158
5.2e EU Member State voting cohesion in ILC Record Votes (Technical Issues)
correlated against the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote ‘for’ 
as a percentage of all votes: 1998-2005.....................................................................158
5.3 EU Member States’ abstentions and votes against the adoption of technical
instruments onto the ILO statute 1973-2005........................................................... 160
9/381
5.4 EU Member State deviant voting (abstentions and votes against) in ILC
record votes to adopt technical instruments onto the ILO statute, in relation 
to whether common EU representation took place during the drafting of 
the instrument: 1973-2005.........................................................................................161
8.1 EU Member State voting in record votes on political issues in the ILC:
1973-2005................................................................................................................... 246
8.2 EU Member State common statements and voting in record votes on
political issues in the ILC: divided by subject area: 1973-2005................................ 246
9.1a EU Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application of
Standards, independently and on behalf of other states: 1973-1980.......................275
9.1b EU Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application
of Standards, independendy and on behalf of other states: 1981-1986................. 275
9.1c EU Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application of
Standards, independendy and on behalf o f other states: 1987-1992.......................275
9.1 d EU Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application of
Standards, independendy and on behalf o f other states: 1993-1997.......................276
9.1 e EU Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application of
Standards, independendy and on behalf o f other states: 1998-2005.......................276
9.2 Countries about which EU Member States made statements, divided by
regions and across the five periods: 1973-2005 .......................................................276
9.3 EU Presidency statements in the CAS (Country and Convention) 2000-2005....... 277
9.4 Nordic Group statements in the CAS Part 1 Committee 1973-2005...................... 277
9.5 Nordic Group statements in the CAS (Country and Convention) 2000-2005........ 277
10/381
L i s t  o f  A p p e n d i c e s
1. ILO Technical Instruments: List of instruments, record voting outcome,
EU Member State voting and number of interventions made in the name of 
the EU Member States by the Presidency and the European Commission 
(1973-2005)............................................................................................................. 326
2. List of ILO Political Resolutions brought before the conference for a record
vote, EU Member State voting pattern in those record votes and EU 
Presidency statements made to the plenary or in committee meetings (1973- 
2005)...................................  332
3. List of all EU Member State and EU Presidency common statements made
in the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS), the country 
about which they were addressed and conventions, and Nordic bloc 
statements for comparison (1973-2005)................................................................ 337
4. EU Member State ratifications of ILO Conventions drafted when no EU
representation took place 1973-2005......................................................................342
5. Chi-square test for the association between EU representation and EU
Member State voting cohesion in ILC technical issues 1973-2005....................  344
6. Chi-square test for the association between EU representation and EU
Member State voting cohesion in ILC political votes 1973-2005......................... 345
11/381
L i s t  o f  A b b r e v i a t i o n s
CAS Committee on the Application of Standards
CFA Committee on Freedom of Association
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CONUN UN Coordination
EC European Community
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECOSOC Economic and Security Council
EESC European Economic and Social Committee
EP European Parliament
EPC European Political Coordination
EU European Union
GA (UN) General Assembly
GB Governing Body
GCHQ Government Communication Headquarters
ILC International Labour Conference
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMEC Industrialised Market Economy Countries
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
LI Liberal Intergovernmental
NF Neofunctional
OSH Occupational Safety and Health
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
SAP Stabilisation and Association Process
SC (UN) Security Council
SEA Single European Act
TEC Treaty o f the European Community
TEU Treaty of the European Union
TUC Trade Union Congress
UN United Nations
12/381
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
This thesis has taken four years to complete and there are many people to thank. I 
would like to begin by thanking my supervisor, Karen E Smith, for her encouragement, 
patience, and continued support, as well as her meticulous attention to detail that helped 
me to clarify many of the arguments presented here.
Thanks to the wider research community at the IR department in the LSE for 
their feedback and suggestions on numerous earlier versions of various chapters, as well as 
the editors and editorial board members of Millennium Journal of International Studies over the 
recent years who contribute so much to the academic life of the department.
Thanks to Christopher Hill and the other partners in FORNET, the research 
network on European Foreign Policy, with whom I worked for three years and learnt so 
much from.
Thanks to the interviewees who agreed to talk to me and provide a number of 
insights into the working of the EU in the ILO, who remain anonymous but nonetheless 
played a vital part in the research of this thesis.
Thanks to University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES) 
for their generous research scholarship that allowed me to travel to Geneva in June 2005 to 
carry out a number of interviews.
Finally, thanks to my family for their love and support, and most of all to Katie for 
making it all worth while.
13/381
C h a p t e r  1
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
1. Research Questions
The Member States of the European Union (EU)1 are simultaneously members of 
other international organisations such as the United Nations, and in very many cases their 
membership of those international organisations predates their becoming a member of the 
EU. Inside these international organisations European states participate alongside other 
states seeking to solve collective problems by cooperation. The solutions reached are 
through intergovernmental negotiation between sovereign states, instead of by coercion 
through the use of military force. This is also the approach practised within the EU, 
although the institutional structure o f EU far exceeds any other international organisation 
in existence. The supranational dimension of EU governance has created a highly 
sophisticated form of multilateralism.
In December 1973 the foreign ministers of the Nine EU Member States produced 
a public declaration tided the Document on the European Identity, which inter alia called for the 
Member States to adopt ‘common positions wherever possible in international 
organizations, notably the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.’ (Hill and Smith,
1 The European Union is taken here and throughout the thesis to include its predecessor treaty organisations, the
European Economic Community (EEC), Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When ‘EC’ 
is used in the thesis it refers exclusively to the European Community, the institutions o f which it consists and its 
international legal personality.
2 Only the Federal Republic o f Germany (FRG) stands out from this general trend, because both the FRG and the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) joined the United Nations Organisation (UN) in 1973 (although the FRG joined 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1954).
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2000: 96) This call was for EU Member States to prioritise working together for the goal of 
speaking with one voice, and remains explicit today within Articles 18-20 of the Treaty on 
European Union. As Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith point out, ‘the EU 
seeks to pool sovereignty and create a common foreign policy in many policy arenas’ and 
label this the EU’s approach to multilateralism. (Smith and Verlin Laatikainen, 2006: 3) 
They contrast this to the multilateralism found in international organisations, where state 
sovereignty is protected and intergovernmental principles shape decision-making 
procedures. Based on this distinction, Verlin Laatikainen and Smith frame the working of 
the EU at the UN as ‘intersecting multilateralisms’ (Smith and Verlin Laatikainen, 2006: 3) 
European Union Member States are at the intersection, and they are faced with a choice 
between acting collectively through their common institutions, or relying on a variety of 
previous networks of bilateral relations extending across the world based on shared history, 
language, culture, geography or political similarities. Within Europe these include Spain’s 
links with Latin America, Britain and France’s links to the Anglophone and Francophone 
worlds respectively, and Denmark’s to the Nordic group of states. (Manners and Whitman, 
2000: Ch.13)
This thesis examines the extent to which the EU Member States are changing their 
behaviour in one specific international organisation, the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the United Nations Speciali2ed Agency responsible for employment and social 
policy. Put succinctly, the research questions are as follows:
• Have the European Union Member States changed their behaviour over the period 
of study (1973-2005) in order to have a common representation o f the EU in the 
ILO?
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•  Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged in the Community pillar, despite the absence of European Community 
membership of the ILO?
• Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged on other grounds, such as inter alia a common foreign policy or a common 
European identity?
• Based on this, which theory tells us most about the behaviour of EU Member 
States and the role of EU institutions within the ILO?
The change in behaviour being looked for is of EU Member States moving away 
from acting as individual national government members of the ILO (as the 175 ILO 
members do) and toward acting in a way that prioritises EU representation. The 
methodology describing and measuring this change in behaviour, as well as a set of 
definitions, is presented in detail below. However, its primary characteristic is engaging in 
EU coordination activities and allowing EU-sanctioned representatives to speak on behalf 
of the national government. In short, we are looking for deviation from a base-line of 
standard behaviour by ILO member governments, where EU Member State governments 
coordinate among themselves more often, and are commonly represented collectively 
more often.
The four questions around which the thesis is designed will be answered through 
the collection of empirical data gathered from archive records from the ILO, EU 
documents and interviews with practitioners. However, over the course of the thesis 
another question will be considered, relating to a qualitative assessment of the performance 
of the EU. While the multilateral environment of an international organisation makes state 
cooperation necessary, what are the potential costs of EU coordination and how are they
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incurred? At least four answers can be given, two relating to the ILO and two to EU 
foreign policy. Firsdy, in the ILO increased coordination between EU Member State 
governments could lead to less coordination between the national workers' and employers' 
representatives and potentially damage the tripartite principles of the ILO. Secondly, EU 
Member States might be better able to pursue their interests working with other 
governmental coordination groups, either smaller (such as the Nordic group) or larger,
3 , .such as the IMEC group. Thirdly, on a general foreign policy level, the assumption that 
EU Member States' interests are naturally congruent needs to be verified, as well as what 
sort of agreements are produced through coordination (e.g. lowest-common denominator 
predicted by intergovernmental theory). Finally, the increased size of the EU could make 
coordination among its members more difficult over time, when one would expect nine 
states to coordinate more easily than 25.
How does the thesis answers these questions and contribute to the existing 
literature? The case study of the ILO is an important one to consider because since 1995 
the ILO has assumed the role of the primary universal organisation concerned with 
monitoring and regulating the social dimension of globalisation.4 It has developed a role to 
complement the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by providing the regulatory labour 
standards of a global economy based on international trade. The WTO's objective of 
reducing trade tariffs implies increasing economic competition and improving economic 
efficiency. The ILO seeks to prevent this becoming a ‘race for the bottom’ in which 
working conditions are sacrificed in order to stay competitive. The rapid acceleration of 
global economic liberalisation after the end of the Cold War has raised similar concerns to
3 IMEC — Industrialised Market Economy Countries is comprised o f the UN Western Europe and Other Group 
(WEOG) plus Japan.
4 The ILO was given its mandate at the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, 1995.
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those of around at the end of World War I, when the ILO was founded. Its constitution 
recognises the link between domestic stability and international peace, stating that ‘poverty 
anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere’ (ILO Constitution: Article 1(c)). 
The EU was founded on similar principles and the EU remains explicitly committed to 
social and economic development, through the exportation of its own model to 
neighbouring states through enlargement, as well as in its development policies. (EU, 2005: 
Paragraph 99)
The ILO case study allows the researcher to hold up a mirror to the two pillars of 
EU policy-making of the Community (Pillar 1) and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Pillar 2). The agenda of the ILO spans both areas, and in coordinating in response 
to various issues the working of each pillar can be compared and contrasted. The two areas 
roughly correspond to ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics, as well as to supranational and 
intergovernmental decision-making procedures.5 The traditional view held by both the 
neofunctional and intergovernmental schools is that ‘low’ political issues are more easily 
agreed upon and form a sound basis for integration, while ‘high’ politics were and remain a 
contentious issue that Member States are often divided upon. (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; 
Hoffmann, 1966) The reason is that foreign policy is traditionally linked to national 
sovereignty and national identity, characteristics that define a nation state. The 
intergovernmental approach argues that the EU will not have a coherent foreign policy 
while it remains essentially a collection of separate states. Alternatively, critics argue that 
identity and culture are important (not only material interests), and that a successful 
common foreign policy can be built over time without fundamentally changing the
5 Such dichotomies ate useful for framing the overview, but in reality ILO ‘technical issues’ related to the Community are a 
mixture o f Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and unanimity. Also, ‘political issues’ have statements coordinated 
through the EPC and CFSP mechanisms.
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sovereignty of Member States of the Union. (Boerzel, 1999; Tonra, 2001; Smith, 2004) 
Does the ILO case assert or refute the basic assumptions about EU foreign policy, namely 
that coordination of political issues will be much harder than purely technical ones?
This thesis answers these questions by drawing on empirical research from 1973, 
the year that European Political Cooperation (EPC) began coordinating EU Member 
States in the UN through the CONUN committee system. I will return to these questions 
periodically throughout the thesis, as well as summarizing my findings in the conclusion.
2. Definitions. Source Material and Methodology
i. Definitions
This thesis is first an empirical study o f the behaviour of the EU Member States in 
the ILO between 1973 and 2005. Behaviour is measured through three variables, applied 
throughout the thesis:
• Coordination is the meeting of diplomats and officials from the governments of the 
European Union Member States (most likely with staff from the Council 
Secretariat and/or Commission present but this is not essential) in any location 
(national capitals, Brussels, Geneva) with the purpose of discussing an issue on the 
ILO agenda.
• Representation is any verbal or written intervention by Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, the European Commission or another EU Member State explicitly 
representing the views of (i) the Member States o f the European Community, (ii) 
the Member States speaking as the ‘Nine’ (‘Ten’ or ‘Twelve) members of the 
European Community or (iii) the EU. Which of the three tides is used depends on
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the coordination mechanism used to prepare the intervention. The distinction 
between (i) and (ii) was preserved from 1973 until 1993, with the former 
represented in relation to technical instruments and the latter in relation to political 
issues.6 After 1993 all representation was in the name of the EU. In the thesis 
representation is quantifiably measured through the recording of statements in the 
Provisional Records of the International Labour Conference.7
• Cohesion is the uniform voting behaviour of European Union Member States in 
International Labour Conference record votes. This term is borrowed from 
Caporoso and Jupille. (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998)
Throughout the thesis the relationship between the three is understood in the 
following manner. All evidence of representation is verifiable evidence of coordination 
between the Member States (with or without the assistance of Commission and/or Council 
staff) because no common statements in the name of the EU Member States is sanctioned 
without prior agreement. However, there is also intermittent archive evidence of 
coordination taking place between Member States in policy areas where no formal 
representation was documented in the ILO Provisional Records. This means that the 
relationship between coordination and representation is not a two-way street. While one 
can be certain that when there is evidence of representation, coordination preceded it, 
reversing the logic is not so simple. Although sometimes no representation signifies that no 
coordination took place, the absence of evidence of representation does not preclude the 
possibility that coordination did take place, and that the outcome was a decision not to 
represent the EU Member States. All of the substantive argumentation presented in this 
thesis is based on the concrete link between evidence of representation being taken as 
evidence of coordination. This approach to gathering empirical data relating to
6 The division of the ILO agenda into ‘technical’ and ‘political’ issues is discussed in Section 3.
7 Trovisional Records’ ate the official documents recording proceeding at ILCs.
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coordination and representation is not foolproof since there will be times when Member 
States may have coordinated but no documented record has been found.8 Thus statements 
made about the relationship between coordination and representation have a potential 
margin of error, although the design of the methodology has sought to minimise it.
Cohesion is measured by looking at the records of EU Member State voting. The 
voting pattern is either said to be cohesive, (there is voting cohesion) or not, depending on 
whether all the EU Member States voted the same way or not. In the analysis of technical 
voting the assumption is made that all Member States vote for the adoption of an 
instrument (there is a detailed explanation of why this is so in Chapter 5). When an EU 
Member State abstains from voting, or casts a vote against the adoption of an instrument, 
voting deviation takes place and cohesion is broken. In the analysis of political voting all 
three possible votes (for, against and abstention) are viable strategies to promote the EU 
Member States* interests, depending on the issue being voted on. In both issue areas the 
association between cohesive voting and common representation is measured, in order to 
provide a provisional hypothesis on whether common representation and therefore 
coordination occurs at the same time as cohesive voting.9
ii. Source Material
The choice of source material was informed by the three key variables listed above, 
coordination, representation and cohesion. However, as stated above, gathering evidence 
showing coordination meetings being held (such as agendas) was very difficult and as a
8 The methodology section below d e tails possible situations where measuring representation leads to potential for errors.
9 Alternative explanations for why cohesive voting without common representation are also discussed in the thesis, for
reasons such as inter aBa a coincidence o f shared interests of like-minded states.
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result the methodology was designed to gather as reliable data as possible on representation 
and cohesion, and then deduce the level of coordination from the general principal that 
when representation took place coordination preceded it. Evidence showing the existence 
of coordination meetings as early as 1974 was found in an internal memo sent from the 
British government (Department of Employment) to the UK Permanent Mission in 
Geneva.10 Personal correspondence with a diplomat working as part of the UK mission in 
1994 and 1995 also detailed coordination meetings in Geneva, and archival research in the 
ILO provided evidence of daily coordination meetings between the EU Member States 
since 2000. (ILO, 2000b; ILO, 2001a; ILO, 2003a; ILO, 2004a; ILO, 2005a)11 Concrete 
evidence of coordination meetings from the Council Secretariat are equally hard to find. A 
personal correspondence with an archivist in the Public Archive Office of the Council 
Secretariat in Brussels stated that the
EU Member States coordinate among themselves before and during the three-week ILC. 
Typically, for each topic the Presidency calls coordination meetings as needed, at times daily or twice 
a day, at times only few times during the ILC. (Bruynel, 2005)
The correspondence continues with confirmation that only four documents 
relating to International Labour Conference (ILC) coordination meetings were found 
concerning negotiations on mining in 1994, but they ‘are not accessible to the public.’ 
T)ocuments from before 1999 can not be found in the public register, but in the Archives. 
But as explained earlier there may not be any.’ (Bruynel, 2005) Three COREU telex 
messages from 2002 giving details of Geneva coordination have been found, and
10 ‘At the 1974[International Labour] Conference West Germany held the EEC Presidency, and appeared to manage the 
chairing o f the co-ordination meetings very well We may therefore be able to draw on their experience concerning the 
demands on the Secretariat It would be very helpful if the delegate could ask the West German government 
representative on the Governing Body, Mr Klotz, at the May 1976 session o f the Governing Body or at the 1976 
Conference o f any advice he can offer on the matter.’ (UKREP, 1976)
11 Data relating to before 2000 is not available from the Dotty Bulletin, because no earlier copies have been kept However, 
the Bulletin only details coordination meetings taking place either in the Palais des Nations or in the ILO building. Prior 
to 2004 a considerable number o f coordination meetings were held in the EU Council Secretariat offices (known as ‘the 
Bunker’) nearby. In 2004 the enlargement o f the EU, and the relocation o f the Council Secretariat further away meant 
this was no longer possible. Interviews: Athens, 1 October 2004; Geneva, 21-22 June 2005
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documents stating the agreed position prior to the 2004 Discussion on Migrant Workers 
were supplied to the author. (EC-Council, 2002c; EC-Council, 2002a; EC-Council, 2002b; 
EC, 2005) In summary, these collected documents show evidence of coordination 
meetings taking place over the entire length of the survey.
In summary, there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim that coordination 
has taken place in Brussels and in Geneva in preparation for ILCs from as early as 1974. 
Pinpointing exacdy when, how much and on what issues is not possible given the 
incomplete records. For this reason this thesis goes no further than making the assertion 
that for the entire period of the study, when evidence of representation is found it is 
evidence of Member States’ coordination too.
The major source of primary reference material used to gather empirical data on 
representation is the ILO annual legislative assembly, the International Labour Conference, 
which has fully documented records of proceedings. The Provisional Records have 
verbatim transcripts of all addresses to the conference plenary, summaries of all 
interventions made in committee meetings and breakdowns of all record voting by ILO 
members. Through this method quantitative data for both representation and cohesion 
was collected for each ILC over the 33-year period (giving 36 in total because three 
additional Maritime conferences were held in 1976, 1987 and 1996). This was 
complemented with additional ILO primary sources from the Daily Bulletins of the 
conferences between 2000 and 2005 (the only ones available in the Geneva archive) as well 
as selected documents from ILO Governing Body meetings (the executive body).
On the European side documents from the European Commission, Council of 
Ministers, European Parliament (resolutions and working groups), Economic and Social
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Committee and the European Court of Justice are used. These sources are augmented with 
20 interviews with various practitioners from the ILO, European Commission, the Council 
Secretariat, Member State national governments and Geneva Permanent Missions. Archival 
references from the National Records Office in Kew, London are also used, as is an 
extensive range of secondary literature. The time-frame begins in 1973, the year in which 
the first representation of EC Member States was made, to 2005.
iii. Methodology
Representation is measured by the number of statements issued by either the 
Member State holding the Council Presidency, the Commission or another Member State 
speaking in the place of the Presidency, where there is an explicit mention of either the 
European Community or the European Union. In technical committees common 
statements are usually prefaced with ‘the Government Member of X, speaking on behalf of 
the Governments of the Member States of the EEC’. On the occasions when the 
European Commission spoke, the statement was prefaced with ‘A representative of the 
European Commission, speaking on behalf of the Governments of the Member States of 
the EEC’.12 When the Presidency spoke for the Member States on political issues 
coordinated through European Political Cooperation (EPC) the statements are prefaced 
with ‘the Government Member of X, speaking on behalf of the ‘Nine’ (‘Ten’ or ‘Twelve’’) 
Member States of the EEC’. After 1993 statements in both technical and political issues 
were prefaced with ‘the Government Member of X speaking on behalf of the Member 
States of the European Union’. The measurement of representation was done by scanning 
the Provisional Records of each ILC committee meeting and counting the number of times
12 The reader should be careful to note that in this context, ‘representative’ is roughly synonymous with ‘spokesperson’ or 
‘diplomat’. It is used differently to the concept o f ‘representation’ in the thesis.
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an intervention was made in the name of the Member States. Care was taken to 
differentiate between interventions and references back to previous interventions so as to 
avoid double-counting.13 Searching for evidence of representation in plenary sessions was 
easier because it was possible to quickly find statements by diplomats from the Member 
State holding the Presidency by using the index of conference speakers.
Recording interventions in committee meetings is more difficult than recording 
interventions in plenary sessions. Plenary sessions are recorded verbatim and are often long 
statements, with the Presidency speaking rarely more than two or three times to plenary
per conference. By contrast committee meetings drafting new instruments (conventions
and recommendations) are like long discussions and the Presidency might make up to 80 
interventions in the name of the Member States of the EU during the meetings. The 
drafting meetings can last either one or two years (referred to as First discussion and 
Second discussion or Single discussion — Standard setting). There are five basic actions 
carried out by actors in these committee meetings. They are:
i. Give an opinion in the preliminary discussion of the topic
ii. Propose amendments
iii. Propose sub-amendments to an existing amendment
iv. Speak in support of or against an amendment
v. Vote to accept an amendment when consensus is not reached
The Presidency can perform actions (i-iv) on behalf of the EU Member States (in 
fact any government can speak for any group of constituents — usually other governments 
but occasionally national tripartite partners will speak together). Since the revised guidelines 
on the role regional groupings can play in Committee meetings after the 1981 Governing
13 For example: The workers’ representative proposed a sub-amendment to the amendment proposed by the 
Governments o f the Member States o f the EU’.
25/381
Body decision (ILO, 1981f) the European Commission can perform actions (i-iv) too. 
Neither the Presidency nor the Commission can vote (action v) on behalf of the Member 
States when a vote is called in a committee meeting.14
When measuring representation, all four types of action are counted as 
interventions of equal significance when done so in the name of the EU Member States. 
The justification for this is that all four actions are necessary to function as a coherent actor 
in the meeting, and individually demonstrate different facets of coordination. 
Contributions to the preliminary discussion (i) and proposing amendments (ii) demonstrate 
preparatory meeting coordination and the establishment of a set of common statements to 
take into the meeting. Proposing sub-amendments (iii) demonstrates flexibility in the 
mandate set in coordination meetings and the ability to revise interests to take into account 
third parties, positions. Finally, supporting or rejecting amendments (iv) represents the 
ability to quickly coordinate during discussions and to recognise opportunities to pursue 
EU interests through the initiatives of other parties in the negotiations.
The alternative to giving each one equal weight is to differentiate between the four 
actions and attribute more significance to one aspect and less to another. One could argue 
that it takes more coordination to agree on making an amendment (ii) than it does to 
collectively reject something that might be very obviously against Member States’ interests 
(iv). There are two considerable difficulties with this approach and neither offer a perfecdy 
objective analysis of the coordination process. Firsdy, grading each intervention requires 
the researcher to enter into a very close reading of the proceedings of the meeting and
14 Voting in committee meetings is usually by show o f hands, although occasionally a record vote will be requested (most 
frequently by either workers’ or employers’ delegates). Voting is weighted so that the combined number of all 
government delegates, all workers delegates and all employers delegates is equal (one third each). This contrasts with the 
conference plenary where 4 national votes are allocated to each member, with two going to the government and one 
each to workers and employers.
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objectively scale the relative significance of each amendment to the Member States 
interests. This would require extensive knowledge in a number of diverse technical areas 
and is unfeasible for an analysis that covers 102 instruments over 33 years. The second is 
that this alternative approach would also require access to the EU coordination meeting to 
measure the relative complexity of each amendment proposed. It assumes that 
coordinating the Member States’ common amendments is necessarily difficult (i.e. that it is 
the most variable part of coordination). This need not be the case in an area of policy 
where extensive Community law already exists, and all amendments are designed to bring 
the instrument into line with EC law.15 On balance the approach chosen is the best 
available because by treating each type of intervention equally it captures the essence of 
being a coherent actor.
The methodological approach of counting interventions in the name of the EU 
Member States has another advantage insofar as it provides a clear set of criteria for 
gathering data in archives that are occasionally ambiguous. The ambiguity arises in 
Provisional Records when interventions do not begin with the prefaces described above, 
but nonetheless resemble the product of Member State coordination. The most obvious 
example of this is the Presidency speaking on behalf of all Member States, but not 
mentioning the EC or EU. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Member 
States decided to speak purely in the context o f their own membership of the ILO and not 
to draw reference from the European Union. The second is that the Reporter responsible 
for minuting the meeting was not aware that Presidency was speaking on behalf of the EU 
Member States, or did not associate the named group as being the EU.16 In these situations
15 A number of conventions fit this description, such as Cl 84 on Health and Safety in Agriculture.
16 Reporters are civil servants from ILO member governments seconded to the ILC and are responsible for recording the 
Committee meetings. They work alongside a Chairperson who is also seconded from a member government, and two
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the question arises of whether a particular intervention is a representation of the EU 
Member States that has been inaccurately minuted? In order to avoid entering a grey area 
of trying to interpret these cases, when the EC or EU moniker is not explicitly found, it is 
not counted as an intervention. The potential disadvantage of this is a systematic under­
reading of representation due to imperfect archival records. However, given the stated 
focus on concrete evidence of coordination, this is the approach chosen and used.
A similar situation concerning the representation of a partial group of EU Member 
States also needs to be considered. Can the Presidency speak in the name of the EU 
Member States when not all of the Member States are present in the meeting? In the 1970s 
Luxembourg was occasionally absent from some ILC committee meetings and for this 
reason preferred to have coordination meetings prior to conference in order to have an 
input into a meeting it would not otherwise attend.17 The same situation still occurs today, 
seen in the case of Presidency coordination of EU Member States in the Fishing Sector 
Instruments on 2005, when the Netherlands (the previous Presidency) chaired 
coordination meetings because of the lack of technical expertise in landlocked 
Luxembourg.18 Just as the dilemma arose of whether a full listing of Member States 
making common interventions could be counted as evidence of EC/EU Member State 
representation, a recurrent list o f all Member States minus one raises the question of 
whether this is actually evidence of coordination between those Member States present in the 
committee. An incomplete group of Member States might not be able to issue statements in 
the name of the EU, but is nonetheless EU coordination. As before, these cases are not
vice-chaiipersons drawn from workers’ and employers’ delegations. The Reporter is responsible for interpreting the 
discussion and succinctly recording the substantive points without transcribing each intervention.
17 “Incidentally, it would not be surprising if Luxembourg were to advocate prior meetings on all items because they field a 
small delegation and do not usually cover all Committees in Geneva.’ (Hess, 1977)
18 Interview, Geneva, 22 June 2005
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counted in the empirical data sets, although the decision has the potential to lead to the 
under-counting of cases of representation.
In summary, the methodology of the empirical data collection has been designed 
around the objective of identifying policy areas where the EU Member States have 
coordinated to produce common statements, referred to as representation. Cohesion is 
measured through the voting records of the ILC showing the votes cast by EU Member 
States. Representation is measured by counting the number of statements made by the 
Presidency and the European Commission in the name of the EU Member States. The 
classification of committee meetings according to whether there had been representation 
will be cross-referenced with voting outcomes and ratifications by the Member States. 
However, there is another important classification in the data to consider, which is the 
division between ‘political’ and ‘technical’ matters. It is to this that we now turn.
3. Technical and political agenda items
Colleagues have however been unable to trace the origins o f  the division o f  handling 
responsibility between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ matters. ( ...)
I am advised that there are no hard and fast rules about what ILO matter is or is not 
suitable for discussion in Political Cooperation (PoCo). But broadly PoCo covers questions o f  
political interest to the N ine in the field o f  foreign policy which fall outside the usual business o f  the 
EEC. (Callway, 1978)
The quotation above is taken from a letter written on 5 May 1978 by Mr Callway in 
the UK government’s European Integration Department (Internal) (EIDI) to Miss Grieve 
in the Department of Employment. The letter explained the difference between technical 
and political matters deriving from the structure of European integration, with political 
matters being the concern of European Political Cooperation (EPC) institutions and
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technical matters being the concern of the European Community. Bearing in mind that 
EPC was created in order to establish a clearly separate political dimension to European 
economic integration that was isolated from the Community’s institutions, the distinction 
between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ matters appears to be an artificial, and historically 
contingent one. Considering that EPC was officially recognised in the Single European Act 
and the Treaty on European Union (IEU) turned EPC into CFSP and placed it next to the 
EC in a pillar structure, what place does it have in explaining the ILO agenda today?
Despite the origins of the distinction dating back at least thirty years, the two terms 
are still used today by diplomats working for both the Member States and the European 
Union.19 The ‘turf war’ between foreign policy and employment policy is recreated in 
national bureaucracies, with labour ministries responsible for working on technical issues 
and foreign ministries and their diplomatic staff in Geneva responsible for political work.20 
The dichotomy remains inside the EU, with technical issues being the concern of the 
Community Pillar and political issues in the CFSP Pillar.
i. Technical issues
‘Technical’ issues on the ILO agenda relate to the preparation, drafting, and 
revision of ILO instruments (conventions, recommendations and protocols) that set
19 Interviews: London, 5 July 2004 and 21 September 2004; Copenhagen 3 March 2005; Geneva, 21/22 June 2005; 
Brussels 18 November 2005.
20 This division o f labour was evident in the field work and is discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters. The 
following archive document illustrates the point too:
‘3 .1 understand from my conversations with you and Bill James last week that the visiting team will man, and chair, the 
EEC coordination meetings on the 4 ILC technical committees (Administration of Labour, Freedom o f Trade Unions, 
The Working Environment, and Nursing Personnel). We imagine that [UK Geneva] Mission input in the work o f  these 
committees, and coordination meetings, will be minimal.
4. EEC coordination on the work o f the other ILC committees and the Governing Body will necessarily involve the 
Mission to a greater extent ... on the various relevant fronts (e.g. Middle East, Article 17, Structure, human tights in 
Czechoslovakia, etc.)’ (Callway, 1977)
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standards in employment law.21 There are two types of committee meeting that prepare 
instruments. General discussions are held most years, and allow the tripartite constituents 
to formulate a set of conclusions to present to Conference that identify policy areas where 
either new standards are needed or old ones need updating. If a General discussion 
concludes that there is a need to create or update a standard, the matter is referred to the 
Governing Body of the ILO, which places an item on the agenda of the forthcoming 
meeting.22 The second type of committee meeting serves to draft an instrument and sits for 
either one or two years.23 Instruments can be based around sectors in the economy (e.g. 
mining, agriculture, fishing), themes pertinent to many issues (e.g. health and safety, equal 
opportunities, maternity cover) or the preservation of tripartite labour relations (freedom 
of association, rights of collective bargaining). It is important to note that although the 
distinction between technical and political is one that the EU Member States use to classify 
items on the ILC agenda according to EU structure, the definition of ‘technical’ is 
consistent within the ILO according to its role as a standard setting international 
organisation.
Inside the European Community identifying ‘technical’ issues is important because 
the competency to legislate any changes in the law necessary to ratify conventions is 
sometimes not held by the Member States. Technical issues on the ILO agenda are often 
related to the content of the acquis communautaire, the body of Community law regulating
21 Conventions are ratified by ILO member governments and enter into force through domestic legislation. A convention 
sets out general principles guiding the purpose o f the legislation, while recommendations are non-binding but suggest a 
framework for legislation. Conventions are often accompanied by recommendations to provide a blueprint for 
legislation. Protocols are additions to conventions that accommodate changing circumstances in the nature o f the issue 
area.
22 A decision to discuss a new area o f technical standard-malting can also be referred to the Governing Body without it 
having been discussed at Conference. The Governing Body decide whether the standard will be discussed and finalised 
in one year, or as is more common, over two years with adoption onto the statute at the end o f the second year.
23 They are referred to as First Discussion, Standard Setting (sitting for only one year) or First Discussion and Second Discussion 
(sitting over two years).
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and legislating the common market. The specific role of the ILO as the UN Speciali2ed 
Agency focusing on employment and social issues means that it has always been salient to 
the process of European economic integration. Over the time period of this thesis (1973- 
2005) the acquis communautaire has developed substantially, both in the scope of its coverage 
and in the way decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers, including introducing 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to Tide XI on Social Policy, Employment, Vocational 
Training and Youth in the Treaty of the European Community (TEC). As a result o f this, 
the ability of Member States to implement legislation to allow them to ratify some ILO 
conventions has been passed to the European Community level, and must be done 
through the Council of Ministers. However, the EC is not a member of the ILO and hence 
cannot participate in the drafting of instruments that direcdy pertain to its competencies. 
Chapter 3 explains this in more detail.
Although the ‘technical’ issue distinction is extremely relevant to understanding EU 
expectations of the ILO and the limits to EU action, the distinction is also useful at the 
level of national governments. Lead government agencies in each European Union 
Member State are responsible for preparing and negotiating national positions at each ILC. 
While there is evidence of coordination taking place in Brussels prior to ILCs, these 
meetings are between staff in the Permanent Representations to the EU, and they are 
oftentimes not the same staff members who meet in Geneva during conferences.24 
Therefore, another characteristic o f technical issues that will be discussed in detail in a 
number of places later in the thesis is that the amount of experience of national diplomats 
of EU Member State coordination meetings varied over time and between issues areas.
24 Interview. Brussels, 18 November 2005.
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it. Political issues
There are a number of possible ways of defining ‘political’ issues. On the one hand 
they could be regarded as ‘everything that is not technical’, helping to establish a binary 
catch-all of everything on the ILO agenda. On the other hand, since ‘technical’ relates to 
issue areas concerning the European Community, it follows that ‘political’ relates to issues 
concerning EPC and later, CFSP.25 The definition used in this thesis draws from both 
these extremes and is a compromise between the two. Drawing from the distinction 
between EC and EPC/CFSP, political issues are those which are coordinated through the 
intergovernmental mechanisms of the EPC and CFSP. Only the Presidency can represent 
the EU Member States by issuing common statements and they are in the name of the 
‘Nine’, (‘Ten’ /  ‘Twelve’) prior to 1993 and in the name of the EU thereafter. There is a 
clearly identifiable institutional framework that coordinates the Member States and this 
gives the definition a grounding in the structure of the EU.
This raises the question how do the EU Member States decide what issues from 
the conference agenda should be coordinated through the EPC/CFSP institutions? The 
distinction between technical and political as a binary classification means that the ‘default’ 
setting for coordination in non-technical issues are EPC/CFSP institutions. In this thesis 
there is less evidence of EU Member State representation in political issues than technical 
issues, and this reinforces the assumption that the intergovernmental nature of the 
EPC/ CFSP institutions limits the scope of EU Member State coordination by requiring 
unanimity to produce a common statement.26 Everything that is not ‘technical’ has the
25 This is the implication o f the letter dted in footnote 20.
26 The issue o f a common EU position on financing the ILO was mentioned on two occasions as an example o f an issue 
that most states agreed on, but that the UK refused to accept a common position on. The major difference is that most 
Member States support limiting the ILO budget to zero real growth (thus increasing only in line with inflation) while
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potential to be a political issue, since the EU Member States would coordinate on it through 
the EPC/CFSP institutions. However, given the need for consensus in the 
intergovernmental decision-making system, the actual number of political issues 
coordinated in the ILO is relatively small.
This is not the only definition of political that exists within the circle of 
practitioners working in the EU. When asked to define ‘political’, a number of interviewees 
said that political issues were those that concerned the domestic practices of other ILO 
member governments. In the formal language of international relations the issue crosses 
the inside/outside dividing line of state sovereignty and addresses domestic politics in the 
forum of an international organisation.27 Crossing this line makes such a statement the 
concern of Foreign Ministries, and illustrates the scope of competency between 
government departments. It is interesting to note (but the thesis does not investigate the 
point in any detail) that the distinction between technical and political issue areas, although 
extremely relevant in defining relations between the EU Member States and the European 
Community institutions in relation to the ILO, is applied by staff in national governments 
to explain their own activities. Noting this means that the division between political and 
technical issue areas is not a unique construct for EU Member States, but one applied by 
all states in the ILO to some degree.
the UK (and the USA, Japan and Australia among other states) advocates zero nominal growth, (which leads to a 
budget decrease by the rate o f inflation over time). The UK defence o f this situation is that the UK position on UN  
budget funding is decided in the Foreign Office and is therefore a political issue. Interviews: London, 5 July 2004; 
London, 21 September 2004; Geneva, 22 July 2Q05.
27 Interview: London, 21 September 2004; Copenhagen, 3 March 2005.
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4. A brief sketch of the ILO
The ILO is a tripartite international organisation, with each national delegation 
composed of four voting members, of which two come from the government, one from 
the national employers federation and one from the national trade union federation. The 
two non-governmental parties represent national interests but are also coordinated 
internationally through two dedicated secretariats in the ILO, and have legislative and 
executive powers in the organisation. Their independence is protected by the ILO 
constitution. The constitution stipulates that only states can join the ILO as members, and 
the unique structure of the organisation has ramifications for the possibility of changing 
the constitution to allow the European Community to accede to the organisation. 
Although certain provisions were agreed by the ILO Governing Body in 1981 that allowed 
European Community diplomats to act more like a state diplomats in committee meetings 
(ILO, 1981 f), European Community membership remains a very remote possibility.
i. A  brief history of the ILO
The International Labour Organisation is one of fifteen Specialized Agencies of the 
United Nations system.28 They sit outside the structure of the United Nations Organisation 
(UNO), which was founded by the UN Charter and contains six Principle Organs (the 
General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Secretary General, and the Trusteeship
28 The 15 are: The International Labour Organization, (ILO); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the World Health Organisation (WHO); the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the International Maritime Organisation (IMO); the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU); the Universal Postal Union (UPU); the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Tourism Organization (WTO).
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Council). The fifteen agencies should not be confused with the funds and programmes that 
are directly accountable to the Economic and Social Committee, and are financed direcdy 
through the UNO budget. The Specialized Agencies have their own constitutions, 
independent membership from the UNO and have budgetary autonomy, although they 
work closely and coordinate with each other and the United Nations Organisation. The 
ILO is the oldest of the fifteen agencies and pre-dates the creation of the UN itself.
The constitution of the ILO was originally drafted by the Commission on 
International Labour between January and April 1919 and became Part XIII of the 
Versailles Treaty, officially ending the hostilities of World War I. The treaty was intended 
to usher in a new era in international relations in the aftermath of the Great War that 
would be based on international cooperation premised on democratic principles, through 
the ILO and three other important international institutions, the Assembly and Permanent 
Council of League of Nations and the Permanent Court o f International Justice (that later 
became the ICJ in the UN Charter).29 With the outbreak of the Second World War the 
ILO Secretariat was relocated to Montreal, Canada, and with the plans for the post war 
international institutional framework well advanced, in 1944 the twenty-sixth annual 
conference met in Philadelphia and restated the aims and objectives o f the Organisation in 
preparation for participation in the UN system. While the basic components of the League 
were substantially modified before becoming institutions of the UN, the ILO remained 
fundamentally unaltered in the post-war era.
29 Commenting on the tole of US President Woodrow Wilson in the drafting o f the Versailles Treaty, Inis Claude said 
‘Wilson had fought his war to make the world safe for democracy; he created his League to make the world safe by 
democracy’. (Italics in original) (Claude, 1971: 52)
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ii. ILO  institutional desist
The institutional design of the ILO is based on three organs, a General Conference 
of representatives of the Members; a Governing Body (described in Article 7 of the ILO 
Constitution); and an International Labour Office controlled by the Governing Body. The 
first organ is the legislative assembly and is known as the International Labour Conference 
(ILC) and meets never less frequently than once a year, (although roughly every decade an 
extra conference session dedicated to maritime issues is convened). The primary function 
of the conference is to agree on the budget, work plan and the drafting and adoption of 
instruments to the statute of the ILO. The Governing Body (GB) is the executive branch 
of the ILO, and ‘meets three times a year in Geneva. It takes decisions on action to give 
effect to ILO policy, prepares the draft programme and budget, which it then submits to 
the Conference for adoption, and elects the Director-General/ (ILO, 2000h: 7) The 
Governing Body is composed of 56 titular members (28 government members and 14 
members from each of the employers’ and workers’ delegations). The non-governmental 
seats are allocated at the discretion of the respective groups, while the government seats are 
allocated according to geographical regions, with eight going to Europe, seven to Asia and 
to Americas and six to Africa. However, within the 28 government members ten seats are 
permanently allocated to the states of ‘chief industrial importance’ in much the same way as 
there are permanent members on the UN Security Council, except that in the ILO there 
are no privileged voting actions comparable to the veto.30 The third organ is the permanent 
secretariat of the Organisation, the International Labour Office, based in Geneva. It is 
headed by a Director-General who is elected for a five-year renewable term.
30 The states are Bra2il, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. Article 
7(2) and (3) o f the ILO Constitution sets out the procedure for defining them. The provisional membership for 2005- 
2008 was published at the 2005 ILC (ILO, 2005f)
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5. Chapter Plan
The remainder of the thesis is divided into ten chapters. The next chapter sets out 
the five theoretical approaches to the study of the EU that will applied to the questions 
driving the thesis. They are: neofunctional theory, intergovernmental theory, liberal 
intergovernmental theory, consociational theory, and institutional theory. Each is briefly 
described and then the key predictions about EU Member State behaviour in the ILO are 
given, informed by the theory. These hypotheses are the basis of a framework for testing 
the applicability of each theory in explaining the empirical data gathered. Chapter 2 ends 
with a list of four key issues to be considered in the thesis. They are:
• The relationship between the EU Member States and the Community
• The role played by the EU Institutions
• The differences and similarities between technical and political issues
• The role played by elites and diplomats
Chapters 3 to 6 are an in-depth examination of the EU Member States’ 
coordination, representation and voting cohesion in technical issue areas, from 1973 to 
2005. The empirical data is taken from Appendix 1, which lists all the ILO instruments 
drafted and adopted onto the statute since 1973. The appendix shows whether there was 
EU representation during the drafting and how much, the voting records of the EU 
Member States in each instrument and the overall outcome of the vote. The 32 years of the 
study are divided into five periods, and these are explained and justified in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 explores the trends and patterns in EU Member State representation, while 
Chapter 5 explores voting cohesion over the five periods. Chapter 6 summarises the results 
gathered, and provides additional support for the main finding of these four chapters, 
which is that in the field of technical coordination, there is no clear association between 
representation and voting cohesion, contrary to the predictions of a number of theories.
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Chapters 7 through to 10 follow a similar format as the previous four, except their 
focus is on EU Member State coordination, representation and voting cohesion in political 
issues at the ILO. Chapter 7 provides an overview of the evolution of political cooperation 
between EU states, from European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). It also surveys the existing literature on EU Member State 
coordination elsewhere in the UN system and looks for trends and patterns that could 
inform this case study. Chapter 8 looks at representation and voting cohesion in the ILC 
from 1973 to 2005, focusing on plenary discussions,31 using empirical data from Appendix 
2, which lists EU Presidency statements to the plenary and record votes on political issues. 
Chapter 9 looks at EU Member State involvement in the Committee on the Application of 
Standards (CAS) between 1973 and 2005, which oversees the adherence to labour 
standards. The chapter records and explains the rise in EU Presidency statements in this 
standing committee since 2000, based on the empirical data in Appendix 3. Chapter 10 
summarises the main finding of this section, which is that representation and voting 
cohesion are associated in political issues, contrary to the intergovernmental theory 
predictions but in support of institutional theory.
Finally, Chapter 11 draws the conclusions from Chapter 6 and 10 together, and 
compares and contrasts coordination, representation and voting cohesion between 
technical and political issues. The results of testing the hypotheses generated by the five 
theories are presented, and the four key issues identified in Chapter 2 are considered and 
discussed.
31 Two conference committees are also considered, the resolutions committee and the standing committee reporting on 
apartheid in South Africa. Chapter 7 explains how these selections were made.
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C h a p t e r  2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter the four questions set out in the beginning of Chapter 1 are related 
to the five theoretical explanations for actions of EU Member States in coordinating and 
producing collective action outputs. For each theory a brief summary of the key aspects is 
presented, followed by a ‘check-list’ of predictions that the theory makes about how the 
European Union Member States might behave in ILO, and why they would do so. By 
referring back to the list during the subsequent empirical chapters detailing actual 
behaviour, the merits of each theory can be gauged. Before proceeding, let us quickly recap 
the four central questions:
• Have the European Union Member States changed their behaviour over the period 
of study (1973-2005) in order to have a common representation of the EU in the 
ILO?
• Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged in the Community pillar, despite the absence of European Community 
membership of the ILO?
• Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged on other grounds, such as inter alia a common foreign policy or a common 
European identity?
• Based on this, which theory tells us most about the behaviour of EU Member 
States and the role of EU institutions within the ILO?
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1. Neofunctional theory
Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration between states that assumes 
economic integration will lead to political integration and the constitution of political 
communities at the supranational level. The theory was developed as a result of the 
empirical study of Post World War II European integration, beginning with the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Jean Monnet’s plan brought together the 
strategic areas of coal and steel production in a single market with oversight by a new 
supranational institution called the High Authority, which promoted the interests of all 
states in an unbiased manner that helped to facilitate political integration. The ECSC was 
expanded into a broader common market after the signing of the Rome Treaty in 1957 
(European Economic Community), an early demonstration of the core assumption of neo- 
functionalism that economic integration in one sector of the economy leads to economic 
integration in other sectors. The dynamic process was supposed to be self-sustaining, as 
the ‘logic of integration’ became the prevailing interest of the elites across the EEC. 
Integration would eventually lead to political union, and the creation of a supranational 
actor above the level of the nation state.
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new centre, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing ones. (Haas, 1958:16)
As well as Ernst Haas’ original work, a number o f other authors contributed to the 
field, although by the 1970s the process seemed to have stalled, leading Haas to reject the 
explanatory power of neofunctional theory. (Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold, 
1970; Haas, 1975) The logic of integration was most importantly characterised by the role 
of non-state actors and European institutions in shaping the direction integration took, and 
placing it beyond the control of the Member States that had initially started the process.
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Dom estic social interests (such as business associations, trade unions and political parties) 
press for further policy integration to promote their econom ic or ideological interests, while the 
European institutions (particularly in the Commission) argue for the delegation o f  more power to 
supranational institutions in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes. (Hix, 2005:15) 
The pressure from domestic actors from below and Community institutions from above
made integration a ‘deterministic process’ (Hix, 2005: 15) that was outside the control of
the Member States.
The dynamism of neofunctionalism comes from the continually expanding number 
of areas of integration. Lindberg summed up the process by saying that ‘a given action, 
related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only 
by taking further actions, which in turn, create a further condition and a need for more, and 
so forth’. (Lindberg, 1963: 9) Haas identified three mechanisms by which the process took 
place; ‘spillover’, ‘log-rolling’ and ‘side-payments’ fuel the deepening of existing integration 
and the widening of integration into new policy areas. Spillover occurs when one area of 
cooperation requires a new area to be entered into due to the nature of cooperation. Log­
rolling and side-payments are actor induced and are part of the process of negotiation, 
when reluctance by a Member State to negotiate in one area is compensated with a promise 
to expand cooperation in another one that was previously unconsidered.
As the principal theory of European integration, neofunctionalism would be 
expected to have plenty of explanatory insight to offer the case study of EU Member State 
coordination in the ILO. There are four key points that sum up the predictions made by 
this theoretical approach.
The first is the increased significance of the European Community. The integration process 
is a dynamic one that the Member States do not fully control As more policy areas become
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integrated at the supranational level, there is a spillover effect into the external 
environment, requiring the European Community to be represented in international 
institutions.32 The process has been seen in other multilateral institutions (such as the 
World Trade Organisation and Food and Agriculture Organisation) and it follows that the 
considerable progress made in creating Community Law in employment and social areas 
(Tide XI of the TEC) would necessitate the same pattern in the ILO. Furthermore, 
neofunctional theory predicts discemable, incremental steps as the integration process 
deepens. The first would be greater cooperation between the Member States, followed by 
the participation of the European Commission on behalf of the European Community. 
Finally the EC would accede to the ILO, either taking the place of the Member States, as 
predicted in the Guertsen Report (EP, 1977a) or supplementing them as has happened in 
the WTO and FAO. .
The second prediction is that the institutions of the European Community will feature 
prominently. The most important institution is the European Commission, which will 
become an active participant in the ILO and represent the European Community. 
However, as the Community becomes more significant in the ILO, one would expect the 
other major institutions (the Council, the European Parliament and the European Court of 
Justice) to all play greater roles in determining the negotiating mandate of the Commission 
when representing the EC. Evidence of Community institutions participating in the policy- 
setting process is a sign of neofunctional predictions taking place.
The third prediction is that domestic non-state actors willplay an important role in promoting 
integration. The creation of a supranational elite comes about through the transferral of
32 Here ‘represented’ is consistent with the definition in Chapter 1, meaning that it must have the ability to speak in 
international organisations.
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loyalties and expectations from the national to the European level. If this manifests itself 
we would expect to find trade union and employers’ members of the ILO from the EU 
Member States working together and with governments to promote their shared common 
interest The tripartite structure of the ILO gives these domestic social interest groups an 
opportunity to promote their agenda through their legislative and executive powers in the 
organisation. The ILO is a highly conducive international organisation for the non-state 
actors that neofunctionalism predicts will evolve into a supranational elite to work 
constructively towards the creation of an integrated Europe.
The final prediction is the sequence of integration. Economic integration through the 
common market is the first step towards eventual political integration, so we would expect 
to see harmonisation of interests between Member States and the emergence of the 
European Community as a member in the technical issue areas first. Political issue areas 
would follow more slowly given the logic of integration. As with all o f these points, 
neofunctionalism predicts ever-closer union over time, and that means incremental change 
forward.
2. Intergovernmental theory
The intergovernmental approach to theorising the European integration has 
developed in response to the perceived shortcomings of neofunctionalism. Simon Hix 
identifies Stanley Hoffmann’s 1966 piece Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and 
the Case of Western Europe (Hoffmann, 1966) as the origin of intergovemmentalism, which
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‘argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of the European 
nation states/ (Hix, 2005:12)33
Intergovernmental theory can be applied to the European integration project as a 
whole, critiquing the arguments made by Haas and others that the process has a logic of its 
own and leads to the creation of the supranational entity. Alternatively, it can be applied to 
explain the behaviour of Member States in European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its appropriateness is based on the 
intergovernmental nature of cooperation (no supranational oversight, unanimity in 
decision-making), was well as the political nature of the issues discussed. EPC and CFSP 
are closer to the concerns of realist theory, namely the security of the state and 
international or ‘high’ politics. Thus the ‘target’ of intergovernmental theory has moved 
from being integration in general, to the acceptance that economic integration is a reality 
but that the attempt to create a viable system of political cooperation between sovereign 
states is flawed. Both angles are discussed below.
Hoffmann led the challenge to neofunctionalism, coining the phrase the ‘logic of 
diversity’ that means that ‘in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer 
the certainty, or self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled 
uncertainty of untested blunder.’ (Hoffmann, 1966: 882) National self-reliance prioritises 
sovereignty over supranationalism and security over economic cooperation. The basis of 
this position is the realist concern about the predicament that all states find themselves in, 
namely how to survive in an anarchical international system.
33 Stanley Hoffmann was not unsympathetic to the project o f closer cooperation between states, as seen in his work on 
security communities based on relations between North America and Europe.
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More recently intergovernmental theory has been focused on EPC and CFSP. 
(Pijpers et aL, 1988; Gordon, 1997) The existence of European integration is no longer 
contested, but the likelihood of the EU Member States becoming a coherent foreign policy 
actor while remaining sovereign states is doubted. As Alfred Pijpers has argued, the 
Member States are involved in an economic enterprise that does not fundamentally alter 
their national interests in the field of security and defence, which always has been 
guaranteed by the US through NATO. In an analysis of the history of EPC, the collective 
‘European’ foreign policy that it produced was only possible because no substantive issues 
relating to the security of the Member States needed to be addressed. The removal of the 
most salient political questions from the nascent EPC agenda simultaneously made its 
chances of success greater, while also making it less relevant. (Pijpers, 1988; Pijpers, 1991)
Philip Gordon concurs with this, saying that as ‘the 1990s began, European foreign 
policies were still nationally made, with EPC playing little more than a consultative 
function.’ (Gordon, 1997: 85) The same shortcomings affect the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), since ‘creating a truly effective common European foreign and 
security policy would mean endowing the EU with the military power to back up its 
diplomatic and economic initiatives.’ (Gordon, 1997: 89) The benchmark for effective 
action is the US, and although comparing ‘the EU’s foreign and security policy to that of 
the United States is, of course, unfair’, the comparison ‘does serve to highlight just how far 
the European Union is from possessing the sort of unity, credibility and military power 
necessary to be an influential actor in global diplomatic and security affairs’. (Gordon, 
1997: 74-75) The shortcomings for both Pijpers and Gordon are that CFSP has a weak 
institutional framework (especially in comparison with the Community pillar), that cannot 
bind the Member States’ actions.
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What soft of predictions does the intergovernmental approach make about EU 
Member State coordination in the ILO? Before going into details it must be stressed that 
from an intergovernmental perspective the ILO is of litde importance because it is far- 
removed from the central issues in international politics such as peace and security. 
Furthermore, it is part of the architecture of international institutions that realism is 
particularly dismissive of. However, one could argue that because the agenda of the ILO 
consists of less salient political issues, the costs of coordinating a common position 
between the Member States is low in terms of a threat to their sovereignty. In short, while 
coordination in the ILO may fall under the CFSP title of the Treaty of the European 
Union, it does not constitute a significant test of the essence of foreign policy.
The first prediction by the intergovernmental approach is that the Member States will 
prioritise the promotion of their national interests over those of the Community. The extent to 
which Member State interests are divergent varies, which means common representation is 
possible on some issue areas. There are often high levels of voting cohesion between all 
delegates at the annual conferences, frequendy over 90%. Given this level of consensus 
reflected in cohesion, it follows that the items being discussed provide gains to all states 
equally and therefore do not alter the hierarchical order in the international system.34 The 
intergovernmental approach predicts that Member States remain the most important 
actors, but also that many issues discussed in the ILO do not tend provoke differences in 
national interests.
34 Joseph Grieco argued that neo-realists see cooperation between states as possible only when absolute gains are 
proportionally accrued to the existing hierarchy o f powers. The types o f issues discussed in the ILO are often examples 
o f such gains for the following reasons. Firsdy they are minimum standards that apply evenly to all states. Secondly, the 
adoption o f a standard does not bind a state to ratify it, so there is no infringement on state sovereignty in voting to 
adopt an instrument onto the ILO statute. Finally, one has to judge whether labour standards make any credible effect 
on an international hierarchy based on power. (Grieco, 1988)
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The second prediction is that there is more likelihood of common policies between Member 
States in technical issues than in political issues. Although intergovernmental theory is based on 
the assumption that national interests prevail at all times, the level of economic integration 
already entered into means that there is a higher chance of Member States sharing interests 
in technical areas than in political areas.
The final prediction is that EPC and CFSP institutions are weak, and that the 
Community institutions are prevented from exercising an active role in policy-making in 
the intergovernmental pillar. The strength of the Community is based on strong 
institutions that bind Member States together and have effective sanctions to prevent 
defection against agreed Community policies. From the intergovernmental perspective, the 
EU Member States lack an institution with the authority to apply enough coercive force to 
ensure unitary action. Taking the three points together, the intergovernmental theory tells 
us that when the Member States act together it is because of a coinciding of national 
interests. This is more likely in technical issues that political ones, but ultimately the 
institutional structure of the EU is too weak to effectively create any credible coordinated 
policy actions by the Member States.
3. Liberal intergovernmental theory
The review of theories moves on to the liberal intergovernmental (LI) approach 
principally developed by Andrew Moravcsik. He offers an explanation of European 
integration that can explain the incremental progress made through the negotiated 
outcomes that led to the creation of supranational bodies, while remaining state-centric. 
Moravcsik states this clearly when he says the puzzle is ‘why sovereign governments in
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Europe have choosen repeatedly to coordinate their core economic policies and surrender 
sovereign prerogatives within an international institution., (Moravcsik, 1998:1)
Moravcsik bases his theory on the empirical study of ‘five grand bargains’ made in 
the key intergovernmental conferences that shaped the EU and frequently agreed new 
treaties.35 He breaks the puzzle down into three stages and is adamant that because the 
‘integration process did not supersede or circumvent the political will of national leaders’, 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 4) all the explanatory tools needed are available in the existing political 
science literature. Moravscik rejects sui generis theories of European integration because he 
seeks to explain integration as a rational undertaking by the Member States and to refute 
the logic of integration. Liberal intergovernmental theory fuses a consideration of domestic 
interests and an assumption that states can use institutions to foster strong cooperation on 
one hand, with periodic bargaining negotiations between Member States that are shaped by 
political power on the other.
Moravcsik identifies three crucial variables at each of the three stages of analysis: 
economic interests, relative power and credible commitments. The first of the three stages 
is the demand for integration at the domestic level of each Member State on economic 
grounds. Moravcsik points out that the actual policies developed are ‘second best’ 
according to economists, (Moravcsik, 1998: 3) which is explained by domestic politics 
becoming involved and sanctioning a number of side payments to economic sectors to 
offset the localised adjustment costs of economic integration. The second stage is the 
intergovernmental bargaining between Member States where the exact outcome is decided. 
The relative power of the negotiating states shapes the agreement, with ‘non-military
35 Treaty o f Rome; Consolidation o f the Common Market; European Monetary System; Single European Act; Treaty on 
European Union.
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instruments of political power, including credible unilateral vetos, threats of exclusion, and 
financial side payments’ all being used. (Moravcsik, 1998: 8) The final stage is agreeing 
upon a system o f regulation for the hard-won bargain that will effectively monitor and 
ensure compliance. Moravcsik labels this stage the institutional choice and argues that it is 
perfecdy rational for states to create supranational institutions to perform this role if they 
promise to be the most effective. EC institutions are like all other institutions, which are 
‘devices to manipulate information in order to promote compliance with common rules.’ 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 8) The huge potential economic gains from cooperation, added to the 
enormous effort needed to reach agreement on a bargain, make the supranational 
institutional solution of the EC the appropriate response by the Member States.
Wolfgang Wagner has applied a rational choice model of intergovernmental 
decision-making to the CFSP Pillar o f the EU. (Wagner, 2003) In a case study of EU 
responses to crisis situations, Wagner identified the need to make fast decisions as more 
important than locking-in compliance to negotiated intergovernmental bargains. Applying 
the logic of institutional choice, this means that more coherent action in CFSP would 
benefit from extending qualified majority voting (QMV), but that a greater role for 
supranational institutions is unnecessary. CFSP actions do not require long-term 
commitments from the Member States in the way that Moravcsik identifies as being the 
rationale for creating supranational institutions in the Community pillar.
After considering these contributions too the literature, how far can liberal 
intergovernmental theory be applied to the case study? Moravcsik’s model is designed to 
explain the development of the Community as the rational and intended consequences of 
Member State actions. Wagner has applied the same logic to one area of the CFSP, 
although not one analogous to multilateral institutions.
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The first prediction by liberal intergovemmentalism is that Member States are the 
primary actors in the European Union. The treaties negotiated by the Member States 
determine the role played by Community institutions, and unlike neofunctional theory the 
institutions do not have the ability to increase their influence in decision-making outside of 
these treaty re-negotiations. Changes in the level of European Commission activity in the 
ILO would be expected to take place after major treaty negotiations, as a result of Member 
States bargaining. However, because the EU Member States’ use EC institutions to ensure 
compliance with treaties, a change in the role of the European Commission in the ILO 
would be the result of a treaty alteration that had implications for the Community’s 
external relations. Overall, the primacy of the Member States means that coordinated 
action between them will be derived from shared interests.
The second prediction is that there is a higher likelihood of coordinated action in technical 
issues than political ones. This is based on the logic of Member State primacy, and from 
Moravcsik’s first level of analysis of economic interests. The demand for integration comes 
from domestic economic actors, and results in the creation of Community institutions. It 
follows from this that the Member States will have more common interests in areas related 
to the Community pillar than the EPC/CFSP pillar.36 From this point it follows that 
technical issues will have higher levels of coordinated action than political ones. This 
assumption can be supported by looking at Moravcsik’s second level of analysis, the 
intergovernmental bargain. Once a bargain has been negotiated, the Member States have a 
shared interest in ensuring it is adhered to. When technical items on the ILO agenda are 
direcdy relevant to the European Community, the Member States have an interest in seeing
36 Wagner’s analysis is o f little use in this case study. He argues that responses to crises such as engaging in Petersburg 
tasks require fast decisions, but the need to act is very often unanimously recognised. In contrast, two of the major 
political issues in the ILO during the time-span o f this thesis, (Arab-Israeli dispute and Apartheid in South Africa) are 
exacdy the opposite. N o rapid decision-making was required because o f their protracted nature and because o f the 
slow-pace o f ILO actions, while they were highly contentious political issues that divided the Member States.
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that the interests of the Community are taken into account. Adding these two lines of 
reasoning (economic interests and intergovernmental bargain) together, the Member States 
have shared interests in the content of technical issues, and shared interests in seeing the 
application of technical issues. By contrast, political issues do not have the same level of 
shared importance to the Member States.
The final prediction is in the role of European Community institutions. According to the 
third level of Moravcsik’s analysis, institutional choice, the Member States use the 
supranational institutions to oversee the compliance of the bargained agreement as 
effectively as possible. Adapting this idea means that the Member States will be willing to 
use the Community institutions to oversee and enforce compliance with any bargain agreed 
concerning participation in the ILO. In contrast to intergovernmental theory that 
emphasises the sovereignty of the Member States that enables them to act unilaterally if 
they choose to, liberal intergovernmental theory’s acknowledgement of institutional 
oversight as an effective regulator of Member State behaviour means that the Community 
institutions will be used to lock-in’ an agreement.
4. Consociational theory
Consociational theory was developed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart in the 
late 1960s to explain how democratic states comprised of a number of distinct and divided 
communities arranged their domestic politics. (Lijphart, 1975) Consociational theory has 
been applied to national politics in the Netherlands and Switzerland, and primary research 
question is why does a political party holding a majority in the national government not 
capitalise on its position and consolidate its hold on power through constitutional reform? 
Moreover, the interests of minority groups are protected even when they are incapable of
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building a coalition of sufficient size to block a vote. The ‘majoritarian principle in the 
system as a whole, which is characteristic of other forms of democracy, is suspended in 
favour of the requirement of consensus*. (Taylor, 1993: 83)
The explanation for this is that while there may be a high degree of plurality 
between competing political groups, the political elites are homogeneous in character, 
sharing a common interest in the long-term viability and stability of the political system. 
This is because in the long term the elites all recognise that they will belong to the majority 
and the minority positions at different times in the future. If one political group gained a 
majority and asserted itself too forcefully against the interests of the others, there would be 
an eventual backlash and the system would become volatile. Consociational theory
both as a process o f  consensual decision-making and as a pattern o f  elite behaviour, can be 
seen as a strategy o f  cooperative conflict resolution (and even o f  conflict prevention), whereby the 
elites transcend intergroup fragmentation through negotiated agreements or settlements based on a 
politics o f  accommodation. (Chryssochoou, 2001:137)
A paradoxical outcome of consociational politics is the relationship between the 
identity of the groups and the national government. Although national politics between 
groups (or ‘segments* as Paul Taylor calls them) is one of accommodation and consensus, 
the politics inside segments retains a high level of internal discipline designed to preserve 
its distinctness. (Taylor, 1993: 83) The claim of uniqueness of each segment is the basis of 
each claim to membership of the state-level political system. Taylor identifies this paradox 
in the development of the European Community noticeable in the early 1990s:
on  one hand, pressures towards and increasing centralisation o f  arrangements under the 
heading o f  political and monetary union seemed to have increased... whilst, on the other hand, a 
number o f  members . . .  were obviously using the Community to develop their sense o f  their own  
identity as separate states. (Taylor, 1993: 80)
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Integration is a manifestation of supranational processes of European integration predicted 
through neo-functional theory, while diversity has continued significance for state 
sovereignty advocated by intergovernmental theory. The two theories are usually regarded 
as mutually exclusive, and Taylor sums this up by asking if the development of the 
European Community invariably leads to the weakening of the state, as if in a zero-sum 
relationship. The application of consociational theory is based on drawing a parallel 
between the relationship between the segments and state on the national level, and the 
Member States and the European Community at the regional leveL Consociational theory 
argues that ‘the state and the international organisation are capable of being mutually 
reinforcing/ (Taylor, 1993: 80)
The European Community is the political system and the Member States are the 
‘segments’ that retain individual identity and the plurality of the system. However, 
straddling the EU Member States is a European elite that understands that their shared 
interest in preserving the EU in the long term will only be possible if there is a careful 
respect of the views of the minority. Taylor pinpoints President de Gaulle’s resistance to 
further integration at supranational level in 1965 and the Luxembourg Compromise as the 
tipping point between the zero-sum integration where Vhat went to the centre was equal 
to what was lost to the parts’ (Taylor, 1996: 9) and a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between state 
and Community.
Each had becom e essential to the survival o f  the other. Put differently: there were 
arrangements at the European level which had becom e semi-detached from the state, representing a 
distinctive level o f  political activity, interacting with national affairs, but containing its own values 
and imperatives, including that o f  survival. In this arrangement states retained sovereignty within the 
transnational system. (Taylor, 1996: 78)
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Like neo-functionalism, consociational theory relies on a European elite to explain 
the working of the EU, but there is one important difference. While in neo-functionalist 
theory the elite is part of the dynamic process of integration, in consociational theory the 
elite’s interest is in preserving a status quo between the Community and the Member 
States. While on the one hand the elite preserves the integrity of the system through 
consensus politics, it also preserves the plurality of the system’s national identities. The 
institution of the Presidency of the Council captures the essence of the dualism between 
state sovereignty and the interests of the Community. Despite the appearance of the 
institution as the embodiment of the intergovernmental approach to decision-making,
the Presidency generally recognised that they could not simply use this opportunity to 
pursue national interests: they also needed to push the interest o f  the collectivity. They became 
defenders o f  the Community and upholders o f  the interests o f  their ow n state, a duality o f  purpose 
which was partly the result o f  socialisation — the consolidation o f  the regime’s injunctions on  
behaviour — and pardy the result o f  the rational calculation that to pursue national interests too 
blatandy would be counter-productive. (Taylor, 1996: 90)
What sort of behaviour by the EU Member States would be predicted by 
consociational theory? There are four main predictions that this approach offers. The first 
concerns the membership of the European Community to the ILO. The ‘symbiotic’ relationship 
between the EC and the Member States is characterised by integration and state 
sovereignty simultaneously. Consociational theory argues that the gradual expansion of the 
acquis communautaire and its relevance to ILO issues does not inevitably lead to Community 
membership of the ILO in the place of the Member States. Continued integration at the 
European level is possible without Community membership of the ILO, if one argues that 
the EU Member States’ membership of the ILO is important in preserving the distinctness 
of the segments.
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The second prediction concerns the role of elites. Building on the point made above 
that consociational theory explains why the EU Member States have sought to preserve 
their distinctness through ILO membership, for this to be operationalised it must become 
a policy of the European elite. The tripartite membership of the ILO contains trade union 
and employers’ federations from the EU Member States, as well as national government 
officials. While in neo-functional theory transnational elites are potential advocates of 
integration, according to consociational theory there is a strong tendency to preserve the 
autonomy of the segments. One would expect transnational elites (trade union and 
employers federations) to promote the independent membership of the EU Member States 
in the ILO by using the instruments at their disposal to preserve their national autonomy.
The third prediction is that the role of the President captures the symbiotic nature of 
relations between the Community and the Member States. The Presidency straddles the 
interest o f the Member States in preserving their sovereignty and also the importance of 
Community and integration for long-term political and economic stability. We would 
expect the Presidency to play an important role in managing both sets of interests in the 
ILO. The role of the Presidency is also to seek consensus in the decision-making process, 
because it is through consensus that minority concerns are protected. As Taylor says: ‘the 
condition for retaining the common decision-making system is that the fear of 
fragmentation is greater than the fear of weakening segmental authority’. (Taylor, 1993: 88)
The fourth prediction concerns the role of the Commission. Taylor identifies the 
implications for consociational theory on the European Commission as the central 
bureaucracy. In this role, the bureaucracy must be ‘an umpire rather than the promoter of 
any specific ideology.’ (Taylor, 1993: 88) This is contra neo-functionalism where the 
specific ideology of the European Commission would be to promote the European
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Community in the ILO. Instead, consociational theory sees the role of the Commission as 
a mediator between the segments of the system, a strategy that is necessary considering the 
long-run likelihood of all segments to belong to the majority and minority over time. Siding 
with one segment against another in the present risks undermining credibility as a 
bureaucracy in the future, when the relative positions of the segments is reversed. In the 
case of the ILO we would expect to see the Commission becoming less involved in the 
representation of the EU, (which reflects a particular ideology) and more involved in 
assisting the Member States.
5. Institutional theory
The fifth and final theory to be applied to the empirical data in this thesis is 
institutionalism. March and Olsen define an institutional approach as ‘one that emphasises 
the role of institutions and institutionalisation in the understanding of human actions 
within an organisation, social order, or society/ (March and Olsen, 1998: 948) Further 
clarification is given as follows:
A n institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection o f  practices and rules defining 
appropriate behaviour for specific groups p f  actors in specific situations. . . .  Practices and rules are 
also embedded in resources and the principles o f  allocation that make it possible for individuals to 
enact roles in an appropriate way and for a collectivity to socialise individuals and sanction those 
w ho wander from proper behaviour. Institutionalisation refers to the emergence o f  institutions and 
individual behaviours within them. (March and Olsen, 1998: 948)
In a review of the literature, Hall and Taylor identify three ‘seminar questions which the
institutional approaches seek to answer: ‘how do actors behave, what do institutions do, 
and why do institutions persist over time?’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939)In the same review 
the two authors identify three competing strands in the field of ‘new institutionalism’ that 
seek to answer these three questions, albeit in different ways. The three schools are labelled
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historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936) Hall and Taylor’s central claim is that the three schools 
evolved independendy, and using the core questions their progress can be compared and 
contrasted.
Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel acknowledge the significance of Hall and Taylor’s 
categorisation of the institutions literature, and agree that there are multiple varieties, 
although ‘among these stood two seemingly opposed variants (rational and sociological) 
and one hybrid that could be shaded toward one or the other pole (historical).’ (Checkel et 
al., 2003: 11) March and Olsen also identify two schools in the institutions literature, with 
one branch driven by the ‘logic of anticipated consequence and prior preferences’ and the 
other driven by the ‘logic of appropriateness and senses of identity.’ (March and Olsen, 
1998: 949) The former corresponds to rational choice institutionalism, while the latter to 
sociological institutionalism. March and Olsen assert that the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, and have identified ‘four major interpretations of the relationship 
between the two logics.’ (March and Olsen, 1998: 952) The first is when one of the two 
logics dominates and is clearly the most applicable. The second distinguishes between 
major decisions and minor refinements, and attributes one logic to decision-making and 
the other to refinements. The third is termed ‘developmental’, and gives instrumental 
(consequential) reasons for creating institutions, but accepts the development of identity 
and rules later. The final interpretation is when one logic is labelled as a ‘special case’ of the 
other, and subsumes it into its logic, for example by arguing that rational behaviour is a 
social construct. (March and Olsen, 1998: 952)
Given that there is broad agreement in the literature that there are two, clearly 
defined institutional approaches, what does each entail? Jupille et al choose individualism
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and optimality as the key defining attributes of the rational choice approach. ‘Individuals 
want things, and they act in such a way as best to obtain what they want/ (Checkel et al., 
2003: 12) March and Olsen concur, saying that the instrumental approach assumes that 
‘society is constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of individual ends/ (March and 
Olsen, 1998: 951) Hasenclever et al identify Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Oran 
Young and Duncan Snidal as exponents of the rationalist approach. (Hasenclever et al., 
1997: 23-135) John Ruggie identifies the neo-utilitarianism as the basis of the rational 
choice institutional approach, by saying that ‘neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are 
drawn directly from microeconomics/ (Ruggie, 1998c: 862)
By contrast, the sociological approach takes account of the ‘substantial role of 
identities, rules, and institutions in shaping human behaviour/ (March and Olsen, 1998: 
951) By doing so, the sociological approach overcomes the principle flaw which is levelled 
at the rational choice model, namely that it treats
states* identities and interests as exogenously given, i.e. as not-theorised initial conditions in 
explanations o f international phenomena ... [and is] a significant source o f variation in international 
behaviour and outcomes is ignored and ipso facto trivialised. (Hasenclever et al., 1997:136)
Within the sociological institutional approach, Hasenclever et al make a distinction between 
‘weak cognitivists, that ‘focus on the origins and dynamics of rational actors’ understanding 
of the world’ and ‘strong cognitivists’ that ‘inquire into the origins and dynamics of social 
actors’ self-understanding in the world.’ (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 137) Hasenclever et al 
provide examples of theorists working in each group. They cite the work of Ernst Haas 
(social learning), Peter Haas (epistemic communities), John Ikenberry (Post WWII 
Keynesian world order), Robert Jackson (post colonialism) and Joseph Nye 
(simple/complex learning) as weak cognitivists.
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To this list we could also add the work of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 
among others, who have developed the idea of norm entrepreneurship starting from a set 
of basic questions: ‘How do we know a norm when we see one? How do we know norms 
make a difference in politics? Where do norms come from? How do they change?’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888) The authors then proceed to consider how norms 
develop over their life, from emergence to becoming established and accepted. For this 
they turn to Sunstein’s work on the life cycle of a norm, who has identified three important 
stages. The first is its emergence through the work of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who ‘attempt 
to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms’. (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998: 895) Once a threshold level has been reached, referred to as the ‘tipping 
point’ the norm becomes promoted widely by state leaders through a process of 
socialisation. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902-904) This is referred to as the period in 
which the ‘norm cascades’ through actors in the international system, until it reaches the 
third and final stage, which is internalisation. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904) This is 
characterised by the norms being ‘taken for granted’. Through the norm cycle individuals 
(norm entrepreneurs) introduce standards of behaviour that over the course of the cycle 
become widely established and accepted, and come to characterise normal behaviour.
The institutional approach has been adapted to the specific context of the EU, 
asking how the institutions of the EU have effected the behaviour of the Member States. 
The name widely used for this is ‘Europeanization’, which Kevin Featherstone notes has 
recently proliferated widely in the literature. His primary misgiving about the usefulness of 
the term ‘Europeanization’ is its vague definition. ‘The obligation of the researcher is to 
give it a precise meaning.’ (Featherstone, 2003: 3) In his survey of the recent literature 
using the term, he distinguishes four basic ways of using it. The first two are labelled
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‘maximal’ and correspond the Europeanization as a historical process and as cultural 
diffusion. The third and fourth are
a process o f  institutional adaptation; and as an adaptation o f  policy and policy processes. 
The first two are maximalist interpretations and have litde direct connection to the impact o f  the 
European Union. The other two categories are minimalist and are more closely linked to the 
operation o f  the European Union. (Featherstone, 2003: 5)
Following Featherstone, the two aspects of Europeanization that are of concern in this 
thesis are firsdy institutional adaptation, which is the ‘domestic adaptation to the pressures 
emanating direcdy or indirecdy from EU membership’, and secondly adaptation of policies 
and policy processes (which includes the CFSP dimension incorporated in national foreign 
policies). (Featherstone, 2003: 7)
Institutional adaptation
Institutional adaptation is more relevant to the Community pillar of the EU, and to 
technical issues on the ILO agenda. Featherstone also identifies three key variables in the 
application of institutional theory to the study of the European Union; firstly the 
‘goodness o f fit between EU level processes, policies and institutions and those found at 
the domestic level’ (Featherstone, 2003:15); secondly the logic of consequences; and finally 
the logic of appropriateness. (Featherstone, 2003: 15) Boerzel and Risse note the 
significance of these three components in the study of institutional adaptation, but refer to 
goodness of fit as ‘misfit’.
(Tjhere are always two conditions for expecting domestic changes in response to 
Europeanization. First, Europeanization must be inconvenient, that is, there must be some degree o f  
‘misfit’ or incompatibility... This degree o f  fit or misfit leads to adaptation pressures, which 
constitute a necessary, but not sufficient condition for expecting domestic change. The second 
condition is that various facilitating factors — be it actors, be it institutions — respond to the 
additional pressures, thus inducing change. (Boerzel and Risse, 2003: 58)
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Europeanization is triggered by a need to adapt policies to make EU and national fit 
together. EU Member States seek to minimise the amount of misfit by uploading national 
preferences to the EU level, thus harmonising domestic policies with EU policies (and 
forcing other EU Member States to face compliance problems). ‘As a result, all Member 
States — including the “big three”, Great Britain, France and Germany — face significant, 
albeit different degrees of adaptational pressures when they have to download European 
policies/ (Boerzel and Risse, 2003: 62)
Boerzel and Risse identify two types of misfit, one arising from policies and the 
other from institutions. The former is short term, while pressure to adapt institutions can 
take much longer. ‘Institutional misfit is less direct than policy misfit. Although it can result 
in substantial adjustment pressure, its effect is more likely to be long term and 
incremental’37 (Boerzel and Risse, 2003: 63) The two logics of consequences and 
appropriateness explain the way in which Europeanization takes place to overcome the 
misfit. Rational choice institutionalism operates through the redistribution of domestic 
power, in which some actors grow stronger and others weaker. For example, liberal 
intergovernmental theory predicts the strengthening of the national executive, while 
neofunctional theory claims that supranational institutions gain from adaptation. 
Alternatively, a logic of appropriateness is observed, where ‘European policies, norms and 
the collective understandings attached to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic- 
level processes’ through the either ‘change agents’ or political culture. (Boerzel and Risse, 
2003: 58)
37 Tanja Boerzel explored institutional misfit between the ‘cooperative federalism’ of Germany and the ‘competitive 
regionalism’ o f Spain in response to pressures from European integration to transfer legislative and administrative 
powers from regional to national assemblies. (Boerzel, 1999)
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Boerzel and Risse define the outcome of these processes as Europeanization, 
which is the
emergence and development at the European level o f  distinct structures o f governance, 
that is, o f  political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that 
formalises interactions among the actors, and o f policy networks specialising in the creation o f  
authoritative European rules. (Boerzel and Risse, 2003: 59)
Because Europeanization is a process over time, we see evidence of it taking place in the
ILO, as well as observing evidence of it having taken place in the past. According to the
definition above, when Europeanization takes place in the present it is about finding
solutions to the problem of European Community representation, and these take the form
of Member States and/or the Commission speaking for the Union. However, we would
expect to see higher levels of EU common representation in technical issues where there is
already a high degree of integration at the Community level. Here, misfits that occurred in
the past have been minimalised through earlier Europeanization of domestic policies with
EU ones. There are two predictions relevant to the thesis; firstly, that in policy areas where
there is considerable policy harmonisation through Europeanization, EU common
representation should be easier because the EU Member States have already gone through
the process of establishing common interests and common laws. Secondly, in areas where
there remains misfit between the domestic and EU level, EU Member States seeking to
upload their competing domestic policies to the ILO will not be able to agree on a
common EU representation.
Adaptation of policies andpolity processes
The pressure on EU Member States to adapt to European-level policies also takes 
place in national foreign policies. The Member States make common foreign policy 
decisions by a process of intergovernmental negotiation and cannot be forced to adapt
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national positions if misfit occurs. Nonetheless, changing foreign policies have been 
observed, and Europeanization is used to explain it. Ben Tonra defines Europeanization as 
a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways 
in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation o f norms 
and expectations arising from a complex system o f  collective European policy-making. (Tonra, 
2000: 229)
Tonra places emphasis on the socialisation of foreign policy diplomats and staff, who over 
time develop a coordination reflex through which national interests become partially 
determined by expectations o f what EU common interests might be. Simon NuttalTs 
inside view of the policy-making process of EPC during its informal years (1970-1986) 
likening it to a club with a close cooperative spirit. (Nuttall, 1992) In contrast to the 
assumption that intergovernmental meetings inevitably leads to lowest common 
denominator outcomes, ‘median lines’ were the policy outputs. Philippe de Schoutheete 
agrees saying that ‘the embarrassment of being singled out’ was too great for states to derail 
decisions, (de Schoutheete, 1987: 65) Michael E. Smith has also done substantial work on 
the institutionalisation of EPC and CFSP, which he refers to as the ‘institutional logic of 
cooperation’. His empirical research led him to identify three logics o f institutionalisation: 
functional, appropriateness and socialisation (Smith, 2004: 240). In contrast to the authors 
cited above, he found the first two proved to be the most useful for explaining the 
behaviour of EPC/CFSP participants who
organised their cooperation on the basis o f  two fundamental principles, one functional (do 
not attempt to codify working procedures until they have proved their necessity) and one normative 
(always respect the EC’s own legal culture). . ..  These processes also led to the gradual internalisation 
(or ‘Europeanization) o f EPC/CFSP procedures and policies in EU Member States’. (Smith, 2004: 
242)
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How can the study of institutionalisation inform the research undertaken here? The 
first way is that weak institutions can become stronger over time and practitioners play a 
role in the process. This applies specifically to the EPC/CFSP institutions that are 
responsible for coordinating political issues in the ILO. Following M.E. Smith’s work we 
would expect to see a strengthening of the institutional framework coordinating political 
issues, and this would be seen (following the methodology set out in Chapter 1) as more 
common statements (representation) by the Presidency. If strong institutions are associated 
with greater voting cohesion (based on the assumption that strong institutions influence 
the behaviour o f Member States) then we would expect to see voting cohesion increase 
over time too. However, if the basis of political cooperation in the early period of EPC was 
‘negative’ policies designed to protect the external interests of the Community, it follows 
that Member States shared common interests and coordinated on the basis of that.
The second prediction is that changing the behaviour of practitioners leads to 
institutional change. Tonra, Nuttall and de Schoutheete agree that practitioners are 
important ‘change agents’ (Boereel and Risse, 2003: 59), and following Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s work on norm entrepreneurs, the relationship between agents and structures is 
opened up to scrutiny. The two are mutually constitutive, meaning that structures are 
defined by the behaviour of agents, but over time if agents change their behaviour new 
structures will emerge that define new boundaries o f what is possible. In the case of 
institutionalisation, diplomats (agents) work within a set institutional framework (structure), 
but through evolving practice, new opportunities, and initiatives taken by staff the 
institution changes over time. Evidence of diplomats engaging in new practices in the 
coordination process would show changing institutional design.
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6. Summary
To summarise this review of the literature, the common threads running through 
the various approaches are listed below, along with the various ‘scenarios’ of possible 
findings.
a. The Member States and the Community
The relationship between the Member States and the European Community in the 
ILO is the most important dividing line between the theories. For most there is a binary 
distinction between them, where increased importance in the ILO for one comes at the 
cost of decreased importance for the other. For neofunctionalists there is a trend over time 
for greater integration between the Member States that results in a stronger supranational 
Community. On the other hand, intergovernmental theory regards the positions of the 
Member States as static over time, and that they will retain the right to pursue their national 
interests at any time. Liberal intergovernmental (LI), consociational and institutional theory 
lie between the two positions, with LI stressing that the Community could become a more 
prominent actor in the ILO but only after specific changes to the treaties that would be at 
the behest of the Member States. Consociational theory sees Member States and the 
Community in a symbiotic relationship that once established, will not change, while 
institutional theory looks at the pressures upon Member States to change their domestic 
political system and policies as a result o f membership of the EU.
The empirical data looks for evidence of representation and voting cohesion in the 
annual conferences. Over the period of the survey an increase in both variables would be 
expected by neofimctional theory, while intergovernmental theory predicts that even if a
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pattern does exist between the two, it is explained through national interests alone.38 For 
liberal intergovernmental theory we would expect any changes in the level of 
representation or voting cohesion to reflect the major intergovernmental conferences and 
their treaty amendments (in this case SEA: (ratification 1987); TEU: (ratification 1993), 
Amsterdam (ratification 1999) and Nice (ratification 2001). Consociational theory predicts 
a plateau of representation and voting cohesion that corresponds to symbiotic equilibrium. 
Institutional theory predicts that as a dynamic process between the two levels, with 
variation in representation and voting cohesion over time.
b. The Institutions
The significance of the European Union institutions in representing the 
Community and shaping the behaviour of the Member States follows a similar dividing line 
as the one between Member States and the Community above. Intergovernmental theory 
applied to the CFSP Pillar of the EU (and to EPC before it) regards the weakness of the 
institutions as the crucial flaw in the credibility o f the EU as an international actor. In the 
ILO the weakness of the institutions would be manifested most clearly in the political 
issues on the agenda, where Member States would be most likely to pursue national 
interests, and the situation would worsen as the EU enlarged. By contrast, the sociological 
branch of institutional theory (the logic of appropriateness) assumes that the lack of 
supranational oversight in the EPC/CFSP pillars is not necessarily detrimental to common 
representation and voting cohesion. Despite the weakness of formal institutions, informal 
institutions based on shared identity, reflective decision-making and peer pressure to 
conform have all be identified as reasons for increasing cohesion in the EPC/CFSP
38 The thesis compares EU Member State voting cohesion with the general level o f cohesion between all delegates voting 
at conference to address this point See Chapter 5.
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institutions over time. The building of shared identities and interests leads to higher levels 
of cohesion and this process does not necessary dependent on the size o f the Union. A 
larger number of Member States could be argued to put more pressure on individual states 
to agree to common positions.
Neofunctional theory predicts an ever-closer union leading to stronger institutions 
playing a greater role in the representation of the Community in the ILO. Voting cohesion 
would be made unanimous through the accession of the Community to the ILO, and on 
issues where Member States still vote cohesion would increase over time. Through the 
greater participation of the Community, the ECJ and EP could be expected to become 
more involved in ILO affairs, as would be predicted by liberal intergovernmental theory. 
The European Commission’s role in representing the Community in the ILO is 
determined by the treaties as discussed above. The arrangements agreed are subject to 
institutional monitoring and enforcement, which in the case of a dispute between Member 
States and European Commission are to be decided by the ECJ.
According to consociational theory the Presidency represents the symbiotic 
relationship between the Community and the Member States. It bridges the gap between 
the supranational and intergovernmental decision-making processes, and the theory helps 
us to understand the role that the institution plays. Evidence of a strong influence of the 
Presidency on the coordination process would support consociational theory.
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c. Technical and Political Issues
This third distinction follows the same cleavages as the previous sections. 
Neofunctional theory predicts that the EU will develop into a strong actor in technical 
issues first, and that this in time will lead to spillover into political ones. However, in both 
the trend over time will be closer union between the Member States with a growing role 
for the Community and its institutions. The intergovemmentalists refute the possibility of 
effective coordination without strong institutions, and point to political areas as the best 
example of this. Their position is diametrically opposed to that of neofunctionalism, which 
is summed up by saying that there will never be meaningful coordination in political areas 
(what coordination that does go on in the ILO between Member States is of low salience), 
and the coordination in technical areas is only possible because of the shared national 
interests underpinning it. Both agree that there is a higher possibility of coordination in 
technical issues than political ones.
Liberal intergovemmentalism and consociational theory also broadly agree on this 
point. The former is not directly applicable to the CFSP pillar, and focuses on explaining 
growing integration only in the Community framework. The latter theory supports similar 
conclusions for two reasons. The first is that it is focused on the tension between the 
supranational Community and the sovereignty of the Member States. This follows the 
technical /  political division rather than challenging it. The second reason is that theory’s 
emphasis on preserving the identity of the segments means pointing to distinctive foreign 
policies, as seen in the literature on identity and interests in European foreign policy. (Hill, 
1983; Manners and Whitman, 2000)
69/381
d. Elites and diplomats
What impact do diplomats have on the coordination of EU Member States in the 
ILO? Two theories (neofimctionalism and consociational theory) are based on assuming 
the existence of a European elite as an integral part of their operation. Neofunctionalism 
predicts that non-state members of the supranational elite (such as European trade unions 
and employers’ groups) become more influential as there is a power shift within the EU 
governance structure. The logic of consequences applied through Europeanization sees the 
adaptation in response to misfit benefiting such elites. Consociational theory predicts that 
segments remain separate and that trade union and employers’ federation members of the 
European elite seek to preserve their national identities and block initiatives to establish a 
European Community membership in place of the Member States. These groups could use 
agenda-setting power and voting in the ILO to block the accession of the European 
Community to the ILO. One might also expect the elite members to exert influence 
through their representatives on European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). 
Records of trade union and employers’ federations interventions in committee meetings 
and plenary sessions, as well as EESC reports will show whether this is happening or not.
Diplomats representing the governments of the Member States are considered in 
the sociological approach to institutional theory. The socialisation of diplomats through 
coordination meetings leads to the formation of new identities and common interests. 
Socialisation is a method of overcoming policy misfit by adapting national policies to 
accommodate them in EU-level policies.. The success of this adaptation depends on how 
often the diplomats meet and how closely they work together. One would expect 
adaptation to be more likely in technical issues rather than political ones because of the 
more effective institutional pressure exerted by the Community pillar. However, Geneva
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based diplomats work more frequently together, and have a higher likelihood of adapting 
to social pressure.
Now that we have a clear idea of what to look for in the empirical data, as well as 
having identified the hypotheses and key variables, the following eight chapters export the 
empirical data, beginning with technical coordination and then looking at political 
coordination. In the conclusion we will return to these points as establish which theories 
have been supported and which have been rejected by the data.
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P a r t  I I :  T e c h n i c a l  C o o r d i n a t i o n  
C h a p t e r  3
THE FOUNDATIONS OF TECHNICAL COORDINATION
The following four chapters investigate common EU representation and voting 
cohesion of EU Member States in the technical committees of the International Labour 
Conference between 1973 to 2005. As set out in the opening chapter, ‘technical’ issues on 
the ILO agenda relate to the preparation, drafting, and revision of ILO instruments 
(conventions, recommendations and protocols) that set standards in employment law. An 
important secondary component in the definition is that technical issues are coordinated 
through the institutions of the European Community (Pillar 1) as opposed to the political 
issues coordinated through EPC/CFSP. As was explained in Chapter 1, the behaviour of 
EU Member States is being modelled through three variables; coordination, representation 
and voting cohesion. However, it is being measured through only two of them 
(representation and voting cohesion), working on the assumption that these two 
measurable variables are the outputs from coordination. This chapter introduces the 
framework that will be used over the coming four chapters, while Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical data on representation and Chapter 5 the empirical data on voting cohesion. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises both sets of results, locates the most important common 
factors and contrasts the explanatory performance of the theories being tested.
Because technical issues in the definition used here are partly defined by their 
connection to the Community pillar, how the Community pillar developed over time has a 
bearing on how the EU Member States coordinate their common representation, and 
potentially on how they vote. For example, as the acquis communautaire has expanded to
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include more areas of social and economic policy in the Treaty of the European 
Community’s Title XI on Social Policy, Employment, Vocational Training and Youth, EC 
law becomes more relevant to the drafting of ILO instruments for two reasons. The first is 
to make EC law compliant with ILO standards so EU Member States can ratify 
conventions, and the second is to use ILO standards as a guide to best practice in drafting 
EC law. Understanding the nature of the legal relationship between the European 
Community, its Member States and the ILO is crucial to understanding the struggles 
between the European Commission and the Member States for the right to speak for the 
European Community. For this reason, a detailed explanation of the 1993 European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) Opinion 2/91 is given first in Section 1. Section 2 then compliments the 
explanation of the Court’s opinion by expanding on the background circumstances. 
Section 3 introduces the five periods into which the 1973-2005 survey is divided into, and 
contextualises them in the history of the European Union. Section 4 reviews the 
crosscutting issues that will be considered in the following chapters and the last section 
gives the rationale for which theories will be tested by looking at technical issues.
1. Contested Competency in the European Court of Justice
The European Community is an ‘observer’ in the ILO, albeit granted special 
privileges to intervene in the drafting of technical instruments by virtue of its status as a 
‘regional grouping’. (ILO, 1981f) In other Specialized Agencies of the United Nations it 
has surpassed this, having full membership of the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) and has been credited with ‘Active Observer’ and ‘Privileged Observer’ status in a 
number of the other Specialized Agencies, as well as in UNO Funds and Programmes. 
(Taylor, 2006: 134) Outside the UN system the most important example of EC 
membership of a multilateral organisation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Why
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has the ILO been passed over in the general trend of greater EC participation in 
multilateral organisations?
As Lucia Cavicchioli points out in her analysis of relations between the European 
Community and the ILO, Community competence over a policy area being discussed in 
the ILO can occur in three ways. (Cavicchioli, 2002: 265) The first is when the entire 
content of a convention falls under the exclusive competency of the Community; the 
second when parts of the convention content fall under the exclusive competency of the 
Community and other parts fall under the exclusive competency of the Member States; and 
the third is when parts of the convention are under the exclusive competency of the 
Community and other parts are under concurrent competency.39 Who represents the 
Member States in each of these three scenarios is the question the ECJ was asked to 
answer. The heart of the problem is that exclusive Community competence means that the 
Member States have transferred their powers to legislate to the Community, and with it 
their sovereign authority to act internationally in relation to those issues. At the same time, 
the Community remains an observer in the ILO and is unable to represent itself through its 
legal personality directly.
This stalemate is unlikely to change for two reasons. The first is the constitution of 
the ILO stipulates only states may join the ILO. Article 1 §2 of the ILO Constitution says 
that:
The Members o f  the International Labour Organization shall be the States which were 
Members o f the Organization on 1 November 1945 and such other States as may become Members 
in pursuance o f  the provisions o f  paragraphs 3 and 4 o f  this article.
39 This analysis follows the Opinion o f the ECJ, 2/91, Convention N ' 170 of the International Labour Organisation concerning safety 
in the use of chemicals at work. Issued 19 March 1993
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According to Article 36 of the ILO Constitution, amendments must be passed by a 
majority of two-thirds of votes cast at the annual legislative meeting of the organisation, 
the ILC. The amendments only take effect when ratified by two-thirds of ILO member 
governments including five of the ten states of ‘chief industrial importance’.40 Without a 
change in the constitution there remain fundamental structural reasons why the European 
Community cannot accede to the ILO. The second reason is that the tripartite structure of 
the organisation means that supranational government representation would be 
incompatible with national workers’ and employers’ representation. This situation has led 
to an impasse in both the negotiation of instruments and the ratification of instruments. 
The Member States have ceded the right to act, while the Community is prevented from 
acting. The problem was first recognised in 1977, and dealt with on an ad-hoc basis until 
1991, when the Commission asked the ECJ to rule on the matter. (ECJ, 1993)
i. Conventions C153 (1979) and C162 (1986)
The first ILO instrument relating to an existing piece of EC legislation (Regulation 
EEC No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969) was the convention concerning hours 
of work and rest periods (road transport) 1979 (Cl 53). The issue was first discussed in a 
preparatory meeting in 1977, and then at the ILCs in 1978 and 1979. During the 
negotiations there was uncertainty about whether the EC Member States or the European 
Commission should speak on matters concerning the European Community. When the 
Commission did represent the EC Member States it significandy exceeded the scope of
40 These ten states hold permanent membership to the ILO Governing Body (its executive body) and are: Brazil, China, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russia Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States o f America.
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actions granted by its official status as an observer in the ILO.41 A parallel concern of both 
workers and employers was the reduction in consultation between the tripartite national 
representatives and an increase in consultation exclusively among EU governments.
‘The problem of the Community's competence in the context of the ILO arose 
once again during the preparation of Convention No. 162 concerning safety in the use of 
asbestos (1983 to 1986), an area which has been covered by four Community directives., 
(ECJ, 1993: 'Grounds' VI) The Commission took the view that this convention fell within 
the exclusive competency of the Community. (EC, 1994: 3) This interpretation was not 
disputed by the Member States but because the Community was not part of the ILO, ‘the 
Council decided that the Community and its Member States would put forward the 
Community's position on the basis of the relevant Community directives., (ECJ, 1993: 
'Grounds' VI) The Commission tried to annul the Council decision and took their case to 
the European Court of Justice (Case 217/86), but withdrew it when on the 22 December 
1986 the Council adopted a ‘decision of general scope on the arrangements governing 
Community participation in negotiations on ILO conventions falling within the exclusive 
competency of the Community/ (EC, 1994: 3) The Council decision, ‘while ensuring the 
prior consultation of employers’ and trade union organisations, envisaged the adoption by 
Council of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate’. (Cavicchioli, 2002 p.265) 
In the opinion of the ECJ, this decision was ‘confined to cases coming within the exclusive 
competence o f the Community’ (ECJ, 1993 'Grounds' VI) and therefore addressed the 
fundamental problem of the Member States ceding decision-making authority to the 
supranational level while simultaneously the Community was unable to negotiate.
41 The need for the Commission to play a more active role in the negotiation o f instruments led the Governing Body to 
draft a document outlining what Commission can do during committee meetings. (ILO, 1981f; ECJ, 1993; Cavicchioli, 
2002: fn23)
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it. Convention C170 (1990): Contested Competence
The issue atose again in July 1988 when the ILO began the consultation process 
for the Convention concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1990 (Cl 70), when ‘it became 
clear that differences in opinion existed between the Commission and the Council on the 
exercise of external competence by the Community.’ (EC, 1994: 3) The normal procedure 
for drafting an instrument is for a questionnaire to be circulated to all ILO members prior 
to conference, in which the government, workers’ and employers’ representatives reply 
(and have the option to consult each other). The Commission considered the issue an 
exclusive competence of the Community and requested the Member States send the 
completed questionnaires to Brussels so that it could formulate a single response. Several 
EU Member States ignored this request and sent their replies direcdy to the ILO and 
prevented the ‘transmission of replies at Community leveL’ (ECJ, 1993: 'Grounds' VI) The 
Commission requested authority from the Council to negotiate on behalf of the 
Community in a letter on 12 May 1989, but the matter was not discussed until the Council 
Meeting (Labour and Social Affairs) on 30 November 1989, when ‘the Council adopted a 
Decision authorising the Commission to present the Community point of view during the 
negotiations in question, subject to close consultation with the Member States. The latter 
retained their right to express views on aspects which fell within the areas of national 
competence.’ (ECJ, 1993: 'Grounds' VI)
In accordance with the ILO Constitution (Article 19 §5c), after a convention is 
adopted onto the ILO statute all member governments have twelve months to bring the 
convention before the relevant authorities, decide whether it will be ratified and then 
report their decision to the ILO. After the 1990 conference the Commission wrote to the 
Member States saying that the relevant authority in the case of Cl 70 were Community
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institutions. In response to this ‘several national delegations to the Council indicated their 
refusal to accept that the Community had exclusive competence to conclude the 
Convention’ and the matter was brought before the ECJ. (ECJ, 1993: 'Grounds' VI) In 
considering its opinion, the ECJ took note of all previous precedents, received written 
observations from a number of Member States and the European Commission, and 
addressed the question of where competence lay, and how the nature of representation 
should be made given the constraints imposed by the ILO constitution. The major 
contribution made by the opinion to an understanding of Community representation in the 
ILO was its systematic appraisal of the three possible circumstances in which some portion 
of exclusive competency is relevant to the instrument.
Hi. ECJ Opinion 2/91
Germany argued that because the Community is not a member o f the ILO, the 
entire case was not admissible, and that seeking a greater role o f the Community in ILO 
affairs would undermine the tripartite structure. This point was not accepted by the ECJ 
decision. (ECJ, 1993: 'Reasoning') The governments of Germany, Spain, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium argued that the convention was joint competency, 
and that this meant that a Council decision was not needed to ratify the convention. The 
UK government argued that the nature of the Community law (found in Article 118a 
TEC) was minimal, and that they ‘cannot justify any external competence on the part of 
the Community.’ (ECJ, 1993: 'Grounds' VI) The Court upheld both o f these arguments in 
their final verdict. (ECJ, 1993: 'Reasoning1) In a summary of the decision prepared by the 
Commission, four main conclusions of the opinion were given. Firstly, ‘the conclusion of 
the ILO Convention No. 170 is a matter which falls within the joint competence of the 
Member States and the Community.’ (ECJ, 1993: 'Reasoning1) The second was that ‘the
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Court pointed out that the independent role of the EU Member states and the social 
partners — trade unions and employers’ associations — must not be restricted/ (ESC, 1995: 
1) Thirdly, the Court ‘ruled out the possibility of exclusive external competence being 
founded on internal rules constituting minimum requirements, at least when the 
international standard covering the same matter is also a minimum’ requirement/ (EC, 
1994: 4)42
The final conclusion of the ECJ opinion is the least clear, which is that 
‘cooperation between the Community and the Member States is all the more necessary in 
view of the fact that the former cannot, as international law stands at the present, itself 
conclude an ILO convention and must do so through the medium of the Member States/ 
(ECJ, 1993: 'Reasoning1) Through the medium of the Member States’ returns the question 
of Community representation back to square one, since in the interpretation of one 
scholar, this implies that the ‘Member States would have to act on the Community’s behalf 
thereby exerting a competence which formally is no longer theirs/ (Cavicchioli, 2002 p.265) 
The Economic and Social Committee noted that a ‘dispute had been smouldering for 
several years between the EC Commission and most Member States about the EU’s 
legislative competence in respect to the establishment of ILO standards/ (ESC, 1995: 1) 
Opinion 2/91 did not resolve the dispute, and despite the Court’s ruling, ‘no form of co­
ordination between the EC Member States and the European Commission seems to have 
been developed as to the negotiation and conclusion of international labour conventions/ 
(ESC, 1995: 1) As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Opinion locked the European 
Commission out of representing the Member States for a decade.
42The ESC own-initiative opinion commented that ‘the Commission, in the Committee’s view, failed to recognise that 
there is a qualitative difference between the ILO’s standardisation work and the EU’s legislative role. Whilst EU 
Regulations or Directives are legally binding upon Member States (or become legally binding after a transition period), 
the incorporation o f ILO Conventions into national law is optional.’ (ESC, 1995:1)
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2. European Union institutions and the ILO
In 1975 the European Commission reported to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the possibilities and difficulties of ratification by the EU Member States of a 
list of conventions concerned with labour standards concluded within the ILO and the 
Council of Europe. (EC, 1975) This was not the first time that either the European 
Commission or the EP had considered the question of Member State ratifications; there 
had been two previous occasions in 1967 and 1972. (EC-Council, 1967; EP, 1968; EC- 
Council, 1972; EP, 1972) On the latter occasion, the decision was made to review the 
situation again after Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom entered the Community in 
1973.
The report noted the number of ratifications by the Member States o f each 
convention and commented on their current performance towards ratification. The 
language used by the Commission in the report was strikingly blunt. On passing judgement 
on the failure of Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK to ratify Convention 
111, ‘the Commission feels compelled to insist that each of the five named Governments 
make every effort to speedily ratify this convention, which regulates a very important 
sphere for the provision of true equality between workers within the Community/ (EC, 
1975: 48) Furthermore, not only was the European Commission report clear about what it 
expected Member States to do, it was also clear on the reasons why it believed they should 
do it.
The Commission confirms the statements it made in the previous report, when it said 
‘with the exception o f  certain efforts made by Benelux, the Member States took no active part in 
coordinating the international labour conventions, whether they are adopted by the ILO or by the 
Council o f  Europe.’ (EC, 1975: 38)
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Why was the European Commission so anxious that the EU Member States ratify 
ILO standards? The answer is that while today the social and labour laws regulating the 
Single Market are legislated at the Community level by the Council and Commission, this 
was not always the case. At the time of the drafting of the Treaty of Rome there was no 
internal legal competence at the Community level to produce laws that bound all Member 
States. Instead, Article 118 of the Treaty of Rome sets out the principle that the Member 
States would harmonise their national policies by the adopting international labour 
standards, such as those of the ILO and Council of Europe.43 The 1977 Working 
Document from the EP Committee of Social Affairs, Employment and Education states 
that the significance of Article 118 was
the execution o f at least some o f  the aspects o f  [the Communities'] social policy could be 
allowed to depend on progress already achieved in the framework o f  other international 
organisations, in particular the ILO. This procedure has not always been satisfactory and specific 
Community action has been taken in certain areas.
The activity o f  the ILO has, then been regarded as an integral part o f efforts to create a 
Community social policy as laid down in the Treaty o f  Rome, whether in the form o f new legislation 
or the harmonisation o f  existing national legislation, and this view still holds good today. (EP, 1977a: 
12 §1.6)
43 COM (75) 142 Final Third report from the Commission to the Council on the possibilities and difficulties of ratification by the Member 
States of thefirst Sst of conventions concluded within other international organisations lists the following conventions from the ILO:
Convention 103 concerning maternity protection
Convention 111 concerning discrimination in respect to employment and occupation 
Convention 117 concerning aims and basic standards fro social policy
Convention 118 concerning the equality of treatment o f nationals and non-nationals in respect o f social security
Convention 118 recommendations concerning the guarding of machinery
Convention 120 concerning hygiene in commerce and offices
Convention 121 concerning benefits in the case o f employment injury
Convention 122 concerning employment policy
And from the Council of Europe:
European Social Charter
European Social Security Code and Protocol to the European Social Security Code
81/381
This approach was used when the development of Community law, the acquis 
communautaire, was in its infancy. As well as using other international organisations to set 
intra-EC labour standards, they would also provide the mechanism to ensure that they 
were being complied with. The Community was therefore harmonising and reflating its 
internal laws through external, third party international organisations. The European 
Parliament and the Commission interpreted Article 118 as a treaty obligation on the 
Member States to harmonise their ratifications of ILO instruments. This is where the 
justification for the forceful language comes from, and is also the first example of the 
Commission trying to coordinate the ratification of instruments by the Member States.
The Council clearly did not share the same view as the European Commission on 
what its role should be in influencing Member States’ decisions to ratify international 
labour conventions. In a reply given by Mr Vredeling of the Commission to a question 
from the European Parliament in 1980, it was stated that COM (75) 142 ‘was not discussed 
by the Council.’ (EP, 1980) After the 1975 report by the Commission no further such 
summaries of Member State ratifications took place. A European Parliament resolution of 
16 May 1977 requested the Council to instruct ‘the Commission to continue to follow 
closely in the future, in consultation with the International Labour Office, not only the 
progress being made with ratifications, but also the actual application by Member States of 
ratified conventions, and to continue to report regularly on this subject to the Council and the 
Parliament (emphasis added). (EP, 1977b: Point 8) The fact that the Council did not discuss 
the third report was the reason given as to why ‘the Commission has been unable to 
comply with the wishes expressed by Parliament in point 8 of the resolution.’ (EP, 1980)
At the same time as using the ILO as the external auditor of labour standards 
within the Community, the European Parliament was considering the likelihood of the
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European Community joining the ILO. Towards the end of the 1970s there were high 
expectations voiced in a European Parliament report that in time the European 
Community would accede to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as a full 
member and take the place of the nine Member States. The basis of this assumption was 
that as the Community developed more comprehensive legislation regukting social and 
employment kw  in the Single Market, the competency of the Community would 
encompass the ILO policy agenda.
The example o f relations between the EEC and GATT in particular raises the question o f  
the possibility o f  the Community becoming a member o f the ILO in place o f  the individual Member 
States.
Accepting that this could not take place immediately, in view in particular o f the tripartite 
principle laid down by the ILO statute, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that there can be no 
fundamental legal objection to such a move although obviously a number o f  legal and other 
adjustments would be necessary which would require a certain time and depend on the willingness 
o f  both parties to accept change. (EP, 1977a: §2.9)
During the 1980s the European Parliament continued to call for greater 
Commission oversight of Member State ratifications of ILO standards, as well as 
simultaneously calling for the EC to supersede the Member States inside the ILO. A 
resolution in 1984 reiterated the Parliament’s belief that the Communities would become a 
member of the ILO (§F), but also seems to be promoting an idea of joint membership 
with the Member States and the EC ratifying conventions (§1). (EP, 1984) The ideas were 
repeated two years kter when the Parliament recommended that the
Commission, the Council and governments o f  the Member States make an assessment o f  
those factors impeding the ratification o f international labour standards, and notably conventions, by 
the EC Member States or, in the case o f Council Directives, by the European Community, and that 
they take a political decision to help improve international labour standards and ensure compliance 
with them in the Community and throughout the world. (Emphasis added) (EP, 1986)
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The Parliament's recommendation for joint membership of the Community and the 
Member States in the ILO marked a change from the earlier position of the Community 
superseding the Member States in the ILO. It was based on the recognition of exclusive 
Community competences derived from EC law, and the responsibility of seeing that these 
laws were compliant with ILO standards would rest with the Commission. This marked a 
substantial change from the earlier rationale for Member States' ratifications. Originally the 
purpose of ratifying conventions was to establish harmonised internal EC laws. However, 
making Community law complicit to ILO standards implies that EC law had established 
itself inside the Community, and was being extended in its external competence.
With regard to the Commission, the policy shift from its assertive position in 1975 
had turned full circle by the late 1980s. In 1988 an MEP asked why only Spain and 
Portugal had ratified the 1981 convention concerning occupational safety and health 
(Cl 55). The response she received was that ‘it is not for the Council to comment on 
questions concerning the ratification of ILO Conventions.’ (EP, 1988) This answer was 
not surprising given the Council's record on avoiding discussing the issue of ratifications. 
However, a similar question asked in 1990 addressed to the Commission concerning 
Member State ratifications of the 1975 convention concerning migrant workers (Cl 43). 
Mrs Papandreou answered on behalf of the Commission that with ‘respect to ILO 
instruments, Member States are free to ratify them or not as they see fit.' (EP, 1990)
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3. Time periods of the survey
The survey has been divided into five time periods of roughly equal length. The 
purpose is to facilitate a comparison of EU Member States’ behaviour over time, and judge 
whether it changes over time. By making the boundaries of the periods congruent with 
structural changes in the European Union brought about by treaty amendments it is 
possible to see their impact on EU Member State representation and voting cohesion.
i. Period 1:1973-1980
Period 1 begins with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and to European Political Cooperation (EPC) on 
1 January 1973, taking the membership total from six to nine, and also marking the 
beginning of efforts to increase the political influence of the EEC in the United Nations. 
(Luif, 2003)This was also the year that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic were admitted into the United Nations, although both had been 
members of the ILO since 1954. 1973 was the first year that the Presidency spoke for the 
EU Member States, in a technical committee drafting the convention concerning the 
minimum age of employment (Cl 38) and was also the first year the Presidency spoke on a 
political issue.44 Thus the year the survey begins is the first year of representation in the 
name of the ‘Member States of the EEC’ and the year of the enlargement from six to nine 
Member States.
44 A spokesperson for the European Commission addressed the annual conference plenary from 1971 onwards, but spoke 
only in the capacity o f the European Community’s observer status in the ILO.
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The first period ends with the 1980 annual conference, bringing the total number 
held during Period 1 to eight (seven regular conferences and one special Maritime session 
in 1976). The membership of the Community is constant throughout Period 1 at nine, and 
thus provides an opportunity to see if there was any change in behaviour of this group of 
states before the EU embarked on a process of enlargement over the following six years. 
From the history presented above it is clear that during the 1970s the Commission and the 
European Parliament enthusiastically promoted Community membership of the ILO and 
saw the role o f Member States as one of representing the interests of the Community until 
the EC acceded to the ILO in their place. Despite the decade’s reputation as the one that 
disproved neofunctionalism as Ernst Haas concluded (Haas, 1975), the rhetoric from the 
EP was one of quiet confidence for the future of the EC inside the ILO, while the 
Commission took seriously its self-appointed mandate of highlighting the inconsistencies 
with EU Member State ratifications of ILO conventions.
ii. Period 2:1981-1986
Period 2 begins with the accession of Greece into the EU in 1981, and ends in 
1986 with the accession of Portugal and Spain, two enlargements that incorporated poorer 
states into the EU and had the potential to change the dynamics of EU decision-making. 
O f the three, Spain had the highest number o f ratifications of ILO conventions, 
outnumbering all of the previously existing members of the EU with 102. Portugal had 
ratified 65 conventions on entry in 1986 which was very close to the EU Member State 
average of 67, while Greece had considerably less at 38. (See Table 3.1 for ratification 
levels) Thus despite their geographic and economic differences with the rest of the EU 
Member States, the average number of ratifications by EU Member States did not change 
as a result of their entry. The period contains seven ILCs (once again there was an
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additional maritime conference in 1986) and over the course of this period the EU adjusted 
to being a larger group of states; how did this effect the level of representation and voting 
cohesion?
Period 2 also includes the legal preparatory steps for the Single European Act that 
was signed in 1986 and ratified by the 12 Member States in 1987. The SEA signposted the 
direction that future economic integration would take, and therefore the comparison 
between Period 2 and Period 3 is intended to help measure the impact of this legislation on 
technical coordination in the ILO.
iii. Period 3:1987-1992
This period begins with the coming into force of the Single European Act, and 
ends with the completion of the Maastricht Treaty (although it came into force in 
November 1993). The period also fits with Tsebelis and Grant’s second epoch of EU 
legislation-making. ‘The second epoch of European integration began when the SEA was 
ratified. In this period the Council became a more effective legislative institution, at the 
cost of national sovereignty.’45 (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001: 359) The period has a constant 
number of Member States, so represents a period of consolidation for the EU, although in 
terms of legal development it marks a period of great change. One of the major purposes 
of the SEA was to prepare for the creation of a Single Market on 1 January 1993, which 
would ‘remove all physical, fiscal, and technical barriers to trade within the 12 Member 
States, ensuring an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
45 Tsebelis and Grant identify the first epoch between 1957 and 1987, which includes Periods 1 and 2 in this survey. The 
first epoch was called ‘the Luxembourg compromise period’ and was ‘characterised by legislative gridlock in the 
Council. In this period the Council was an ineffective collective institution, with the system o f national vetos protecting 
the sovereignty o f Member States.’ (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001: 359)
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persons, services and capital is assured/ (McCormick, 2005: 70) The legislation required to 
do this covered social and employment legislation, and required the harmonisation of 
labour standards across Member States, something that clearly relates direcdy to the 
technical standards of the ILO. An important additional objective in the SEA was 
Community cohesion, which helped ‘poorer parts of Europe, revitalised regions affected 
by serious industrial decline, addressing long-term unemployment, providing youth 
training, and helping the development of rural areas/ (McCormick, 2005: 71)
A further development in the field of social policy during this period was the 1989 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (also known as the Social Charter) that 
‘promoted the free movement of workers, fair pay, better living and working conditions, 
freedom of association, and protection of children and adolescents/ (McCormick, 2005: 
71) These issues are integral to the EU’s social model, and also constitute some of the 
primary interests o f the ILO and its standard setting. As a result, the movement of the EU 
in this direction would be expected to have an impact on the behaviour of the Member 
States in the annual conferences of the ILO.
iv. Period4:1993-1997
Although Period 4 is relatively short in comparison with the other periods (6 
conferences, one of which was a maritime conference), a considerable amount took place 
during it. Firsdy, the Maastricht treaty came into force, and with it the creation of the 
European Union. The Union consisted of three pillars, of which the European Community 
(Pillar 1) contained the economic and social policies of the Single Market. ‘The origins of 
Europe’s third and current epoch lie in the Maastricht Treaty, and these foundations were 
cemented at Amsterdam ... the Commission’s legislative agenda-setting powers are far
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more limited than they were in the immediate post-SEA era/ (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001: 
359) The Treaty on the European Union contained the Social Charter as a Protocol and 
gave Member States the opportunity to sign up to the commitments contained within it. 
This meant the charter gained formal recognition in the law of the EC. The period also 
included the 1995 enlargement of the EU with the accession of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden. At the time the average number of ratifications of ILO conventions by the 
Twelve was 71.5. Austria entered the EU with 48 ratifications, while both Finland (75) and 
Sweden (70) were close to average.
1993 was also an important year because it marked the first conference after the 
publication of the ECJ Opinion 2/91 (in March 1993) concerning the responsibilities of 
the Member States and the European Commission for representing the European 
Community in the ILO, as well as resolving the issues of EC membership and the division 
of legal competencies between EC and the Member States in issues relating to ILO 
instruments and where authority lies to ratify them. The conclusion came down in favour 
of the Member States, reiterating their duties as members of the ILO and seeking to 
accommodate the division of EC competencies within that framework. On first 
appearance this seems to be a victory for intergovemmentalism, putting the Member States 
before the Community. However, the dispute between the Commission and the Member 
States was adjudicated through the ECJ, an institution of the Union with only limited 
judicial powers in the second pillar. Observing Period 4 will allow us to see the impact of 
the opinion on Member State behaviour.
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v. Periods: 1998-2005
Period 5 begins in 1998, the year after the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed.46 The 
Social Charter was moved once again, this time becoming part of the main body of the 
TEU in Articles 138 and 139 (Article 139 was subsequently altered again at the IGC in 
Nice, 2000). Not only did the full gamut of social legislation become standardised across 
the EU, it also gave a more formal role to EU tripartite social partners in decision-making 
in the field of EC employment law. Since the ‘Amsterdam Treaty the social partners have 
gained substantial influence over the legislative activities of the European Community in 
the area of social policy/ (Cavicchioli, 2002: 262 fn4) This means that ‘agreements 
negotiated by the European social partners, could, if the latter so wished, be given legal 
effect by a Council decision and transposed into the national legislation of Member States/ 
(EC, 2004b)
The role of the tripartite members has increased in prominence in the EU policy 
making structure with the adoption of the 2000 Tisbon agenda’, a ten-year programme 
designed to promote employment and sustainable growth, and in 2003 the Council agree to 
hold a Tripartite Summit on Employment and Growth. (EC-Council, 2003a) The 
incorporation of the social partners into the policy-making system of the EU has been 
driven by five key Commission Communications between 1993 and 2005. (EC, 1993; EC, 
1996; EC, 1998a; EC, 2002a; EC, 2004a) While the Union has institutionalised 
consultations with the social partners in EC legislative processes, it is unclear whether this 
has taken place as a response to the claims that it threatened the tripartite principles of the 
ILO, or if failing to gain greater influence led to a focus more on intra-Union social policy.
46 The signing took place on 2 October 1997 but the Treaty did not come into force until 1 May 1999.
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The final important change included in Period 5 is the enlargement of the EU from 
15 to 25 Member States on 1 May 2004. The enlargement brought in a number of poorer, 
former communist countries, with very mixed histories of ILO involvement. Some, like 
Lithuania and Latvia, re-joined as members of the ILO, after having been subsumed into 
the Soviet Union after 1934. Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic replaced former 
ILO members and re-ratified the conventions signed by their predecessors. In 2004 the 
EU 15 had ratified an average of 74 conventions, and the range of ratifications of 
accession states varied considerably from around 70 (Poland and Slovenia) to around 35 
(Lithuania and Latvia). Intergovernmental theory would predict that a 40% increase in the 
size of. EU membership would make common representation and voting cohesion 
considerably harder, and this is tested in the thesis.
4. Theories tested and crosscutting issues concerning technical coordination
Let us briefly recap how each theory would predict the behaviour of the EU 
Member States and their approach (or not) to coordinating in preparation for the technical 
issues areas of the ILO. In order to do this, a list of five ‘crosscutting’ issues has been 
drawn up, which constitute the major points of contention between the competing 
theories. By looking at how these issues influence EU Member State behaviour, we will be 
able to weigh up the relative strengths and weaknesses of the competing theories. The five 
crosscutting issues are:
i. The role of national interests
ii. The role of the European Commission and the Presidency of the Council
iii. The technical issue area under discussion
iv. The number of Member States in the EU
v. The possibility of change over time of an EU position
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i. The role of national interests
The five theories can be differentiated according to how much significance the 
national interests of the Member States will have over the course of the survey. 
Neofunctionalism predicts a decreasing significance over time and a corresponding 
increase in the establishment of European interests. In contrast to this, 
intergovemmentalism predicts that national interests always be of greater concern than 
European ones, and that the Member States do not fundamentally alter in this respect 
through becoming a member of the EU. Furthermore, there will be no change in this over 
time, reiterating the lack of change in the international system drawn out from its realist 
roots.
Between these two extremes lie firsdy liberal intergovemmentalism, which accepts 
that national interests remain significant, but in the social and economic sphere national 
interests can be aggregated at the European level without compromising the importance of 
the Member State. This is because the institutional structures of the European Community 
provide a comprehensive safeguard against cheating on the agreed rules of cooperation. 
Furthermore, the three large Member States (France, Germany and the UK) not only shape 
the direction the EU takes through their power in intergovernmental bargaining, but also 
retain national interests outside the EU and pursue those independently when it suits them.
Consociational theory is concerned with the equilibrium between the opposing 
logic of the supranational Community and the sovereign identity of the Member States. 
The national interests of the Member States are on the one hand to retain the economic 
arid social cohesion of the Community, while on the other hand to preserve their identity 
as segments. The theory therefore predicts a pattern of behaviour that at times promotes
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the interests of the Community, while at other times promotes the national interests of the 
Member States. However, these variations take place around an equilibrium position that 
will not change considerably over time.
Finally, the institutional adaptation by EU Member States when faced with misfit 
between domestic and EU policies occurs when interests cannot be reconciled. EU 
Member States seek to minimise misfit by petitioning for the uploading of national policies 
to the EU level. The ILO is another forum in which competing national policies are put 
forward to be uploaded into new ILO standards, and those that are successfully adopted by 
the ILO are legitimised by it. Since ILO standards are taken into consideration when 
drafting Community law, winning the argument between rival policies in the ILO can help 
to win the argument again in the EU later on.47
ii. The role of the European Commission and the Presidency of the Council
The European Commission and the Presidency both speak for (‘represent7) the EU 
Member States in technical committees in the ILO. What is said is agreed in coordination 
meetings of Member States beforehand. The question is what impact do coordination 
meetings have on forging European interests out of the multitude of national interests? 
Can either the Commission or the Presidency build consensus on European interests? The 
importance given to these two institutions by the theories depends on whether they regard 
membership of the EU as having the potential to change Member State behaviour. To the 
intergovemmentalist, neither the European Commission nor the Presidency can alter the 
fundamental positions of the Member States, and if their interests are not being served they
47 ILO standards are taken into consideration by the European Commission when preparing new EU directives. 
Interview: Brussels, 18 November 2005
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will act alone or with other, non-EU like-minded states if necessary. Neofunctionalists 
regard these as powerful institutions that gain more influence over time as the Member 
States engage in an ever-closer union. As noted above, European Community membership 
of the ILO was a goal for a number of years in the 1970s and 1980s, and the European 
Commission would be expected to become the most influential actor.
From a liberal intergovernmental perspective the importance of these two 
institutions is the same as all EU institutions, namely to ensure that the treaties agreed by 
the Member States are fairly upheld and that the scope of action they prescribe is carried 
out efficiently. Their primary job is to serve the Member States, and to ensure that the 
Community operates as efficiently as possible so as to maximise their economic and social 
gains from membership. A fundamental claim made by LI is that European integration is 
entirely at the behest and control of the Member States, and challenges directly the 
neofunctional claim that a logic of integration exists. To this end, the Commission and the 
Presidency represent the Member States’ common interests, but do not expand the limits 
of what those interests are. That is done during intergovernmental conferences negotiating 
treaty reforms.
Consociational theory highlights the role of the Presidency in capturing the balance 
between the two tendencies of integration and preservation of the segments. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the Presidency is responsible for representing the Community 
while at the same time remaining one of the Member States. The willingness of the other 
Member States to allow the six-month term to have a national ‘stamp’ that reflects the 
national interests of that state is recognition of the need to maintain individual national 
identities, even while working as the face of the Community.
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Institutional approaches can be divided into a logic of consequences’ and a logic 
of appropriateness’. The former operates through LI or neofunctional mechanisms, as the 
distribution of power changes and are described above. In a logic of appropriateness, such 
as the ‘weak cognativists’ identified by Hasenclever et al, the work of Peter Haas is taken as 
an example and explains the role of epistemic communities. The Commission staff fulfil 
this role by circulating new ideas between the Member States and assist in enacting those 
ideas into policy, thus performing a expert role in policy coordination.
Hi. The technical issue area under discussion
How many technical issues should be the subject of EU coordinated 
representation? Will the number be fixed or will it grow over time? Neofunctional theory 
predicts that the number will grow over time through spillover, both expanding the acquis 
communautaire inside the Community and as Member States coordinate in the ILO. Log­
rolling also takes place during EU Member State negotiations, bringing issues that were 
previously off the agenda onto it, in return for agreeing to deals in the original area. The 
dynamic nature of neofunctional theory and the predictions it makes about the logic of 
integration are highly relevant to the technical issue-areas discussed in the annual 
conferences of the ILO.
Intergovernmental theory takes the opposite view, that EU membership does not 
fundamentally alter the pursuit o f national interests as the primary goal of international 
cooperation. Indeed, an intergovemmentalist would point to the many occasions when 
there are high levels of consensus across all ILO member governments, as well as workers
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and employers delegates.48 Such consensus can be seen in the voting records on the 
adoption of technical instruments, occasionally accepted unanimously by all delegates. In 
such an environment it is difficult to attribute any significance to EU membership as 
altering behaviour.
According to liberal intergovernmental theory the number of technical issues in 
which coordination takes place is determined by the treaties, which set the extent to which 
the Community acts and how decisions are made. The fundamental tenet is that the 
Community serves the interests of the Member States, which in the Single Market is to 
provide increasing levels of wealth and welfare to their domestic constituencies. When an 
ILO technical issue directly relates to established parts of the acquis communautaire the 
Member States will choose whether to coordinate or not, but the scope will be limited to 
existing common law and there will be no dynamic growth as predicted by 
neofunctionalism except in treaty amendments.
Consociational theory identifies issue areas where the Community is strong as 
where the Member States will coordinate on technical issues, while technical areas relating 
to issues that the Member States use to define their national identities will not be the 
subject to EU common representation. What is important is that the balance between the 
two sides is maintained, and therefore after a period of intense EU Member State 
representation we might expect to see a period of regression as the equilibrium between 
the Community and its Member States is re-balanced.
48 See Appendix 1. Examples indude: C139/R147 Occupational Cancer (1974); C150/R158 Labour Administration 
(1978); C164 Seafarers’ Health Protection (1986); R175 Safety in Construction (1988); R177 Safety in the Use o f  
Chemicals (1990); C182/R190 Worst Forms o f Child Labour (1999)
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Finally, institutional approaches reiterate the importance of misfit between the EU 
Member States and EU policy in determining the level of common representation. After 
Europeanbation has taken place at the EU level, common representation of the Union in 
the ILO is more likely. However, it is not a smooth transition as foreseen by 
neofunctionalism, and may be uneven over time or between Member States, as 
Featherstone warns. (Featherstone, 2003: 4)
iv. The number of Member States in the EU
O f central concern to all theories is the impact that the si2e of the EU has on its 
common representation and voting cohesion. There is also the second dimension to 
enlargement, which is how does the entry of new Member States with existing national 
interests affect the EU as a whole? Beginning with intergovernmental theory, simple 
arithmetic shows that increasing the number of Member States means more national 
interests and the likelihood of greater fragmentation. Achieving common representation 
and voting cohesion becomes more difficult with the arrival of each new member. 
Moreover, as the EU enlarges to take in states with divergent histories (such as the former 
military dictatorships of Southern Europe or the former communist countries of Eastern 
Europe) the chances of agreeing on common interests decreases further. By contrast, 
neofunctional theory does not foresee these problems because as European integration 
deepens over time national differences diminish. New members are integrated into the 
existing institutional and legal structures of the EU, and this means that diverse national 
histories do not constitute the stumbling blocks foreseen by intergovemmentalists.
Consociational theory is based on maintaining the distinction between the 
constitutive units and the whole system (the Community), so the increase in membership
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should not necessarily create additional problems. On the one hand neofunctionalism 
argues that new members join the Community at its current level of development, with 
shared interests derived from its economic success. On the other hand new members are 
not required to forgo their previous identities on entry, and thus diverse national histories 
are advantageous to the EU system as a whole. Such histories are part of the preservation 
of the segments, which the political system’s survival is predicated on.
From a liberal intergovernmental perspective, the divergent interests of states are 
only of concern during intergovernmental negotiations on major issues, such as treaty 
reform. The parameters of common representation are set by the existed, agreed treaties, 
while the likelihood of national interests being pursued outside the EU framework, (leading 
to a potential breakdown in either common representation or voting cohesion) is most 
likely with only large Member States, of which the three most important have been 
members since the beginning of the survey.
Following the logic of appropriateness, the size of the EU need not create any 
substantial difficulties in common representation and voting cohesion. According to 
Featherstone, what is important is whether actors ‘develop commitment to the institution 
or are persuaded by the legitimacy of its claims.’ (Featherstone, 2003: 15) Size could work 
in favour of common representation, as Member States outside the common position are 
under increased pressure to act ‘appropriately’ by sheer weight of numbers.
v. The possibility of change over time
The final consideration is the likelihood of change over time in the behaviour of 
EU Member States in the technical committees of the ILC. As set out in the methodology
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section in Chapter 1, the measurable variables chosen are EU common representation and 
voting cohesion. If evidence is found showing change in this area, which direction would 
each theory predict the change to go in, and how would it explain it? Intergovernmental 
theory predicts no change over time, given the constant concern to pursue national 
interests. Intergovernmental theory questions what impact EU membership makes on 
Member States in an organisation that deals with issues of low  politics’ that have high 
levels on international consensus. Consociational theory predicts no aggregated change 
over time in the level of representation and voting cohesion, once an equilibrium position 
has been established. Balancing the Community’s supranational elements with the 
preservation of clearly identifiable constitutive parts is the main concern of all EU 
politicians. This concern does not change over time, so we would expect to see cyclical 
patterns in representation and voting cohesion, with peaks and troughs levelling out over 
time at an equilibrium position.
One of the guiding questions driving new institutionalism (according to Taylor and 
Hall) is how to explain the process of institutional development and change. The 
sociological school understands change in response to the norms of the EU Member States 
and the actors working there. However, the theory provides no insight into which direction 
this change will take over time. The rational choice approach is able to be more specific, 
and is found in the LI and NF approaches. Liberal intergovernmental theory predicts that 
changes will take place in the aftermath of intergovernmental bargains being struck over 
the content of treaties. Whether there is more or less representation and voting cohesion 
depends on what the negotiations decide. For example, the Single European Act’s 
expanded qualified majority voting (QMV) in the area of occupational health and safety, 
and as a result we might expect to find more common representation afterwards because 
the intergovernmental decision to move to QMV signals that it is an area of Community
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interest. Alternatively, a decision to retain unanimity in the Council in a particular issue area 
indicates less chance of common representation in the ILO because of perceived national 
sensitivities in that area. Finally, neofunctionalism predicts constant and progressive change 
over time, increasing the depth and breath of common representation and voting cohesion, 
as Member States become more integrated over time. As discussed above, this is due to 
spillover linking new issue areas of coordination, and the establishment of European 
interests over national ones.
5. Summary
This chapter set out the framework for investigating the common representation 
and voting records of the EU Member States in technical issues, specifically the drafting 
and voting onto the ILO statute of conventions and recommendations. This is a 
Community pillar area of coordination and the purpose of the framework is to identify and 
measure change in EU Member State behaviour, quantified by representation and voting 
patterns. A number of key dates in the history of European Community representation in 
the ILO were noted, most importantly the Convention concerning safety in the use of chemicals 
(1989). This led to the European Court of Justice issuing Opinion (2/91) on whether the 
Commission or the Member States were the relevant authority to consider the ratification 
of the instrument. The Opinion set the boundaries of Commission involvement in the ILO 
that were adhered to for the following decade. The chapter also set out the five time 
periods that will be used as the temporal framework for the empirical research, as well as 
five ‘crosscutting’ issues of central importance. They are (i) the role of national interests; (if) 
the role of the European Commission and the Presidency of the Council; (iii) the technical 
issue under discussion; (iv) the number of Member States in the EU; and (v) the possibly 
of change over time.
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Table 5.1: E U  Member State and accession state ratifications of ILO  conventions: 1986, 1995, 2004 
1986 1995 2004
Country No. Rats Country No. Rats Country No. Rats
Belgium 76 Belgium 73 Austria 45
Denmark 55 Denmark 61 Belgium 76
France 98 France 96 Denmark 60
Germany 60 Germany 67 Finland 81
Ireland 48 Greece 59 France 104
Italy 88 Ireland 51 Germany 68
Luxembourg 46 Italy 88 Greece 63
Netherlands 68 Luxembourg 54 Ireland 58
UK 68 Netherlands 77 Italy 92
Portugal 64 Luxembourg 63
Spain 103 Netherlands 82
UK 65 Portugal 70
Spain 106
Sweden 76
UK 66
Average 67 Average 71.5 Average 74
Greece (1981)* 38 Austria 48 Cyprus 50
Portugal 65 Finland 75 Czech Rep. 64
Spain 102 Sweden 70 Estonia 33
Hungary 57
Latvia 44
Lithuania 38
Malta 55
Poland 73
Slovakia 64
Slovenia 72
Note:
Although Greece joined the EU in 1981, it is included in the same column as Spain and Portugal for comparative purposes.
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C h a p t e r  4
EU MEMBER STATE REPRESENTATION IN TECHNICAL
COORDINATION
This chapter looks at the representation of the EU in technical committees of the 
annual International Labour Conferences (ILC) from 1973 to 2005 and answers three basic 
questions:
• Who has represented the EU, how often and when?
• How much has the EU been represented and has the level changed over time?
• In which issue areas has the EU been represented and have they changed over 
time?
These questions have been formulated by taking into account the possible role of 
three of the ‘cross-cutting issues* set out in Chapter 3, namely the role of the Presidency 
and the Commission, the type of issue being considered and the temporal dimension of 
possible change over time. According to neofunctional theory we would expect to see the 
role of the Commission grow over time in core areas of the integration, with a high 
probability of spillover into other areas following afterwards. By contrast, 
intergovernmental theory predicts no development of Commission representation, and 
where Member States are represented by the Presidency they will be in areas of low 
salience. Liberal intergovernmental theory is tested here through the inclusion of the 
specific time periods corresponding to treaty-based changes to the Community pillar. 
Consociational theory’s emphasis on balancing the segments with the whole is considered 
through contrasting the Presidency and the Commission’s role in representing the EU.
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In order to answer these questions empirical data from ILC Provisional Records of 
technical committees has been gathered and is set out in Appendix 1, IL O  Instruments 
and EU Voting and Interventions’. This chapter uses the data in the four columns on the 
right of the table. Representation is measured by the number of statements made by the 
Presidency and the number of statement made by the Commission (two columns).49 The 
third column records the length of the technical committee discussion by the number of 
paragraphs in the Provisional Record.50 The fourth column is labelled ‘EU participation 
level’ and is the total number of EU statements (columns one and two) divided by the 
number o f paragraphs (column three). The level is measured as a decimal with a range 
from no participation (0.000) to total participation where an EU intervention made in 
every paragraph (1.000).51
In the first section the question of who represents the EU is considered, using the 
data on the number of statements made. In the second section the level of participation is 
calculated and in the third section the level of participation is measured according to issue 
area. At the end of the chapter the different theories’ predictions about EU representation 
will be revisited in the light of the empirical findings.
49 This chapter follows the definition set out in Chapter 1, where ‘representation’ is any verbal or written intervention by 
Presidency, the Commission or another Member State explicitly representing the views o f (i) the European Community, 
(ii) the Member States as the ‘Nine’ (Ten’ /  Twelve^ through EPC or (iii) the EU.
50 Measuring the length o f a technical committee meeting is an imprecise science. The number o f sittings, the number of 
pages or the number o f paragraphs in the Provisional Record could all be used. The length o f a sitting is not fixed, and 
the type-setting o f Provisional Records means that the length o f each document changes over time. Paragraphs have 
been chosen because each one usually covers one substantive point in the discussion. However, the number of 
paragraphs per Provisional Record has increased over the length of the survey for a number o f reasons. Firstly 
committee meetings are longer with more participants speaking; secondly conventions and recommendations are
_ becoming more detailed, and more discussion needs to take place in order to prepare them. Thirdly, there has been a 
change in style by some Reporters (the seconded government official in charge o f preparing the Provisional Record) 
and one paragraph is given to each major intervention by a delegate in the committee. Finally, advances in word- 
processing technology makes more detailed records possible.
51 Chapter 1 set out five types of intervention each participant can make.
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1. EU Representation by the Presidency and the Commission
In this section we ate interested in who speaks for the EU in the technical 
committees of the ILC, and how has it changed over the course of the survey. The first 
reference to the European Economic Community (EEC) was made in 1973 in the second 
discussion on Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, when ‘the Government members of 
the European Economic Community countries represented on the committee’ were 
mentioned twice. (ILO, 1973b: 485 §26, 487 §48) This was not the first time that the 
Member States of the European Community had spoken together at an ILC committee 
meeting. In 1972 in the first discussion of the Minimum Age instruments ‘the government 
members of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy and the 
Netherlands (subsequently referred to as “Common Market” countries)’ made seven 
interventions. (ILO, 1972: 540 §25)52 However, the 1973 common statements made by the 
Belgium government diplomats were in the name of the nine Member States of the EEC 
and constitute the first Presidency statement matching the criteria set out defining EU 
representation. Appendix 1 lists all subsequent EU representation by staff of the 
Presidency and the Commission. Table 4.1 summarises this information by detailing the 
number of technical committee meetings at which one or both of them spoke for the EU.
The table shows the number of committee meetings at which the EU was 
represented during the five time periods into which the survey is divided into. The table 
provides data that allows two comparative dimensions between the five periods; firstly who 
was representing the EU, and secondly the average number of committees per conference 
at which the EU was represented. The patterns drawn from this preliminary look at the
52 It should be noted that Luxembourg was absent from the committee meeting and Common Market coordination took 
place without it
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empirical evidence already point to a number of interesting conclusions about what has 
happened in the last 30 years.
i. Committees per conference
Let us look first at the average number of technical committees the EU Member 
State are represented in and compare it to the average number of technical committees per 
conference. By dividing the number of committees in which the EU Member States were 
represented by the number of technical committees, a percentage figure is calculated 
showing the level of representation and shown in the right hand column o f Table 4.1. In 
the period between 1973-1980 the EU was represented on average at 1.6 committee 
meetings out of 4.1 per conference (or 39.0%). The number increases dramatically to 2.7 
committees in the period 1981-1986 (67.5% of technical committees) during the 
preparation for the Single European Act (SEA), and drops slighdy to 2.2 committees in the 
period between the SEA and the Maastricht treaty negotiations of 1992 (equivalent to 
66.7%). The level of representation falls again between 1993 and 1997 to a record low of 
1.5 committee meetings per conference, but this was during a period when fewer technical 
issues on the agenda and representation is calculated at 46.9%. The level climbs again in 
the final period after 1998 to an average of two committees per conference (64.5%). 
Overall, the aggregated data from 1973-2005 shows that the EU has been represented on 
average at two committee meetings per year since 1973, or 57.1% of the technical 
committee meetings.
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ii. Identifiable trends
Two conclusions can be drawn from this that already begin to hint at which 
theories are more relevant that others. Firsdy, the level of EU representation has not 
grown in a linear manner that suggests an ever closer union over time, as predicted by 
neofunctional theory. The period of most intense representation came between 1981 and 
1986, and the following six years were also above average in terms of the levels of 
representation. In die five years from 1993 onwards the level of representation was lower 
than the two previous periods and closer to Period 1. This trend was reversed after 1998 
and the number of committee meetings returned to a level on a par with the average of the 
whole survey, at two, and slighdy above average when calculated as a percentage of all 
technical meetings. The number of committee meetings in which the EU Member States 
are represented varies over time, and is neither constant nor a gradually increasing process 
over time (as neofunctionalism would predict). What is the cause of this variation?
The variation in the level of EU Member State representation over time is not 
proportional to the number of technical committee meetings being held. The number of 
technical items on the agenda has steadily declined over the course of the survey, from an 
average of 4.1 in Period 1 to 3.1 in Period 5. The decline can be explained by the changing 
number of instruments drafted at ILCs. In the 1970s and early 1980s each ILC (excluding 
maritime conferences53) typically adopted instruments in two issue areas per year after 
second discussions, and held the first discussions for the following year’s instruments. 
Since then there has been a trend towards adopting the instruments related to one issue
53 The exceptions to this ate the Maritime conferences that dtaft three or four instruments in one conference. These take 
place roughly every decade (1976,1986,1996 during the survey, and another in 2006 that is outside o f  the data set) and 
EU representation was high in the first two, but non-existent in the 1996 conference. This coincided with a period o f  
low representation between 1993 and 1997.
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area per year, resulting in there being rarely more than three technical committees meeting 
each year. O f these three, one is a second discussion, another a first discussion for the 
following year and the additional meeting is often either a general discussion or prepares a 
revision of an existing instrument.. Archival evidence points to a prioritisation of second 
discussion items on the agenda and this supports the claim that the level of EU 
representation is, at least partially, determined by the ILC agenda.54 Present-day 
practitioners concur with this and regard first discussions as an exploration of what is 
possible, and hard negotiations only begin with the second discussion that leads to the 
drafting o f a finalised instrument.55
If the level of EU Member State representation does not vary in proportion to the 
changing shape of the ILC agenda, then over time the EU Member States must be altering 
the areas where they are commonly represented. The factors determining what causes the 
alteration in the pattern o f common representation can either come from inside the EU 
(such as a greater involvement in first discussions or general discussions) or from outside 
the EU. The primary external factor capable of altering the pattern of EU common 
representation is the ILC agenda. The second conclusion to be drawn is that exogenous 
factors such as ILC agenda-setting could have a significant influence over EU Member 
State representation. This is important because all of the theoretical models being tested are 
concerned with the internal logic of EU integration and its impact on EU coordination in 
the ILO. These theories will have only limited explanatory power if external variables have 
a role to play too. The next step is to refine the analysis of the empirical data and continue
54 There will be a need for coordination in the normal way in the Social questions Working Group in May on common 
amendments to the Working Environment paper which is up for discussion for the second time. Nursing Personnel 
has already been discussed by the Group and probably needs no further coordination. As to the other two items 
[Administration o f Labour and Freedom o f Trade Unions] it is probably for the UK experts to consider whether useful 
coordination could take place*. (Biddiscombe, 1977) In 1977 the Working Environment and Nursing Personnel were 
second discussion items, while the other items were first discussions.
55 Interviews: London, 21 September 2004; Copenhagen 3 March 2005
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to look for evidence supporting or refuting the competing theories derived from EU 
Member State actions. For this reason it is necessary to look at the intensity of 
representation, rather than simply whether it takes place or not.
2. Quantitative measurement of EU Member State representation
In this section we move onto the question of how much representation takes 
place? The data gathered in Section 1 recorded all technical committee meetings at which 
at least one statement was made representing the EU. As was discussed in Chapter 1, this is 
an imprecise measure of representation because there are a number of possible scenarios 
when the products of EU coordination are overlooked because they do not have the 
‘official’ label of EEC or EU. However, it was reasoned that no better alternative existed 
and in its favour it offers concrete evidence of coordination having taken place in order to 
prepare the common statement. In this section the amount of representation is taken into 
account, and by doing so we will be able to see if there are trends over time pointing 
towards more representation per committee meeting. Although there may be a limit to the 
number of technical committee meetings at which the EU can be represented, the number 
of common statements produced is at the discretion of the EU Member States.
i. Explanation of the data
All of the data presented in Table 4.2 has been calculated using the ‘EU 
participation level’, data in Appendix 1. As explained above, this figure is calculated by 
dividing the total number of EU representation statements by the Presidency and the 
Commission by the length of the Provisional Record from which they have been counted,
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measured in paragraphs. This serves as a simple scaling device, telling us that when the EU 
was represented by 10 statements made in a technical committee meeting that was 
recorded in 200 paragraphs, this would be equivalent to 20 statements in a technical 
meeting recorded in 400 paragraphs of text The higher the number the more frequently 
the EU Member States are represented through a common statement by either the 
Presidency or the Commission.
For each period the scores for EU participation in each instrument were collected, 
and listed from smallest to largest. The list can be used to summarise the performance of 
the EU Member States’ during the period, and five columns on the right hand side of the 
table do this. The columns labelled lowest’ and ‘highest’ show the scores lying at each end 
of the list. The range is distance between them, calculated by subtracting the lowest figure 
from the highest figure. The median value is the score lying in the middle position of the 
scale, and the mean is calculated by adding up all the scores and dividing by the total 
number of scores (the ‘average5).56 The purpose of doing all this work is to see if the level 
of participation of the EU Member States through their collective representation follows 
the same pattern as the previous data, which suggests there has been little change over 30 
years.
ii. Mean levels of participation
Comparing the figures in the ‘mean’ column show that the level of participation in 
technical committee meetings rose during the first three periods and then fell during the
56 The inclusion o f  a median value helps to ensure that the mean value has not been skewed by a few outlying scores from 
the data set. When a comparison o f mean values and median values produces the same results then it shows that all the 
data sets in the survey have similar profiles.
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next two. The number of times the EU was represented in a committee by a statement by 
the Presidency or the Commission was highest between 1987 and 1992, controlling for the 
length of meetings. The figure of 0.148 in this period tells us that aggregated over the six 
conferences, in technical committees where the EU was represented by either the 
Presidency or the Commission, (and therefore when coordination took place), 14.8% of 
paragraphs (or roughly one in seven) contained an intervention in the name o f the EU.57 
When this figure is compared to the other periods we see that EU representation was three 
times greater between 1987 and 1992 than between 1973 and 1980, and 1998 and 2005. 
Similarly, the level is twice as high as the previous period (1981-1986), and about 50% 
higher than the one directly afterwards (1993-1997). The intensity of EU representation in 
ILC technical meetings peaked between the SEA and Maastricht Treaty, and between 1998 
and 2005 it was barely more than it was during the 1970s.
The problem with building a story of EU representation based on calculating the 
mean level of representation is that the information could be misleading if the data sets 
used contain a wide range of samples. For example, if there were a small number of 
technical committees with very high levels of representation, the mean figure would rise 
and may not give an accurate picture of how much representation took place in the 
majority of the committees. One way in which we can double-check the accuracy of the 
picture painted by the mean data is to look at the median figures. As explained above, the 
median figure is the middle data entry in a list of all entries of the particular set It can tell 
us two things. Firsdy, if there is a difference between the ranking order of the five periods
57 It is possible that one paragraph contained more than one intervention by the EU. For example, the Presidency could 
propose an amendment to the document under discussion, the amendment might not be accepted by one party in the 
negotiations. In response to this the Presidency could suggest a sub-amendment to accommodate the objections. The 
process could continue with further steps to reach consensus, and all o f this might be recorded in one (long) paragraph. 
In such cases, the original EU amendment, and any subsequent sub-amendments are counted separately in the data 
table as distinct interventions. The five types o f interventions are discussed in the methodology section in Chapter One.
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when sorted by mean and when sorted by median, it alerts us to the possibility that a few 
‘extreme’ cases (at either end) are causing distortions. Secondly, if the median and the mean 
are very close, we can be sure that the data is evenly distributed across the time period, and 
not skewed either positively or negatively.58
iii. Median levels of participation
Looking at the median data column we find out two things. Firsdy, the order of 
periods is the same when using the median as when using the mean. This finding supports 
the case presented above that the level of EU representation has risen and fallen, and that 
it was strongest between 1987 and 1992. The second noticeable fact is that in all o f the 
periods the median is less than the mean, which is referred to as a ‘positive skew’ in the 
distribution of data. A positive skew occurs when a small number o f high values are 
included in the data set and leads to a higher mean than is a true reflection on the data set. 
Therefore we can say that while the identified trend of increasing representation until the 
1987-1992 period and a decline thereafter is verified. However, the intensity of 
representation is exaggerated, with some very highly coordinated technical meeting EU 
representation, but the majority being less than the mean figure.
Looking over the data in the columns showing the lowest and highest values (and 
also the range between them) helps to demonstrate this point. In ,every period except the 
third one (1987-1992) there were committees with very low levels of participation (0.001, 
0.003 or 0.005). Figures this low mean that only one or two common statements were
58 The issue o f a skewed sample is important because we are using the data to summarise the behaviour of the EU 
Member States over a period o f 6 to 9 conferences. When a data set is skewed, the amount o f useful information that it 
can give is distorted, either by exaggerating the level of representation or under-playing it. When using statistical tools, 
awareness o f their limitations is an important consideration before drawing conclusions.
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presented during the whole committee. By contrast, between 1987 and 1992 there were no 
such cases where EU coordination resulted in only a couple of common statements as 
outcomes. However, it is interesting to note that with the exception of the first period, all 
other periods contained some committee meetings where there were very high levels of 
EU representation (0.292, 0.279, 0.215, 0.249). These cases are the reason for the positive 
skew of the sample distribution, but they tell a far more important story in relation to the 
thesis. They show that the EU Member States can coordinate their common representation 
very effectively, and have been able to do so for a long period of time, since Period 2 
(1981-1986). The question that arises from this is what issue areas do they work this closely 
in, and have they been the same throughout the survey? This question will be answered in 
Section 3.
iv. Identifiable trends
Before moving on to Section 3, this section should be concluded with a brief 
comparison of the results from the Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The first table showed a peak 
level of representation during the second period of the study (1981-1986), followed by a 
gradual decline over the third and fourth periods, where the EU Member States were 
represented on average at 1.5 technical committee meetings per year (or 46.9%). The level 
rose in the fifth period to two committee meetings, higher than either Period 1 or Period 4, 
and as a percentage nearly as high as Periods 2 and 3. Table 4.2 shows a rise in intensity of 
representation over the first three periods to a peak between 1987 and 1992, which then 
declines over the two following periods. What sort of relationship should we expect to find 
between the two? Answers can be grouped as those that see EU coordination as a finite 
resource and those that see no limit to the outputs of coordination. The former position 
assumes coordination is a zero-sum business and more time spent in one area means less
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time for another area. In this case, when the EU is represented more often, the intensity of 
representation would be expected to decrease. Intergovernmental theories endorse these 
predictions based on the constant need to drive bargains between Member States. On the 
other hand the latter position is supported by supranational theories, where coordination is 
a positive-sum business and the more it is entered into the greater the demand for more 
coordination in other areas. The logic of integration predicts that representation can be 
more frequent and higher in intensity simultaneously.
Neither position is conclusively refuted or supported by the data in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. The most significant periods are 3, 4 and 5. In Period 3 the data shows that highly 
intensive representation (0.148) coincided with a high percentage of participation in 
technical committees, (66.7%), and appears to substantiate neofunctional predictions about 
the likelihood of wider (more frequent representation in more issue areas) and deeper 
(more interventions per committee) occurring simultaneously. Periods 4 and 5 appear to 
refute this, each exhibiting either depth or width but not both. In Period 4 there is a 
marked decline in width seen in the fact the EU Member States were only represented in 
46.9% of committees, yet spoke ffequendy in them (0.099). Period 5 exhibits the opposite 
trend, with considerable width (64.5% of committee meetings) but saying much less in 
them (0.052). Thus without being able to discern clear trends, the chapter turns to look at 
the issue areas under discussion. It was observed that in four of the five periods there has 
been very intensive representation despite variance in the mean level. This pointed to the 
possibility that the EU is better represented in certain policy areas than others, and if this is 
so, then the power to set the ILC agenda influences EU Member State behaviour.
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3. EU Member State representation by issue area
This section answers the question in which issue areas have the EU Member States 
been represented and have they changed over time? In order to do so the technical 
committees that the EU Member States has been represented in that are listed in Appendix 
1 have been sorted by issue area. The categories of issue area have been taken from Article 
137 of the Treaty of the European Community, part of Tide XI on Social Policy, 
Employment, Vocational Training and Youth.59 Table 4.3 lists the nine issue areas (two are 
not used as no instruments fell into them), the decision-making procedure in Council, and 
into each group the ILO instrument, how the EU was represented (Presidency or 
Commission) and the participation level (averaged over two sessions where appropriate). 
The purpose of doing this is to see in which policy areas the EU has been well represented, 
and for how long. Therefore in this section the data is not been divided into time periods, 
but issue areas. The columns in Table 4.3 list the issue area, the paragraph in Article 137 
from which they come, the method of decision-making in the Council on that issue on the 
left o f the table, and on the right the columns give information about the ILO instrument 
being drafted in the technical committees, the year o f completion, who represented the EU 
Member States and the participation level.60 The six instruments at the bottom of the table 
do not fit into the Article 137 categories.
59 The 11 paragraphs are: (a) health and safety, (b) working conditions, (c) social security, (d) termination o f  employment, 
(e) information and consultation o f workers, (f) representation and collective defence, (g) rights o f nationals from third 
countries, (h) excluded persons, (i) equality, 0  social exclusion and (k) the modernisation o f social protection. The 
classification uses the version o f Article 137 that was revised in Nice 2000. N o attempt has been made to apply the 
relevant version o f Article 137 to the specific time period under study because it was decided that one rigid set of 
categories was simpler than applying multiple ones over time.
60 When the technical committee met twice the participation level is calculated by averaging the scores from both 
meetings.
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i. Issue areas
The first striking feature is the concentration of representation in the first two issue 
areas, ‘the improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers’ 
health and safety’ (§a, referred to throughout as “health and safety”) and ‘working 
conditions’ (§b). With 15 instruments relating to health and safety and 13 to working 
conditions, they account for over half of the EU representation during the survey, with 15 
other instruments split over the seven remaining issue areas, and six outside.61 Looking at 
the years the instruments were completed, we see that a health and safety issue (the 
Minimum age of employment62) was the first area in which the EU Member States 
coordinated a common position in the name of the EU, and that there has been consistent 
representation in this area throughout the whole survey. The working conditions 
committees display similar characteristics, starting in 1976 with a series of conventions 
concerning the working conditions of seafarers, and continuing right through to 2005 
Fishing Sector instrument.63 The 15 remaining instruments in which the EU was 
represented during the drafting process in technical committees correspond to seven issue 
areas in Article 137. The majority fell into ‘the modernisation of social protection systems’ 
(§k), although the treaty clearly states that it is ‘without prejudice to point (c)’.64 If a pattern 
has emerged showing a high level of coordination in health and safety and working 
conditions over the length of the survey, why is there only sporadic coordination in the
61 This totals 49 and is less than the 71 recorded in Table 4.1 because a number o f instruments had EU coordination at the 
first and second committee meeting.
62 The convention concerning the Minimum age o f employment (Cl 38) is o f the eight core labour standards that are 
promoted globally by the ILO through the 1998 Declaration on the Fundament Rights at Work which made universal 
ratification o f the eight instruments a priority. This has been classified as a health and safety issue because it is about the 
basic protection o f children. Similarly, the convention concerning the worst forms o f child labour (Cl 82) has also been 
included as a health and safety issue.
63 The convention concerning the fishing sector failed to be adopted in the 2005 ILC plenary, the only instrument to fail 
during the survey. Since coordination did take place, the data has been left in the tables.
64 The difference between the two is the voting procedure, with QMV applied to §k and Unanimity to §c. There is a 
discussion o f this below.
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other issue areas? The answers will become clear by the end of this section, after looking at 
the significance of Council voting procedures, representation and the level of participation.
ii. Council voting procedures
Table 4.3 includes a column showing how each issue area is voted on in Council 
meetings, either by qualified majority voting (QMV) or unanimity (Una). The reason for 
including this was the hypothesis proposed by intergovernmental theory that in issue areas 
where the Council works on a unanimity principle there would be lower levels of 
coordination (and hence representation) in the technical committees. This is because these 
issues are deemed by the EU Member States to be closer to national interests and therefore 
less likely to be considered suitable for EU common representation. The data in the table 
supports the former statement, namely that there has been limited EU representation in 
the three issue areas decided by unanimity, ‘social security and social protection for 
workers’ (§c), ‘protection of workers where their employment is terminated’ (§d, referred 
to throughout as “termination of employment”) and ‘conditions of employment for third- 
country nationals legally residing in Community territory’ (§g referred to as “migrant 
workers’). In these cases the Presidency has spoken for the EU Member States but the 
level of participation has been very low, except in the 2004 general discussion on migrant 
workers. However, this was a general discussion and was not a policy-making committee.
The table does not support the second statement that supranational representation 
to the same extent. All other issue areas are covered by this type of decision-making in 
Council, and there are very varied levels of representation, both in terms of time and 
intensity. In keeping with the conclusions drawn above, there does not seem to be a trend 
towards closer union and greater representation based on the supranational pillar of the
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Community that we might expect. While we can say with a degree of confidence that the 
Member States are willing to draw the line at areas of national interest, they are not willing 
to move freely towards common representation in other areas as a neofunctional theory 
predicts.
Hi. Representation
The table clearly illustrates an established pattern of who speaks for the EU and 
when. There are three possibilities: the Presidency speaking alone, the European 
Commission speaking alone or a combination of both speaking together in the same 
meeting. Least frequent is European Commission representation of the EU Member States 
alone, which happened only twice, once in 1975 and once in 1985, both times relating to 
the issue of ‘equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities 
and treatment at work’ (§i referred to as “equality”). Each time only one statement was 
made, (this is shown in Appendix 1 and reflected in the very low participation level, 0.008 
and 0.011) and on both occasions it was in a general discussion. The table shows five 
instruments in the field of health and safety where the Commission represented the EU in 
tandem with the Presidency over nine years between 1984 and 1993. They were 
consecutive instruments in the regular conferences, interrupted only by the 1986 
Convention concerning seafarers’ health protection (C164) that was drafted in the 1986 
special maritime conference. By far the most common occurrence was the Presidency 
speaking to represent the EU Member States alone, which occurred 41 out of 49 times in 
the survey.
What factors explain the eight non-conforming cases in the sample? Looking first 
at the two examples when the Commission represented the EU Member States alone, their
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contribution to general discussions is a notable feature. In both cases the Commission 
explained European Community policy in a general discussion; in 1986 the general 
discussion on youth employment was lead by the Presidency and the EU was not 
represented in a general discussion again until 2003.65 In terms of the theories being tested 
in the thesis, it offers evidence that the logic of integration appeared to be working in 1975, 
with the representation of the EU by the supranational authority. However, this practice 
stopped after 1986, and responsibility for speaking in general discussions was taken over by 
the Presidency in 1986 but that representation was not considered important until 2003. 
This implies that the logic of integration was curbed during the mid-1980s and 
intergovemmentalism returned to the fore.
More common was the practice of the Presidency and the Commission 
representing the EU Member States together. This began in 1984 and represented a new 
phase in EU Member State representation that suggested economic integration was leading 
to common external representation. To a neofuctionalist this would be a sign of an ever 
closer union being built by the Member States. Alternatively, Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmental theory asserts that through intergovernmental bargaining new powers 
are intentionally handed over to the supranational authority by the Member States. While 
the former expects integration to occur gradually over time, the latter locates change in the 
periods after intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) and new treaties. Two statements 
from Commission staff during the opening remarks in the technical committee drafting the 
convention concerning safety and health in construction (Cl 67) are significant. The 
‘harmonisation of health and safety is part of the completion of the Internal Market* (ILO, 
1987h: §15) was stated at the first discussion in 1987, while one year later a Commission
65 Occupational safety and health (2003), The employment relationship (2003), Migrant workers (2004) and youth 
employment (2005).
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delegate said that the ‘Single European Act would enable safety and health legislation to be 
adopted by majority vote’. (ILO, 1988h: §20) From these two statements the reason for the 
Commission becoming involved in representing the EU Member States is explicidy linked 
to the expansion of the common market and the Single European Act (SEA). Combined 
with the evidence that the Commission stated playing an active role in representing the EU 
Member States in 1984 (the first discussion of the C l61 that was completed in 1985), 
neither the neofunctional nor liberal intergovernmental theory is successfully supported or 
refuted. While the reference to the SEA points to it being seen as significant in explaining 
the position of the EU Member States, there is no discemable change in representation 
before and after the treaty.
A discemable change in representation is very clear after 1993, when the European 
Commission stopped representing the EU Member States. This coincided with the 
ratification of the Maastricht treaty, but the more compelling reason for the absence of the 
Commission is the European Court of Justice Opinion 2/91. The European Commission 
claimed it was the relevant authority to decide if the Member States could ratify the 
Convention concerning safety in the use of chemicals (Cl 70), something that was 
contested by a number of the Member States. After hearing petitions from both sides the 
ECJ’s opinion favoured the Member States, upholding their claim that they remained the 
relevant authority because of their membership of the ILO. However it also accepted the 
point raised by the Commission that some issues discussed in the ILO were Community 
competency and the Member States were unable to act unilaterally without consultation 
together. The Court obliged the Member States to coordinate in these areas, and while we 
see a continuation of high levels of participation in health and safety issues (e.g. mining 
(Cl76), agriculture (Cl 84) and occupational health (Cl 86)), the Commission no longer 
played any role representing the EU. From the perspective of liberal intergovemmentalism,
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this is an example of an intergovernmental bargain between the Member States (since they 
were divided over the issue) being locked-in through the use of ECJ (the third stage 
‘institutional choice’ of the model).
iv. Level of participation
The final column o f the table to look at is the level of participation. The data in the 
column substantiates a number of the claims made above. In the area of health and safety, 
the participation level rises steeply in 1981, and is consistently high to the end of the survey 
in 2005, dipping only in the 2003 general discussion.66 Thus despite the changes in who 
represented the EU, health and safety has always been an area of strong coordination and 
representation. The area of working conditions has nearly as long a history of 
representation as health and safety, although the level of participation has been consistently 
lower. It peaked in 1990-1991 with the convention concerning the working conditions in 
hotels and restaurants (Cl 72) but has fallen since then. Despite the relatively low level of 
participation, the fact that there has been representation tells us that the EU Member 
States coordinate in this area.
The next three issue areas in Table 4.3 are all decided by unanimity in the Council 
and there has been very litde EU representation in these areas, both in terms of the 
number of committee meetings and the level of participation. The relationship between 
voting procedure in the Council of Ministers and representation has been discussed above, 
as has the issue area of equality being addressed by the Commission. The remaining three 
issue areas are: ‘the integration of persons excluded from the labour market’ (§h referred to
66 The low level o f participation in the convention concerning the worst forms o f child labour (Cl 82) is because the EU 
were part of a larger group o f around 40 states that coordinated common statements. The EU was not mentioned by 
name, and for the reasons discussed in the methodological section of Chapter 1 are not counted in the data sample.
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as “excluded persons”); ‘the combating of social exclusion’ (§j); and ‘the modernisation of 
social protection systems’ (§k). The trend in both excluded persons and social protection is 
a rise in the level of participation followed by a decline, with the former peaking in 1986 
and the latter in 1988.
v. Identifiable trends
In Section 1 EU representation was measured by counting the number of technical 
committee meetings per conference and as a percentage of all technical committees over 
the five time periods. When the data was compared over time there was a discemable peak 
during the second period, followed by a decline and a rise again in the fifth period. Across 
the whole survey the average number of technical committees at which the EU was 
represented was two per conference, although there was a steady decline in the number of 
technical committees. From the data in Table 4.3 we can see that the variations in the level 
of representation peaked during the period in which a large number of health and safety 
issues were on the agenda. This shows that frequency of EU representation is heavily 
influenced by the ILC agenda, the issue areas it covers and how many issues are discussed. 
This means that when testing the validity of theories that predict the course of integration 
based in intra-EU variables (such as neofunctionalism), the impact of exogenous 
independent variables (such as ILC agenda setting) must be considered.
In Section 2 the measurement technique was refined by looking at the intensity of 
representation. Although the frequency of representation is partially determined by the 
external variable of the ILC agenda, the amount of representation remains internally 
determined. Over the five periods of study the mean and median levels of participation 
both showed a peak period of representation between 1987 and 1992. Data from Table 4.3
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shows that of the 13 committee meetings during this period, five were health and safety 
related, four related to working conditions and four to the modernisation of social 
protection.67 These three issue areas have the highest frequency of representation and are 
all decided in Council by QMV, which points to the conclusion that the ILC agenda 
between 1987 and 1992 was particularly conducive to EU representation. Once again this 
means that the increased intensity of EU representation was not exclusively due to intra- 
EU logic, but affected by external variables. However, we could argue that because of the 
changes introduced by the SEA and the development of the Single Market, it was possible to 
increase representation in these areas. This reverses the causal direction of the argument, 
and means that the reason why we attribute significance to the area of health and safety 
(such as stating that the EU is most frequendy represented there) is the result of the 
development of Community competency. The concrete insight that Table 4.3 gives to the 
results derived from Table 4.2 is that there were mutually conducive circumstances during 
the period 1987 and 1992 in both the ILC agenda and the development of the EU. 
Disentangling the two in order to give a one-way direction of causality is not easy, and 
trying to do so would probably lead to missing important points. We will return to this 
point after gathering more information.
4. Implications for theory
The answers to the three questions set out at the beginning of this chapter will help 
to identify which of the different theories have been able to predict the behaviour of the 
EU Member States and their common representation in the technical committee meetings 
of the annual conference.
67 The committee meetings were: C167 (2), C170 (2), C174 (1), C171 (2), C172 (2), C168 (2), C173 (2).
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Who has represented the EU, how often and when? Table 4.1 shows that the 
European Commission has only represented the EU on ten occasions out of 71 committee 
meetings, twice acting alone and eight times in conjunction with the Presidency.68 In terms 
of a shifting balance between the intergovernmental and supranational approaches to 
understanding European integration, the evidence points far more to the former than the 
latter. This fact alone is not sufficient to refute neofunctionalism, but taking into account 
when the Commission played a role does provide substantial evidence against it. The 
chronological order is the reverse of what we would expect to see if the logic o f integration 
was at work. The first representation by the supranational European Commission without 
the Presidency took place in 1975, only two years after the first representation by the 
Presidency. The second occurrence was ten years later, and after that all Commission 
representation took place in conjunction with the Presidency. The joint representation
I
ended in 1993 and did not appear again until 2003. This pattern is the opposite of what 
neofunctionalism would predict, and throws into doubt any possibility of an incremental 
growth of external representation.
The intergovernmental approach predicts the retaining of power in the Member 
States and the promotion of national interests, which is a plausible explanation for stable 
frequency of representation over the length of the survey. Since there is no long-term 
increase in representation, and the level of representation in Period 1 (1973-1980) is higher 
than period four (1993-1997), one could interpret this as showing that integration has not 
had any noticeable effect on representation. The changes in representation that we would 
expect to see if liberal intergovernmental theory was applicable are not clearly discemable,
68 Note that Table 4.1 shows all committee meetings where common representation took place, while Table 4.3 shows all 
instruments where common representation took place. When common representation took place in two committee 
meetings in successive years discussing one instrument, this is counted twice in Table 4.1 and once in Table 4.3.
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with the largest change between periods coming before the SEA. The impact of the SEA 
was to slightly diminish representation, the impact of Maastricht was to diminish it further, 
and the Amsterdam Treaty improved it slightly. In Section 1 the data showed fairly 
constant levels of EU Member State representation despite a declining number of technical 
committees per year. Evidence was given to show that representation was prioritised for 
second discussions, which limited the total number per conference. However, by applying 
the sociological school of new institutionalism this level of representation is explained as 
being the level that agreed by EU Member States. Once started, successive Presidencies 
based their coordination on previous years*, practices.69 Consociational theory posits that 
the Presidency is the compromise between the supranational and intergovernmental 
approaches to decision-making. The early activity of the Commission, followed by its 
gradual demise could be interpreted as an embedding of the status-quo compromise 
between the two approaches to EU integration, which since 1993 has been established. 
The re-emergence in 2003 of the European Commission is a challenge by supranationalism 
on the equilibrium position of the previous ten years.
How much has the EU been represented and has it changed over time? The data 
from Table 4.2 added more definition to the picture sketched out in Table 4.1. The process 
of change was made much clearer, with rise an identifiable peak in the intensity of 
representation between 1987 and 1992. During the periods either side there was a rise 
from, and decline to, approximately the same level (0.050). This data refutes 
neofunctionalism through the demonstration of considerable decline after a period of 
growth, and refutes intergovemmentalism because it shows that coordination and common 
representation can be considerable at times. Consociational theory is difficult to apply to
69 Note how the UK prepared for the 1977 ILC by consulting the German diplomats who worked on the 1974ILC.
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the data, since it shows no evidence of establishing an equilibrium. However, liberal 
intergovernmental theory appears to be substantiated insofar as after the Single European 
Act we can observe a noticeable change in Member State behaviour, as noted by Tsebelis 
and Garrett in their ‘second epoch’. (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001) Furthermore, taking into 
consideration the ECJ opinion of 1993 we have an example of an institutionalised 
agreement to end Commission involvement in the ILO negotiations. The insight from the 
institutional approach that misfit is an important determinant in the level of policy 
integration taking place fits with the period of peak representation. Like LI, the legislation 
undertaken in Period 3 after the SEA resulted in a prolonged period of Europeanization 
and consequendy a high level of common representation.
Section 3 answered the question of which issue areas has the EU been represented 
and have they changed over time. Neofunctionalism is supported by the finding that 
representation increases in issue areas where there is QMV in Council, illustrating a 
spillover from the supranational decision-making processes inside the European 
Community to the external representation in the ILO. The highest intensity of 
coordination are found in these issue areas, although, as mentioned above, the trend over 
time is not one of growth as would be predicted. Conversely, issue areas requiring 
unanimity between Member States in Council are seldomly represented in the ILO, and 
when they have been, it has been very low intensity. Liberal intergovernmental theory 
predicts that after the various treaties we should see substantial changes in representation, 
either in an issue area or across issue areas. The increase in representation around the 1986 
SEA appears to substantiate this position, while the subsequent treaties appear to have 
done nothing to improve the level of representation, described as the ‘third epoch’. 
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001) A more significant event is the 1993 ECJ opinion (2/91) that 
produced an institutional agreement to represent the EU in technical committees
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exclusively through the Presidency. The decrease in the level of policy misfit between the 
Member States and EU-level policy caused by pressure to Europeanization and create 
Community law is substantiated by the empirical data regarding issue areas. The areas of 
higher representation are also those in which the level of incompatible policies has been 
minimised.
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5. Summary
This chapter looks at who represents the EU Member States in technical 
committees in the annual ILCs, based on data recorded in Appendix 1. Three questions 
were asked of representation: by whom, how much and in which issues? Three of the five 
crosscutting issues introduced in the previous chapter were identified as useful issues to 
consider; the role of the Commission and the Presidency, the technical issue under 
discussion, and the possibly of change over time. There are five key findings in this 
chapter. The first is that the content of the ILC agenda is an important exogenous variable. 
The second is that there is a wide variation in the level of representation over the course of 
the survey, implying that the level of EU representation varies according to the particular 
issue area under discussion. Thirdly, it was demonstrated that there is a higher level of 
representation in issues that are the subject of qualified majority voting in the Council, as 
defined in Article 137 of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC). Fourthly, the 
most common form of EU representation was by the Presidency speaking on behalf of the 
EU, (61/71 times), while joint representation by the Presidency and Commission staff took 
place eight times, and the Commission staff spoke alone twice. Finally, there was a change 
in representation following the publication of the ECJ Opinion 2/91, after which the 
Commission refrained from representing the EU for ten years. It was argued that the 
Opinion was an institutional agreement as defined by liberal intergovernmental theory.
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Table 4.1: E U  Member State representation in technical committee meetings listed by Presidency,
Commission and Combined representation, 1973-2005, aggregated into Jive periods.
Period Conferences Presidency
Represent’n
Commission 
Represent’ n
Combined
Represent’n
Total no. of 
Committees 
Represented
Represented/
Committees/
Percentage*
1973-1980 9 13 1 0 14 1.6/4.1 39.0%
1981-1986 7 16 1 2 19 2.7/4.0 67.5%
1987-1992 6 9 0 4 13 2.2/3.3 66.7%
1993-1997 6 8 0 1 9 1.5/3.2 46.9%
1998-2005 8 15 0 1 16 2.0/3.1 64.5%
1973-2005 36 61 2 8 71 2.0/3.5 57.1%
Key:
Conferences: number o f conferences during the time period.
Presidency Representation: Committee meetings where only the Presidency spoke on behalf of the EU.
Commission Representation: Committee meetings where only staff from the Commission spoke on behalf o f the EU. 
Combined Representation: Committee meetings where the Presidency and the Commission spoke on behalf o f the EU. 
Total number o f Committee meetings: Sum o f all committee meetings in which the EU was represented. 
Represented/Committees/ Percentage* This column shows three pieces of data used in the following calculation:
1: total number o f committee meetings at which the EU was represented divided by number o f conferences;
2: the average number o f technical committee meetings per conference during the period;
3: (1) divided by (2) to give level o f representation measured as a percentage o f all technical committees held.
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Table 4.2: Level o f E U  participation in technical committee meetings where E U  Member State
representation took place, 1973-2005, aggregated into five periods.
Year Total Lowest Highest Range Median Mean
1973-1980 14 0.003 0.142 0.139 0.032 0.049
1981-1986 19 0.005 0.292 0.287 0.047 0.075
1987-1992 13 0.043 0.279 0.236 0.116 0.148
1993-1997 9 0.003 0.215 0.212 0.094 0.099
1998-2005 16 0.001 0.249 0.248 0.035 0.052
Key:
Total: number o f technical committees during which the EU was represented during the time period.
Lowest Lowest level o f participation recorded during the time period.
Highest Highest level o f participation recorded during the time period.
Range: Highest level minus lowest leveL
M edian : Middle value along the range o f participation levels (e.g. the 8th value in a set o f 15)
Mean: Sum o f all values o f participation levels divided by the total number o f committee meetings
Notes:
All data is expressed as a decimal calculated by dividing the total number of EU statements (Presidency + Commission) by 
the total number o f paragraphs o f the provisional record o f that technical meeting.
Possible range: 0.000 would mean no statements were made; 1.000 would mean that every paragraph o f the provisional 
record contained a reference to an EU statement (e.g. highest figure 0.292 means that nearly one in three paragraphs 
contained an EU common statement).
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Table 4.3: EU  Member State Representation in ILC  technical committees listed by relevance to Article 
137 of the Treaty of the European Community, 1973-2005
Issue Area Article 137 § Council ILO instrument Year Representation Participation
Voting Level
Health and safety (a) QMV C138: Minimum Age 1973 Presidency 0.025
C148: Environment 1977 Presidency 0.038
C155: OSH 1981 Presidency 0.186
C161: Health Service 1985 Pres+Comm 0.197
C162: Asbestos 1986 Pres+Comm 0.097
C l64: Seafarers Health 1986 Presidency 0.147
C167: Construction 1988 Pres+Comm 0.198
C170: Chemicals 1990 Pres+Comm 0.173
C174: Industrial Accid. 1993 Pres+Comm 0.142
C176: Mining 1995 Presidency 0.132
C182: Child Labour 1999 Presidency 0.005
C184: Agriculture 2001 Presidency 0.169
R194: Occ Disease 2002 Presidency 0.075
Gen: OSH 2003 Presidency 0.036
C186: Occ. Health 2005 Presidency 0.173
Working conditions (b) QMV R153: Seafarer protect 1976 Presidency 0.015
C145: Seafarer employ 1976 Presidency 0.024
C146: Seafarer Leave 1976 Presidency , 0.053
C147: Merchant Ship 1976 Presidency 0.072
C153: Road transport 1979 Presidency 0.081
C l 66: Sea’ Repatriation 1986 Presidency 0.034
C171: Night Work 1990 Presidency 0.096
C172: Hotels & Rest 1991 Presidency 0.178
C175: Part-time work 1994 Presidency 0.038
C177: Home Work 1996 Presidency 0.002
-----Contract Labour 1998 Presidency 0.108
Gen: Employ relation 2003 Presidency 0.042
-----Fishing Sector 2005 Presidency 0.003
Social Security (c) Una. C183: Maternity Law 2000 Presidency 0.008
Employ” Termination d) Una. C158: Employ Term” 1982 Presidency 0.007
3rd State Nationals (g) Una. C143: Migrant Work 1975 Presidency 0.019
Gen: Migrant Worker 2004 Presidency 0.034
Excluded persons (h) QMV C l59: Disabled Per 1983 Presidency 0.013
Gen: Youth Employ” 1986 Presidency 0.115
Gen: Youth Employ” 2005 Presidency 0.047
Equality 0 QMV Gen: Equal Opportunity 1975 Commission 0.008
Gen: Equal Opportunity 1985 Commission 0.011
Social Exclusion 0 QMV R162: Older Workers 1980 Presidency 0.129
Social protection (k) QMV C156: Family Respon. 1981 Presidency 0.010
modernisation R169: Employ” Policy 1984 Presidency 0.070
C165: Sea’ Soc Secure 1986 Presidency 0.041
C168: Employ” Prom 1988 Presidency 0.152
C173: Insolvency 1992 Presidency 0.072
Non-classified in Article - _ C160: Labour Statistics 1985 Presidency 0.101
137 C181: Private agencies 1997 Presidency 0.064
R189: Job Creation 1998 Presidency 0.051
R193: Coop promotion 2002 Presidency 0.002
C l85 Seafarer Identity 2003 Pres+Comm 0.003
R195 Human resources 2004 Presidency 0.001
Notes:
Article 137 § e (information and consultation) and f  (representation and collective defence) did not apply to any o f the 
instruments considered.
Gen: General Discussion
Contract Labour and Fishing Sector did not result in instruments being concluded. The former was aborted after the 
divisions between tripartite members were too great, while the latter failed to be adopted by the plenary.
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C h a p t e r  5
EU MEMBER STATE VOTING COHESION IN TECHNICAL
COORDINATION
This chapter builds on the findings presented in the previous one, which looked at 
EU Member State representation at the International Labour Conferences (ILC) from 
1973 to 2005. In Chapter 1 a two-stage analytical process was described, linking 
coordination to representation in the first step and representation to voting cohesion in the 
second step. This chapter presents further empirical data on technical coordination found 
in Appendix 1, comparing EU Member State voting cohesion with the occurrence o f EU 
Member State representation. The chapter is structured around the following four 
questions:
• Is there a relationship between EU representation and EU Member State voting 
cohesion?
• Is EU Member State voting cohesion explained by the general pattern o f voting in 
the ILC?
• Which Member States are likely to disrupt cohesive voting?
• In which issue area(s) is non-cohesive voting more likely to occur?
It should be noted that throughout the analysis of voting cohesion in technical 
instruments the expectation is that all EU Member States will vote for the adoption of 
instruments onto the ILO statute in the plenary record vote. This assumption is supported 
by the data, which in the survey of 102 record votes in the plenary and a total of 1199 
votes cast by EU Member States between 1973 and 2005, only 47 were cast as either
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abstentions or votes against the adoption of the instrument.70 This means that 96.2% of 
votes cast were for the adoption of an instrument, and this is explained by one observer 
with experience of negotiating ILO instruments by the unwillingness of governments to 
jeopardise the adoption of an instrument they have invested considerable time in 
negotiating.71 To do so would lead to the criticism that they do not consider the ILO to be 
a credible institution, and if the ILO fails to perform its mandate the blame falls on 
governments for their lack of support. Given the very high levels of EU Member State 
voting cohesion, the occasions when cohesion is broken have additional significance due to 
their rarity. The relatively small number of cases makes a detailed study of why it occurs 
possible. One final point to note is that the number of record votes in which there is no 
EU Member State cohesion is less than the number of actual votes against and abstentions 
(47). This is because sometimes more than one Member State votes against or abstains.
1. EU Member State representation and EU Member State voting cohesion
A working hypothesis of this section is that the EU Member States are more likely 
to vote cohesively to adopt an instrument if they have been commonly represented by the 
Presidency or the European Commission during the drafting of the instrument. This is 
based on the assumption that representation is founded on coordination, and that
70 This is calculated as follows:
1973-1980: 33 record votes and 9 Member States: 297 votes cast 
1981-1985:17 record votes and 10 Member States: 170 votes cast.
1986-1994:26 record votes and 12 Member States: 312 votes cast 
1995-2003: 23 record votes and 15 Member States: 345 votes cast 
2004-2005: 3 record votes and 25 Member States: 75 votes cast.
Total 1199; see Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for Member State voting records
71 Interview, London 5 July 2004. This point was made in specifically about the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Rights at 
Work.
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coordination facilitates both common EU interests and an EU identity. Speaking together 
and voting together appear logically consistent, and this can be explained by all the theories 
considered. Neofunctional theory predicts common interests, which form the foundations 
of common representation and will be promoted through voting cohesion. While 
intergovernmental theory is sceptical about the successfulness of coordination, in low 
salience issues where representation takes place (national interests permitting), common 
voting is possible. The important difference between the two is that EU membership has 
not changed national interests. Liberal intergovernmental theory concurs, because 
exercising vetoes (such as voting against the adoption of an instrument) is used by Member 
States as a bargaining tool, but in the case here would only damage their credibility as a 
negotiator. While consociational theory emphasises the need for a clear distinction between 
the Member States and the Community, the Member States retain an interest in ensuring 
that the Community functions well as a political entity and we would expect cohesive 
voting after representation. Institutional approaches concur, working on the basis of 
assuming that once Europeanization has taken place, i.e. after a policy misfit and 
adaptation between the national and EU-level policies has happened, common interests 
will be agreed. Thus representation and voting cohesion are in support of those interests.
Table 5.1 shows the aggregated data gathered from the 102 record votes on the 
adoption of an instrument onto the ILO statute listed in Appendix 1. The results of the 
votes are sorted by two separate criteria. The first is whether the EU Member States were 
represented during the drafting of the instrument (noted in bold type in Appendix 1) and 
this is the independent (or explanatory) variable. The second is whether the EU Member 
States voted cohesively, or whether either one or more Member State abstained or voted
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against an instrument, and this is the dependent (or response) variable.72 If the hypothesis 
set out above is correct, we would expect to find high levels of voting cohesion after 
common representation.
The data found in the first and second rows of the table supports this hypothesis. 
The level of voting cohesion after common EU representation is 74.6%; while in record 
votes in which there has been no common representation the frequency drops to 61.3%. 
Further supporting evidence is found in the data on abstention and votes cast against the 
adoption of an instrument. Abstentions rise from 21.1% to 29% in the absence of 
common representation, and the example of votes against appears even more conclusive, 
rising from 4.2% to 9.7% in the absence of common representation. Thus on first appraisal 
the data seems to support the hypothesis by demonstrating the trends predicted.
However, it is also important to determine how significant the data is, in terms of 
whether the magnitude of trend is convincing enough to remain confident that there is a 
genuine association between representation and cohesive voting. Using statistical analysis 
to test the level of association between the two variables, we find that we cannot 
confidendy rule out the possibility that there is no association between representation and 
voting cohesion (i.e. we cannot reject the null hypothesis).73 We do not need to rely on 
statistical calculations alone to see this, since the bottom row of figures aggregating all 
record votes together clearly points to the same story. In this row all the data is grouped 
together regardless of whether common EU representation took place. By doing this, but
72 During some record votes one or more abstention and one or more vote against were cast in the same ballot In such 
cases the vote is recorded once in the ‘against’ category (to avoid double-counting).
73 This was done by using a chi-square test for significance. The chi-square value of 2.264 at 2 degrees o f  freedom places 
the value close to 0.30 (2.408) along a normal distribution curve. Under normal circumstances the null hypothesis is 
only rejected when the chi-square value falls at 0.05 or less on the distribution curve, which corresponds to higher than 
95% certainty. See Appendix 5 for full calculations.
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still sorting the group data into the three categories of cohesive voting, abstentions and 
votes against, we are able to see what happens when the explanatory variable is ignored. If 
after doing this we do not see a large change in the results, we know that the explanatory 
variable does not explain very much. This is exacdy what we see when we compare the 
level of cohesion overall (70.6%) with the level after common representation (74.6%). This 
jump of only 4% is too small to be sure that the hypothesis that EU representation leads to 
cohesive voting by the EU Member States is correct.
This finding is surprising and seems to go against the predictions o f all of the 
theories considered. However, it is an aggregation over 32 years and as was shown in the 
previous chapter, there have been ebbs and flows in the level of representation during the 
five periods of the survey. Therefore it would not be surprising if aggregating these 
fluctuations lead to the appearance of no statistical significance between the two. Yet this 
defence of the theories, predictions remains speculative until a more thorough investigation 
into the voting cohesion of the EU Member States has been undertaken. The following 
three sections provide the investigation, after which we will reconsider whether there is a 
relationship between representation and voting cohesion after all.
2. EU Member State voting cohesion in the ILC
This section answers the question of whether EU Member State voting cohesion 
can be explained by general voting patterns in the ILC. If this were the case, it would lend 
weight to the evidence suggesting that there is no association between representation and 
voting cohesion. Instead it would show that the different voting behaviour of the EU 
Member States is a reflection of larger divisions across all voting delegates at the ILC. It 
would also give an alternative explanation for why the EU Member States have been
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observed voting in the way that they have. The hypothesis under consideration here is that 
there is an ideological division in the ILO between economic liberalisation and less market 
regulation on the one hand, and social democracy and more market regulation on the other 
hand. The two non-governmental partners in the ILO represent the poles of the 
ideological spectrum, with employers’ federations on the right and workers’ trade unions 
on the left. Governments are situated between the two and may move closer to one or the 
other over time, according to the preferences of the party in government. Although the 
ILO strives to reach agreement through consensus whenever possible,74 it is not always 
possible and the vote to adopt an instrument is an opportunity to voice protest against its 
content. The division in the vote to adopt an instrument is a measure of the level of 
consensus between the tripartite constituents, with unanimity showing complete 
consensus.
The data tables in this section are drawn up from the record votes listed in 
Appendix 1. The data is divided into the five periods described in Chapter 3 (1973-1980, 
1981-1986, 1987-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2005) and all votes are considered regardless of 
whether EU representation took place or not. For each record vote the number of votes 
cast ‘For’ was calculated as a percentage of the total number of ballots (‘for’, ‘against’ and 
‘abstain’), and were divided into ranges o f 5 per-cent (e.g. 95.1% to 100%). This gives a 
measure of consensus within the entire delegate body of the conference in relation to an 
instrument, ranging from 100% to the lowest level of 66.1% (which was the 2005 
convention on the fishing sector that failed to be adopted). Secondly, each record vote was 
classified by either EU Member State voting cohesion or no EU Member State voting
74 Interview, London, 5 July 2004.
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cohesion. Data was sorted by both cohesion/no cohesion and by level of plenary voting 
cohesion on the 5% scale. Tables 5.2a to 5.2e show the results for each period.
Before looking at the data in detail, the template of the tables lends itself to a 
simple form of analysis of the behaviour of the EU Member States within the ILC. On the 
left of the table is a vertical scale measuring plenary consensus, approximating to they-axis 
on a graph. Horizontally across the table is cohesion on the left and non-cohesion on the 
right, approximating to an x-axis. Considering these two factors on a 2x2 matrix we can 
construct a quadrant diagram, as shown in Diagram 5.1. In the top left hand comer, EU 
Member State voting cohesion and plenary consensus coincide. To the right plenary 
consensus is maintained but the EU Member States do not vote together. In the bottom 
left comer the EU Member States vote cohesively in record votes that show low levels of 
consensus between ILC delegates (split over ideological issues) and in the bottom right 
hand comer, low levels of consensus in the Plenary and EU Member States vote non- 
cohesively. Most importantly in terms of explaining EU Member State voting behaviour 
are two lines drawn through the centre of the diagram, one from top-left to bottom-right 
(Line A), and the other bottom-left to top-right (Line B). If EU Member States’ voting is 
influenced by the ideological division across the ILO, we would expect to see cohesion 
when there is consensus in the plenary, and no cohesion when there is little consensus in 
the plenary. This would be reflected by a clustering of data along Line A, in the top-left and 
bottom-right comers.75 However, if the data falls along Line B, then the EU Member 
States are not being influenced by the overall consensus in the plenary. These two lines are 
powerful tools to detect the influence of the plenary on the Member States’ voting.
75 In the tables the division between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ quadrants is 85%, meaning the 85.1 to 100% counts above the line, 
and 85% and less below.
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Looking at the first period (1973-1980) in Table 5.2a, we see that of the 33 record 
votes during the period, only four resulted in non-cohesive voting by the nine EU Member 
States. The majority resulted in voting cohesion (29/33 or 87.9%), and of those 29, over 
half (16) occurred in record votes where over 95% of the plenary delegates votes for the 
instrument to be adopted. In the range from 90.1 to 95% a further six instances of EU 
Member State cohesive voting took place, and the remaining seven at various intervals 
below that. By contrast, of the four record votes without cohesive EU voting, one was in 
the 75.1 to 80% range, two in the 80.1 to 85% range and only one in the 90.1 to 95% 
range. There is a clearly identifiable trend of EU Member State cohesive voting in record 
votes with high levels of overall plenary consensus, and to a lesser extent the cases of non­
cohesion fall in votes where the plenary is more divided. There is an approximate fit with 
Line A and although there are relatively few cases on non-cohesive voting and they are 
scattered closer to the bottom right comer than the top right comer.
The second period (1981-1986) illustrated in Table 5.2b is slighdy different. In this 
period there is a higher level of consensus within the entire plenary as seen by 17 out of 25 
record votes exhibiting 95.1% or more of all ILC delegates voting for the adoption of 
instruments. No votes were lower than the 75.1 to 80% range, which means that this 
period was the most harmonious in terms of tripartite consensus out of the five. Within 
this environment EU Member States voting cohesion was recorded at 20/25 or 80%, 
marginally lower than the 87.9% recorded in the previous period. Given the very high level 
of plenary consensus, it is not surprising that some instances of EU Member States voting 
non-cohesively in record votes occurred the range of 95.1 to 100% range (three times). 
Using the quadrant model to understand the distribution of the data, the top-left and top- 
right quadrants are both important which means that a simple pattern of influence from by 
the ILC plenary consensus does not explain everything.
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Table 5.2c presents the data gathered between 1987 and 1992 (Period 3) and shows 
evidence of a continuing trend over time. Voting cohesion between the EU Member States 
fell again, to 8 votes out of 14 (57.1%). However, this occurred at a time when the level of 
consensus in the ILC plenary was much lower than previous, with only 36% of 
instruments passing with more than 95.1% of the record vote (compared to 47% in Period 
1 and 68% in Period 2). Furthermore, 28.6% of the instruments were passed with less than 
75% of the delegates supporting them, compared with 6% in Period 1, and in Period 2 no 
instruments passed with such a low level o f support. In terms of appraisal through the 
quadrant model, while there are six out of eight examples of cohesive voting towards the 
top-left comer (plenary consensus), there are two in bottom-left quadrant, while on the 
other side the majority of non-cohesive EU votes also fall in the top half of the table, albeit 
clustered around the 85.1 to 90% range. Adhering to the specified boundary between the 
top and bottom of the table as the 85.1% and above ranges, the EU Member State voting 
pattern appears to be symmetrical, with roughly equal occurrences on cohesive and non- 
cohesive voting regardless of ILC plenary consensus. This shows that EU Member States 
voted independendy from the plenary consensus.
Table 5.2d shows the most dramatic shift in the pattern of EU Member State 
voting in any of the five periods. Between 1993 and 1997 the EU Member States voted far 
more ffequendy apart, achieving only 4 cohesive votes out of 17 record votes (24%). The 
reason why they were very ffequendy divided can partly be explained by the fact that 
during this period plenary consensus was not as high as at other time, with only one 
instrument being adopted with more than 95.1% of the vote. However, eight were 
recorded in the 90.1 to 95% range and another four in the 85.1 to 90% range.76 The
76 If one looks at the number o f instruments passed by more than 8 5 .1 %  o f the record vote every period except the fifth is 
sim ilar. The respective percentages are (Period 1 to Period 5) 7 2 ,8 0 ,7 3 ,7 6  and 62.
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quadrant model has a heavy bias in the direction of the top-right comer with nine split 
votes, although the corresponding quadrant in the bottom-left (EU cohesion and no 
plenary consensus) is empty. To the extent that any example corresponds accurately with a 
model (Line B), of the five periods surveyed here Period 4 is the nearest to demonstrating 
that ILC plenary consensus did not influence the voting behaviour of the Member States.
Finally, looking at Table 5.2e we see a return to a clearly established pattern of high 
levels of EU Member State voting cohesion. With 11 out of 13 cohesive votes (84.6%) the 
final period of 1998-2005 demonstrates nearly as much cohesion as between 1973-1980. 
The concentration of data in the top-left comer, along with the two instances of non­
cohesion in votes with low levels of plenary consensus corresponds to the quadrant model 
(Line A), which suggests the Member States’ voting pattern reflects the broad ideological 
trends in the plenary as a whole. However, that is not the whole story for this period, 
because there is also a high frequency of low levels of consensus in the plenary (3 record 
votes passed with less than 70.1% of the vote). This makes Period 5 the period of greatest 
ideological polarity and the record of successful EU voting cohesion should be considered 
in that light.
The purpose of this section was to ask if the general pattern of voting in the ILC 
could explain voting cohesion of EU Member States, given the evidence presented in 
Section 1 that an alternative explanation to the association between representation and 
cohesion was needed. In order to do this, a methodology was devised to compare the level 
of consensus in the ILC plenary with the instances of EU Member State voting cohesion. 
In order to make the analysis simple, a quadrant model was proposed with two lines of 
inference, one proposing that EU voting reflected ILC voting (Line A), and the other that 
it did not (Line B). When tables broadly conformed to Line A, (as they did in Period 1, 2
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and 5) we are able to say that EU voting cohesion occurred during period of consensus in 
the ILC plenary.
However, Line B shows that the EU voting cohesion was not influenced by plenary 
consensus, and this opens two alternative lines of explanation. The first is in the bottom- 
left quadrant: the EU voted cohesively despite the plenary being divided, so logic of 
integration did influence EU Member States behaviour. Alternatively, in the top-tight 
comer the EU Member States are divided despite consensus among the ILC plenary 
members. This means that although there is ideological agreement about the acceptability 
of the instrument, particular Member States still objected to it. In Period 3 there was an 
approximate symmetry between cohesion and non-cohesion, which suggests that EU 
voting cohesion took place regardless of what was happening in the ILC, and therefore 
other variables influences EU voting behaviour that were independent to the ILC plenary. 
In Period 4 the failure to vote cohesively cannot be easily attributed to ideologically 
contentious instruments that fragmented consensus in the ILC plenary as a whole. In this 
case national interests would be a good place to start the investigation.
3. EU Member States and voting deviation
Which Member States disrupt EU cohesive voting by abstaining or voting against 
the adoption of technical instrument, and why do they do it? The answer provided by 
intergovernmental theory is because national interests are more important than European 
cohesion. When there is EU Member State voting cohesion it is because the common EU 
interest is aligned to national interests, and when they are not aligned Member State voting 
behaviour follows the path that serves its own interests. According to liberal 
intergovernmental theory the pursuit of national interests is calculated over the long term,
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and Member States are more willing to accept sub -optimal collective agreements in return 
for better agreements in the future. In the same way, small Member States are more 
reluctant to challenge collective agreements because they consider the future costs of such 
action on their credibility during negotiations. However, the three most powerful Member 
States (France, Germany and the UK) still seek to maximise their national interests, 
especially in situations when they are marginalised by the European common position. By 
contrast neofunctional theory predicts closer EU integration over time and as a part of that 
we would expect to see growing voting cohesion over time too. A consociational approach 
to the study of European integration seen as a symbiotic relationship between the 
supranational Community and the intergovernmental Member States looks for tension 
between the two, and would be reflected by fluctuations in the level of cohesion over time. 
Finally, the institutional approach looks at the degree of misfit between national and EU- 
level policies. Deviating voting can be explained as a way of uploading national policies 
into the ILO that have not gained acceptance at the EU-level.
In order to see which of the theories provides the best explanatory framework for 
the empirical evidence, Table 5.3 shows the occasions on which Member States have either 
abstained from voting or voted against an instrument over the course of the survey. 
Dividing lines have been inserted to show the five periods of the survey. Table 5.4 lists the 
number of occurrences by Member State aggregated over the survey period. (It should be 
noted that states absent from the list have never abstained or voted against the adoption of 
an instrument in the period from 1973 to 2005). The data is drawn from Appendix 1 and 
instruments in bold type correspond to EU representation during their drafting.
There are a number of interesting points to note from the data presented in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4, including which states have broken the cohesion of the EU by their voting
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action, what sort of votes have been cast and how often. The United Kingdom has 
abstained from voting 18 times and voted against an instrument six times during the 
survey, and accounts for just over half of all ‘deviations’ away from a cohesive position 
(24/47).77 France has abstained seven times, followed by Portugal with five abstentions, the 
Netherlands with four, Germany with two abstentions and a vote against, and Luxembourg 
and Denmark both with two abstentions.78 The method of deviation is also noteworthy. 
The most frequent voting deviation was an abstention, practiced over the entire period of 
the survey by all of the states listed. Far less frequent was the recourse to vote against the 
adoption of an instrument, which only happened on seven occasions, all between 1994 and 
1996. Six of the seven were votes cast by the UK, while the seventh was cast by Germany, 
an otherwise compliant Member State unused to deviating.
From this we can see that the UK most frequently pursues its national interests and 
deviates from common position of the other EU Member States. France, albeit far less 
often, also pursues its national interests at the cost of EU cohesion. Germany does not 
appear to conform to this trend, having only deviated three times during the course of the 
survey, less than either the Netherlands or Portugal. However, it is the only Member State 
aside from the UK to have voted against an instrument. A vote against an instrument is a 
stronger political statement than an abstention,79 although in the ILO voting system an
77 ‘Deviation’ and to ‘deviate’ are used in this section as shorthand for either abstaining or voting against an instrument 
and refer to the actions that lead to non-cohesive voting between EU Member States. The term is borrowed from 
Lindermann. (Lindemann, 1982: 126) They are used equally for instruments where there has and has not been EU 
representation. While one might question how a state can ‘deviate’ when no coordination has taken place (or more 
specifically in the case o f this thesis’ argument, when no concrete proof o f coordination can be found). In these cases the 
record o f EU Member State voting o f 96.2% for the adoption o f all instruments can be taken as evidence that it is not 
hard to predict the behaviour of the majority o f EU states and their voting.
78 It should be pointed out that the 1975 Migrant Workers instruments (C143 and R151) were responsible for nine 
abstentions, (nearly one-quarter o f all recorded during the survey) and constitute Denmark’s only deviance, one-half of 
the Netherlands’ and two-thirds o f Germany’s deviations.
79 Interviews: London, 21 September 2004; Athens, 30 September 2004; Copenhagen, 3 March 2005; Brussels, 18 
November 2005.
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abstention is potentially a more damaging action given the quorum rule, as witnessed in the 
failure to adopt the 2005 convention on the fishing sector.80 Taken together these 
considerations point to the primacy of the large Member States acting in pursuit of national 
interests while the smaller states are less willing to do so. Indeed, out o f the thirty cases of 
non-cohesive voting, on only three occasions was one of the three large Member States not 
part of the group deviating (1990 Protocol on Night Work: Portugal, and 1997 Private 
Employment Agencies: (Cl 81/R 188) Luxembourg). This evidence points in the direction 
of liberal intergovernmental theory rather than intergovernmental theory because small 
states are less willing to deviate in comparison to the large three. Pursuing national interests 
does not preoccupy all Member States to the same extent.
Looking at the data in Table 5.3 there is no clear correlation between EU 
representation and voting deviation. O f the 30 cases, 18 were after common representation 
and 12 were after no EU representation. On balance, it would appear that voting deviation 
is slightly more likely after common representation than without. However, as shown in 
Section 1, there is no statistical significance between the two variables when aggregated 
over the length of the survey. Let us turn instead to look in detail at the five periods into 
which the survey has been divided, and see if explanations can be found for voting 
behaviour during each one.
80 The voting system in the ILO operates as follows. A record vote is passed when a simple majority o f votes are cast in 
favour, provided that a quorum o f two-thirds o f delegates registered to vote at conference is reached. To block a vote, 
either a majority o f votes must be cast against the item, or a minority o f one-third o f votes must be cast as abstentions. 
This means that an abstention is very frequently used in a tactical manner against the adoption o f an instrument or a 
resolution, rather than as signalling a neutral stance on an issue.
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i. Period 1
In the first period (1973-1980) there were five instances of voting deviation over 
four instruments out of a total of 33 record votes (12.1%), spaced at regular intervals 
(1973,1975,1977 and 1980). In each case the UK abstained from voting, and in the 1975 
Migrant Workers instrument five of the nine Member States abstained in record vote to 
adopt the convention, and four did likewise for the recommendation. This was the largest 
mass-deviation from the expected position of voting ‘for’ adoption, and given that five 
Member States out of a Community of nine abstained, the abstention constitutes the 
majority position. EU representation only took place in the second year, and only three 
interventions were made by the Presidency, to express the incompatibility of Community 
law with the instrument. In this respect, the voting deviation of the five Member States was 
not based on national interests but on Community interests, and supports neofunctional 
predictions about Community interests superseding national ones. The counterpoint to this 
is the even level of UK abstentions throughout the period, contradicting the prediction of 
an ever-closer union developing over time.
ii. Period 2
In the second period, from 1981 to 1986 there were five deviating votes, but these 
came during a period of 25 record votes, meaning 20% non-cohesion. During this period 
there were more Member States in the EU, with the accession of Greece in 1981 bringing 
the total to 10, and in 1986 Spain and Portugal joined, totalling 12. Intergovernmental 
theory predicts that voting cohesion decreases as the number of states increases, and this 
appears to be validated by the increase in non-cohesion from 12.1% between 1973 and 
1980 (Table 5.2a) to 20% (Table 5.2b). However, on closer examination the five cases of 
deviance were recorded by the UK (four) and by France (one), both of which are large
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Member States. We note from this that although the EU enlarged, the Member States that 
continued to vote independendy from the majority of Member States were large states. 
This lends more weight to liberal intergovernmental explanations that places more 
emphasis on the relative power of EU Member States, and the higher likelihood of these 
states acting alone rather than small and medium sized states.
Hi. Period 3
During Period 3 (1987-1992) there was a constant number of (12) Member States, 
and the number of instruments where there was non-coherent voting increased to six out 
of 14 record votes, or 42.9%. The third period has a number of other important 
differences to the second period. Firstly, the 1991 instruments on working conditions in 
hotels and restaurants (C172/R179) was the first time since the 1977 convention 
concerning nursing personnel that one of the large Member States (the UK) was joined by 
a smaller Member State in voting deviation (the Netherlands and Portugal). In the 
intervening 14 years the France and the UK were the only Member States to abstain in the 
vote to adopt a convention or recommendation. This was the first instrument since the 
1975 convention concerning migrant workers (Cl 43) that small Member States deviated in 
voting after common EU representation, and in 1975 it was because of an incompatibility 
between the instrument and Community law. As significant was the 1990 abstention by 
Portugal on the protocol on Night Work for Women. This was the first deviating vote cast 
by a small Member State independendy from a large Member State also casting a deviating 
vote. In terms of implications for the different theoretical schools, this period appears to 
reflect stronger intergovernmental trends, with less cohesion and smaller EU states willing 
to vote according to their national interests at the expense of cohesion. The trend of ever- 
decreasing cohesion over time is the opposite of the predictions of a neofunctional model.
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iv. Period 4
Period 4 (1993-1997) has the lowest level of cohesion during the survey. 13 out of 
17 record votes contained deviating voting by one or more Member State, or 76.4% of the 
time. Not only did the level of cohesion decrease, but the scale of the deviation increased, 
seen in the seven cases of voting against the adoption of an instrument. This behaviour 
was not observed in any other period, and as noted above was limited to the large EU 
Member States, (UK six times, Germany once). O f the 20 actual instances of voting 
deviation (some instruments contained more than one deviating vote) five were from small 
EU Member States. Portugal abstained three times with either the UK (twice) or France 
(once) accompanying them in voting deviation, but Luxembourg alone abstained during 
the voting for the adoption of the convention and recommendation concerning private 
employment agencies (Cl 81/R188). This was the only other example apart from the 1990 
Protocol where a small state alone deviated from the expected behaviour.
Singling out exceptional behaviour by the UK proves difficult given its very high 
level of deviation over the entire survey. However, the period from 1994-1996 is 
particularly noteworthy with four abstentions and six votes against. In 1994 the UK voted 
against the adoption of an instrument for the first time, the convention concerning part- 
time work (Cl 75), while Portugal and France both abstained, and abstained during the 
record vote to adopt the accompanying recommendation (R182). In 1996 the UK voted 
against the adoption of both the convention and recommendation concerning home-work 
(C177/R184), with Germany also voting against the convention. In November 1996 there 
was an addition maritime conference at which the UK continued to vote against and 
abstain during the adoption of instruments. This behaviour is significant for two reasons. 
The first is that the level of consensus in the maritime plenary is very high, averaging across
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all votes 88.2% in 1976, 98.3% in 1986, and 92.6% in 1996.81 For one Member State to 
deviate so strongly from the conference consensus is highly unusual. Secondly, the voting 
behaviour of the UK cannot be explained through the protection of a set o f core national 
interests. In all six record votes at the maritime conferences the UK employers’ and 
workers’ representatives voted in favour of the instruments, suggesting that there was no 
reason why these maritime instuments were against UK national interests. Furthermore, 
two of the three conventions (Cl 78 concerning labour inspection and Cl 80 concerning 
hours of work) were ratified by the UK government in 2003 and 2001 respectively. It 
would therefore appear that the UK government’s voting behaviour was motivated by 
interests that were not direcdy concerned with the content of the instruments. This finding 
will be explored in more depth in Chapter 6, but its significance is that EU voting cohesion 
in the fourth period of the survey was affected by a UK government policy that was not 
direcdy related to the content of the instruments under discussion.
v. Period 5
Period 5 (1998-2005) appears to be a return to normality in terms of voting 
cohesion and EU Member State behaviour. O f the 13 record votes during this time, there 
were only two deviating votes (both abstentions by the UK), meaning that non-cohesive 
voting took place on 15.4% of the time. This is back down to roughly during Period 1, a 
fact that is all the more significant because the EU grew from nine to 25 Member States 
during the survey. The size of the EU does not appear to have direct significance on the 
voting cohesion of the Member States. Although the highest level of non-cohesion was 
measured between 1993 and 1997, during which the EU enlarged from 12 to 15 members,
81 Consensus is measured in the same way as is used in Section 2, calculated as the vote ‘For’ as a percentage o f all votes 
cast The average for each year is calculated from all votes held during the maritime conferences, data from Appendix 1.
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the 15 members from 1998 to 2003, and the 25 members in 2004 and 2005 voted more 
cohesively than previously. This evidence suggests that contrary to intergovernmental 
theory, the size of the EU does not adversely affect the level of cohesion. Indeed, of the 16 
Member States that have joined the nine members between 1973 and 1980, only one 
(Portugal) has deviated from the normalcy of voting for the adoption of instruments.
This section asked which Member States disrupt EU cohesive voting by abstaining 
or voting against the adoption of technical instrument, and why do they do it? The answers 
that are provided by looking in detail at the data on abstentions and votes against in Table 
5.4, and show that the UK most frequently votes contrary to the normal pattern of 
behaviour of EU Member States, which is to affirm the adoption of technical instruments. 
France, to a lesser extent behaves in the same way, as did Germany, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark. This goes some way to substantiating liberal 
intergovernmental predictions about the behaviour of large Member States, while refuting 
intergovernmental predictions that all EU Member States are equally disposed to 
protection their national interests. Furthermore, enlargement of the EU did not correlate to 
increased levels of non-cohesion, and new Member States with the exception of Portugal 
have not deviated from the path of normalcy.
In terms of change over time, the five periods chart a rise from 1973 to 1997 in the 
level of non-cohesion, followed by a drastic fall after 1998. In Section 2 ideological 
divisions between the tripartite constituents were identified, and governments were located 
between the poles of regulation favouring trade unions and limited regulation favouring 
employers. Deviating voting based on ideological grounds by the EU Member States 
occurs when a Member State does not favour regulation (since all votes measured as 
deviating are deviations away from passing instruments to increase regulation), and the
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traditionally more open market, liberal economic orientation of the UK points to probable 
motivation. The credibility of this motivational factor will be judged over the coming 
chapters, and one important consideration is whether the policy areas in which the UK (or 
any other EU Member State) decided to deviate in is a matter or national or Community 
competency. If it is the former, then the national interests can continue to be defended by 
a government through refusal to ratify an instrument. If it is the latter, the national interest 
at stake may be subject to qualified majority voting in the Council, and thus ‘indefensible’ 
there. In the language of institutional theory, there is forced downloading of EU-level 
policies that misfit with preferred national policies. In such cases, are deviating votes in the 
plenary protests against the Community’s acquis communautaire?
Finally, the detailed case of the 1996 maritime conference raises a third line of 
inquiry concerning the formation of national interests and voting behaviour. The high 
number of deviating votes that were evidenced not to be based on ideological aversion to 
the content of the instrument, (as shown by UK workers’ and employers’ acceptance) 
means that voting on technical issues can be influenced by national interests beyond the 
scope of the instrument. Some of these points cannot be answered within the scope of an 
empirical analysis of voting records and will be considered in the following chapter. One 
issue that can be analysed is the relationship between deviating voting and issue areas, and 
the following section does this.
4. EU Member State voting behaviour and issue areas
This section returns to look at Table 5.3, and compares the EU Member States’ 
abstention and votes against to the type of issue area. In the previous chapter it was shown 
that more representation takes place in issue areas that relate to parts of the social and
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employment law of the European Community that are decided by qualified majority voting 
than unanimity. Given this, we now ask in which issue area(s) is non-cohesive voting more 
likely to occur?82
Starting at the top, the first case of abstaining in the vote to adopt the convention 
concerning the minimum age of employment (Cl 38) by the UK was the only time a TEC 
Article 137 paragraph (a) issue, occupational health and safety, was the subject of a voting 
deviation. In the previous chapter it was shown that the majority of EU representation 
takes place in the area of ‘working environment to protect workers’ safety and health’, and 
that it constitutes a large part of the ILC agenda. The single occurrence of deviating voting 
in this area in 1973, and never subsequently substantiates the neofunctional assumption 
that integration will build stronger cohesion among the Member States. Moving onto the 
issue (b) area of Vorking conditions’, we see that nine of the 19 instrument areas are in this 
field.83 They span from 1977 to 1996, so unlike the demise of non-cohesion shown in the 
field of occupational health and safety, the same is not observed here. The only other issue 
area that is decided by QMV under Article 137 of the TEC to have caused non-cohesive 
voting is (k), ‘the modernisation of social protection systems’. Two instruments fall under 
this category, the employment policy recommendation of 1984 (R169), and the convention 
concerning seafarers’ social security (Cl 65). The former drew an abstention from the UK 
government while the latter drew an abstention from the French government.
82 Six instruments were identified as not pertaining to TEC Article 137 and are therefore excluded from this analysis. They 
concern: Labour Statistics (Cl 60); Private employment agencies (Cl 81/R 188); Job Creation (R189); Promotion o f  
cooperatives (R193); Seafarers’ Identity documents (C185) and Human resources provision (R195).
83 There are 19 issues areas and 30 instances o f non-cohesion because sometimes one issue area has had two instruments, 
Le. Part time work, Cl 75 and R 182.
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Three issue areas detailed in Article 137 that require unanimity of all Member 
States when decision-making in the Council were covered in the survey. The first, ‘social 
security and the protection of workers’ (c) was discussed in 1986 in the instruments 
concerning seafarers’ welfare (C163/R173) and again in 2000 with the instruments 
concerning maternity protection (C183/R191). On both occasions the UK abstaining from 
voting during the adoption of the instruments. The same happened in 1981 with the 
convention concerning collective bargaining, (Cl 54) which relates to the ‘representation 
and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co- 
determination’ (f) when the UK abstained during the adoption of the instrument. The final 
example relates to Article 137 paragraph (g), which concerns ‘conditions of employment 
for third-country nationals legally residing in Community territory’. The 1975 instruments 
concerning migrant workers (C143/R151) were seen as being contrary to this instrument 
and five EU Member States abstaining during the vote to adopt the convention and four in 
the vote to adopt the recommendation.
Taken together, these form an interesting set of results. Firsdy, the relationship 
between cohesive voting and unanimity in the Council decision-making process appears to 
be an inverse one. In 1975 there was a coordinated effort to challenge the content o f an 
ILO instrument based on its incompatibility with Community law.84 This is the only time 
such action has ever been taken (e.g. 5/9 of the EU abstaining), while in all subsequent 
cases where unanimity decision-making issues are discussed in a technical committee they 
led to a UK abstention. The EU Member States conformed to the predictions of
84 The EU Member States wanted the convention to be divided into two parts, which would distinguish between serious 
violations and social security arrangements. In the preparatory consultation that year, three Member States all requested 
the convention to be changed. Denmark said that ‘further consideration should be given to the question o f  dealing with 
the two Parts in two separate conventions.’ (ILO, 1975e: 3) The French government Svould have no objection to a 
single Convention if, in accordance with international practice, followed in particular by the ILO, it could be ratified 
Part by Part.’ (ILO, 1975e: 4) The UK government said that Tart II o f the proposed convention should form a separate 
instrument from Part I.’ (ILO, 1975e: 6) The final convention did not include this provision. (ILO, 1975d: 652-655)
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neofunctional theory more during the beginning of the survey than towards the end, which 
contradicts the normal expectations one would have concerning a gradual increase in 
voting cohesion over time. This evidence also confirms a consociational explanation of a 
growing symbiotic balance between the Community and the Member States, which the UK 
above all has been anxious to maintain the differentiation between the two. Another point 
to take into consideration is how revisions to the Treaty on the European Community 
have altered the decision-making procedures in Article 137. Changing the decision-making 
procedure indicates the salience of the issue to the Member States and how likely they are 
to acquiesce to putting EU voting cohesion before national interests in record votes.
Why has there been so little voting cohesion between the EU Member States in the 
area of working conditions (TEC Art. 137 §lb), especially when by comparison there has 
been so much in the other area of intense activity, occupational health and safety? The level 
of plenary consensus in the instruments has varied, from around 90% in the case of 
C171/R178 (Night work), C177/R184 (Home work), C179/R185 (Seafarer recruitment) 
and C180/R187 (Seafarers’ hours of work). At the other end of the scale the C172/R179 
(Working conditions in hotels and restaurants) and Cl 75/ R182 (Part-time work) score 
only around 70% in plenary consensus. Therefore some issues are ideologically heavily 
divided, while in others there is far greater consensus. With no clear pattern it is as yet not 
possible to find an explanatory link between issue area and voting. As the previous section 
also concluded, causal variables outside the specific nature of the technical instrument are 
likely to be influential in some decisions concerning national interests. When these 
variables come into effect, analysing the data alone is insufficient.
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5. Summary
This chapter began by refuting the hypothesis that increasing common 
representation lead to more cohesive voting between the EU Member States. This result 
was based on aggregated data from the whole of the survey (1973-2005) and could be 
challenged on the grounds of that the definition of EU representation is imprecise because 
it is difficult to measure. The definition is set out in Chapter 1, but this result did also not 
take into account degrees of representation. However, based on the data gathered under 
the methodological framework set out, no statistical significance between the two variables 
was found. This finding challenged all of the tested theories in one way or another.
The chapter moved on by looking at three other possible causal variables; the 
general level of consensus in the ILC plenary, patterns of behaviour by individual Member 
States and issue areas. The purpose of looking at these variables was to see what caused the 
national interests to come to the fore. The decision on whether a given technical 
instrument would support or threaten national interests was framed in terms of the 
ideological landscape of the ILO, between advocates of more social regulation and 
advocates of more market liberalism. The normalcy of the EU Member States in record 
votes is to vote for the adoption of an instrument and places the ideology of the EU in the 
social regulation camp, as would be expected from the nature of the Community’s 
integration process. It was argued that one reason why deviating voting occurs is because 
those states wish to protest against the ideological position of the EU, or wish to re-assert 
their national position as free-market supporters. Whether or not this is successful depends 
on the division of competencies between the Member States and the Community and the 
decision-making processes, as to whether the Member State can effectively enact the 
policies they wish to promote.
154/381
Another issue to consider is whether the decision to abstain or vote against an 
instrument is determined by the ideological position of an EU Member State vis-a-vis the 
content of the instrument, or whether attitudes to the ILO in general affect voting 
behaviour. This has two important consequences for the thesis. The first is that it means 
that the factors determining EU Member State voting behaviour lie outside the issue area 
of a particular technical issue, and any associations and trends detected between voting and 
instrument may not be the sole explanatory variables. The second is more fundamental 
because it challenges one of the core assumptions of the thesis. The division between 
technical and political issue areas has been recognised in the archives and in interviews, and 
also in the division between Community and EPC/CFSP decision-making processes. If, as 
seems plausible in the case of the UK in 1996, a Member State has used its votes on 
technical issues as a statement on their views to the organisation as a whole, it means that 
technical issues are sometimes politicised. This means that EU voting cohesion in technical 
areas is a hostage to fortune of the political whims of the Member States’ and has less to do 
with the level of representation and by extension, coordination. This would explain the 
results gathered in Section 1 concerning the lack of a statistically significant association 
between representation and cohesive voting, because on random occasions non-cohesion 
takes place when a Member State uses the record vote to register their dissatisfaction with 
the ILO.
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Table 5.1: E U  Member State voting in the adoption o f technical instruments onto the ILO  statute: 1973-
2005
All EU Member States 
vote cohesively
1 or more EU Member 
State abstains
1 or more EU Member 
State votes against
Total:
EU Member States’ 
represented during 
drafting
53 (74.6%) 15(21.1%) 3 (4.2%) 71 (100%)
EU Member States’ not 
represented during 
drafting
19 (61.3%) 9 (29.0%) 3 (9.7%) 31 (100%)
All record votes: 72 (70.6%) 24 (23.6%) 6 (5.9%) 102 (100%)
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Table 5.2a: E U  Member State voting cohesion in IL C  Record Votes (Technical Issues) correlated against
the overall level o f voting cohesion, measured as vote fo r’as a percentage of all votes: 1973-1980
Level o f voting cohesion in 
the record vote %
Number o f record votes with 
EU Member State voting 
cohesion
Number o f record votes 
without EU Member State 
voting cohesion
Total
95.1 -100 .0 16 0 16
90.1 -  95.0 6 1 7
85.1 -  90.0 1 0 1
80.1 -  85.0 2 2 4
75.1 -  80.0 2 1 3
70.1-75.0 1 0 1
65.1-70.0 1 0 1
Total: 29 4 33
Table 5.2b: EU  Member State voting cohesion in Uj C Record Votes (Technical Issues) correlated against 
the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote for* as a percentage of all votes: 1981-1986
Level of voting cohesion in 
the record vote %
Number o f record votes with 
EU Member State voting 
cohesion
Number o f record votes 
without EU Member State 
voting cohesion
Total-
95.1 -100.0 14 3 17
90.1-95.0 1 1 2
85.1-90.0 1 0 1
80.1 -  85.0 3 0 3
75.1 -  80.0 1 1 2
70.1-75.0 0 0 0
65.1 -  70.0 0 0 0
Total 20 5 25
Table 5.2c: EU  Member State voting cohesion in ILC  Record Votes (TechnicalIssues) correlated against 
the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote for* as a percentage of all votes: 1987-1992
Level of voting cohesion in 
the record vote %
Number o f record votes with 
EU Member State voting 
cohesion
Number o f record votes 
without EU Member State 
voting cohesion
Total
95.1 -100.0 5 0 5
90.1-95.0 1 1 2
85.1-90.0 0 3 3
80.1-85.0 0 0 0
75.1-80.0 0 0 0
70.1-75.0 2 1 3
65.1-70.0 0 1 1
Total 8 6 14
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Table 5.2d: E U  Member State voting cohesion in IL C  Record Votes (Technical Issues) correlated against
the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote fo r* as a percentage of all votes: 1993-1997
Level o f voting cohesion in 
the record vote %
Number o f record votes with 
EU Member State voting 
cohesion
Number o f record votes 
without EU Member State 
voting cohesion
Total;
95.1 -100 .0 0 1 1
90.1-95.0 3 5 8
85.1 -9 0 .0 1 3 4
80.1 -  85.0 0 1 1
75.1 -  80.0 0 1
70.1-75.0 0 1 1
65.1 -  70.0 0 1 1
Total; 4 13 17
Table 5.2e: EU  Member State voting cohesion in ILC  Record Votes (Technical Issues) correlated against 
the overall level of voting cohesion, measured as vote for* as a percentage of all votes: 1998-2005
Level of voting cohesion in 
the record vote %
Number o f record votes with 
EU Member State voting 
cohesion
Number o f record votes 
without EU Member State 
voting cohesion
Total
95.1 -100.0 6 0 6
90.1-95.0 2 0 2
85.1-90.0 0 0 0
80.1 -  85.0 0 0 0
75.1 -  80.0 1 0 1
70.1-75.0 0 1 1
65.1-70.0 2 1 3
Total; 11 2 13
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Diagram 5.1: Possible outcomes of a 2x2 matrix measuring the level of voting cohesion between ILO tripartite 
constituents (For vote as % of total) and European Union Member State cohesion
Level of voting cohesion between all ILO 
tripartite constituents high
EU Member States voting cohesion: 
unanimous
Consistency between ILO voting 
behaviour and EU MS voting
Level of voting cohesion between all ILO 
tripartite constituents high
EU Member States voting cohesion: 
split voting
Inconsistency between ILO voting 
^  behaviour and EU MS voting
Line B /
/
/
/
/
*
/
Line A
Level of voting cohesion between all ILO 
tripartite constituents low
EU Member States voting cohesion: 
unanimous
Level o f voting cohesion between all ILO 
tripartite constituents low
EU Member States voting cohesion: 
split voting
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Table 5.3: E U  Member States* abstentions and votes against the adoption of technical instruments onto the 
ILO  statute 1973-2005.
Year Instrum ent/ TEC Art 137(§) Denmark France Germany Luxemb’g NL Portugal UK
1973 C138: Minimum Age a Abst
1975 C143: Migrant Work g  
R151: Migrant Work g
Abst
Abst
Abst Abst 
Abst
Abst
Abst
Abst
Abst
1977 C149: Nursing Personnel b A bst Abst.
1980 C l54: Collective Bargain f Abst.
1984 R169: Employ Policy k Abst
1986
Maritime
C163: Seafarer Welfare c 
R173: Seafarer Welfare c
C165: SeaP Soc. Sec. k Abst
A bst
Abst.
1989 R169: Indigenous People - Abst.
1990 C171: Night Work b 
R178: Night Work b
Pro: Night Work Women b A bst
Abst
Abst
1991 C172: Hotels /  Restaurt b 
R179: Hotels /  Restaurt b
Abst
Abst
Abst
Abst.
1994 C175: Part-time Work b 
R182: Part-time Work b
Abst Abst
Abst
Ag’st
Abst
1995 Protocol: Labour Ins. - Abst Abst
1996 C177: Home Work b 
R184: Home Work b
Ag’st Ag’st
Ag’st
1996
Maritime
C178: Labour Inspect - 
R185: Labour Inspect -
C179: Seafarer Recruit b 
R186: Seafarer Recruit b
C180: Hours o f Work b 
R187: Hours o f Work b
Abst
A bst
A bst
A bst
Ag’st
Ag’st
A bst
Ag’st
1997 C181: Private Agencies - 
R188: Private Agencies -
Abst
Abst
2000 C183: Maternity Protect c 
R191: Maternity Protect c
Abst
Abst
Key:
Abst: Abstention from voting 
Ag’st: Vote against
Only Member States that have either abstained or voted against shown in table. All other Member States have voted for all 
instruments between 1973 and 2005.
Bold text shows EU representation took place during drafting.
Lines divide table into five periods studied.
TEC Article 137: QMV §1 (a,b,e,h,i,j,k) Unanimity: §l(c,d,f,g)
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Table 5.4: E U  Member State deviant voting (abstentions and votes against) in ILC  record votes to adopt 
technical instruments onto the ILO  statute, in relation to whether common E U  representation took place 
during the drafting of the instrument: 1973-2005
Denmark France Germany Luxem’g NL Portugal UK Total
Abstain after EU rep. 2 4 2 2 3 4 11 28
Against after EU rep. 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 4
Sub-total 2 4 3 2 3 4 14 32
Abstain after no rep. 0 3 0 0 1 1 7 12
Against after no. rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Sub-total 0 3 0 0 1 1 10 15
Total 2 7 3 2 4 5 24 47
Note:
Only EU Member States that have ever abstained or voted against an instrument are shown.
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C h a p t e r  6
TECHNICAL COORDINATION: SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter concludes the survey of EU Member State coordination, 
representation and voting cohesion in technical issue areas of the ILO. Chapters 4 and 5 
have concentrated on analysing empirical data gathered from ILC Provisional Records on 
the interventions in the name of the EU Member States and their behaviour in record 
voting. We will correlate all the information generated on the five periods and use it to 
consider which of the cross-cutting trends introduced in Chapter 3 are relevant and how 
the five theories tested in this part of the thesis have faired in relation to the empirical 
findings. To summarise, the purpose of this chapter is to answer the following three 
questions:
•  How has representation and voting cohesion changed over the last five periods?
• Which crosscutting trends have been most influential?
• Which theories best explain the behaviour of the EU Member States?
1. Representation and voting cohesion over the survey
i. Period 1
The period between 1973 and 1980 had the highest level of voting cohesion o f any 
of the periods of the survey, but also very low levels of common EU representation. The 
voting cohesion rate of 87.5% is significant too because the first period has the largest 
number of record votes (33). Increasing the sample size makes establishing a high level of 
cohesion more difficult as it captures more issues that are potentially controversial.
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However, there were only nine Member States during the period, which according to the 
logic of intergovernmental negotiation one would assume would make voting cohesion 
easier to reach. In contrast to the significant levels of voting cohesion, the frequency of EU 
representation was 1.6 committees per conference, which corresponds to 39.0% of the 
technical meetings held during the period and the lowest recorded. The intensity of EU 
representation was the lowest recorded at 0.049. Period 1 of the survey points more to an 
inverse relationship between representation and voting cohesion rather than a direct 
proportionality as was tested at the beginning of Chapter 5.
What role did the ILC agenda play in shaping EU Member State cohesion during 
this period? There was a high level of ILC plenary consensus during this period, as shown 
by the distribution of the data alone Tine A’ in the quadrant model in Diagram 5.1. This, 
coupled with the frequency of occupational health and safety issues during the time, 
produced a favourable setting in which the EU Member States could frequently find 
agreement when adopting instruments. Since it has already been established that there was 
a low level of common representation during the period but a high level of cohesion, the 
permissive environment cannot be ignored as a variable influencing the data. Evidence 
pointing to external (i.e. ILO) factors influencing EU Member State voting cohesion are 
very important because they locate the causal explanations for EU Member State 
behaviour outside the EU, and as a result weaken the explanatory power of theories o f EU 
integration such as neofimctionalism.
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1ii. Period 2
In Period 2 (1981-1986) the level of voting cohesion fell slightly from the first 
period, from 87.5 to 80% based on a smaller number of record votes (25). Meanwhile, the 
frequency of EU representation rose dramatically to 2.7 committees per conference (67.5 
of all technical meetings), the highest level during the survey. The intensity of 
representation rose too, albeit less dramatically to 0.075 (from 0.049). The sfre o f the EU 
grew twice during Period 2, from nine to ten with the accession of Greece in 1981 and 
then to twelve in 1986, but these enlargements did not lead to a significant fall in the level 
of voting cohesion. Period 2 is also characterised by the highest level of ILC plenary 
consensus of any of the five periods under study, with 17 out of the 25 (68%) record votes 
during that period passed with 95.1% or more of the votes cast in favour of adopting the 
instrument.
Why did the level of voting cohesion fall in this period, and why by this amount? 
There are three different ways to answer the question and it is not possible to separate out 
the explanations into isolated, testable hypotheses. The first is that the level of voting 
cohesion fell because the two enlargements o f the EU made the likelihood of agreement 
between 10 (and then 12) less than with nine. The second is that the levels of 
representation and voting cohesion are inversely proportional, although this has yet to be 
demonstrated. The third is that the higher level of overall consensus in the plenary 
contributed to a higher level of voting cohesion between the EU Member States that 
would otherwise have been expected.
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iii. Period 3
EU Member State representation during Period 3 (1987-1992) was significantly 
more intense than in any other period in the survey, recorded as 0.148 (compared to 0.049 
and 0.075 in the previous periods and 0.099 and 0.052 in the subsequent ones). The 
frequency of EU representation was also high, averaging 2.2 committees per conference, 
but with fewer technical committee meetings held this remained an impressive 66.7% and 
the second highest level of the entire survey. The period also marked a significant shift in 
the nature of EU representation, with the first committee meetings in which the Presidency 
and European Commission both spoke on behalf of the EU Member States. Yet coupled 
to this flourishing of EU representation was a drastic decrease in the level of voting 
cohesion, which fell from 80% in the previous period to 57%, or 8 votes out of 14. Once 
again we find evidence that suggests that representation and voting cohesion are inversely 
proportional.
Period 3 is also characterised by a lower level of plenary consensus that the 
previous periods, seen in the fact that 4 of the 14 (29%) record votes during the time were 
passed with less than 75% of the vote in favour.85 The voting cohesion of the EU Member 
States was judged to have altered in this period, away from the ‘Line A’ axis of Periods 1 
and 2 when cohesion and consensus were approximately aligned, to a pattern o f symmetry 
with a roughly equal number of cohesive and non-cohesive votes distributed evenly across 
all the levels of consensus in the plenary voting. What does this tell us about the behaviour 
of the EU Member States during the period? On the one hand the lower level o f consensus
85 75% represents one vote in four which is the size o f the workers’ and the employers’ blocs, and reflects a lack of 
consensus o f either bloc. As noted earlier, the two non-government parties sit on the ends o f the ideological spectrum 
of interests in the ILO.
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could have contributed to the lower level of voting cohesion. On the other hand, the 
pattern of voting in the quadrant model suggests that there was less inference from the 
level of consensus in the plenary as a whole into the voting of the Member States. As is the 
case in the other periods thus far, trends can be identified but they are only useful for 
identifying possible lines of inquiry, rather than proving concrete causal linkages.
tv. Period 4
Period 4 from 1993 to 1997 does not follow all the trends identified over the three 
previous periods. Firsdy, the frequency of EU common representation declined in during 
the period, to a low point of 1.5 committees per conference. Although the number of 
committees was also in decline, this still resulted in only 46.9% of technical meetings. At 
the same time the intensity of representation also fell, although it was recorded at 0.099 
which was still the second highest of the survey. Voting cohesion fell to 24%, or just 4 
record votes out of 17. Meanwhile the level of consensus in the ILC plenary did not reach 
the levels seen between 1973 and 1986 (Periods 1 and 2) when the number of votes passed 
by more than 95% of the delegates was around a half of all instruments adopted. 
Nevertheless 13 of the 17 fell in the range between 85 and 100%, which puts it broadly on 
par with those earlier periods. This means that the low level of EU Member State voting 
cohesion cannot be attributed to the ambient consensus in the ILO. The quadrant diagram 
actually suggests exactly the opposite because the distribution of voting follows the Tine B’ 
model of autonomy from the ILC plenary consensus.
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v. Period 5
The result of Period 5 (1998-2005) closely matches the first period of the survey. 
Voting cohesion stands at 84.6% (or 11 out of 13 record votes) which is the second highest 
of the survey. The level of representation intensity was 0.052, marginally higher than the
0.049 of Period 1. However, the level of representation in committees was considerably 
higher at 64.5% that the figured recorded in Period 1 of 39.0%. The behaviour of the EU 
Member States appears to be similar to the early period, a particularly interesting finding 
considering that the membership stood as 15 for six of the conferences, and 25 and the 
final two. The growth in membership does not seem to have had a significant impact on 
the level of cohesion measured in a willingness to speak with one voice, although what the 
single voice says is considerably less than in Periods 2, 3 and 4.
There is an important difference between the first and final period in terms of the 
level of consensus in the ILC plenary. While in the early years there was a clustering of 
consensus around the 95.1 to 100% range, in Period 5 there are two clusters, one around 
the 95.1 to 100% range and the other at the opposite end (65.1 to 70%). This pattern 
shows that the agenda of the ILCs over Period 5 has been a mixture of ideologically 
contested and non-contested issues. In the midst of this polarised environment, the EU 
Member States have remained cohesive in their voting.
The conclusions from this synopsis are that no single theory explains EU Member 
State behaviour by linking the level of common EU representation to voting cohesion over 
the entire study. A tentative inverse relationship between representation and cohesion 
appears to hold for Periods 1, 2, 3 and 5, and can be applied to Period 4 if one considers 
only the intensity of representation and not frequency. One theoretical explanation for this
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is that the process of coordinating an EU common representation creates at the same time 
a drive by some Member States (usually the UK) to re-assert their national identity by 
voting autonomously from the rest of the Member States. These two actions that appear to 
be antagonistic to one another resemble the symbiotic process captured in consociational 
theory, of the Community and the Member States retaining separate, strong identities. 
There are two issues that cast doubt over this conclusion. The first is that it has been 
statistically shown that there is no positive relationship between representation and 
cohesion over the survey, so there can be no inverse relationship either (because that 
would have been noted in the data). Secondly, the quadrant model looked for the 
association between EU Member State voting cohesion and ILC plenary consensus, and 
demonstrated a positive correlation in Periods 1 and 2 (Line A) and a negative one in 
Period 4 (Line B). There cannot be a relationship between EU representation and voting 
cohesion if there is evidence of a correlation between the EU and the ILC plenary too, 
because that locates the causal explanation outside of the Union. For this reason we will 
look for more plausible explanations in the crosscutting issue areas identified in Chapter 3.
2. The explanatory power of the crosscutting issues
i. National interests: protecting sovereignty
The crosscutting issues will be discussed in the order in which they appear to be
I
most relevant to the case of EU representation and voting cohesion in the technical 
committees of the ILC. The first issue is the national interests of the individual Member 
States. Intergovernmental theory posits the ‘logic of diversity’ as the antithesis to the ‘logic 
of integration’, reminding us that national interests will prevail as the end of the day when 
issues of sufficient significance are involved. The questions that naturally arise from this
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position are as follows; firstly, are the issues handled in the ILO of sufficient significance 
for the EU Member States to have divergent national interests? Secondly, would Member 
States still pursue their national interests after coordinating a common representation of 
the EU in a technical committee? Finally, how does abstaining or voting against an 
instrument actually protect national interests? Answering these questions will help to 
establish whether national interests really do provide an explanation into the voting 
behaviour of the EU Member States.
Beginning with the last question, how does the vote of any government in an ILC 
plenary adopting an instrument affect its obligations to that instrument? A government 
that votes to adopt an instrument onto the statute of the organisation does not incur any 
additional responsibilities as a result of its action. Regardless of how a government votes, 
all governments are obliged by the Constitution of the ILO to bring the instrument before 
the relevant national authorities within twelve months of adoption by the ILC. The 
authorities consider the possibility of ratifying the instrument, and they communicate their 
decision to the ILO Secretariat. (Article 19 §5) If they decide to ratify the convention, the 
Secretariat begins the necessary preparations. However,
if  the Member does not obtain the consent o f  the authority or authorities within whose 
competence the matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the Member except that it shall 
report to the Director-General o f the International Labour Office, at appropriate intervals as 
requested by the Governing Body, the position o f its law and practice in regard to the matters dealt 
with in the Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be 
given, to any o f  the provisions o f the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective 
agreement or otherwise and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification o f  such 
Convention.
Once it has been decided that a convention is unsuitable for ratification, an ILO member 
state has no obligation to ratify a convention in the future, only report occasionally on the
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progress (if any) being made. This is an obligation on the government regardless of their 
vote, so how a state votes in the plenary has no consequences on its domestic law and does 
not infringe upon its national sovereignty.
ii. National interests: ideological
If the record votes to adopt instruments onto the ILO statute have no direct 
impact on the future implications of what that state must do, the reasons why states choose 
to vote the way they do must lie somewhere other than in the defence of national 
sovereignty. What sort of national interests are they protecting? There are two ways in 
which a deviating vote can serve a national interest, both of which have been mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The first is when the voting behaviour is used to signify an 
ideological position, most commonly contrary to the content of an instrument on the 
grounds that is a step too far in the direction of market regulation.86 The second is when 
the record vote is used to express dissatisfaction with another issue not directly related to 
the content of the instrument, and thereby politicising the technical issue. This answers 
both the first and second questions posed above because the common EU representation 
is focused around the technical issues of the instrument, while the voting to adopt it can 
become a separate issue if a Member State wishes to use it as a political platform. Using the 
record votes in this way does not usually jeopardise the overall outcome of the vote on
86 An example o f deviant voting because an instrument did not contain enough regulation can be seen in the record vote to 
adopt the convention concerning maternity protection (Cl 83) in 2000. O f the 22 votes cast against the instrument 18 
were by the government and workers’ representatives o f Argentina, and Chile, all four o f the Uruguayan delegation 
(including the employers’ representative), and the governments of the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. The expectations o f the group fell short o f the final outcome, as illustrated in the following extract from 
the minutes o f the committee meeting negotiating the final text
The Government members o f Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela considered 
that the proposed amendment [to include an optional article on Parental leave] was an excellent initiative. ... However, 
they did not support the proposed amendment since it sent a signal o f modernity which was not consistent with the 
removal of protection so far agreed.’ (ILO, 2000L' §508)
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conventions, which with the exception of the convention concerning the fishing sector of 
2005, have all been adopted during the survey.
Let us look first at an example of defining national interests along ideological lines. 
Some issues discussed in the ILO are deemed sufficiently important that opposing them is 
a genuine matter of national interest. During Period 4 of the survey (1993-1997) the UK 
voted against two pairs of instruments, one relating to Part-time work (C175/R182) and 
the other to Home work (C177/R184). The UK government was deeply hostile to the 
subject of some of the instruments under discussion in 1994 and 1995. A member of the 
UK delegation noted the following points about the Part-time work instrument 
negotiations, which were in their second year in 1994 and that the UK voted to reject.
In contrast to m ost other European countries, the U K  Governm ent was generally opposed  
to the extension o f  rights for part time workers on the grounds that the proposed convention would 
contradict its policy o f  labour flexibility. Whereas som e countries had problems with particular 
articles... the U K  alone was vehemently opposed to the whole convention. (The Major Governm ent 
has no intention o f  ratifying it despite acceptance by the conference). Privately several countries 
expressed their dismay at this attitude. (UK-Diplomat, 1994b)
The same attitude was expressed about the Home-work convention in its first discussion in 
1995, which the ‘UK Government position was one of opposition to the proposed 
instrument and their delegate fought to weaken the Convention, wherever possible’. (UK- 
Diplomat, 1995) It should be noted that the UK position was issue specific, because the 
same delegate noted that with regard to the 1995 Protocol on Convention 81 discussions, 
the UK was ‘in full accord with the terms of the protocol and may actually agree to its 
ratification’. (UK-Diplomat, 1995)
Objections to particular instruments on the grounds of national interests help to 
define the ideological orientation of a government. All EU Member States are also
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members of another governmental coordination group within the ILO called IMEC 
(Industrialised Market Economy Countries).87 The IMEC group is very similar in 
membership to the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG) in the United Nations 
Organisation, except that IMEC also has Japan as a member too. It was originally known 
as the ‘Geneva group, comprising permanent representatives of major non-communist 
contributors, [and] was initiated in 1964 to achieve consensus on budget policy within that 
significant group/88 (Cox and Jacobson, 1974:124) During the Cold War it represented the 
capitalist West against the Soviet Bloc and the leadership of the United States was an 
important factor in defining its character.
IMEC and the EU have different attributes and what some observers perceive as a 
strength in IMEC others perceive as it weakness, and vice versa for the EU. For example, 
supporters of IMEC point to its larger membership and collective weight within the ILO, 
and argue that through this it is better able to pursue certain goals, especially concerning 
the ILO budget.89 However, the size of IMEC means that the number of state interests 
that must be considered is much larger, and the areas in which agreement can be reached 
are fewer in number and less specific in detail90 The spectrum of political approaches to 
labour law in the IMEC group ranges from social democratic models in the Nordic states 
to free market approaches of Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and to a lesser extent, 
Japan. On balance, the non-EU part members of IMEC are more staunchly in favour of
87 IMEC consisted o f the EU 15 (1995-2004) plus USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and Japan. 
Turkey, Cyprus and Malta frequendy coordinate alongside the IMEC states. In November 2004 the Dutch Presidency 
negotiated the entry of the 10 new Member States into IMEC. Interview, Geneva 22 June 2005.
88 Six IMEC members have permanent seats on the ILO Governing Body (US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the 
UK), and control a large proportion of the total ILO budget The budget is still an area in which the IMEC group 
coordinates and the EU Members States do not. In 2005, the IMEC group contributed 83% o f the annual budget to 
the ILO. Interviews: London, 21 September 2004; Geneva, 22 June 2005. (ILO, 2005c)
89 Interview: London, 21 September 2004
90 Interviews: Copenhagen, 3 March 2005 Geneva, 21 & 22 June 2005.
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market liberalisation than regulation and offer a competing ideological position to the 
social regulation of the EU, with the exception of Norway and Switzerland.
A second difference between the EU and IMEC is the ethos behind their 
coordination meetings. The IMEC group is a forum for an informal exchange of ideas and 
information between national governments, which debates an issue and find areas of 
agreement but delegates do not feel under pressure to reconcile divergent opinions into a 
single IMEC position.91 In contrast, Geneva based diplomats with first hand experience of 
both IMEC and EU coordination meetings claimed that the latter are more formal and aim 
to find common positions.92 IMEC is more like an intergovernmental group while the EU 
is more supranational in its efforts to produce a unitary position on each issue.93 When EU 
Members States advocate IMEC coordination in preference to EU coordination, they do 
so either because IMEC is a stronger bloc (a ‘positive’ reason), or because they want weaker 
EU coordination (a ‘negative’ reason). EU Member States that advocate closer 
coordination see IMEC as a hindrance and calls to use it as blocking techniques against 
closer EU coordination.94 For this reason support for IMEC coordination is regarded as 
incompatible with strong EU coordination, because they reflect different principles 
regarding the autonomy of members and their national interests.
91 Interview; Geneva, 22 June 2005
92 ‘Coordination’ is used here because the interviewers have first hand experience of the coordination meetings, and there 
is also empirical evidence o f the times and dates o f the daily EU Member State coordination at the ILC from 2000 to 
2005. From 2004 onwards the EU Member States met daily between 9 and 10 a.m. in the same room as the IMEC 
group, which met between 10 and 11 a.m. This technique was used to give the EU Member States a physical presence 
in IMEC and also to reach common positions on some issues on the IMEC agenda. Some diplomats presiding over the 
EU coordination meeting became frustrated when commonly agreed positions were ignored by some EU Member 
States in the IMEC meeting. The explanation for this given by more pro-IMEC states was that the purpose o f IMEC 
was a general discussion and that would not work if 15 or 25 members all repeated the same thing. Interviews: Geneva, 
21,22,24June 2005. (ILO, 2004a; ILO, 2005a)
93 Interview: Athens, 1 October 2004
94 Interview: Geneva, 22 June 2005
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If an EU Member State wishes to challenge the prevailing social protection 
ideology of the ILO and assumes that EU Member States will not support it, then the 
IMEC group offers an alternative coordination network that has a more free-market 
orientation. The UK remains one of the most committed EU Member States to IMEC,95 
which is partly due to the use of the English language among many of the non-EU 
members, as well as the close political ties with those countries. Furthermore, the tri-annual 
meeting of UK government delegates for the Governing Body meetings forges close 
working relationships with other permanent members, most importantly America, 
Germany and Japan.96 Coordination with EU partners that are less well known on a 
personal level and have less experience of ILO business is seen as a lower priority than 
maintaining the well-established and well-functioning relations with important IMEC 
governments. In personal correspondence with a member of the UK delegation to the ILC 
in 1994 and 1995, the delegate wrote that there were divided loyalties between EU 
coordination and IMEC coordination. In 1995 the UK participated in both groups (as all 
EU states did) but prioritised IMEC over the EU. *1116 UK was a member of two blocs — 
the EU and IMEC. O f the two blocs they considered IMEC by far the most effective. This 
was also my impression. The IMEC meeting was well chaired and decisive’. (UK- 
Diplomat, 1994a; UK-Diplomat, 1995)
iii. National interests: political
The second way in which national interests could be invoked as an explanation for 
a deviating vote was through using a record vote to register a political grievance against
95 So too are (in 2005 when the question was asked) Germany, the Netherlands and to a less extent, Denmark. Interviews: 
London, 21 September 2004; Copenhagen, 3 March 2005; Geneva, 22 June 2005.
96 Interview: London, 21 September 2004
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another, non-related issue at the ILO. The period when this seemed most plausible was 
between 1993 and 1997, when the UK voted against six instruments and abstained from 
voting four times. Three of those votes against instruments (Cl 75, Cl 77 and R184) were 
explained above as ideological positions against the specific instrument. However, during 
the 1996 Maritime conference six other instruments were drafted (three conventions C178, 
179 and 180 and three recommendations R185, 186 and 187). The UK abstained three 
times and voted against the other three while the UK workers’ and employers’ 
representatives voted to adopt all six.97 The UK government later ratified two of the 
conventions (Cl 78 and Cl 80), which demonstrates that the conventions were not against 
the UK national interest. What explanations can be given for the UK’s action during this 
period? The answer proposed is that these votes were used as a method of protest against 
wider political resentment of the ILO.
The political protest was made against the repeated threat by the ILO to invoke the 
highest penalty against the UK government for breaching one of the fundamental labour 
standards, convention concerning the right to organise and bargain collectively (C87 and 
C98). The standing committee of the annual conference in change of monitoring ILO 
member states’ adherence to conventions, the Committee on the Application of Standards 
(CAS), had called on the UK government to give evidence of its actions to rectify its 
practices that were found to be in breach of C98. The practices in question related to 
Section 13 of the Trade Union and Employment Rights Act (1993) that allowed employers 
to pay non-union employees more than union employees. The UK government had been 
brought before the committee in 1985 for its failure to allow trade unions to operate within
97 There was no ideological protest against the instruments either. O f the 21 IMEC (EU and non-EU) states at the 
conference, and across the three tripartite constituents, only 11 deviating votes were cast (6 belonging to the UK 
government) out o f a possible 378.
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one of its intelligence agencies, GCHQ. The dispute wrangled on for over 10 years as the 
British Conservative government repeatedly failed to address the concerned raised by the 
CAS.
A member of the UK delegation in 1995 described the situation in the Committee 
on the Application of Standards (£the Committee’) that year as follows:
A t the beginning o f  the conference the Committee selects the particular cases that will be 
discussed over the ensuing weeks. This year there was an air o f  anticipation at the conference as it 
became apparent that the Government would have to defend its handling o f  its trade union ban at 
the G C H Q  Cheltenham spy centre. 1995 was the 10th anniversary o f  the ban and it was reported 
that the U K  workers’ side were pushing for a “special paragraph”, the ultimate ILO repudiation, and 
a move normally used as a sanction against military dictatorships.
The stakes seemed to have been raised still higher by the then Employment Minister 
Michael Portillo’s signal that the government might threaten to pull out o f  the ILO altogether if  it 
was denounced at the conference. (UK-Diplomat, 1995)
The ‘special paragraph’ was not agreed in 1995, but this issue was raised again in the 
summer conference in 1996, when the same piece of legislation was contested again in 
relation to three further violations of C98. (ILO, 1996g: 224-226)98 The British Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) gave detailed evidence in the heating in the CAS against the UK 
government, and the situation was summed up by John Monks, the General Secretary of 
the TUC, with the following statement:
Once again the U K  has been found guilty o f  breaching basic human tights at work. 
Employers are n ot allowed to pay wom en less than men, or black people less than white people, but 
in Britain they can legally pay union members less than non-union members. This is an outrage. The 
government should urgendy repeal this measure."
98 The cases were Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Wilson, Associated British Ports v. Palmer and Harrison v. Kent County 
Council
99 Details of the case were found at http://list.waikato.ac.nz/pipermail/prir-1/1996-June/000788.html (accessed 08-12- 
2004)
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Although no special paragraph was agreed in the CAS, the Committee on Freedom 
of Association, which convenes three times a year during Governing Body meetings to 
pass judgement on violations of conventions 87 and 98 met on June 6 1996 to consider 
Case 1852, brought by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) against the UK government. The 
claim made was that section 13 of the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 
was in violation of the ILO core standards. The TUC had repeatedly brought cases 
involving this law to the ILO, and Case 1852 alleged ‘acts of interference by the employer 
in the functioning of workers’ organisation and lack of adequate legal protection’. (ILO, 
1996a: 138) The committee recommended that the Governing Body approve a 
recommendation that
The Committee calls again on  the Government to take steps to amend section 13 o f  the 
Trade U nion Reform and Employment Rights A ct so that it ensures workers’ organisations 
adequate protection from acts o f  interference on the part o f  the employer and so that it does not 
result in fact in the discouragement o f  collective bargaining. The Government is requested to keep 
the Committee informed in this regard. (ILO, 1996a: §498a)
The UK government was under continuous pressure from the ILO to amend its domestic
law, stemming from a continuous stream of complaints by the TUC.
The argument that has been made thus far concerning national interests can be 
summarised in the following way. Two explanations for voting deviation based on national 
interests have been given; voting deviation can be explained by government commitment 
to ideology (most often free-market liberalism) or by using the technical instrument to 
make a political protest against an unrelated issue. In order to make the case for these two 
explanations, I put forward the argument that the way a government votes does not 
obligate it to ratify a convention, so voting deviation is not needed to protect national 
sovereignty, the most basic defence of national interests. This argument can be 
substantiated with empirical evidence showing which EU Member States have ratified the
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conventions that were drafted with EU representation as presented in Appendix 4.1. The 
table shows all the conventions drafted since 1973 during which the EU Member States 
were represented by either the Presidency or the Commission. The table is split into 5 
periods, corresponding to those used throughout the analysis of technical coordination. 
The data shows only three instruments that a Member State (the UK) has ratified after 
previously either abstaining or voting against its adoption. One was a core labour standard 
that all EU Member States are expected to ratify,100 while the other two are the maritime 
conventions discussed above and explained as political actions in protest against the 
ongoing complaints raised in the CAS. What these results show is that strong claims about 
the protection of national interests such as the upholding of state sovereignty cannot be 
considered in the case of ILO labour standards, because they do not challenge the 
autonomy of the state. Voting deviation must therefore be for other reasons, and such as 
the ideological and political ones set out above.
iv. Agenda setting
The power to set the agenda of the annual conferences is an important 
consideration in determining how much common EU representation will take place, as well 
as the likelihood of voting cohesion between the Member States. As has been shown in the 
previous two chapters, the EU Member States do not coordinate in a vacuum, but instead 
coordinate in response to the content of the agenda. Examples of this include noting the 
decline in the number of technical issues on the agenda, as well as the correlation between 
higher intensities of representation in occupational health and safety and working
100 This includes the 10 new members. As o f June 2006, 23 EU Member States have ratified all eight core conventions. 
The Czech Republic and Estonia have both ratified seven, and are yet to ratify the convention concerning the minimum 
age of employment (C138). The reason given by a Commission staff member was that the legal services capable o f  
translating and processing the official texts were overwhelmed with work. Interview; Brussels, 18 November 2005.
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conditions. It was also shown that different issue areas evoke different ideological 
responses from the EU Member States, spread over a spectrum between favouring social 
regulation and favouring market freedom. The agenda is set by the ILO Governing Body, 
based on a mixture of standing committees (such as the ILO budget, the Committee on 
the Application of Standards and the Resolutions Committee) and recommendations from 
the conference tabled as resolutions (most instruments are included this way).
Agenda setting is significant to the study of EU Member State behaviour because it 
represents an exogenous explanation for EU representation and voting cohesion that 
needs to be factored into any theoretical framework being applied. For example, while 
neofunctionalism might be appropriate for explaining the increasing intensity of EU 
representation in the area of health and safety, how can this explanation be separated from 
the evidence showing that the ILC agendas of the mid 1980s and early 1990s contained a 
higher number of OSH instruments than average? On the one hand we would not be able 
to observe neofimctional logic in action without a permissive series of ILC agendas, but on 
the other hand the EU Member States would not have been able to increase the intensity 
of their common representation without the SEA and preparation for the Single Market in 
1992. By equal measure, intergovernmental theory appears more valid during periods when 
the content of instruments are controversial Liberal intergovernmental theory’s emphasis 
on the periods of time after intergovernmental treaties cannot be strictly tested because the 
ILC agenda will influence the results gathered. The conclusion from this is not that we 
cannot freely apply theory to understand the behaviour of EU Member States in the ILO, 
but instead we must remember that the results we gather and the interpretation we make 
must factor in an assessment the impact of external influences.
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v. The Presidency of the Council
The Presidency of the Council is responsible for chairing coordination meetings in 
Geneva as well as preparatory meetings in Brussels. In technical issues the additional staff 
brought in to carry out the additional responsibilities of the Presidency come from Brussels 
and the national capitals, while for political issues the Geneva Permanent Mission Staff 
play a more active role.101 They work with colleagues from the national capitals of the 
other Member States, who have high levels of technical expertise but may not have much 
familiarity with the process of EU-style decision-making, which can make negotiating more 
difficult.102 Institutional theory gives us the insight that national officials with only a little 
experience of European coordination will be less exposed to the socialising pressures that 
close cooperation between officials brings. In these cases, EU representation is likely to be 
low intensity because coordination is between reluctant government officials from Member 
State national capitals.
The compartmentalised nature of technical committee coordination is evident not 
only by the fact that delegates from the EU Member States come from narrow technical 
specialities in national governments with little EU experience, but also in the skill with 
which the Presidency chairs meetings. An example of this can be found from the 1995 
ILC, where coordinating meetings were taking place for two instruments, a first discussion 
on Home Work and a protocol on labour inspection. According to a delegate from the UK 
the coordination for the Home Work committee was poorly organised, and the chairing of 
the EU meetings was squarely to blame for them ‘meandering endlessly even when minor 
points were being discussed/ (UK-Diplomat, 1995) On one occasion a junior observer was
101 See Chapter 1: (Biddiscombe, 1977; Hess, 1977)
102 Interview: Geneva, 21 June 2005
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sent to an EU meeting instead of the more senior UK delegate, and this ‘incensed’ the 
French Presidency, although the attitude of the UK delegation was ‘If we’re upset them 
[the French] we know we’re doing our job.’ (UK-Diplomat, 1995) Commenting on a 
different EU coordination meeting for labour inspection protocol at the same ILC:
In contrast to my experience with the French President o f the EU group looking at Home 
Work I found his colleague to be most helpful and courteous. The European countries agreed to 
support one o f  the UK amendments and to have a free vote on the second as there was no common 
position amongst the EU. (UK-Diplomat, 1995)
This example illustrates how the actions of the Presidency can effect the outcome of the 
coordination process, as well as how very different levels of EU representation in technical 
committees can occur at the same conference.
3. Theoretical explanations re-considered
i. Neofunctional theory
Given that this part of the thesis looks at the coordination of EU Member States in 
technical issues, one would expect neofunctional theory to serve as a useful tool. However, 
the evidence gathered in the two previous chapters challenges the theory at the level of its 
core assumptions as well as on its operational mechanisms. The usefulness of the theory is 
as a mirror, held up to the case study and showing the areas where we would have expected 
the Member States to have behaved differently.
Looking first at the core assumptions of neofunctional theory, the first area where 
the empirical study challenges the theory is in an evolutionary development of closer 
cooperation between the Member States over time. Over the five periods of the survey, 
none of the indicators chosen to measure either representation or voting cohesion have
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demonstrated evidence of a continuous process of integration. Instead, the similarities 
between Period 1 and Period 5 suggest that the cyclical pattern of behaviour over time 
might be more accurate in describing the behaviour of the Member States. What is also 
certainly clear is that after three periods of incrementally more intense representation 
(Period 1 to 3) there was a fall (from Period 4 to 5), and that in terms of voting cohesion, 
the same pattern was repeated slightly earlier in the survey (growing from 1 to 2, falling 
over periods 3 and 4, and increasing again in the fifth).
The second core assumption challenged in the claim made that there is no 
statistical association between representation and voting cohesion. Although this claim was 
based on aggregated data from the whole survey, four of the separate periods 
demonstrated a slight inverse relationship between the two, while the fourth period (1993- 
1997) proved inconclusive. Neofunctional theory would expect the two to be directly 
proportional because the more common representation means either (a) more coordination 
has taken place in order to mandate the Presidency (or European Commission) to speak 
more widely on behalf of the Member States; or (b) that a detailed and well-established 
acquis communautaire exists in the issue area and it is the basis of EU interventions. In both 
cases, there are common interests shared by the EU Member States, which once promoted 
in the drafting of an instrument should then be adopted onto the ILO statute. It would be 
a waste of time and resources to coordinate a common representation without doing as 
much as possible to see it ‘locked in’ to an ILO instrument. Yet the evidence from this case 
study is that this does not always happen.
In terms of what neofunctionalism would predict as measures of the changing 
behaviour of the EU Member States, three of the most important are: (1) an increasing role 
for the European Commission including the possibility of European Community
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membership of the ILO; (2) the decline in heterogeneous national interests and 
establishment of EU-level common interests; and (3) a mechanism of spillover between 
issue areas enhancing the scope of coordination. The role of the European Commission 
has been limited to speaking on behalf of the EU Member States, and the idea of 
Community membership has not become any more of a reality over the length of the 
survey. Where the Commission did develop its role was in two areas, firsdy speaking 
without the Presidency on the subject of equality, and secondly in the area of occupational 
health and safety (OSH) speaking alongside the Presidency. However, while this did 
develop and there was a confirmation by the Commission that the preparations for the 
Single Market were the basis of integration in the area of OSH,103 it prompdy ended in 
1993 after ECJ Opinion 2/91, despite further OSH instruments being drafted in 1994/5 
(Mines, C176), 2000/2001 (Agriculture, Cl 84) and a general convention in 2005, to be 
completed in 2006. Although the European Commission did contribute to the 2003 
Seafarers’ Identity Document, the total contribution by the Commission has not grown 
constandy, but instead developed and then receded, contrary to the thesis of a logic of 
integration.
National interests appear to be far more influential in shaping EU Member State 
voting during the course of the survey that one would have expected. A gradual decline in 
national interests influencing voting and a corresponding increase in EU voting cohesion 
was predicted. One could argue that voting cohesion could also take the form of common 
abstentions or votes against an instrument, if such action was deemed to be in the interests 
of the EU Member States, although in practice this is very unlikely because it would signify 
that the EU did not share the ILO’s objectives of social protection. The coordinated
103 ‘Measures to harmonise health and safety at work could complement the steps being taken to complete the internal 
market of the EC by 1992/ (ILO, 1987h: §15)
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abstentions of five of the nine Member States (Denmark, France, Germany, NL and UK) 
in the record vote to adopt the convention concerning migrant workers in 1975 (C143) 
comes closest to this sort of action. However, it was a majority vote but not a cohesive 
vote and it occurred only once in 1975. Far from seeing an increase in this sort of 
behaviour, it points to a decline in actions predicted by neofunctionalism. Instead, Member 
States vote according to the rationales given above based on either ideological or political 
grounds. The highlighting of political issues is especially important because 
neofunctionalism assumes economic integration precedes political integration, and its 
explanatory power in technical issues was based on the assumption that technical issues 
were non-political.
Finally, the identification of national interests based on ideological objections to 
some technical committees makes the dynamic process of spillover more difficult in the 
ILC. For spillover to work we would expect the EU Member States to agree to log-rolling 
between technical committees, agreeing to a common statement in one committee in 
return for a ‘reward’ in another committee. The specialisation of delegates from the EU 
Member States national governments and their compartmentalised mandates is different 
from Brussels-style negotiating,104 and they rely on their own established network of 
contacts that do not necessarily include exclusively EU Member States.105 Taken together, 
this makes spillover across the conference agenda more difficult, as demonstrated in the 
example of the French Presidency in 1995.
104 Interview; Geneva, 22 June 2005
105 Interview; Athens, 1 October 2004
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ii. Intergovernmental theory
As the alternative to neofunctional theory, the substantial evidence refuting 
neofunctionalism should signal the usefulness of intergovernmental theory. There are a few 
features that do support this approach but they do not make a convincing case for it. The 
first argument in support of intergovemmentalism is the continued importance of national 
interests in shaping EU Member State behaviour. The statistical evidence against a 
significant association between representation and voting cohesion demonstrated this, as 
did the quadrant diagram that pointed to EU Member State voting being moderately 
aligned with ILC plenary consensus. The importance of these points is that membership of 
the EU does not lead to the Member States voting differendy to how they would otherwise 
vote if they were not members. The level of consensus in ILC plenary sessions is an 
indication of how broad common interests are, the cohesive voting of EU Member States 
is attributed to consensus, not EU membership itself. Intergovernmental theory does not 
predict autonomous pursuit of national interests on every occasion (hence the possibility of 
consensus in the ILC), but rather that the pursuit of national interests will be the first 
priority over broader EU interests. The fact that intergovernmental theory does not 
preclude cohesive voting is important because on average the level of cohesion between 
EU Member States in ILO record votes is high (around 70% as shown in Table 5.1).
The intergovernmental approach predicts that all EU Member States would pursue 
their national interests regardless of their size and relative power within the EU by virtue of 
their sovereign status. We do find evidence of smaller EU Member States voting 
autonomously from the majority of members (voting deviation) although only Portugal 
and Luxembourg have acted truly independendy, on three occasions between them. Far 
more frequendy either French or British voting deviates from the majority position alone,
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of other small Member States join them. A far more damning criticism of the 
intergovernmental position exposed by the empirical research is the lack of change over 
time in the level of voting cohesion, despite the continuous enlargement of the EU from 
nine to 25. With a nearly three-fold increase in size over the survey we would expect to see 
far less common representation, but the mean and median data from Tables 4.2 show that 
Periods 1 and 5 are remarkably similar.106 While the data shows a continued willingness to 
pursue national interests from time to time, it is a small number of Member States 
(principally the UK) that have always behaved in this way, rather than being an inherent 
characteristic of EU decision-making.
Hi. Liberal intergovemmentalism
The applicability of liberal intergovernmental (LI) theory begins where 
intergovernmental theory falls down. A central plank of this approach is the built in 
assumption that the big three EU Member States (France, Germany and the UK) operate 
with slightly different rules to the other Member States. In the intergovernmental 
negotiations the three use the non-military tools of power politics (such as the threat of 
veto) to ensure that none of their fundamental interests are damaged by the treaties 
created. In the same way that their national interests take precedent in negotiations, the 
evidence gathered in this thesis shows that the UK to a great extent, France to a lesser 
extent and Germany to a certain extent have all acted to protect their national interests 
ahead of maintaining EU voting cohesion are common EU representation. The majority of 
smaller EU Member States accommodate themselves to the common positions, so as not 
to jeopardise their credibility in future negotiations, seeing their best interests lying inside
106 Period 1: Mean: 0.049; Median 0.032. Period 5: Mean: 0.0.52; Median 0.035.
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the EU. This assumption holds mostly true, with Portugal being the only Member State to 
have joined the EU after 1973 and to have deviated in its voting.
Another important result from the data that supports LI is the impact of treaties 
on the different periods of the survey. Two examples stand out, the Single European Act 
(SEA) and the Maastricht Treat. The SEA set out the framework to build the Single 
Market by harmonising employment and social protection legislation, as set out in Article 
137 of the TEC. The growth in the intensity of representation was most obvious in OSH 
legislation, as was the growing role of the European Commission in speaking for the EU 
Member States. This also concurs with Tsebelis and Garrett’s ‘second epoch’. (Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2001) In 1993 the pattern of behaviour drastically changed. The role of the 
Commission ended and the Member States through the Presidency took sole responsibility 
for representation, even in OSH where there was previously joint representation. The 
timing coincides with the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty, which reduced the 
influence of the Commission, characterised as the ‘third epoch’. (Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2001) However, it also coincides with the ECJ Opinion 2/91 which resolved the long- 
running dispute over who represents the EU Member States in the ILO. In this respect the 
opinion closely matches Moravcsik’s treaties, insofar as it is constitutes the third stage of 
his model of institutional choice. Moravcsik explains the rational choice of Member States 
to create supranational institutions through their interest in preventing other Member 
States cheating on the hard-fought intergovernmental agreements. The supranational ECJ 
opinion serves to secure the agreement.
The third piece of supporting evidence is the integration in some areas of social 
policy that are of low salience to national governments, such as OSH. Other issues that are 
more relevant to the national identity of each Member State will not be integrated so easily,
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such as those that have a strong ideological component. The very low levels of 
representation in areas that are decided by unanimity in the Council (as defined in TEC 
Art. 137 (§c,d,f,g)) is to be expected because the intergovernmental negotiations drafting 
the treaty identified those areas as high salience. The low levels of voting cohesion on 
instruments concerning working conditions are also examples of how integration takes 
place at the discretion of governments and not in accordance to a teleological process with 
its own dynamic mechanisms.
iv. Consociational theory
Does the evidence from the case study confirm or refute the applicability of 
consociational theory to the EU Member States’ behaviour in the ILO? There are a 
number of ways in which it does appear to be appropriate, in its ability to explain the 
fluctuations in the level of representation and voting cohesion over time, the uneven 
development of coordination in some issue areas and not others, as well as explaining the 
significance of the Presidency, something that the other theories considered above tend to 
overlook.
Beginning with the fluctuating level of representation and voting cohesion over the 
five periods, the explanation given by consociational theory is the need to find equilibrium 
between the Member States’ intergovernmental aspirations of maintaining their national 
identities (as ‘segments’) and their supranational aspirations of economic gain through the 
development of the European Community. The theory predicts that progression too far in 
one direction will lead to a counter-balancing movement in the opposing one in order to 
retain stability in the system. The supranational dimension in the case study is common EU 
representation, based on Member State coordination and the establishment and promotion
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of common interests, which are common because they are European Community interests. 
Alternatively, voting cohesion and the instances when voting deviation has taken place 
measures the intergovernmental dimension. This is when an EU Member State seeks to 
preserve their individual status as a segment distinct from the Community. When reviewing 
the five periods, the rise in representation over Periods 1 to 3 is accompanied by a decrease 
in voting cohesion, as the intergovernmental counter-balance of the supranational 
development. Period 4 marks a radical re-alignment with reduced representation and very 
high levels of non-cohesion. Period 5 illustrates how the re-alignment was too extreme in 
an intergovernmental direction, and the level of voting cohesion has risen again, although 
the supranational element (representation) remains low. This situation is a return to the 
equilibrium of the 1973-1980 period, which in turn led to a period of supranational 
development. This analysis also provides a theoretically grounded explanation of why 
representation and voting cohesion are not statistically associated, which is because they 
can work in opposing directions as well as together.
Within the framework of a consociational theory explanation for the balancing of 
representation and voting cohesion, the uneven development of EU representation in 
some technical issue-areas and not others is also explainable. Using a similar argument to 
liberal intergovernmental theory, the area where the EU Member States exhibited most 
common representation (OSH) is one that is best handled at the Community level, and 
equally importandy, does not compromise the identity of the Member States. The 
argument that the defence of national interests takes place on ideological grounds is 
direcdy applicable to the consociational theory concern for preserving the individuality of 
segments. EU Member States choose to abstain or vote against instruments that challenge 
the market ideology of the government, most commonly by seeking to be seen as more 
favourable to the free market than to social regulation. Following the consociational theory
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position through this case study, the conclusion is reached that common representation 
and non-cohesive voting are not contradictory actions, but instead promote the unique 
balance between supranational and intergovernmental pressures within the EU, which both 
need to be kept in check in order to preserve the equilibrium in the EU system.
Finally, consociational theory explains the role of the Presidency in the context of 
the symbiotic relationship between supranationalism and intergovemmentalism. The six- 
month rotating Presidency of the Council is responsible for nearly all EU representation in 
the ILC (the exception being the European Commission spokespersons listed in Appendix 
1). As chair of the coordination meetings, the Presidency decides the scope of 
representation and facilitates bargaining between Member States over agreeing what will be 
said. The Presidency does not have a free-hand in deciding which committees the EU will 
be represented in because it must follow precedents from previous conferences (i.e. second 
discussions are prioritised, previous instruments discussed, issue areas relating to 
Community law) as well as what was agreed during the Social Questions working group in 
Brussels. However, the Presidency is responsible for shaping the outputs of coordination 
meetings in Geneva between the technical experts sent from each national government, 
who may have little experience of EU coordination. Some Presidencies are regarded as 
being closer to the European Commission than others, and preconceptions over their 
independence can influence the expectations of national delegates as to whether their 
interests will be served.107
The main criticism levelled against consociational theory is the role played by 
European elites assumed to have an interest in the preservation of the EU, and therefore
107 Examples o f such Presidencies include Greece in 2003 and Luxembourg in 2005. Interviews: London, 21 September 
2004; Copenhagen, 2 March 2005; Geneva, 22 June 2005.
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.limit the extent to which national interests are pursued. In the technical committees, as 
mentioned above, there are some networks of experts that have more experience of ILO 
coordination through IMEC than the EU. These experts also come from within national 
governments that may not have much experience of EU-style coordination, and hence 
bring into doubt the credibility of assuming a European elite. The explanation given in 
support of non-cohesive voting for the maintenance of different segments is easier to 
substantiate when voting deviation is triggered by ideological differences, rather than 
political motivations. This was also seen in Chapter 3 when evidence was given of the 
tripartite national members (workers and employers) using the ESC own-initiative report to 
promote their own interests in maintaining the distinctiveness of each segment by 
criticising Commission plans for greater European level coordination of governments. 
(ESC, 1995)
v. Institutionalism
The core assumptions of the institutional approach being applied to technical 
coordination come from the study of institutional adaptation, which Featherstone 
identified as the goodness of fit, the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness. The key empirical findings that we have to consider are the apparent lack 
of statistical association between EU representation and voting cohesion in technical 
issues, the lack of any sustained increase in the level representation over time, the 
importance of national interests, the role of the Presidency and exogenous ILC agenda 
setting power.
Starting with the concept of ‘misfit’, while incompatibility between national and 
European policies in the Community pillar leads to Europeani2ation and adaptation, ‘this is
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a major difference to other international institutions which are simply based on voluntary 
intergovernmental arrangements.’ (Boerzel and Risse, 2003: 61) Although in some policy 
areas (notably occupational health and safety) there is a very high level of common 
representation, in other policy areas there is not, while we also found evidence of EU 
Member States deviating in their voting behaviour after common representation.
Why has Europeanization taken place so patchily? The answer lies in the two logics 
of action used to overcome misfit, the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness. Europeanization through the logic of consequences is the result of a 
redistribution of domestic power, with some actors winning and other actors losing. In 
contrast, in the logic of appropriateness leads to redefined interests based on shared 
identities and interests. When Europeanization has taken place through sociological 
processes common representation and voting cohesion between the EU Member States is 
observed. When Europeanization takes place through rational choice processes the losing’ 
parties remain convinced of their national interests, despite acquiescence to EU-level 
policies. We can explain the lack of EU common representation and deviating votes as 
attempts by EU Member States Europeanized through the logic of consequences to upload 
their national policy preferences to the ILO. If successfully uploaded, the national position 
will be legitimised by being incorporated into an ILO standard, and can shape future EU 
legislation when the Commission consults relevant ILO standards. This explanation fits 
well with the observation of competing ideologies between greater social protection and 
market liberalisation.
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4. Sum m ary
. This chapter correlated the empirical findings across the five periods of time from 
Chapters 4 and 5 with the five theories and the five crosscutting issues. Over the five 
periods there was no clearly identifiable relationship between coordination and 
representation, and none of the theoretical approaches conclusively fitted the observed 
pattern of EU Member State behaviour. O f the five crosscutting issues, three were 
identified as being of greatest usefulness in explaining the observed behaviour; national 
interests, ILC agenda setting and the Presidency of the Council.
The first was national interests, operating through the promotion of an alternative 
ideology to the majority of EU Member States, or as a protest against the ILO. The role of 
IMEC is important because it offers EU Member States a rival forum for coordination 
with a stronger orientation for economic liberalisation. IMEC coordination is more 
informal than EU coordination and less supranational in its decision-making process. 
IMEC remains important in the coordination of budget agreements and in preparation for 
the Governing Body, and its strength in these areas limits the number of areas of EU 
coordination. Furthermore, evidence was gathered to show that the some of the actions of 
the UK government, which accounted for over half of all instances of deviating voting, 
could be explained as protests against the reporting of core labour standard (C87, C98) 
violations taking place in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s.
The second crosscutting issue was agenda setting, an important exogenous variable 
influencing the gathering of data. Recognising this is crucial when assessing the applicability 
of theories that focus exclusively on the internal dynamics of EU Member State behaviour. 
Finally, the Presidency of the Council was another important crosscutting issue, since the
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level of coordination and the successful outcome of meetings was dependent on the skill 
and experience of the Presidency staff.
The appraisal of the competing theories found neofunctionalism to be of little use, 
despite the expectation that it would accurately predict the behaviour of the EU Member 
States in technical issues. Coordination and representation did not clearly correlate with 
each other, there was no noticeable increase in the level of coordination over the survey, 
national interests continued to be an important variable and no evidence of spillover 
between issue areas was found.
The applicability of intergovernmental theory is problematic because of its inability 
to explain why the level of coordination has varied over time but remains unaffected by the 
size of the EU. Increasing the size of the EU has not effected the level of coordination.
Liberal intergovernmental theory is supported by three observations. Firstly, the 
evidence that the hig three’ Member States act differently to other Member States. 
Secondly, the varying levels of representation and voting cohesion in different periods 
shows the impact of treaties on the behaviour of Member States, and the ECJ Opinion also 
acted as an institutional agreement. Finally, the low political salience issues identified by 
QMV in Article 137 correspond to those where the coordination is most developed.
Consociational theory is supported by the identification of fluctuating levels of 
representation over time, as well as variation around an equilibrium position that 
corresponds to a symbiotic balance between Community and Member States. The role of 
the Presidency is also recognised, although the assumption of a homogeneous European
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elite cannot be supported because of the hostility of national workers’ and employers’ 
representatives towards EU coordination.
Finally, institutional theory employs two methods of policy change to explain 
Europeanmtion (rationalist and sociological). The empirical data showed technical issues 
could be categorised as either having successful common representation and cohesive 
voting, or as having limited common representation and deviating voting. The former 
exhibits the characteristics of the logic of appropriateness, where common identities and 
interests are agreed and common representation is regarded as legitimate. The latter 
exhibits the characteristics of the logic of consequences, where power has shifted but 
interests and identities remain unchanged.
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P a r t  I I I :  P o l i t i c a l  C o o r d i n a t i o n  
C h a p t e r  7
THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL COORDINATION
The following four chapters investigate the common EU representation and voting 
cohesion of the EU Member States in response to selected political issues arising on the 
agenda of the annual International Labour Conferences, from 1973 to 2005. As discussed 
in the Chapter 1, ‘political’ issues are not as easy to define as the technical issues surveyed 
in Chapters 3 jto 6. This is because two definitions of political were offered; the first a 
‘negative’ definition that was ‘everything that is not technical’, while the second ‘positive’ 
definition was agenda items where the EU Member States coordinate common 
representation through the EPC/CFSP decision-making apparatus. The positive and 
negative adjectives are not used to give a value judgement about the issue area, but instead 
reflect whether the definition says something about what the issue are is (positive), or what 
it is not (negative).108 In order to clarify this distinction, the following issues have been the 
subject of an EU common statement during the course of the survey:
•  The conditions of Arab workers in the Occupied Territories
•  Concern for human rights and trade union rights in Chile
•  The adoption of the report of the Committee on the Application of Standards
•  The structure of the ILO
•  The apartheid regime of the South African Government
•  The recognition of ILC delegates from Serbia and Montenegro
108 For example, the practice o f forced labour in Myanmar is the subject o f EU Presidency statements and can be classified 
as a political issue. By contrast the ILO biennial budget is not a technical issue, but there is no coordinated common 
EU position. (Interview: Geneva, 22 June 2005) If there were a common position, it would be coordinated through the 
intergovernmental CFSP pillar. This is an example o f a ‘negative’ definition o f a political issue; it is not technical, yet 
also not subject to actual coordination.
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• Violations of core labour standards in Myanmar, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Belarus 
and Sudan
By contrast, the following issues (inter alia) recur frequently on the ILC agenda, are not 
technical but no common EU representation is made:
• The admission of new members to the ILO
• Granting permission to vote to governments that have not paid their fees
• Election of the President o f the annual conference
• The adoption of the biennial budget
The study of political coordination, representation and voting cohesion in this 
chapter and the following three uses empirical data from the first list of actual political 
issues, as opposed to potential political issues in the second list. Chapter 8 presents the 
empirical data on EU Member State representation and voting cohesion in the ILC plenary 
between 1973 and 2005. Chapter 9 looks at the EU Member States’ participation in the 
Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) since 1973, and the development since 
2000 of EU Presidency statements. Finally, Chapter 10 summarises both sets of results, 
identifies the most important common factors and contrasts the explanatory performance 
of the theories being tested.
The remainder of this chapter gives an overview of the development of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) and its transition into the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The history is complemented by a 
review of the literature on EU Member State coordination in the UN system, which is 
predominantly focused on the General Assembly.109 The chapter ends with a summary of 
the five theories and provides a framework for testing which theory is most useful to 
explain EU Member State coordination in political issues in the ILC.
109 Wotk has also been done on the World Trade Organisation and environmental regimes, but there is insufficient space 
to consider it here.
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1. EPC and CFSP: A brief history
In December 1969 the six Member States of the European Community met in The 
Hague to discuss ways of addressing the discrepancy between the economic and political 
power of the European Community. It was already apparent that the EC was an economic 
‘giant’ and a political ‘dwarf. The communique produced at the end of the meeting (The 
Hague Summit Declaration) urged ‘paving the way for a united Europe capable of 
assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution 
commensurate with its traditions and missions’.110 (Hill and Smith, 2000: 725) This set in 
motion a process that became known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), and is the 
ancestor of today’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The ancestral heritage 
comes from both the objective of EPC (to give Europe a single voice in international 
politics), and its institutional design that is strictly intergovernmental in nature. Simon 
Nuttall sums up the motivation for an intergovernmental system of political cooperation in 
which Trance, in particular, was determined that no taint o f Community or supranational 
procedures should sully the pure milk of national foreign policy.’ (Nuttall, 1997:19)
In order to ensure the separation of European Community and EPC affairs, the 
Foreign Ministers of the Member States met in two capacities, one as the General Affairs 
Council of the EC and the other as national government Foreign Ministers in EPC. In 
each role they had a separate team of support staff, coordinated by the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) for European Community Council meetings and 
by Political Directors for EPC affairs. To clarify which capacity the Foreign Ministers were
110 Communique o f the Conference o f the Heads o f State and Government o f the Member States o f the European 
Community (The Hague Summit Declaration), The Hague, 2 December 1969. Paragraph 1
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acting in, the title ‘the Six’ signified that the sphere in which the Member States were acting 
in was political, and therefore excluded the institutions of the EC.
EPC was increasingly appreciated as “a central element in the foreign policies o f  member 
states.”111 The attractiveness o f  EPC stemmed largely from its intergovernmental character, which 
gave participating governments the final say, based on the consensus o f  all. EPC was not designed 
to  absorb national diplomacy; it allowed for the pursuit o f  collective and individual foreign policies. 
(Regelsberger, 1997: 68)
A major change in the status of EPC came in the 1986 Single European Act, when 
it became formally recognised in a European Community treaty, albeit remaining an 
intergovernmental institution outside the scrutiny of the European Parliament or the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). One thing that did change was the full inclusion of the 
European Commission in the workings of EPC. Article 30.3(b) of the SEA states that the 
‘Commission shall be fully associated with the proceedings of Political Cooperation’, 
something that had been taking place incrementally for a number of years due to the 
realisation by the foreign ministers that the European Community had two very useful 
foreign policy tools at its disposal. The first and most powerful was the control over the 
external tariff to the Community Single Market and the extension of preferential access to 
it (‘carrots’), or the suspension of either access to it (‘sticks’). The second tool was the 
control of access to development aid given by the Community. Although this tool was less 
universally applicable it still remained useful when seeking to influence developing states.112 
*The SEA also gave the Commission (together with the Presidency) responsibility for 
ensuring consistency in the external policies of the Community. The Commission’s 
external delegations were also drawn into the European Political Cooperation (EPC)
111 Affirmed in 1981 in the “London Report” of the foreign ministers. (13 October 1981)
112 These two tools of foreign policy are also the primary credentials of the EU as a civilian power, using non-military 
coercive force to achieve its aims. (Smith, 1998a)
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framework by the commitment to intensify cooperation between member states, 
diplomatic missions to third countries, and international organisations/ (Cameron, 1997: 
99)
In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was agreed by the 12 Member States of the 
European Community and formally created the European Union in November 1993, after 
the final Member State ratified the treaty. The institutional design of the Union consisted 
of three pillars, the European Community (I), the CFSP (II) and Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA — III).113 EPC was replaced by CFSP and although changes were made to its 
institutional structure, ‘the future CFSP, to all intents and purposes, lay firmly within the 
intergovernmental tradition from which it had arisen. ... EPC was designed to coordinate 
national foreign policies; the Union, as its tenets announce, is expected to have a common 
foreign and security policy. This is difficult to achieve by the intergovernmental method/ 
(Nuttall, 1997: 19) Christopher Hill summed up the difficulty the CFSP had in achieving 
what was expected of it as the ‘capabilities and expectations gap’. (Hill, 1998)
The institutional framework of the CFSP set out in the Maastricht treaty continued 
the evolutionary process of greater Commission involvement. The Commission gained the 
co-right of initiation with the aim of making the EU into a more coherent actor. The 
intention was to allow closer coordination of the ‘political’ foreign policy handled through 
the CFSP and ‘economic’ external relations handled by the Commission. In a move that 
consolidated the strength of the European Council and its secretariat, the separate
113 JHA included the ateas o f (1) Asylum, (2) The crossing o f external borders, (3) Immigration, (4) Combating drug 
addiction, (5) Combating fraud on an international scale, (6) Judicial co-operation in civil matters, (7) Judicial co­
operation in criminal matters, (8) Customs cooperation and (9) Police cooperation. Critics regarded the third pillar as 
deeply flawed because o f  the strong claim for incorporating the first three areas in the EC pillar due to their relevance 
to the movement o f labour in the single market (Dinan, 1999: 439-451) The structure o f the third pillar soon proved to 
be unworkable, and was subsequendy reformed at the Treaty o f Amsterdam when points 1-6 were moved into the 
Community pillar.
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diplomatic bureaucracy that supported EPC was brought under the direction of 
COREPER. The decision-making process in the CFSP is limited to the Council and the 
Commission, since ‘provisions on the competence of the European Court of Justice are 
not applicable; [and] the European Parliament (EP)’s involvement is confined to a mere 
right to be consulted and informed.’ (Grunert, 1997:109)
David Allen sums up the evolution of foreign policy coordination since the 1970s
as the
emergence o f  two “cultures” competing for control o f  the policy-making process, 
institutionally-based in the Council and Commission. After making steady gains since the early 
1970s, the culture o f Commission control has been set back by the Amsterdam Treaty, which 
fortifies the pre-eminence o f  the Council over EU foreign policy. (Allen, 1998: 43)
The pre-eminence of the Council after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty came principally as a 
result of changes made to make the CFSP more effective. The most important procedural 
change was the new job description handed to the Secretary-General of the Council — to 
become the High Representative for the CFSP and act on behalf of the Council in 
international affairs.114 Decision-making in the CFSP is based on the use of four 
instruments, which were defined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
• Principles and Guidelines: The European Council shall define the principles of and 
general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for 
matters with defence implications.’ Article 13§1
114 Other changes included the reform of the Troika system, in which its composition went from the Past, Present and 
Future EU Presidencies and the Commission, to being comprised o f the Present and Future EU Presidencies, the 
Council Secretary General and the Commission. Changes were also made to the decision-making process with a limited 
extension o f qualified majority voting (QMV) and the creation o f a ‘constructive abstention’ in areas that require 
unanimity, and the setting up o f a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) that would allow the EU to react 
more quickly to crisis situations.
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• Common Strategies: ‘The European Council shall decide upon common strategies to 
be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important 
interests in common.’ Article 13§2
• Joint Actions: ‘The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address 
specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. 
They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the 
Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.’ 
Article 14
• Common Positions: ‘The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions 
shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of geographical or 
thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to 
the common positions.’ Article 15
Principles and Guidelines and Common Strategies provide overall guidance to the 
CFSP, while Joint Actions and Common Positions are designed to help it operate in its 
daily functioning. However, the instruments at its disposal are limited, and the majority of 
practical responses require the use of foreign policy tools from the first pillar, such as 
controlling development aid and access to the EU’s Single Market. (Smith, 1998a; 
Ginsberg, 2001; Smith, 2002) The EU therefore remains heavily reliant on economic 
power as the diplomatic arsenal at its disposal, which was what originally led to the 
inclusion of the Commission into the EPC framework and later into the CFSP.
The cordoning and sanitization o f ‘foreign policy’ as a pillar II intergovernmental 
competence under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has excessively narrowed the 
domain for EU foreign policy action. Almost in every instance, Pillar I communautain competences 
are required to implement CFSP in practice. (Holland, 2002: 7)
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The critique made of the foreign policy of the EU is that its decision-making 
apparatus and its instruments are disconnected, spread between the CFSP pillar and the 
Community pillar, and thus leading to the increasing role of the Commission to improve 
efficiency. ‘The pillar structure of the EU...is in contrast to the nature of international 
problems and the Union’s ability to manage them.’ (Regelsberger et al., 1997b: 9)
During the late 1990s the focus of the CFSP was on increasing the military 
capabilities of the EU, including the development of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). In December 2003 Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, 
attempted to set out in a single document a coherent foreign policy direction for the EU, 
known as the European Union’s Security Strategy and titled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better 
World’. (Solana, 2003) In it is a section dedicated to the relationship between the EU and 
international institutions, including the United Nations. Solana states that
our security and prosperity increasingly depend on  an effective multilateral system. The 
development o f  a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule- 
based international order is our objective. We are committed to upholding and developing 
International Law. . . .  Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and 
to act effectively, is a European priority. (Solana, 2003: 9)
This statement is an assertion that the EU Member States are committed to orchestrating 
the continued transformation of the international system away from one based on power 
and towards one based on international law. International law is the basis of the 
management of relations between European states, and the promotion of effective 
multilateralism through the UN system is an attempt to fashion the world in its own 
likeness.115 This is in line with Richard Whitman’s argument that the legislative nature of 
the intra-EU politics is being replicated in its external relations with third parties through
115 Robert Cooper, ‘Can Europe run the 21st Century?’; speech as the London School of Economics 6 October 2005.
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trade, aid and humanitarian agreements. The ‘operations o f the European Union that are 
explicitly directed outwards can be characterised as the ‘international identit/ of the Union’ 
and that identity is ‘conceived in terms of those instruments that are available to the Union 
to give expression to policy.’ (Whitman, 1998: 234) Europe’s role as a supporter of 
multilateral institutions is endorsed by Stephan Keukeleire, who argues that the EU should 
pursue a ‘structural foreign policy’ that is ‘based on the various strategies and partnerships 
the EU has with other regions in the world, and is aimed at promoting structural long-term 
changes in these regions’. (Keukeleire, 2003: 32) ‘Structural power’ is a phrase used by 
Mario Telo to describe a long-term strategic objective to transform the structure of the 
international system into one based on the rule of law rather than the ‘law of the jungle’, as 
realism maintains. Telo refers to the European approach to international and inter-regional 
agreements as ‘pactomania’. (Telo, 2001: 265)
2. EU Member States’ political coordination in the United Nations
For over thirty years the Member States of the European Union (EU) have 
declared their intention to coordinate their national positions in the institutions of the 
United Nations system. Luif traces the first public declaration of coordination in this area 
to the ‘Document on the European Identity’, issues by the foreign ministers of the Nine 
EC members in December 1973. (Luif, 2003) Point 21 states
The N ine will participate in international negotiations in an outward looking spirit, while 
preserving the fundamental elements o f  their unity and their basic aims. They are also resolved to 
contribute to international progress, both through their relations with third countries and by 
adopting com m on positions wherever possible in international organizations, notably the United 
Nations and the Specialized Agencies. (Hill and Smith, 2000: 96)
The rhetoric has remained effectively the same ever since, despite the evolution of 
European Political Cooperation into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In
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Tide V of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) there are a number of articles relating 
to coordination of Member States in international organisations. Article 11 states that one 
of the objectives of the CFSP is ‘to promote international cooperation’, and continues by 
spelling out the procedures that should be followed in order to bring this about:
The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters com ing within the com m on foreign 
and security policy.
The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation o f  decisions taken under this 
title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position o f  the U nion in international 
organisations and international conferences. (Article 18 §1-2)
Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the com m on positions in such forums.
In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member 
States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the com m on positions. (Article 19 §1)
The diplomatic and consular missions o f  the Member States and the Commission  
delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to 
international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the com m on positions and joint actions 
adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments 
and contributing to the implementation o f  the provisions referred to in Article 20 o f  the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. (Article 20)
Empirical investigations into the coordination of Member States of the EEC/EU 
in the United Nations have taken place sporadically within the literature, although as Simon 
Nuttall points out efforts had been underway since the early 1970’s to improve the 
coordination through European Political Cooperation. The CONUN Working Group was 
part of the EPC framework and its main function was ‘to exchange information, and on 
the basis of that shared information to arrive at common analysis’. (Nuttall, 1992: 17) 
Nuttall continues by explaining that the
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activity o f  the Twelve in the United Nations in N ew  York and in the specialised agencies in 
Geneva is somewhat different from that in third countries. The object here is not so much to 
achieve a uniform presentation o f  policy to the host organisation as to work out com m on positions 
on  questions on which the central authorities o f  EPC do not provide sufficiently detailed guidance. 
The rhythm o f  work o f  the Member States’ missions and the Commission delegation is intense. 
(Nuttall, 1992:27)
Despite knowledge of the EPC workings and the proclamations in the Treaties and 
Council reports, scepticism of the success of the mechanisms and ideals has always been 
close to the surface. Practitioners have claimed that the ‘EEC states vote together on 
unimportant questions and apart on important ones’ (Foot, 1979: 351 fn5), while 
academics query whether the ‘differentiated bipolar agendas among the Six, Nine, Ten and 
Twelve, in the UN context, would not allow the effective coordination of their foreign 
policy views’. (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 69)
Leon Hurwitz published the first study into voting cohesion between the Member 
States in the UN system in 1975. (Hurwitz, 1975) He measured the voting records of five 
of the original six Member States in the United Nations General Assembly (West Germany 
did not join until 1973) between 1946 and 1973, and over the same period those of 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK. This approach enabled him to look at the level of cohesion 
within the groups, but also say which Member States disagree most frequently, and which 
states found themselves in agreement most often. He compared voting cohesion across 
eleven issue areas before the establishment of the EEC in 1957 with afterwards. His 
principal findings were that overall cohesion declined after 1957, (except in the issue areas 
of Human rights and the Arab-Israeli dispute) and that France was the main dissenting 
member in the group.
206/381
Rosemary Foot surveyed three consecutive General Assembly sessions (30-32) 
between 1975-1977 and compared the voting record patterns of the Nine in roll-call 
votes.116 (Foot, 1979) The three sessions were ‘indicative of the General Assembly at its 
best and its worst, at its most acrimonious and at its most business-like’ (Foot, 1979: 351). 
Foot found that the level of voting cohesion was constant at around 60%. She noted a 
number of trends, such as the willingness of France to vote alone (especially on nuclear 
issues), a minority group of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and occasionally Italy 
actively supporting action against apartheid in South Africa, and the emergence of 
Germany, France and the UK taking common positions against such action. Cohesion 
was visible in 1975 on a common position against a resolution to equate Zionism with 
racism, with 8 voting against and France, while initially voting for, ‘later changed her vote 
to an abstention, presumably through Community pressure.’ (Foot, 1979: 353)
Beate Lindemann’s 1978 monograph on EU Member State coordination in the 
United Nations was summarised in a 1982 book chapter. (Lindemann, 1978; Lindemann, 
1982) Lindemann made an important distinction between internal and external pressure to 
coordinate and raised the more fundamental question, which was what is the purpose of 
EU Member State coordination? Lindemann answered the question as follows:
Declarations o f the Nine may help the internal development o f  European unity, but they 
are not really effective or politically convincing contributions to the debate in the General Assembly. 
(Lindemann, 1982:120)
This is a recurrent issue that is still at the centre of the debate on EU effectiveness. (Smith, 
2006c) The Lindemann article also provided some very useful quantitative data on five
116 Resolutions before the GA can be adopted by consensus, by show of hands, by a roll-call or a record vote. The 
majority o f votes are passed in the former two methods, when there is unanimity among all states. A publication by the 
European Commission claimed that the EU member states achieve cohesive positions 95% o f the time. However, 
these statistics count all votes including those adopted by consensus. By their nature, roll-call votes are about 
contentious issues and therefore all the surveys o f European cohesion focus on these votes. (EC, 2003: 4)
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sessions (28-32) of the General Assembly between 1973 and 1977. Data is given for overall 
voting cohesion in the record votes, as well as being divided by issue area. Lindemann 
pointed to four key issues of contention between the EU Member States at this time, 
which were the Middle East (including Palestine), decolonisation (including Southern 
Africa), disarmament and economics. (Lindemann, 1982:122)
The first two of these issues are of most significant to this thesis because they 
concern major political issues dominating the agenda of the ILC in the 1970s and 1980s. 
From 1973 to 1976 Denmark and the Netherlands were identified as being in the minority 
o f EU Member States that did not support the Arab position on resolutions concerning 
the Middle East. (Lindemann, 1982: 123) After 1977 a common position of abstention was 
agreed between all EU Member States on situation in the Middle East, which is attributed 
to ‘the Middle East declaration of the European Council of 29 June 1977 which formed 
the basis of the Nine’s consensus.’ (Lindemann, 1982: 125) In the UN, the ‘question of 
apartheid has also been linked to that o f decolonisation despite attempts by the West to 
keep the two issues separate.’ (Lindemann, 1982: 125) For this reason the finding by 
Lindemann that decolonisation was an issue of division for the EU Member States is also 
significant. In the UN General Assembly Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy have 
all been critical of the apartheid regime, while France, Germany and the UK were cited in a 
1977 GA resolution ‘as countries who had supplied weapons to South Africa that were 
used for both internal repression and external aggression’.117 As will be seen later, these 
divisions manifested themselves over the issue of apartheid in the ILO too.
117 Resolution 31/6D 9 November 1976 quoted in (Lindemann, 1982: 125)
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The voting behaviour of the EU Member States in the General Assembly were 
ignored for much of the 1980s and 1990s, and revival in interest came after 2000, with a 
string of publications by Jurgen Decking, Paul Luif, Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues and Katie 
Verlin Laatikainen. (Decking, 2002; Luif, 2003; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Verlin 
Laatikainen, 2004)
Juergen Decking’s 2002 conference paper presented his reflections on observing 
the EU Presidency and Member States at the United Nations General Assembly in New 
York between 1999 and 2001 (Sessions 54-56). Decking is interested in the study of 
coordination meetings between EU Member States in the UN, and reports the startling 
fact that during the first six months of 2001 ‘more than a thousand EU consultations were 
held to achieve a common position on the full range of UN agenda items’. (Decking, 2002: 
15) In considering the impact of these meetings, the author cited the widely ckculated 
statistic that the EU Member States achieved ‘a common position on almost 95% of 
General Assembly votes’ (Decking, 2002: 3) which has been contested by other authors 
cited below. Decking’s contention is that it ‘would be much more interesting to get hold of 
the cases where disunity and the EU group had to abandon the struggle for a consensus 
position’ (Decking, 2002: 4) Although this is not possible, Decking presents an alternative 
methodology, which is ‘the very careful study of joint declarations and the individual 
country statements [which] opens up a few leads that might be significant in terms of 
fissures and cracks in the consensus front.’ (Decking, 2002: 5) The paper therefore takes a 
different approach to the earlier work (including Foot, who also looked at three sessions) 
by focusing on the speeches given to the Assembly rather than the voting patterns. 
Decking shows that by reading the speeches of each EU Member State closely, one can 
identify which issues they agree and disagree on. Decking concludes that the fact that the 
55th Session was dedicated to the Millennium Summit, and the 56th fell in the wake of the
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September 11 attacks, meant that these exceptional circumstances dictated the content of 
plenary addresses to the extent that more detailed work is necessary.
Katie Verlin Laatikainen begins her study by contesting the data published by the 
Commission on EU coherence, that includes all votes, not just roll-call and record votes, 
which ‘includes the consensus decisions taken by the UN General Assembly (roughly 2/3 
of all decisions) where in fact all UN member states* not just the Europeans, have a 
common position.’ (Verlin Laatikainen, 2004: 4) Verlin Laatikainen follows the 
methodology of Hurwitz, Foot, Luif and Johansson-Nogues by looking at the roll-call 
votes taken in the GA, ‘where there exists the possibility for voting dissension, a more 
stringent test of cohesion can be applied/ (Verlin Laatikainen, 2004: 4) She calculates an 
EU cohesion rate based on roll-call votes at 52.7% in 1991-2, rising to 78.2% in 1999-2000. 
While there is a trend in increased cooperation, there is far more dissent between Member 
States that the Commission’s optimistic appraisal suggests, and this reinforces the 
conclusion that the CFSP has little impact on national interests of the Member States.
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues’ study looks at record votes in the General Assembly 
between 1970 and 2000. (Johansson-Nogues, 2004 p.71) She identifies four periods of time 
during which particular patterns of convergence are visible between the current EU 
Member States of the time. The first period is from 1970-1978, when she notes that 
convergence increased to a value of 63% unanimity in the final year. During the next 
period (1979-1984) there was divergence between the Member States, with unanimity 
dipping to ‘one-third’ in 1983, and that they were ‘increasingly divided over issues related 
to the Middle East, decolonization and nuclear arms’. (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 71) The 
third period from 1985-1990 saw the level of unanimity in votes rise to around 50%, 
attributable to a ‘joint EC stance on South Africa and the convergence of opinions on the
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nature and scope of the UN organisation/ (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 71) The fourth 
period is from 1990 to the present, and has seen an increase in unanimity as high as 85.2% 
in 1998-1999, although Johansson-Nogues argues that the agenda of the General Assembly 
has shifted ‘toward less controversial issues’ and that this ‘indirectly favoured a greater 
coherence among EU Member States.’ (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 73) However, she 
identifies a set of core issues that continue to split the voting of the Member States, 
‘including nuclear arms, disarmament and decolonisation, as well as declaring nuclear-free 
zones, human rights, the law of the sea, economic and social issues regarding North-South 
relations and, until recently, the repeated UN condemnation of the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia.
Paul Luif s survey of the voting records in the same period produces similar results, 
although he also looks as the pattern of convergence and divergence between Europe, the 
USA and the USSR/Russia. Luif notes that post Cold War the level of consensus between 
Europe and the USA has declined, while the gap between the USSR and the West of the 
Cold War period has gradually lessened as the EU and Russia voting patterns have 
converged. (Luif, 2003: 52) Thematically, Luifs findings support the initial work of 
Hurwitz that human rights and the Arab-Israeli dispute are the issue areas of greatest 
cohesion, while also concurring with Johansson-Nogues’ appraisal of the remaining areas 
o f contention. Luif also notes the Voting behaviour of France and the UK is different 
from the EU ‘mainstream’; this divergence from the other EU countries is especially visible 
in security matters’, which he attributes pardy to the two states’ permanent membership of 
the Security Council. (Luif, 2003: 51) Luif concludes with a commentary on the EU 
coordination process, which is ‘very cumbersome and time-consuming’, and he questions 
whether ‘reaching a consensus is more highly valued than proactively influencing the 
General Assembly’. (Luif, 2003: 52) The supporting evidence for this is that the hard-won
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collective position is so rigid that negotiations ‘with third countries often become 
impossible’.
Scholarly investigations into the coordination of the EU Member States in other 
parts of the UN system have pointed to similar findings. In a study on the EU Member 
States in the Human Rights Commission, Karen Smith noted that the efforts to coordinate 
common positions between the Member States was very often the highest priority. 
However, ‘the colossal amount of time spent in EU coordination takes its toll: as a result, 
the EU has little time for “outreach” ... the problem is that some Member States have 
only the goal of EU unity in mind and not the EU’s effectiveness within the UN.’ (Smith, 
2006c: 132) The leadership of the Presidency is another important variable, since a ‘strong 
(committed, efficient, effective) Presidency can project a strong position, a weak one can 
be ignored/ (Smith, 2006c: 132) More members could potentially make the EU even more 
cumbersome, suggesting that the outputs of the CFSP are limited by the intergovernmental 
process through which they were produced.
The relevance of Smith’s work (Smith, 2006c) is that it is one of the first attempts 
to look at the work of the EU in Geneva, rather than New York, and is focused on the 
coordination of EU Member states in one UN body. Paul Taylor’s recent contribution to 
the literature has also studied EU Member State coordination in Geneva from a wider 
perspective across a number of UN bodies. (Taylor, 2006) He argues that there are two 
currents running through the coordination process. The first is a logic of synthesis headed 
by the Commission and working to improve the operating effectiveness of the 25 Member 
States. The second is a logic of diversity which comes from the Member States remaining 
the primary actors in the UN system in Geneva. More specifically, Orbie et al have 
discussed the use of ILO core labour standards in EU bilateral relations, principally as
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conditionality for its preferential trade arrangements and development assistance. (Orbie et 
al., 2005) The following chapters complement these works and the rest of the literature 
mentioned. In the first instance this is an investigation into the political agenda of the ILO 
since 1973, and notes where it overlaps with the General Assembly (Chapter 8). Chapter 9 
explores the political coordination process in Geneva in detail, and the resulting statements 
with which the EU Presidency explains the EU position on core labour standards.
3. Applying the competing theories to political coordination
i. Neofunctional theory
Neofunctional theory is frequently used in the analysis of the supranational 
Community pillar of the EU rather than the intergovernmental EPC/CFSP. Early 
neofunctional theory regarded economic integration as the pathway leading to political 
integration too, and the resolute nature of the division between the European 
Communities and EPC led to serious doubts over the applicability of the theory. (Haas, 
1975) However, as has been shown in this review of the development of EPC and CFSP 
institutions, it is clear that the European Commission has become more involved in the 
EU foreign policy making apparatus of the Member States. It is important to note that the 
European Commission staff working in Geneva and liaising with EU Member States in the 
ILO report to DG External Relations, and are responsible for ensuring consistency 
between EU policies and ILO policies (such making the Council aware of states breaking 
labour standards upon which trade preferences or development assistance are 
dependent).118 Thus while the intergovernmental basis of decision making in EPC and
118 Interview: Geneva, 22 June 2005
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CFSP limits the usefulness of neofunctional theory, a lessening of the distance between the 
economic and political dimensions of the EU is observable over time.
ii. Intergovernmental theory
Once again, the logic of diversity is at the heart of explaining EU Member State 
behaviour. While in technical issues there was a higher chance that national interests might 
converge in key areas and allow the EU Member States to be commonly represented, this 
is less likely in political issue areas. National interests will prevail over the efforts to speak 
with one voice, since the EU Member States ultimately pursue their own interests first. 
Added to this is the fact that the EU Member States are the actual members of the ILO, 
they hold the voting rights and made contributions to the budget. The EU Member States 
have a right to expect something from the dues that they pay, and there is no reason why 
they should forego such benefits for the sake of EU cohesion. In terms of change over 
time, intergovernmental theory predicts no long-term trends. Any variation in the level of 
common representation and voting cohesion over time is most likely attributed to the ILC 
agenda and the issues being discussed. During periods when a number of divisive issues 
arise, such as those identified in the literature (South Africa and the Middle East), the EU 
Member States behave in a fragmented manner because their first priority is to pursue 
national interests. However, the impact of the changes described above in the evolution of 
the EPC and the CFSP will have no effect on the actual behaviour of Member States, 
because (a) the decision-making procedure remains intergovernmental, and (b) national 
interests are determined independently of EU coordination meetings.
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iii. Liberal Intergovermental theory
Moravcsik’s theoretical model for liberal intergovernmental theory is based in the 
Community pillar of the EU and the supranational institutions created are explained as 
locking-in’ mechanisms for the complex intergovernmental bargains. Wagner applied the 
intergovernmental logic to the CFSP and concluded that because decisions need to be 
made faster, more qualified majority voting would streamline the CFSP. However, because 
the decisions reached bind Member States for far less time, no supranational institutions 
are needed. The type of foreign policy statements made in the ILO (and also in many of 
the situations elsewhere in the UN system) are deliberated over and do not need the type 
of rapid decision-making that Wagner envisages. While negotiation time is finite and 
criticism has been made of the tendency of the EU to become so preoccupied with internal 
agreement that no time is left to work with non-EU states (Smith, 2006c), there is 
sufficient time to produce common EU representation through the intergovernmental 
method.
The main insight from LI that is useful here is whether the big three Member 
States (France, Germany and the UK) are able to influence intergovernmental negotiations 
to the extent that all outcomes are based around bargains primarily acceptable to those 
three. If this is the case, do the smaller EU Member States accept the primacy of the big 
three or do they challenge it? Finding out the answer to this will help answer the second, 
related insight from the LI, which is how are intergovernmental bargains kept without the 
oversight of supranational institutions? In the Community pillar it is the acceptance by all 
EU Member States of the rule of law inside the Community (a norm of behaviour), 
coupled with a rational-choice explanation about credibility in future negotiations.
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iv. Consociational theory
The application of consociational theory to political issues has been attempted by 
Wolfgang Wessels and Joseph Weiler. They attempted to apply the theory to explain EPC 
coordination but concluded that it gave little real insight into the intergovernmental Pillar. 
(Wessels and Weiler, 1988) The main difference between applying it to political issues is 
that there is a weaker Community element of integration pulling the Member States 
together and stronger divergent tendency between the Member States based on distinct 
national identities. The central purpose of consociational theory is to explain how the two 
seemingly opposing tendencies can be reconciled. The theory argues that the integration 
process in Europe is constant over time by balancing the drive for closer union with the 
need to maintain the autonomy of the parts, or ‘segments’ (the Member States). Therefore 
consociational theory predicts little change over time because it is concerned with the long­
term stability of the European political system, and this is achieved through balancing the 
drive for integration by some EU Member States with the desire to preserve national 
identities by others. In the short term either side might be in the ascendancy, but over the 
long term there will be an equilibrium position that does not fundamentally alter. While 
intergovernmental theory predicts no overall change because of the character of the 
international system, consociational theory predicts long-term equilibrium around a 
position acceptable to elites in all Member States.
A working hypothesis set out in Chapter 2 was that dual movements of integration 
and differentiation in consociational theory corresponded to technical coordination 
through the Community pillar of the EU and political differentiation through the 
intergovernmental EPC/CFSP. However, in Chapter 6 the appraisal of the consociational 
theory concluded that the duality of integration and difference was contained within the
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technical issues on the agenda. It was argued that technical issues were not homogeneous 
and while some were commonly represented and voted on (in accordance to the 
Community logic of integration), others were not and the reason given was that some EU 
Member States maintained their national identities by voting along ideological lines (market 
liberalisation verses social protection). The application of consociational theory (i.e. the 
identification of integration and the preservation of difference) took place within the 
technical issue area. This raises the question of whether all political issues are used to 
maintain the national identities of the EU Member States, or whether some political issues 
serve to integrate the Member States, (i.e. build a closer union)? We should consider the 
possibility that both elements of integration and diversity could also take place 
simultaneously in political issues.
v. Institutional theory
The framework set out in Chapter 2 for the study of political coordination in the 
ILO using institutional approaches was based on Featherstone’s second minimalist 
interpretation of Europeanization: adaptation of policies and policy processes. March and 
Olsen’s logic of appropriateness’ was used to understand how the institutions of EPC and 
CFSP have developed norms and rules of acceptable behaviour, and socialised EU 
Member States into accepting them. In order to make this research approach operational, 
the practices of the actors involved in the institutions need to be considered, as they 
constitute the contact point between institution and state. The institutional environment 
affects the behaviour of the diplomats and bureaucrats working in it. ‘Actors are socialised 
into new norms and rules of appropriateness through processes o f arguing, persuasion, and 
social learning and to redefine their interests and identities accordingly.’ (Boerzel and Risse, 
2003: 66)
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In order to test this theory we need to have a clear idea of when coordination takes 
place, who is involved and what is being discussed. As set out in the methodology section 
of Chapter 1, it is not possible to collect empirical evidence of all EU Member State 
coordination meetings in the ILO, and instead representation is used as a benchmark for 
coordination leading to the agreement of a common EU position. The more established an 
institution is, the better it will be at shaping the expectations, identity and interests of the 
states working in it. The transmission belt from institution to state are the diplomats and 
officials working there, and in the institutions of political coordination the number of staff 
involved is smaller than in technical issue areas (where national delegates to the ILC are 
experts in a specific issue area) and they meet more frequently. According to the logic of 
appropriateness, common representation and cohesive voting should become easier in 
political issues over time because the diplomats involved in the coordination mechanisms 
become more familiar with each other and with the system. This is because political issues 
such as apartheid in South Africa recur over time (it was on the ILC agenda from 1978 to 
1993), or the coordination work in the standing Committee on the Application of 
Standards (CAS) that meets every year.119 In contrast, a technical issue is on the agenda for 
one or two years and then a new one is considered. As was shown in Chapter 4, the highest 
level of EU representation (in frequency and intensity) in a technical issue was occupational 
health and safety, which was also one of the most frequently occurring issues on the ILC 
agenda. The greater frequency coincided with more coordination between national experts, 
but the annual meeting of EPC/CFSP diplomats offers the opportunity for a higher level 
of group socialisation.
i H 9 The issue o f apartheid in South Africa is discussed in detail in Chapter 8 and the CAS in Chapter 9.
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4. Summary
This chapter set out the framework for investigating the common representation 
and voting records of the EU Member States in political issues, specifically from the 
issuing of common statements and the record votes held in plenary sessions of the ILC. 
This was recognised as being outside the Community pillar and instead the business of 
EPC and CFSP. The purpose of framework was to identify and measure a change in 
Member State behaviour, quantified by representation (through common statements) and 
voting patterns. The chapter gave a brief review of the historical development of EPC and 
CFSP institutions, as well as reviewing the literature on EU Member State cohesion in the 
UN General Assembly (UNGA). It was noted that the Middle East and decolonisation and 
apartheid in South Africa were two of the recurrent issues that most frequently divided the 
EU Member States in the UNGA. The chapter ended with an overview of the five theories 
being tested and their relevance to EU foreign policy coordination.
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C h a p t e r  8
POLITICAL COORDINATION IN ILC PLENARY SESSIONS
This chapter is similar to Chapter 5, which began with a statistical analysis of the 
EU Member States’ voting cohesion and common representation in technical instruments. 
Here we will be looking at political voting cohesion and EU common statements made 
through the EPC and CFSP coordination mechanisms between 1973 and 2005. Building 
on the methodology introduced in Chapter 1 and utilised in Chapter 5, once again 
empirical data will be presented gathered from the Provisional Records of the ILC, and 
listed in detail in Appendix 2. The chapter is structured around the following three 
questions:
• Is there a relationship between EU representation and EU Member State voting 
cohesion?
• What additional insight do we gain on the coordination process by looking at the 
content and context of EU representation?
• How complete is the picture of EU coordination presented by the relationship 
between EU Member State representation and voting cohesion?
Appendix 2 provides the source material for the statistical analysis presented below 
in Section 1. It should be noted that the survey sample of 15 plenary votes (14 record votes 
and 1 secret ballot) is considerably smaller than the 102 record votes on technical issues. 
The main reason for this is that at the annual conference many more technical record votes 
take place than political votes. Within the broad definition of political issues set out in 
Chapter 7 approximately five political votes take place annually, including the decision to 
admit new members (rare), granting permission to vote to members that have failed to pay 
their dues (frequent), as well as the biennial budget. However, these are not subject to
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common representation through statements. The political issues about which EU common 
statements have been made are:
• The conditions of Arab workers in the Occupied Territories (1973-2003)
• Concern for human rights and trade union rights in Chile (1974-1978)
• The participation of the PLO at the ILO (1975)
• The Committee on the Application of Standards report (1977)
• The Committee on the Structure of the ILO (1977)
• The apartheid regime of the South African Government (1978-1993)
• The recognition of ILC delegates from Serbia and Montenegro (1992)
• The widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar (1999)
The analysis of these issues will be carried out in the following way. In the first
section the degree of association between the issuing of common EU statements
(representation) and cohesive voting in the related record vote will be measured. Sections 2 
and 3 address the second guiding question in the two most frequent and recurrent issues 
on the ILC agenda over the course of the survey, the Arab-Israeli dispute and apartheid in 
South Africa. The final section concludes with a summary of the answers generated in the 
chapter.
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1. E U  M em ber State Representation and V oting  C ohesion
In contrast to the empirical data gathered on technical record votes, the quantity of 
data provided on political record votes is much less; 15 record votes (one of which was a 
secret ballot) as opposed to 102. There are a number o f reasons for this, the most 
important of which is that the preferred procedure for adopting a resolution is by a show 
of hands. This signifies that the decision has been reached by consensus and therefore the 
show of hands is sufficient to record the will of the conference delegates. Record votes are 
called when the subject of the resolution is contentious and one of the tripartite 
constituents (most frequently either workers’ or employers’ delegates) wants government 
positions to be made transparent.120 In terms of testing the hypothesis that EU 
representation and voting cohesion are associated and that an increase in representation 
leads to higher levels of voting cohesion, this is both a good and a bad thing. On the 
negative side it provides a small sample of data that is less likely to provide reliable 
statistical information. This is because the 14 votes over 33 years roughly averages one vote 
every 2.3 years. However, the votes are not spread out evenly and 11 out of the 14 useable 
record votes were held between 1973 and 1980 (Period 1). On the positive side the votes 
have occurred over contentious issues and therefore provide an opportunity to seriously 
test the cohesion of the EU Member States. On balance, the results of the statistical 
analyse will be insightful because of the nature of the cases studied, but must be judged 
carefully because of the small sample size.
Another difference between political record votes and technical record votes is the 
assumed common voting position of the EU Member States. In the previous analysis of
120 Interview: London, 5 July 2004
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technical coordination the assumption was that all EU Member States would vote for the 
adoption of the instrument, and abstentions and votes against were degrees of deviating 
away from the common position. Political votes are different because the resolution or 
proposal being voted on may or may not be in the interests of the EU Member States. For 
example, in the 1977 plenary record vote to adopt the report on labour standards by the 
CEACR (Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations) the Nine voted for the motion. The motion was not passed because 
the 135 votes cast to accept the report were below the conference quorum due to 197 
abstentions.121 By contrast, in the 1973 resolution concerning the Arab workers122 the Nine 
all abstained from voting and the resolution failed to be passed, which was their intended 
outcome.123 The following year, the same voting strategy failed as an identical resolution 
was adopted by the conference. From these three examples it is clear that the way the EU 
Member States cast their votes dependents on the content of the resolution, and because 
of this voting data is classified into two categories; cohesive and non-cohesive. No value 
judgement is made on what sort of vote is cast, only that the EU Member States do so 
cohesively.
This section uses the same working hypothesis as Chapter 5, which is that the EU 
Member States are more likely to vote cohesively in a record vote on a political issue if they 
have been commonly represented by the Presidency giving a statement concerning that 
issue. Relating this back to the issue of coordination, when the Presidency speaks for the 
EU Member States on a political issue, coordination will have taken place through the
121 The report contained criticism of Soviet Union employment practices and the vote was divided between Western 
governments, employers and trade unions and Communist and non-aligned states’ tripartite participants. This is an 
example o f an ideological division between ILO delegates that transcends the tripartite divisions in a state.
122 Resolution concerning the policy o f discrimination, racism and violence o f trade union freedoms and rights practices by 
the Israeli authorities in Palestine and the Occupied Territories.
123 See Section 2 for full details including the statement from the Belgian spokesman for the Presidency.
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EPC/CFSP mechanisms in the drafting of the statement. When the EU Member States 
agree on a common representation, are they more likely also to vote cohesively? The 
difference between political and technical coordination is in the frequency and 
effectiveness of coordination leading to common representation and cohesive voting. 
According to intergovernmental theory the nature of the EPC and CFSP means that 
national interests will prevail over common EU interests, and that coordination will have a 
negligable impact on the behaviour of sovereign Member States. Consociational theory 
predicts a similar outcome, albeit for different reasons. The logic of European integration 
is a dualistic one that requires synthesis and diversity at the same time. Maintaining the 
identities of the segments (the EU Member States) is easier in political issue areas because 
of the centrality of foreign policy in defining national identity.124 By contrast, institutional 
theory predicts that socialisation through coordination meetings intended to draft common 
statements leads to a process of defining common interests based on understanding of 
national positions, and the importance of agreeing European ones. This approach predicts 
both an association between representation and voting cohesion, and an increasing level of 
EU collective action over time.
Table 8.1 shows the aggregated data gathered from the 14 record votes on political 
issues listed in Appendix 2. The results of the votes are sorted by two separate criteria. The 
first is whether the EU Member States were represented during the drafting of the 
instrument, as shown in the column tided ‘Statement Given’. No distinction is made 
between whether a statement was made in a plenary session or a committee meetings, since
124 There are many examples o f this within the EU. Among them include France and Britain that both regard their special 
status as permanent members of the UN Security Council as part o f their national identity. Germany, by contrast, for 
many years orientated its foreign policy along civilian power lines (although this changed during Chancellor Schroeder’s 
period in office when Joschka Fischer re-orientated its direction from ‘never again war* to ‘never again Auschwitz’ [me 
wetter Krieg me wetter Auschwil$ . Spain has links to Latin America, Denmark to the Nordic countries, Ireland and Austria 
to their position o f neutrality.
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the purpose of noting common representation is to establish whether coordination took 
place. As in Chapter 5, this is the independent (or explanatory) variable. The second sorting 
criterion is whether the EU Member States voted cohesively or not, and this is the 
dependent (or response) variable. If the hypothesis set out above is correct, we would 
expect to find high levels of voting cohesion after common representation.
The data presented in Table 8.1 supports this hypothesis, shown by the level of 
voting cohesion after common EU representation, which is measured as 85.7%, while the 
level of voting cohesion in record votes with no preceding common representation drops 
to 14.3%. On average, over all cases the level of cohesive voting is 50%, meaning that there 
is a drastic rise in cohesiveness after coordination, and a sharp drop without it. This 
information appears to support the hypothesis set out by demonstrating the trends that 
were predicted. As was done in Chapter 5, statistical analysis can be used to calculate the 
level of association between the two variables and whether the appearance of a correlation 
between EU Member State representation and voting cohesion is statistically significant. By 
repeating the chi-square method used earlier, (and set out in Appendix 6) we find that we 
can confidently rule out the possibility that the appearance of an association between 
representation and voting cohesion is coincidental (i.e. we can reject the null hypothesis).125
This finding is surprising for two reasons. Firstly, we have found that 
representation and voting cohesion are associated, and that coordinating makes EU 
Member States much more likely to vote cohesively in the record vote. This supports the 
sociological approach to institutional theory, through the mechanism of the socialisation of
125 The Chi-Square value calculated was 7.143 (to 1 df), lying between the p values 0.01 (6.635) and 0.001 (10.827). Since 
the null hypothesis is rejected if the result lies beyond the 95th percentile on the distribution curve (a p value o f 0.05) 
this result comfortably exceeds this standard. The value in fact lies beyond the 99th percentile.
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actors through increased contact with an institution. The second reason this is surprising is 
when it is compared to the results from Chapter 5, in which technical coordination was 
shown not to lead to a statistically significant association between representation and voting 
cohesion. This is counter intuitive to the assumptions commonly made about low and high 
politics equating technical issues to low politics and political issues to high politics. This 
follows the logic of EU integration through the division of labour between the Community 
and EPC/CFSP, the former responsible for technical coordination and the latter political 
coordination.
There are at least three possible explanations for this; firstly, and most obviously, 
the data set of 14 cases is too small to draw reliable conclusions. Secondly, the causality in 
the table could be reversed, and voting cohesion is the independent variable. In this case, 
the EU Member States make common statements (representation) because national interests 
converge (as seen by the subsequent voting cohesion). The data is divided in a 2x2 matrix 
and is symmetrical, calculating the Chi Square value in the reverse direction would yield the 
same result. The third possible answer is that what has thus far been assumed to constitute 
‘low politics’, i.e. technical issues, are in fact more controversial that they appear. Two lines 
of argument can be used to substantiate this claim. The first is in Christopher Hill’s 
assertion that ‘the once popular distinction between “high” and “low” politics is no longer 
much help.’ (Hill, 2002: 4) The second comes from the results of study on technical issues, 
which suggested that national interests and ideology play an important role in determining 
how EU Member States vote.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on exploring in more detail the two largest 
political issues on the ILC agendas during the course of the survey, the conditions of Arab 
workers in the Occupied Territories and the efforts of the ILO to put pressure on its
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members to put pressure on the South African government to end the apartheid regime. 
These issues are significant, because as Simon Nuttall explains, the political differences 
between the Member States were ‘concentrated in a few areas, but ones of particular 
significance, such as disarmament, South Africa, or the Middle East/ (Nuttall, 1992: 28) As 
Table 8.2 shows, there were 16 statements presented on the former issue, and 25 on the 
latter issue. However, between them only five record votes were held.126 The extent of EU 
Member State coordination in political matters goes much further than the 15 record votes 
(14 of which we have data from) and without a closer examination of these issues the 
picture provided by the empirical data will be inadequate. By looking at these cases in more 
detail it will also be possible to gain a clearer answer on whether the statistical findings are 
accurate or not, and whether common representation is a result of pre-existing common 
interests, or whether coordination leads to the identification of common positions.
2. EU Member State representation on the issue of Arab workers
The first evidence of European Political Cooperation (EPC) coordination in the 
ILO came in 1973, at the 58* Session of the ILC. The Resolutions Committee of the 
conference drew up a Resolution concerning the polity of Discrimination, Racism and Violation of 
Trade Union Freedom practised hy the Israeli Authorities in Palestine and the Occupied Territories. The
126 The third most common item on the agenda, Chile is not included because o f lack o f space. Record votes were held on 
two separate issues; (1) resolutions concerning trade union and human rights were brought before the conference in 
1974 and 1975 and (2) proposals to invalidate the credentials o f the workers delegates (on the grounds that they were 
considered government imposers) in 1975-1978. On the issue o f human rights the Member States issued a common 
statement in 1974 in the form o f two amendments to the text o f the resolution. These amendments were not accepted 
by the committee, and as a result the Nine did not get to vote on the resolution as they preferred it, and consequendy 
did not vote cohesively.
The Government member o f Italy stated that his Government had been happy to join in sponsoring amendments D.17 
and D.18 because it was convinced that a spirit of solidarity should inspire the action o f the countries o f the European 
Economic Community within the ILO.’ (ILO, 1974c 486 §24)
From 1975 to 1978 there were also votes on whether to reject the credentials o f the Chilean Workers’ representatives, 
which eight Member States abstained on consistendy while Denmark repeatedly voted for the modon (which failed 
every time).
227/381
resolution was supported by a majority of workers’ representatives and government 
members predominantly from the developing world and Communist bloc countries. A 
Belgian diplomat spoke in the drafting committee meeting on behalf of the EU Member 
States to say that they had abstained from voting for the resolution because they believed 
the issue fell outside the technical remit of the ILO. (ILO, 1973b: 651 §77) The vote was 
passed in the resolution drafting committee and then put before the conference plenary to 
be voted on. Later on in the plenary discussion before voting to adopt the resolution Mr 
Van Bellinghen spoke in his capacity as a representative of Belgium and on behalf of the 
Nine to reiterate their belief that the issue of the Occupied Territories belonged in the 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council and not in the ILO. (ILO, 1973b: 
737) The resolution failed to be adopted because of the different voting weights in 
committee meetings and conference plenary.127
The issue was returned to the following year in 1974, and another Resolution 
concerning the polity of discrimination, racism and violence of trade union freedoms and rights practices by 
the Israeli authorities in Palestine and the Occupied Territories went before the Resolutions 
Committee. The resolution invited the ‘Governing Body of the International Labour 
Organisation and the Director General to use all the means at the disposal of the ILO to 
put an immediate end to these violations and discriminatory practices’ in Israel. (ILO, 
1974c: 6 §3) The Federal Republic of Germany held the rotating Presidency and on behalf 
of the Nine ‘indicated that the members representing those Nine Governments would 
abstain in any vote on the resolution.’ (ILO, 1974c: 349) This time the resolution was 
adopted by the Conference in the plenary vote, which passed the issue to the Governing
127 The result was 64 for, 0 against and 128 abstentions. The large number of abstentions resulted in the record vote failing 
to reach quorum. In the committee vote workers, employers and government representatives hold one-third o f the 
votes respectively, while in the plenary the proportions are one-quarter, one-quarter and one-half. The extra 
government votes blocked the resolution in the plenary.
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Body that in turn mandated the Director General to act. In 1977 the Director General 
‘announced his intention of utilising all available ILO methods and procedures, including 
visits, to help ensure that the conditions of the workers concerned was in keeping with the 
principles and objectives of the ILO/ (ILO, 1977e: 42) In 1978 the first annual report of 
the Director General was submitted to the conference for consideration as a separate 
annex to his report, a procedure continued until the present day. (ILO, 1978f: 24-32)
The issue of the Arab-Israeli dispute caused only one split vote, which occurred in 
1975 concerning granting observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). 
The issue was raised in the Standing Orders Committee and actual decision to admit the 
PLO was taken by a show of hands. However, the division of the Member States was 
shown in a record vote concerning the adoption of a clause to the report of the committee 
that stated:
provided that the body considering the invitation assured that the liberation m ovem ent in  
question fully recognises the principles o f  the ILO and its constitution and the right o f  all member 
States to continue in existence and participate in the work o f  the organisation. (LLO, 1975d: 257)
The motion to accept the PLO followed a similar move in the UN General Assembly the 
previous year, and the reference to ‘continue in existence’ was made to highlight the 
section in the PLO constitution referring to the destruction of Israel, which had featured 
prominently in the plenary discussion. If the clause was accepted, the right o f the PLO to 
participate could be disputed and therefore the clause was an anti-PLO device. In the 
record vote to accept this, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands voted to adopt it 
(aligning themselves with Israel and the US among others) while Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the UK abstained. In one of the few contributions to the literature 
to look at the ILO at this time, Mark Imber claims that the inclusion of the Arab-Israeli
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dispute on the ILC agenda was instrumental in causing the US to leave the ILO for two 
years. Imber’s analysis of the US withdrawal from the ILO between 1977 and 1980 cites ‘a 
resolution adopted by the Conference in 1974 condemning Israeli labour practices in the 
occupied territories, and the admission of the PLO to observer status in 1975’ as two of 
the main reasons for US action. (Imber, 1989: 53)
At the 1978 conference there was a Resolution concerning the polity of discrimination, 
racism and violence of trade union freedoms and rights practices by the Israeli authorities in Palestine and 
the Occupied Territories. The EU Nine voted cohesively again, and once more set out their 
common position towards attempts to involve the ILO in what they considered to be a 
‘political issue* that should be discussed in the UN General Assembly. The resolution was 
narrowly defeated through a strategic use of abstentions that totalled 139, five more than 
the 134 needed to invalidate the vote by failing to make quorum. However, two years later 
in 1980 the same strategy failed to block the Resolution concerning the implications of Israeli 
settlements in Palestine and other Occupied Territories, in connection with the situation of Arab workers. 
The common statement repeated the EPC position that the content of the resolution went 
beyond the remit of the ILO’s competencies and that the Member States had no choice 
but to abstain from voting. (ILO, 1980e: §17) However, the vote was held as a secret ballot 
and despite the policy of abstention by the EU Nine the strategy failed and the resolution 
was passed. Without a record of the votes cast it is not possible to know if the EU Member 
States voted cohesively or not although their statement suggests they did.
No further EPC statements were given until 1988, when a resolution concerning 
‘the protection of workers* and employers* rights and freedoms in Palestine and other 
Occupied Territories* was put before the resolutions committee. The West German 
delegate spoke on behalf of the Twelve and stated that the:
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Foreign ministers o f  the European Community had discussed the situation in the occupied 
territories on a number o f  occasions and had expressed their profound concern at the deteriorating 
conditions in these territories. However, they had also consistendy stressed that certain issues 
belonged to other United Nations forums and not within the Specialized Agencies. (ILO, 1988f: 
§18)
Thus the EU Member States reiterated their previous position which was that the ILO 
should remain concerned with technical issues and not become a vehicle for discussing the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Arab-Israeli issue became the subject of a special sitting of the plenary in 1990, 
when a session was dedicated to discussing the report on the Situation of Workers in the 
Occupied A.rab Territories as an annex to the Director General’s report. In every year since 
then the employment conditions of Arab workers has been discussed in plenary and not 
moved into the resolutions committee as it was during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1990, the 
Irish Labour Minister said that the Twelve agree with the Director General’s statement in 
his report that the political aspects of the occupation, the intifada, are not as such within 
the competence of this Specialked Agency of the United Nations family.’ (ILO, 1990b: 3) 
The speech went on to focus on the aid given to the region by the EC, as well as 
expressing the hope for a peaceful settlement. The Presidency of the EU contributed to the 
special sitting again in 1991 and every year until 1996, when the Italian Presidency did not 
speak, and in 1997 the Dutch Presidency did not speak either, and no explanation was 
given for their absence. (ILO, 1991c: 24; ILO, 1992b: 2; ILO, 1993c: 2; ILO, 1994f: 2; 
ILO, 1995b: 2) The practice resumed again in 1998 and 1999 with the UK and German 
Presidencies, and again in 2001 (Sweden) and 2003 (Greece). (ILO, 1998c: 13; ILO, 1999: 
3; ILO, 2001b: 3; ILO, 2003b: 4) In the other years no statement was made, and again, no 
reason for this was given. The most recent statement in 2003 was similar to previous ones,
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recalling recent EU initiatives and aid programmes as well as urging political progress to be 
made.128
Over the duration of the survey the EU Member States have been very consistent 
in their common positions with regard to the attempts to draw the ILO into the Arab- 
Israeli dispute by passing resolutions on the treatment of Arab workers in the Occupied 
Territories. For the early period of the study, from 1973 to 1980 (coincidendy matching the 
Period 1 set out in Chapter 4, but in this case 1980 is the last year a resolution was put 
before the ILC) the Nine agreed that General Assembly was the appropriate place to 
discuss the issue. This was reflected in statements and voting cohesion, and is somewhat 
ironic because in it has been noted elsewhere in the literature that in the General Assembly 
the Nine were divided over the issue, (op cit. Foot, 1979; Johansson-Nogues, 2004) What 
the Nine could agree on was that the ILO should not become politicised. However, the 
cracks in unity could not be plastered over on the issue of PLO involvement in the ILO, 
where Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany sided with the US and Israel in attempting 
to insert a clause that would direcdy challenge the legitimacy of the PLO’s claim to 
participation. The remaining Member States abstained and were closer to the Arab 
position.
From 1990 onwards the plenary statements soon began to resemble the previous 
year’s statement, with the addition of more relevant information concerning the Arab- 
Israeli peace process, European Community overseas development aid (or sometimes the 
actual content of the report). These statements demonstrate the evolution of an acquis 
politique over time, with their formulaic style and references to the work of the European
128 The Greek Presidency’s address was also on behalf of the 10 accession states o f the time, the associated states o f  
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as the EEA states of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. (ILO, 2003b: 4)
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institutions. These statements illustrate a different dimension to political coordination and 
representation by the EU Member States that is based on an expectation to contribute to 
the plenary, rather than the combative stance taken in the voting for and against 
resolutions. This also reflects the management of the issue by the ILO through addressing 
it in the less-confrontational environment of the annual special sitting of the plenary.
On balance, this case study has shown EPC worked well in the Arab-Israeli dispute 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Inside the ILO the Nine were commonly represented 
and voted cohesively on the issue of whether the Arab-Israeli dispute should be the 
concern of the ILO. Can we answer the question about whether shared national interests 
made a common position possible, or if a common position was achieved through 
coordination? If we consider the fractions between the Nine in the General Assembly on 
this issue, it is clear that the nine national positions were not congruent. In the ILO they 
did agree on a common position and maintained it throughout the period. Where they did 
not agree (PLO observer status) they did not make a common statement and voted non- 
cohesively. This demonstrates than the Nine were divided, yet in the ILO through EPC 
they were cohesive.
3. EU Member State representation on the issue of apartheid in South Africa
The second case study under review is the ILO response to the apartheid regime in 
South Africa. The rising membership of African states in the ILO led to a ‘situation after 
1963, when African delegates moved successfully to condemn South Africa and force it 
out of the ILO/ (Cox and Jacobson, 1974: 107) In 1964 a Declaration concerning the Policy of 
Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa required the ILO Director General to submit annual 
reports to conference concerning the situation of labour rights in South Africa. The first
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year in survey in which the report was discussed in plenary was in 1978, and again in 1979 
and 1980. (ILO, 1978d: 10; ILO, 1979c: 9; ’ILO, 1980c: 5) On each occasion joint 
statements in the name of the Nine were presented. In 1981 the tenth item on the agenda 
was Apartheid in South Africa, including the updating of the 1964 Declaration concerning the Policy of 
Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa. The update under consideration was a resolution, 
which
explicitly invite[d] the Director General o f  the International Labour Organisation, in  
accordance with the spirit o f  the ILO Declaration concerning apartheid, to request the governments 
and employers and workers organisations o f  the Member States annually to provide information in 
the activity they have undertaken in respect o f  the conclusion adopted by the ILC in 1980. (ILO, 
198%  §2)
In keeping with existing practices, the Netherlands spoke on behalf of the Ten in 
the plenary discussion before the adoption by vote of the declaration.
The T en member countries o f  die European Community together, and individually, have 
taken measures to bring pressure to bear on the South African Government. However, in our 
opinion a total isolation o f  South Africa would run the risk o f  strong counterproductive effects . . .  
instead o f  contributing to the desired objective o f  a multiracial society. . . .  (T]he Ten remain 
convinced that full implementation o f  the measures contained in the Code o f  Conduct they adopted 
som e years ago . . .  will continue to be useful in furthering change. (ILO, 1981d: 17)
The declaration had implications for the Ten because they had already developed a Code 
of Conduct in 1976 setting out guidelines for firms with subsidiaries, branches or 
representation in South Africa, and the code constituted a coordinated political response 
through EPC mechanisms. However, Simon Nuttall describes it as being ‘on British lines’ 
and ‘intended by Member States with important economic interests in South Africa to 
ward off the need for more drastic action.’ (Nuttall, 1992: 7) The impact of the ILC 
declaration in 1981 proved to be significant because it tested the EPC. Workers’ delegates 
on the committee repeatedly challenged the individual EU Member States to report
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separately, informed by information from national trade unions from inside the EU 
claiming that the EPC response was masking a lack of action.129 In response, the Member 
States reiterated their decision to respond collectively.
The 1982 conference included on the agenda a committee composed of tripartite 
delegates dedicated to scrutinising the responses from members’ questionnaires concerning 
their Action taken in the Declaration concerning the polity of Apartheid in South Africa and reporting 
back to the plenary.130 The workers’ delegates in the committee drew attention to the fact 
that the EU Member States had submitted a joint reply, but that Denmark had also replied 
individually.131 Denmark’s actions should not have come as a surprise, since ‘when the 
question of an arms embargo against South Africa came up at the General Assembly in 
autumn 1976, the Danes broke ranks and voted with their Nordic partners against the rest 
of the Nine’. (Nuttall, 1992:132) Denmark had a clearly identifiable national interest based 
on actively seeking to end apartheid in South Africa. However, despite criticism of the 
EPC common response by workers’ representatives, a representative of the Belgian 
Presidency spoke in defence of the EU position:
The Member States o f  the Community had submitted a joint reply on action against 
apartheid by governments to the questionnaire from the Director General because o f  the joint 
policy on apartheid which they had developed. . . .  The Member States o f  the European Community 
had adopted the Code o f  Conduct in 1977 and continued to place substantial confidence in the 
contribution it could make towards reform in the labour and social fields in South Africa. (ILO, 
1982a: §8)
129 The UK Trade Union Congress (TUC) criticised the UK government on this point, as is demonstrated below.
130 ‘Report on the Committee on Apartheid’ was the shorthand abbreviation used by the ILO, and in the thesis too.
131 The workers’ group was concerned that the 10 Member States o f  the European Community had supplied a joint reply; 
among them, only Denmark had also replied individually.’ (ILO, 1982a: §6)
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The committee preparing a resolution to put before the conference was not willing 
to accept this defence of a common reply submitted by the Ten Member States, and 
included in Point 4 of their resolution that ‘the Committee recommends that governments 
must in future provide individual replies to the ILO’. (ILO, 1982a: Conclusions Point 4) 
There is no doubt that this was a reference to the EU Member States, since the Belgian 
official commented that ‘he could not commit his Government or other Community 
members to abandoning their collective reporting procedures, as implied in Point 4 / (ILO, 
1982a: §52) In the plenary sitting discussing the resolution, the Belgian delegate reiterated 
the points made in the committee as follows:
However, I could draw the attention o f  the Conference to the specific nature o f  the Code 
o f  Practice adopted by the member countries o f  the European Community. The bringing into force 
o f  the Code was the fruit o f  a decision which was taken jointly. Supervision o f  the effect given to the 
Code is carried out by the Ten, as is the assessment o f  the Code. (ILO, 1982c: §15)
In 1983 the EU Member States continued to resist pressure to all report 
individually and instead submitted a collective reply again, while the other tripartite 
delegates in the standing committee responsible for assessing the reports became 
increasingly blunt in their condemnation of the EU states. The workers’ representatives in 
the committee condemned the European Code of Conduct for being too weak, and the 
conclusions of the committee included an explicit reference to the EU Member States’ 
continued practice of joint replies, as well as singling out France, Germany, the UK and the 
US as the biggest supporters of the Pretoria government. (ILO, 1983e: §8,18) The Federal 
Republic of Germany spoke for the Ten in the plenary, once again defending the reporting 
procedure. (ILO, 1983f: 2)
The following year in 1984, individual reports were submitted by Denmark and the 
Netherlands, along with the joint reply. A Workers’ delegate commented that during the
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previous year the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr Botha, had visited Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK on a European tour. (ILO, 1984a: §6) Once again the 
committee conclusions were put to the plenary in the form of a resolution, which made 
explicit that ‘the ten EC governments [had] again submitted a joint reply’, while the 
Presidency robusdy defended the practice: ‘The Government member of France ... 
insisted that the ten countries of the European Communities should not be denied the 
right to have a common reply.’ (ILO, 1984a: §41, 48)
The 1985 conference produced more evidence in support of the influential role of 
power and national interests. Township riots broke out in 1984 and although this had 
raised the profile of European trading links with South Africa, the UK was still reluctant to 
consider applying sanctions. (Nuttall, 1992: 231) Ireland joined the Netherlands and 
Denmark in submitting separate national reports, a strategy used by the smaller states 
unhappy with the EPC common position but in no position to change it. The Report of the 
Committee on Apartheid conclusions went further than any previous year to explicitly demand 
an alternative course of action from the EU. The committee members sought:
The adoption by the Member States o f  the European Econom ic Community o f  stringent 
divestment and disinvestment measures in line with the ILO’s Programme o f  Action, as a 
replacement for the European Code o f  conduct or a parallel to a radically reformed Code o f  
Conduct. The monitoring o f  implementation o f  these measures should be coordinated at the level o f  
the Commission o f  the European Communities.
All countries should respond to the ILO’s annual questionnaire on  an individual basis. 
(ILO, 1985a: §4)
The Italian Presidency spoke on behalf of the Ten and explicitly rejected the 
possibility that the Commission of the EC should be involved in the monitoring or 
reporting process. ‘The monitoring of the Code of Conduct was carried out at the national
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level and neither the Commission of the European Communities nor the Community itself 
were competent to take measures in this respect.’ (ILO, 1985a: §53) Later, in the plenary 
debate the Presidency reemphasised the division of competencies with regard to reporting, 
stating that ‘the Ten accord the same value and the same significance to their collective 
reply as though this were the reply of each one of the them taken separately.’ (ILO, 1985d: 
10) Once again, the division of national interests was exposed by the submission of 
separate replies by Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, as well as strongly reaffirming 
the centrality of the EPC instruments and the exclusion of the Commission and 
Community from the reporting process. The EPC process was driven by the stronger EU 
states, but it is also interesting to note the solidarity among all the Member States in their 
continued coordination in the drafting of common statements through EPC. The 
disillusioned Member States broke ranks over the submission of reports but did not 
disassociate themselves from the EPC common statement.
South Africa remained on the agenda in 1986, and the concern for action was 
greater than ever due to the declaration of a State of Emergency on 22 July 1985. The 
Dutch Presidency was responsible for promoting the common position of the Twelve 
through EPC while also undermining it in its own actions (once again submitting an 
individual report to the Conference). The committee conclusions singled out Denmark for 
praise for passing legislation ‘prohibiting trade with South Africa’ (ILO, 1986a: §5) while 
the Presidency statement tamely stated that all ‘governments within the EC were striving to 
bring about an early end to the apartheid system.’ (ILO, 1986a: §19)
The following year (1987) during the committee discussion a British workers’ 
representative from the Trade Union Congress (TUC) accused the UK government of 
holding back the EC from making a stronger common position, and claimed that it ‘chose
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to hide behind the anonymity of a general EEC position.’ (ILO, 1987a: §11) This 
interpretation of the UK position is substantiated by the results of the record vote on the 
adoption of the committee report in the plenary. The workers’ representatives requested a 
record vote in order to highlight the lack of consensus within the Committee examining 
the replies, and was a political move to isolate the government members that refused to 
cooperate. The report was passed by 331 votes for, 8 against and 26 abstentions. Each 
government delegation has two votes and the eight votes cast against the report were from 
Germany, the UK, the US and Switzerland. Denmark, Greece and Ireland voted for the 
adoption, while the remaining seven EU states (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) abstained. The evidence shows that the UK and 
Germany were deeply out of touch with both the interests of the other EU Member States, 
and with the vast majority of ILO members in general The prognosis o f the TUC 
representative cited above was that through refusing to allow the EU to adopt a stronger 
position (something made apparent by the disillusionment of Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Ireland, as well as Greece in the vote), the UK furthered its national interests by using 
the Code of Conduct as a veil for continued involvement with South Africa. It was able to 
do this since it was also in the national interest of Germany, and had been for a number of 
years previously also in the French national interest (although France abstained from 
voting in the record vote).
Apartheid remained on the conference agenda until 1993, when democratic South 
Africa was welcomed back into the ILO. The workers’ representatives continued to 
criticise the actions of the Twelve. In 1989 they sought to shame Germany by highlighting 
its growing trade with South Africa, (ILO, 1989a: §7) while in 1990 the Committee 
objected to the collective reply, saying it allowed the Member States ‘to conceal the 
differences which existed among the 12 members of the Community with respect to
239/381
individual measures against apartheid.’ (ILO, 1990a: §7) In 1991 a Danish workers 
representative asked the Twelve to respond to the complaint on their reporting process, 
and (predictably) the Presidency reiterated a defence of the position. (ILO, 1991a: §44, 45)
During the last five years of the reporting system, no change of great substance 
occurred regarding the continued stalemate between the EU’s common reply and calls for 
greater transparency by ILO delegates. In plenary sessions the Presidencies continued to 
defend the use of a common reply, while in committee meetings the Member States’ 
unified front began to fragment, with Ireland, Denmark and Italy (speaking in a national 
capacity) intervened in 1990 (ILO, 1990a), and Luxembourg (explicidy in a national 
capacity and not on behalf of the Twelve), the Netherlands and Denmark in 1991. (ILO, 
1991a) By 1993 the imminent demise of the apartheid regime conveniendy coincided with 
the Danish Presidency, which was spared the embarrassment of defending EU policy to 
the Conference.
The EU Member States demonstrated at first glance what appeared to be 
commitment to the Code of Conduct and to EPC. However, closer scrutiny of the 
evidence suggests polarisation of opinion between the Member States concerning their 
support for South Africa, with Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the UK on one side, 
as illustrated by the explicit reference in the annual committee report in 1983 and the visit 
of Mr Botha to the following year. On the other hand Denmark and the Netherlands 
demonstrated their opposition to the South African regime, as noted by Lindemann. 
(Lindemann, 1982) Nuttall confirms that although the UK held many of the other states 
back, the UK was not able to unilaterally determine the content of the Code, and for this 
reason it was not the lowest common denominator policy intergovernmental theory 
predicts. The EPC Code of Conduct ‘was less advanced than the Dutch, for example,
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would have wished, but more so that the British or the Germans ever intended/ (Nuttall, 
1992: 237) On reflection, we leam five things from the ILO example that insistence of 
reporting collectively under the pretence of the EPC Code of Conduct.
Firstly, the need for collective reporting was not universally accepted by all 
Member States. Secondly, the Member States that disagreed most strongly were all small or 
medium si2ed: Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and Greece (although not all small and 
medium states disagreed). Thirdly, until 1985 all the large Member States supported South 
Africa to some extent (shown by President Botha’s state visits) but this declined until only 
Germany and the UK remained supportive. Fourthly, the collective replies were widely 
believed to favour EU Member States with continued trading relations with South Africa 
and the nature of the replies were not changed over the 11 year period surveyed. Thus 
finally, by putting these points together we conclude that EPC and the Code of Conduct 
was a tool used by the larger Member States to serve their own economic national interests 
by hiding their continued involvement in South Africa from the ILO monitoring 
procedure. The voting cohesion measured (one cohesive vote in 1981 and one non- 
cohesive vote in 1987) does not accurately reflect the power dynamics within EPC during 
this time. European Union Member States were divided on the issue, but the EPC 
common reply was upheld in accordance to the interests of the UK and Germany.
4. Summary
This chapter began by testing the assumption that EU Member States are more 
likely to vote cohesively in political votes in the ILO after producing a common statement 
presented by the Presidency. Although the sample survey was small, a strong correlation 
was found to exist between the two variables. However, to further substantiate the
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relationship, a detailed study of two significant political issues in the ILO during the survey 
was carried out, on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the apartheid regime in South Africa.
The first case study on the resolutions concerning the rights of Arab workers 
showed EPC working and successful. The cohesive voting and common statements were 
in stark contrast to the fragmentation in the General Assembly during the same period. 
While the EU Member States could not agree on the right course of action in the GA, they 
could agree that the ILO was not a suitable place to discuss the matter. The split vote on 
PLO delegates observing the conference actually confirms the success of the EPC because 
it shows that there were genuine differences in national positions. The second case study on 
South Africa also showed EPC as successful, albeit in a different way, and to a limited 
degree. The continued support for the Code of Conduct was a policy preference of the 
large Member States, and eventually only Germany and the UK. The EU Member States 
that were staunchly opposed to the South African government, led by Denmark and 
including the Netherlands and Ireland, protested by submitting additional reports and also 
voting for the 1987 Report in the plenary.132 However, the Code o f Conduct and the 
Presidency’s defence of the EU Member States’ right to report collectively was not broken 
and the practice was maintained. In this case EPC worked as a foreign policy tool of the 
major Member States and the smaller states did not jeopardise the working of the common 
statements.
Two further conclusions emerge from the empirical case study. The first is that 
common representation and voting cohesion are positively associated, with an increase in 
one leading to an increase in another. The evidence from both cases shows that EPC
132 Greece voted for the report in the plenary vote and the Netherlands abstained.
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coordination led to representation when the Member States were clearly in disagreement 
with each other. This refutes the claim that interests limit the common representation, and 
instead the Member States operate within a set of parameters that are below the most 
enthusiastic Member State, but above the most sceptical. The second is that we can refute 
the possibility that political issues have fallen from the status of ‘high politics, and that the 
effect of coordination and representation on voting cohesion derived from the low salience 
of the issue. The importance attributed to the issues by the Member States as demonstrated 
allows us to reject the possibility that we had inadvertently inverted the significance of 
technical and political issues (as was considered in the beginning of the chapter, as a 
possible explanation for the observed data).
What do these cases tell us about the five theories being tested here? 
Neofunctionalism is less suited to explaining political integration, and the association 
between common statements and voting cohesion supports the conclusion that EU 
Member States are strongly committed to representing the EU in ‘high* politics. However, 
the heavy bias of the data in Period 1 brings into question whether any progress has been 
made over the course of the survey, and undermines the neofunctional assumption of a 
closer union over time.
Intergovernmental theory assumes that national internets will be prioritised, and as 
was noted in the first section, the association between the absence of a common statement 
and non-cohesive voting could also supports the argument that the EU Member States 
only work together when they have a priori shared interests, and that coordination does not 
mould consensus. Furthermore, the occasions of non-coherent voting in the 1987 vote on 
South Africa, and the independent report submissions by Denmark, Ireland and the
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Netherlands brings into question the extent to which Member States are bound by 
common positions.
Liberal intergovernmental theory is not purposefully designed to be applied outside 
the Community pillar, but does seem to have some explanatory insight in this case. The 
most important one was the continued use of the Code of Conduct and the statements 
made in its defence in the face of growing opposition by workers’ representatives in the 
ILO. Its principal supporters were the large EU Member States (in particular Germany and 
the UK) and the Member States most active against it were small ones (Denmark and 
Ireland, with the Netherlands more of a middle-power). This fits Moravcsik’s assertion that 
intergovernmental bargains must satisfy the national interests of France, Germany and the 
UK in order to be successful. The Code of Conduct was agreed in the Council and was 
used because it was in the interests of the ‘big three’. However, the agreement to uphold 
the Code was selectively applied as seen in the actions of those states submitting their own 
replies too. What reasons are there for the selective application, and how did the eventual 
level of adherence come about?
Institutional theory is useful here, since we know that there was no supranational 
institution to enforce the intergovernmental bargain, and yet despite divergent national 
interests a considerable amount of common representation took place. Socialisation into 
institutions leads to agreement between actors on what counts as acceptable and legitimate 
action. The significance of EPC institutions is that they achieved a high degree of cohesion 
between the EU Member State diplomats despite the clear differences in national positions. 
From an institutional perspective, this is explained by the logic of appropriateness.
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In Chapter 7 the review of the applicability of consociational theory to political 
coordination questioned whether the dualistic pressures of integration and preservation of 
difference could be found in political issue areas. From this case it seems that they can be, 
with both the Arab-Israeli case study and the South African case study demonstrating 
examples of cohesion and segmentation simultaneously. In the former example the EU 
Member States were split over the question of the representation of the PLO in ILO, and 
this followed their national policies elsewhere in the UN system, in particular in the 
General Assembly. Cohesion was maintained on the issue of preventing the ILO becoming 
politicised. In the case of South Africa the upholding of the Code of Conduct while some 
Member States submitted additional reports, as well as the 1987 split vote exemplify the 
two movements. The pattern of data fits a consociational model of EU politics, although it 
is open to the criticism that the examples of cohesive policies (non-politicisation of the 
ILO and maintenance of the Code of Conduct) are lowest common denominator 
positions, and the issues of divergence are more significant markers of national interests 
and the limits of foreign policy coordination. However, despite this the EU Member States 
did retain a framework for common representation that was maintained throughout, so 
clearly placed value on the EU single voice.
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Table 8.1: E U  Member State voting in record votes on political issues in the ILC: 1973-2005.
Statement Given: Cohesive MS voting Non-cohesive voting Total
EU Representation 6 (85.7%) 1 (14.3%) 7 (100.0%)
No EU representation 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%) 7 (100.0%)
All record votes 7 (50.0%) 7 (50.0%) 14 (100.0%)
Table 8.2: EU  Member State common statements and voting in record votes 
ILC:, divided by subject area:1973-2005.
on political issues in th
Political issue area Statements Cohesive votes Non-cohesive
votes
Arab workers in the Occupied Territories 16 3 0
Human tights and trade union rights in Chile 1 1 5
The participation o f the PLO at the ILO 0 1
Committee on the Application o f Standards report 1 1 0
Committee on the Structure o f the ILO 1 0 0
Apartheid regime in South Afdcan 25 1 1
Recognition o f Serbia and Montenegro 1 0 0
Forced labour in Myanmar 1 1 0
Total 46 7 7
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C h a p t e r  9
POLITICAL COORDINATION IN THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS
This chapter presents the empirical data on EU Member State statements in the 
Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS), a standing committee at the annual 
Conference that considers serious violations of labour standards by ILO members.133 The 
empirical data used is found in Appendix 3, which lists all the statements made by EU 
Member States since 1973, which country they were addressed to and which convention 
they concerned. The appendix also details similar information for the Nordic group of 
countries,134 which will be looked at in the final section of this chapter. The first EU 
common statement made by the Presidency was in 2000, and there have been common 
statements every year since then. The chapter begins with a brief explanation of the work 
of the CAS, followed by a survey of which states spoke and when. In order to frame the 
discussion of the data, three guiding questions are used, which form Sections 3, 4 and 5. 
The questions are:
• Which countries have been the subject of EU common statements and why?
• How do the Member States coordinate the drafting of common statements?
• Why do the Member States coordinate the drafting of common statements?
133 This is the same committee as the one in which the UK government was threatened with a ‘special paragraph’ in 1996 
over the violations in the rights o f freedom o f association in GCHQ, discussed in Chapter 6.
134 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden between 1973 and 1979, and from 1980 onwards Iceland has also been 
represented by Nordic statements in the CAS.
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1. ILO mechanisms for monitoring the application o f standards
The purpose of ILO standards was originally to solve the ‘problem’ of how to 
avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in an international economic system. Since creating minimum 
standards of employment implies imposing costs (for example by requiring safety standards 
to be implemented, paid periods of rest to be given, etc.), any state that implemented 
standards was voluntarily placing itself at a comparative disadvantage. The only way to 
escape this is for states to cooperate, and the ILO provides an institutional setting where 
states can agree on standards and then monitor adherence to these standards. The ILO 
assists in the monitoring of standards in two ways. The first is to provide expert scrutiny of 
domestic laws and practices that uphold the standards, and in this capacity resembles a 
judicial review in an impartial manner.135 The second is to publish the results of the scrutiny 
process for all members of the ILO in order to promote transparency. The members (both 
government and non-government) of the CAS then decide what further action should be 
taken, including referring the issue to the Governing Body of the ILO. However, the 
impartial information on serious violations can be used by NGOs and governments to 
legitimate economic sanctions or product boycott. EU Common Positions have made 
reference to the practice of forced labour in Myanmar since March 1997 (see below for 
further details).
When a state becomes a member of the ILO, it agrees to provide ILO officials 
with information to ensure labour standards are being respected. When evidence of failings 
comes to light, the ILO makes all tripartite members aware of this. States may make 
complaints against other members that fail to uphold conventions in their domestic law,
135 ILO instruments are ratified and then national law is drafted that incorporates the legal requirements o f the instrument
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provided that the state making the complaint has ratified the convention in question itself, 
(and workers’ and employers’ representatives can too). The role of the ILO is to facilitate 
cooperation between states and it does this through its impartial adjudication, but the ILO 
cannot enforce the application of standards because it has no sovereign authority over its 
members. When evidence of a violation arises, it is left to conference to decide what course 
of action to take by making a recommendation to its members or to the Governing Body.
The process of scrutiny is carried out by two separate committees. The first is the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) and the 
second is the Committee on the Application of Standards (C AS). The CEACR was set up in 1926 
to monitor national law and ensure that the principles committed to in the instruments 
were not subsequendy reneged upon. The committee is composed of 20 eminent judges 
appointed by the ILO Governing Body for a term of three years. Governments are obliged 
to submit reports on the implementation of all ratified conventions every 5 years, except 
for core labour standards, for which reports must be submitted every two years. The 
committee examines the reports and if it decides that the evidence provided is insufficient 
or inaccurate, it responds in one of two ways. The first is to make a ‘direct request’ to the 
national government, usually relating to technical issues and considered to be the less 
severe response. The other course of action is to make an ‘observation’ on the government 
and its compliance with a particular instrument. According to the ILO, observations 
‘contain comments on fundamental questions raised by the application of a particular 
convention by a state’ and are published in the CEACR annual report.136 The report is 
submitted to the annual conference (ILC) the following June, which is invited to examine it 
and adopt it.
136 http://www.ilo.ofg/public/enplish/standards/norm/ applying/committee.htm accessed 21-07-2005
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Although the Committee on the Application of Standards is tripartite in nature, the 
workers’ and employers’ representatives are responsible for selecting a number of cases 
from the CEACR report and inviting government officials from the states charged with 
violating standards to respond to the contents of the report in front of the CAS. The 
absence of governments from the selection process is regarded by a number of EU 
Member States’ diplomats working in Geneva as important, because the decision over 
which cases are discussed cannot be labelled as politically motivated.137 According to the 
diplomats interviewed, ‘politicisation’ occurs when an investigation of violations of 
international law is regarded by the state singled out as breaking the principle of non­
intervention granted by sovereignty. Politicisation is detrimental because it provides an 
excuse for states violating international law to disregard peer scrutiny through the United 
Nations system by labelling it as ideologically motivated and construed as neo-colonialism. 
The second reason is that it can provide an excuse for preventing UN monitors from 
continuing their observation exercise and potentially worsening the domestic situation. In 
the ILO workers’ and employers’ representatives choose which cases are examined and this 
helps to preserve the credibility of the CAS because they represent non-governmental and 
trans-national constituencies.
2. EU Member State statements in the CAS: 1973-2005
In keeping with the rest of the analysis, the survey is divided into five periods, 
(Tables 9.1a to 9.1 e) each one showing which Member States have been represented in the 
CAS in each period (only those listed spoke). Table 9.2 shows from which region of the 
world the countries that the EU Member State making statements about came (and a full
137 Interview; Geneva, 24 June 2005
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list is given in Appendix 3). There are a number of interesting points to be considered from 
the data provided, and they shall be discussed below. These points include which EU 
Member States have spoken most often, why the practice of making joint statements was 
seen in 1977 and then not again until 1997, the emergence of the EU common statement 
and the regional focus of EU Member State statements.
German government officials have spoken most often in the CAS between 1973 
and 2005,138 with a total of 31 statements and have been included in another six made by 
fellow EU Member States.139 German contributions have been fairly evenly distributed 
throughout the survey, with the exception of Period 2, (1981-1986) where Germany was 
absent. Appendix 3 also shows that Germany has made 31 statements about violations in 
22 countries, more than any other EU Member State.
The UK has made 24 statements in the CAS, although its contributions have been 
far less consistent over time, with 16 during the period 1973 to 1980, and participating very 
little thereafter. The UK did not make any statements in Period 2, only one in Period 3, 
five in Period 4 and two in Period 5. It will be recalled that in Chapter 6 the long-running 
dispute between the UK government and the CAS was discussed in relation to the voting 
behaviour of the UK between 1994 and 1996. We can see the same dispute from the other 
side in Appendix 3 and Table 9.2. Between 1989 and 1995 nine statements were made by 
other EU Member States about the UK and whether it was violating conventions 87 and 98 
(concerning freedom of association and the tight to organise and concerning the tight to
138 In the discussion on how often Member States have spoken, the state holding the Presidency has not been included in 
the survey as national statement, e.g. the six EU statements by Luxembourg in 2005 are counted as EU Presidency 
statements and not as part o f Luxembourg’s contribution over 32 years.
139 The survey o f Member States does not include Nordic states, that made separate statements until 1997, when for the 
first time the UK made a statement on behalf of Germany, Austria and Belgium, as well as the Nordic States, Canada 
and Switzerland (Myanmar C87).
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organise and collective bargaining). This plays an important role in accounting for the 
dramatic rise in statements concerning Western states in Periods 3 and 4. In 1997 the UK 
attitude radically changed, as government officials made three statements on behalf of EU 
Member States and other Western governments (Nordic, Swiss, Canadian and US) about 
Sudan, Myanmar and Nigeria. The government made another statement alone about 
Swaziland and was represented in another concerning Indonesia by the Nordic States. In 
1999 the UK spoke on behalf of nine other EU states (Austria, Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, as well as the Nordic bloc including Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden) on Myanmar’s violation of the forced labour convention (C29), which the 
following year became the subject of the first EU common statement.140 The drastic 
change in behaviour of the UK government in the CAS after 1997 can be attributed to the 
arrival of New Labour into government on 1 May 1997, ending 18 years of Conservative 
Party rule.141 This is an example of domestic politics affecting CFSP decision-making and 
the continued importance of intergovernmental theories of European political cooperation.
The third EU Member State that has been active in the CAS is the Netherlands, 
having made 13 statements and been represented in a further three. Provisional Records 
from the CAS meetings do not show any statements made by Dutch officials between the
140 Geneva based diplomats responsible for drafting common statements in the CAS note that UK is one o f the strongest 
supporters o f EU political action in the CAS, along with Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic Member States. 
Interviews: Geneva, 21 & 22 June 2005.
141 The hostility o f the outgoing government in the CAS has been shown in the repeated complaints brought against the 
government in the CAS prior to 1997, however when New Labour were elected to office they made improving 
relations with the ILO a high priority.
The Government has honoured its pledge to restore the right which was denied in 1984, for staff at the Government 
Communications Headquarters in Cheltenham (GCHQ) to join a trade union o f their choice. The conditions of service 
at GCHQ have been amended, with immediate effect, to remove all restrictions on union membership.
“In addition, a Government representative stated that the United Kingdom Minister o f State for Employment had already 
announced formally the restoration of trade union tights at the Government Communications Headquarters in 
Cheltenham (GCHQ) in his speech to the plenary session of the conference. He had emphasised the Government’s full 
support for the ILO, the importance that it attached to restoring the United Kingdom’s reputation for fulfilling its 
obligations in the ILO, and its full respect of the application of the ILO’s core labour standards. (...) This was one o f 
the very first acts o f the new Government, after it was elected on 1 May 1997.’ (ILO, 1997a: 100)
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start o f the survey in 1973 and 1980, but thereafter have been prominent in successive 
periods, and like the UK, Germany and Nordic States actively coordinated in the 
production of common statements prior to the drafting of the first EU statement in 2000. 
The Netherlands continues to be associated with the statements made by the Nordic States 
group concerning violations in countries that the EU Member States do not speak about, 
such as Colombia, Belarus, and Ethiopia.142
Six other EU Member States have spoken in the CAS during the survey: France six 
times (and been included in one joint statement); Belgium and Austria have both spoken 
twice and been included in three joint statements; Italy and Portugal have spoken once and 
been included in two joint statements; and Spain has been included in one joint statement. 
O f these six, one might have expected France to have spoken more often in the CAS than 
it has, given the fact that it is one of the big three Member States, considers itself to have 
an important role to play in international politics and is a supporter of the ILO and is one 
of the ten states of industrial importance in the Governing Body. The other five (including 
Italy, which has never projected itself internationally to the same extent as the similarly 
si2ed France and UK) are medium or small states that are not expected to have an 
extensive range of foreign policy interests, and for this reason gain from becoming part of 
the CFSP.143 The Nordic states and the Netherlands, despite not being large states, have a 
well-established history of support for multilateral institutions and a commitment to 
international development issues, including human rights.144
142 As will be discussed in Section 5, the Nordic States, the Netherlands, Germany (and to a lesser extent the UK) exhibit 
some behaviour that characterises them as norm entrepreneurs.
143 This is an argument made by Tonra among others, that CFSP participation expands the foreign policy horizons o f  
small states that traditionally do not have sufficient resources. (Tonra, 2001)
144 The World Summit on Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen 1995 reaffirmed the 0.7% GDP target for ODA  
by developed states. At the moment Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden are the only EU states to 
spend 0.7% o f their GDP, although six other Member States (Belgium, France, Finland, Ireland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom) have fixed timetables to achieve this target by to 2015. Source: European Commission Press Memo 05/124
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Looking at all EU Member State statements aggregated together over the five 
periods, there is a noticeable decline after Period 1 from 27 statements to 10 in Period 2, 
and then a gradual rise thereafter over Periods 3 to 5, with 15 between 1987 and 1992, and 
then 22 in both periods between 1993 and 1997, and 1998 and 2005. The regional division 
over the periods (as shown in Table 9.2) shows where the EU Member States chose to 
focus on violations in labour standards, and we notice that the first period was dominated 
by complaints against communist bloc states (59%). In the following period the number of 
complaints against communist states declined, but remained the most ffequendy targeted 
region (40%), while the third period (1987-1992) captures the end of the Cold War and 
correspondingly the number of complaints against communist states fell further. From this 
discussion it is clear that the current standing of the CAS as an un-politicised institution has 
not always been the case. During the Cold War the committee was divided along 
ideological lines between East and West, with the ILO serving as a Cold War substitute. ‘In 
ILO conferences the ideological polemic of the Cold War took the form of a confrontation 
between the principles of tripartism and universalism.’ (Cox and Jacobson, 1974: 105) As 
Robert Cox says, in the ‘context of the Cold War, stress on human rights was an 
instrument of political warfare that the Western powers could use to attach Stalinist labour 
camps and the Soviet concept of trade unionism/ (Cox and Jacobson, 1974: 135) A 
workers’ representative with many years experience of working in the ILO concurred with 
this analysis, arguing that western democracies accepted that labour standards, while 
communist countries supported labour standards without any intention of implementing 
them.145 The East regarded them as an impediment to capitalism through the need to 
provide welfare provisions, while the West supported the ILO in its scrutiny of labour
12 April 2005: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referenre=MF',MQ/05/124&format=HTML&aged= 
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en Accessed 20 June 2006
145 Interview: London, 5 July 2004
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practices behind the Iron Curtain. The US government was a vocal participant in the CAS 
during the Cold War, and the UK and Germany also strongly criticised communist 
countries during Period 1.
If the communist states have become less important in the EU Member States’ 
concerns for the upholding of international labour standards, where have they turned their 
attention? In the third and fourth periods, (and to a lesser extent in the fifth period), they 
have devoted considerable resources to making statements about other Western states. The 
majority of these statements concerned the UK, but Australia and New Zealand have also 
been the subject of CAS scrutiny. EU Member State statements in these cases were always 
in defence of Western states. In Period 4 and 5 EU Member States have made statements 
about labour violations in many states, the majority of which have been from Asia, but also 
Africa, South America and former communist states. It is also only during these periods 
that the Member States have coordinated common statements (either as the EU or as 
smaller groups), with the exception of the single statement made by Germany on behalf of 
Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands in 1977 concerning freedom of association in 
Ethiopia. Thus we find limited evidence to support Karen Smith’s statement that during 
‘the Cold War, the European Community maintained a ‘neutral’ stance vis-a-vis the human 
rights and democracy records in third countries’. (Smith, 2006b: 155)
3. EU Member States’ common statements
In this section we answer the following questions: which countries have been the 
subject of EU common statements and why? It will be argued that only serious violations 
of core labour standards are the subject of EU common statements. The eight core
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standards are based on the four fundamental principles agreed in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work, which are:
• freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining;
• the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
• the effective abolition of child labour; and
• the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.146 
Severity is measured by the frequency with which the violating country is subject to
CAS scrutiny in the preceding years to the EU statement. Further evidence of severity can 
be found in any extraordinary measures recommended by the ILC to the Governing Body, 
such as the case of forced labour in Myanmar, Colombia and Belarus, which will be 
described below. Finally, we will consider whether it is important that a violating country is 
the subject of an existing EU Common Position agreed by the Council. All of these factors 
point in the direction of a high threshold for agreement between all EU Member States, 
reiterating the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP pillar. However, despite the 
intergovernmental design, the number of EU statements made has grown between 2000 
and 2005, as shown in Table 9.3. From one statement in 2000, six were produced in 2005, 
despite the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 members during this time. If the process 
is truly intergovernmental, this must be explained.
146 Declaration: ILC 86 (1998) see web:
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static jumpPvar language=EN&var pagename-DECLAR 
ATIONTEXT accessed 20 June 2006
256/381
i. Myanmar
The first core labour standard violation to be the subject of an EU common 
statement in the CAS was forced labour in Myanmar, contravening C29.147 In 1995 and 
1996 the issue of forced labour in Myanmar was noted in two ‘special paragraphs’ in CAS 
reports. On the 20 June 1996 25 Workers’ delegates presented the Director General with a 
letter presenting a complaint against the government of Myanmar for failing to observe the 
Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), which it had ratified in 1955. (ILO, 2000f) The 
complaint was filed in accordance with Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, which included 
the option of setting up a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the allegations of violations. 
The Myanmar government was asked to clarify the situation in a letter sent by the ILO 
Director General on 23 December 1996. The Governing Body considered the report 
received in response to that letter in March 1997, and concluded that ‘contradictions exist 
between the facts presented in the allegations and those set out in the observations of the 
Government of Myanmar’. (ILO, 1997c) The decision was then taken to set up a 
Commission of Inquiry, and its first report was submitted in July 1998.148 The situation did 
not improve despite the work of the Committee and in June 2000 the ILC adopted a 
resolution to implement measures set out under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, which 
states that:
In the event o f  any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the 
recommendations, i f  any, contained in the report o f  the Commission o f  Inquiry, or in the decision  
o f  the International Court o f  Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body may recommend to 
the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to  secure compliance therewith.
147 The issue of forced labour in Myanmar is the subject of a special session of the CAS, convened annually since 2000 to 
review the situation.
148 The Committee o f Inquiry held sessions to receive evidence in June and November 1997, (at the same time as the 
meetings o f the Governing Body) and visited the region in January-February 1998.
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The course of action undertaken was to request that ILO members consider economic
«
sanctions against Myanmar, as well as taking the issue to the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). This was the first time in 81 years that the ILO had recourse to use 
this measure, and illustrated the severity of the situation in Myanmar.
The situation in Myanmar did not come out of the blue to the EU. As Karen Smith 
has documented, the Council ‘first imposed limited sanctions on Burma in 1990, following 
the refusal of the military regime to honour the results of elections in 1990’. (Smith, 2006b: 
158) An arms embargo followed, and ‘defence cooperation was suspended in 1991, and all 
bilateral aid (expect for humanitarian aid) was suspended the same year.’(Smith, 2006b: 
158) The EU has a CFSP common position on Myanmar since 1996, which strengthen the 
previous sanctions.149 In March 1997 the ‘Council suspended the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) for Burma, because of forced labour there/ (Smith, 2006b: 158) The 
EU therefore had a well-defined common position on Myanmar before its Member States 
began to coordinate m the ILO. In 1999 the UK gave a statement on Myanmar in the 
CAS on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK, (Canada, Iceland and Norway were also aligned with the 
statement). The following year, the EU Member States voted cohesively in the plenary for 
the adoption of a resolution against Myanmar, and the Portuguese Presidency spoke on 
behalf of the Union in a special sitting of the CAS dedicated to the situation in Myanmar.
149 The first Council Common Positions on Myanmar imposed a visa ban on government and military staff, expelled all 
military people attached to diplomatic missions and suspended all non-humanitarian development programmes. (EC- 
Bulletin, 1996a 1.4.2) This was based on an ‘absence of progress’ but did not mention the infringement o f Convention 
29 directly. However, the review o f the position six months later did mention the violation o f core labour standards. 
The European Parliament was also concerned about the issue, first mentioning forced labour in Myanmar in a 
resolution in 1996. (EC-Bulletin, 1996b 1.2.5)
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The Presidency has prepared a common statement for the CAS on forced labour in 
Myanmar in every CAS meeting since then.150
The threshold for collective action in the case of Myanmar was high, in part 
because it was also the first such action and needed to set the precedent. The appointment 
of a Special Representative and the recommendations to the ECOSOC under Article 33 
were unprecedented in the history of the ILO, and thus illustrate the severity of this case. 
Given these special circumstances one could legitimately ask if no collective EU action 
took place after this, then when would it? The reaction from the EU was slow, given that 
the Council agreed the need for collective action against Myanmar’s forced labour practices 
in 1997. Myanmar has also been in violation of C87, which the Netherlands first gave a 
statement on in 1994. No EU statement was made until 2005,11 years later.
it. Colombia
Like Myanmar, the volume of complaints against Colombia led the Director 
General of the ILO to appoint a special representative to the country and report back to 
the Governing Body on its findings. The process began with a complaint by delegates at 
the 1998 ILC that Colombia had been failing to observe conventions 87 and 98 concerning 
freedom of association. As was the case with Myanmar, the complaint was filed under 
Article 26 of the ILO Constitution. (ILO, 2000d) The resulting complaint led the 
Committee on Freedom of Association to consider a number of cases giving evidence of
150 The Luxembourg Presidency made a statement on behalf of the EU on Myanmar in the March 2005 Governing Body 
meeting. However, this was quite exceptional practice and the Union is not generally represented in the Governing 
Body because the Member State holding the Presidency is not always present among the 56 government members of 
the ILO Governing Body.
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violations against the rights of trade unionists in Colombia. (ILO, 2000e) At the Governing 
Body meeting (GB278) in Geneva in June 2000 the following decision was taken:
The Governing Body requested the Director-General to appoint a Special Representative 
o f  the Director-General for cooperation with Colombia in order to assist in and verify the actions 
taken by the Government and the Employers’ and Workers’ organizations to implement the 
conclusions o f  the direct contacts mission and the recommendations o f  the Committee on Freedom  
o f  Association in the pending cases concerning Colombia. (ILO, 2000d)
The Special Representative was requested to report to the Governing Body via the Office 
of the Director General at the November 2000 and March 2001 meetings. (ILO, 2001c) 
The failure to make progress by June 2001 resulted in the issue coming before the CAS, 
and at the time Sweden, holding the rotating EU Presidency gave a statement on behalf of 
the EU Member States condemning the lack of progress. Since 2002 a special technical 
cooperation programme has been in operation working with the Colombian government, 
but the violations have continued to be registered and discussed in the CAS in the 
following years.
However, unlike the previous case of Myanmar there was no history of CFSP 
Common Positions concerning Colombia. Another difference with the Myanmar case is 
that the EU did not make a statement on Colombia in 2002 or 2003, while Myanmar has 
been raised every year since it was first the subject of a common statement. There was an 
interval of two years between the 2001 Swedish Presidency and the 2004 Irish Presidency 
that drafted a second statement on Colombia. The explanation given by Geneva diplomats 
why no statement was made in 2002 was because the Spanish government held the EU 
Presidency and the right-wing Popular Party resisted the pressure to produce a second
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statement while holding the Council Presidency in 2002.151 The government vetoed a 
statement on Colombia again in 2003, and a second EU statement on Colombia was only 
possible after the left-wing Socialist Party came into office in March 2004. The explanation 
for this given by diplomats working in Geneva was the change of government in Madrid, 
which was influenced by workers organisations lobbying the socialist government to 
change their foreign policy on this issue.152 Evidence of the change in policy to Colombia 
elsewhere in EU foreign policy following the March elections in Spain can be seen in the 
two statements issued by the Presidency in on the domestic situation in Colombia. In June 
2004 the Presidency issued a statement saying that the ‘European Union remains deeply 
concerned at the grave human rights and international humanitarian law situation in 
Colombia’, (EC-Bulletin, 2004b) while in December 2004 the Council conclusions ‘voiced 
its grave concern at the human rights situation and the lack of respect for international 
humanitarian law*. (EC-Bulletin, 2004d) The threshold for collective action was high here, 
with the instigation of a Special Representative taking place before the first EU common 
statement. Thereafter, Spanish national interests prevented further action until 2004, when 
the Irish Presidency made a statement (and one was also made in 2005).
iii. Zimbabwe
In 2004 Zimbabwe became the third country subject to an EU common statement 
in the CAS, concerning the right to organise and collective bargaining (C98). Unlike 
Myanmar and Colombia there was no Article 26 procedure underway to send a Special 
Representative of the Director General to oversee an inquiry into violations of labour
151 Interview: Geneva, 24 June 2005. No explanation was given as to why the Spanish government acquiesced to a 
statement being made in 2001.
152 Interview: Geneva, 24 June 2005
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standards. Since 2002 the Zimbabwean violations of C98 had been reported in CAS, 
although no EU position had been forthcoming. This is not to say that the EU was not 
concerned with the worsening human rights situation there in general. As Karen Smith 
notes, ‘Zimbabwe’s slide into autocratic rule became an issue for the EU only from the late 
1990s’. (Smith, 2006b: 161) A common position was established in 2002 (2002/145/CFSP) 
because of the ‘deterioration of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe’, and which had 
two purposes.
One purpose o f  the measures is to prohibit the supply to Zimbabwe o f  weapons and 
related supplies, training, technical assistance or equipment that could be used for internal 
repression. Another is to impose a travel ban on persons on the updated list, w ho are guilty o f  
serious violations o f  human rights and the freedoms o f  speech and association. (EC-Bulletin, 2004b) 
The common position has been renewed every year since then, although there as been at
least one high-profile inconsistency when President Mugabe attended a Franco-African
summit in Paris in 2003. The yearly review of the sanctions was due the day before the
conference, ‘and France threaten to veto their renewal if the other member states did not
allow Mugabe into France.’ (Smith, 2006b: 162) In comparison to the other cases, we note
that the level of ILO action against Zimbabwe is less than either of the previous cases, but
that the common statement concerning labour law violations came considerably later than
the first Council Common Position. There is also evidence that one state (France) had
interests that it put before agreement on collective action by the EU against Zimbabwe.
Overall, the threshold for collective action was lower here than in the previous cases.
iv. Sudan
Sudan’s violation of Convention 29 concerning forced labour lead to an EU 
Presidency statement in 2005. In keeping with the first Myanmar example, this was a case 
of a violation of an individual human right (forced labour) rather than the collective rights
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of trade unionists embodied in C87 and C98. There was a precedent of action by the EU in 
response to forced labour allegations, although unlike the Myanmar case no actions had 
been initiated under Article 26 of the constitution in 2005, the year of the EU common 
statement. Furthermore, the delay between the issue arising in the CAS and the first EU 
statement was only one year. As in the Myanmar and Zimbabwe cases, there was a long 
history of EU Common Positions concerning the Sudan, and therefore a long-held 
consensus among the EU Member States that actions against Sudan were acceptable to all 
EU Member States. Sudan had been the subject of a CFSP common position since 1994, 
when an arms embargo was imposed by the Council (94/165/CFSP). In 2004 the Council 
repealed this decision to allow certain de-mining equipment to be exported (EC-Bulletin, 
2004a), but a Security Council resolution led the Council to adopt the following common 
position (2005/411 / CFSP) on the 30 May 2005:
The Council adopts a com m on position introducing restrictive measures (restrictions on  
m ovem ent and freezing o f  assets) against individuals w ho impede the peace process in Sudan, in 
application o f  U N  Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005). . . .  The Council also im poses measures 
to prevent the entry into or transit through the territory o f  the Member States o f  persons who  
comm it serious violations o f  human rights or humanitarian law, violate the ceasefire or obstruct the 
peace process. (EC-Bulletin, 2005b)
The EU statement concerning the violation of C29 is commensurable with the language 
used at the end of the common position refers to ‘serious violations of human rights’. In 
comparison to the previous examples, the threshold for action fell in Sudanese case. There 
are three contributing factors, two of which are the result of EU policy-making, and the 
third is an external variable. The first is the fact that this statement concerned forced labour 
and there was a precedent for EU action in the Myanmar case. Secondly, there is a long- 
established consensus in the Council on Common Positions against Sudan that enabled 
agreement. Finally, there was the added legitimacy given by the Security Council resolution 
against the human rights violations in the Darfur region.
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v. Belarus
In 2005 the Luxembourg Presidency also presented an EU common statement 
concerning the violation of C87, the freedom of association of trade unions. The first time 
evidence of the situation in Belarus arose was in the 2001 meeting of the CAS. The failure 
of the Belarus government to adequately address the situation resulted in a complaint filed 
under Article 26 of the ILO constitution by workers’ delegates at the 2003 ILC. This 
resulted in the establishment of another Special Representative that reported in November 
2003 and November 2004 to the Governing Body. (ILO, 2003d; ILO, 2004b) The EU has 
a history of poor relations with Belarus that dates back to 1994 and the election to office of 
President Lukashenko, and the subsequent move towards authoritarian rule.153 In 1995 the 
European Parliament drew attention to ‘infringements of trade union rights’ in a 
resolution. (EC-Bulletin, 1995) In February 2003 the Parliament drafted another resolution, 
that called for political reform in Belarus, as well as calling on ‘the Commission to initiate 
an official investigation into freedom of association in Belarus on the basis of which it would 
implement, if necessary, the procedures for temporary withdrawal of GSP trade 
preferences provided for in Regulation (EEC) No 2820/98.’ (EC-Bulletin, 2003) 
(Emphasis added) However, the focus of common positions has been on democratic 
freedoms, iterated strongly in the conclusions of the November 2004 Council meeting 
where it was stated that there was
great concern that the 17 October 2004 parliamentary elections and referendum in Belarus 
were not conducted in a free and fair manner. . . .  The Council strongly condemns the attacks on
153 http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/belarus/intro/#nov Accessed 15 February 2006
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peaceful demonstrators, individual opposition leaders and journalists that took place after 17
October. (EC-Council, 2 0 0 4 )154
In June 2005, after the submission of a report by the ILO Special representative to 
Belarus, the European Commission considered withholding GSP tariff preferences to 
Belarus.155 However, by November 2005 no such action had been taken and the ‘Council 
stated that it would closely monitor the situation in Belarus and was ready to take 
appropriate restrictive measures such as freezing assets or visa restrictions against members 
of the government responsible for failure to meet international commitments.’ (EC- 
Bulletin, 2005c) The threshold of action in this case seems, once again, to be high. Once 
again the severity of the situation in Belarus is comparable to the one in Colombia, where a 
Special Representative was appointed. In addition, there was a long history of EU 
Common Positions concerning Belarus (implying consensus among the Member States), as 
well as European Parliament scrutiny of domestic practices there for a decade prior to the 
EU CAS statement. On balance, many of these criteria match previous cases where EU 
statements have been made, and while the action is therefore explainable, it appears to 
have come late even by the slow standards of the EU.
4. Drafting CAS EU common statements: Geneva coordination mechanisms
This section asks the question: how do the Member States coordinate the drafting 
of CAS common statements? The staff involved in the drafting are from the Geneva 
Permanent Missions of the EU Member States, the Geneva mission of the Council
154 A visa ban on a group o f named government officials that were ‘all implicated in the disappearance o f four people in 
Belarus or obstruction o f justice’ was imposed in September 2004, and renewed subsequently in 2004: Common 
Position 2004/661/CFSP (EC-Bulletin, 2004c); 2005 Common Position 2005/666/CFSP (EC-Bulletin, 2005a)
155 Interviews: Geneva, 21 & 22 June 2005.
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Secretariat and the European Commission’s Geneva Office (reporting back to DG 
External Relations). Table 9.3 shows an interesting phenomenon: as the EU enlarged from 
15 to 25 Member States, the number of statements made in the CAS rose from one to 
three in 2004, and then in 2005 from three to six. According to all expectations based on 
intergovernmental theories, as the number of parties negotiating increases, ceteris paribus we 
expect to see a decrease in the number of agreements being made. One way in which to 
change the circumstantial conditions of the negotiation and produce a different outcome is 
to increase the time spent negotiating. By doing this, the intergovernmental predictions are 
still applicable if we take into account any additional time spent in coordination meetings. 
From the Daily Bulletin of the ILC we know that in 2004 there was a one-hour EU 
coordination meeting for the CAS statements scheduled by the Irish Presidency, and nine- 
and-a-half hours of coordination meetings scheduled by the Luxembourg Presidency in 
2005. (ILO, 2004a; ILO, 2005a)156 Without knowing how many hours were scheduled in 
2003 or earlier we cannot be certain that there is not a proportional relationship between 
the number of Member States, the number of CAS statements and the length of time spent 
in coordination meetings. Interviews with diplomats working in Geneva reveal that these 
coordination meetings are not the only forums in which the CAS statements are discussed; 
before the physical meetings there is a system of email (virtual) coordination that takes 
place to prepare the early drafts.
Interviews with Geneva diplomats all confirm that the preparation of common 
statements in the CAS is greatly facilitated by the use of email. EU diplomats use the
156 The Daily Bulletin in 2003 does not give any information concerning scheduled EU coordination meetings specifically 
for the CAS. This is explained by the move in 2004 from the EU Council Offices close to the Palais de Nations to new 
premises about 1.5km further away. The extra distance made it impractical to commute between the ILC and the office, 
and as a result the EU coordination meetings were moved into the Palais and required booking through the ILO 
Secretariat. All EU coordination meetings appear on the 2004 and 2005 Daily Bulletins (which give the times and 
locations o f all coordination meetings taking place that day in the ILC) whereas previously only a few were listed.
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procedure in other cities and in Geneva it has been used in other UN organisations, 
including the UN Commission on Human Rights. Emails are sent on a distribution list that 
includes all diplomats holding the same dossier (e.g. ILO) and allows for the exchange of 
ideas and information across a horizontal, local network of Geneva staff. An important 
character of the local email network is that it is below that of the COREU telex service of 
capital-to-capital contact. COREU is used for the circulation of information and ‘concrete 
issues’ while the nature of the email network is less formal and more discursive.157 Each 
diplomat in the Geneva network makes direct contact with their national capital (in 
Foreign Ministries) if issues arise in the email correspondence that requires instruction 
from their superiors. It is clear that the Geneva email correspondence network and the 
COREU are • separate and distinct inter-member communication networks and that 
diplomatic staff in each mission are responsible for their own contributions within the 
email system.
In the specific case of the CAS common statements, the Presidency prepares a first 
draft and sends it out to all members of the email correspondence network. Recipients 
then consider the draft and use the ‘reply to all’ function to post responses and suggestions. 
One of the advantages of this system is that it taps into the strengths of the different 
Member States, and allows additional local knowledge from embassies to be incorporated, 
alongside the national reports gathered by the Presidency (part of the responsibilities of the 
six-month post).158 The Presidency mission staff are then responsible for drafting a second 
version of the statement that synthesises the various comments into a statement that will 
be acceptable to alL The email correspondence network was often referred to by diplomats 
as ‘a tool’ for the Presidency that simplified its task of coordinating common statements.
157 Interviews: Geneva, 22 & 24 June 2005
158 Interviews: Geneva, 22 & 24 June 2005
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The reason for this was that it did not require all 25 Member States and the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission to be present in the drafting phase and allowed each one 
to contact their colleagues and gain approval of the draft statements.
During the Irish Presidency email was used as much as possible and it only 
convened a meeting once all of the statements had been agreed in principle in order to gain 
final acceptance. In contrast in 2005, the Luxembourg Presidency chose to meet to discuss 
the second draft of each statement and during interviews revealed that the discussion of 
the Myanmar (C87) and Zimbabwe statements required a day each to finalise.159 Once 
finalised, the statements are then circulated to the associated states, other European states 
(Norway, Switzerland, etc.) and they are invited to align themselves with the statement. 
These findings illustrate how the amount of time spent in coordination meetings can be 
reduced by dedicating more resources to electronic communication in the preliminary 
stages.
All interviewees agreed that the use of the email correspondence network saves 
time and is more efficient. The process was described as ‘clinical’ because contributions are 
succinct and purposeful, and as a result participants focus on key issues and are disciplined 
in addressing only them. The reason email correspondence was often preferred to face-to- 
face meetings is because diplomats are able to ‘talk up to the bell’ when sat in a room with 
a statement in front of them, and a discussion mediated through email did not suffer from 
the same drawbacks.160 In order to assist the Presidency in their job of coordinating and
159 Interviews: Geneva, 21 & 22 June 2005. Some diplomats involved in the negotiation o f  the CAS statements in 2005 
voiced the opinion that more time should have been spent fine-tuning the statements before the meeting, and that CAS 
coordination meetings were poorly chaired, inviting general discussion o f the statements, rather than focusing on their 
acceptability or not.
160 All points raised were from interviews conducted in Geneva with diplomatic staff from various permanent missions.
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synthesising the emails exchanged, and also to help give them sufficient time to compile a 
completed statement, a ‘silent procedure’ is often used near the end of the coordination. 
The silent procedure is stated along with a time (e.g. 11a.m.) after which no more 
comments should be submitted to the network, and remaining silent (i.e. not emailing) is 
regarded as a sign of acquiescence. Member States do their utmost to observe this rule out 
of respect for the Presidency diplomatic staff, and also so as to retain credibility among the 
other members of the correspondence network.161 The rule is not foolproof and it is 
broken, on estimate, 10% of the time but only when it is based on instructions received 
from superiors on an important issue relating to national interests. Thus while much effort 
goes into producing common statements through extensive coordination, the Member 
States remain the central actors and each diplomat in the Geneva staff of the permanent 
missions is responsible for ensuring that national interests are not threatened by the 
process.
How well does the system work? In order to answer this we must first decide upon 
the criteria we wish to measure it by. There appears to be an inverse correlation between 
increasing the amount of time spent using the email correspondence network and the 
amount of time spent in face-to-face meetings. By increasing the former one can decrease 
the latter, and a number of diplomats regarded it as more efficient and a better use of 
resources. However, part of the success of the system is the espirt de corps between the 
members of the network (as illustrated in the observance of the silent procedure rule) that 
is fostered through personal contact. Therefore we cannot assume that all coordination 
could become electronic and made more efficient. A balance must be struck between using
161 Both o f these points were raised in interviews and lend evidence to theories o f socialisation between diplomatic staff, 
because they illustrate how inter-personal relations (and their potential deterioration) can be important factors in 
determining how Member States negotiate together.
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local email correspondence to save time and personal contact to retain the social network 
between colleagues. Central to all of these points is the resourcefulness and experience of 
the Presidency. The Presidency must decide on the balance between electronic and 
personal interaction, as well as mediate between Member States in both the virtual and real 
discussion forums. The evidence suggests that with more time (9.5 hours) more statements 
(six) were produced by Luxembourg than by Ireland the previous year (1 hour, three 
statements).162 Yet the relationship is not linear, and the Irish Presidency agreed each 
statement in an average time of 20 minutes, while the Luxembourg Presidency took on 
average over 90 minutes to agree each statement. For this reason, the claims that the Irish 
Presidency was more efficient appear valid.
5. Why EU Member States coordinate common statements in the CAS
This final section pulls together a number of strands of argument from the 
previous sections and adds some extra information on the role of the Nordic group of 
states to offer one explanation for why the EU Member States began the practice of 
speaking with one voice in the CAS. The information presented will focus on empirical 
data and in the next chapter the significance of the data in terms of substantiating or 
refuting different theories explaining the behaviour of the Member States will be 
considered. However, the purpose of the data presented is to show that evidence of norm 
entrepreneurship can be seen in some diplomats’ behaviour, as well as the emergence of a 
core group of EU Member States that began speaking together in common statements and 
later came to speak for all EU Member States.
162 As will be shown in Chapter 10, most coordination for CFSP related issues is done in Geneva and not in Brussels, 
although Brussels is seen as the ideal location. (EC-Coundl, 2003b) In contrast, some preparatory work for technical 
coordination is down in the Social Questions Working Group. Interview: Brussels, 18 November 2005
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Section 2 identified Germany, the UK and the Netherlands as the most actively 
involved EU Member States in the CAS since 1973. However, the government members 
o f the Nordic Bloc have met prior to ILC meetings since the middle of the 1950s in order 
to coordinate their positions in both technical and political ILC committees.163 The 
Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) meets in two parts (and three since 
2000 with a special sitting dedicated to forced labour in Myanmar). The first is a review of 
the annual report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR), the report by the independent judges that scrutinise the 
submissions by national governments on their domestic laws, and from where CAS issues 
are selected. The second is the hearing panel where violating states are called to present 
evidence and where all of the preceding data has been taken. The Nordic bloc has a long 
history of speaking together in the review of the CEACR report, as detailed in Appendix 3. 
Table 9.4 shows the number of statements made by the Nordic group in the Part 1 CAS 
during the five periods of the study.164 Over the five periods of the study there is a gradual 
increase in the level of participation by the Nordic group, rising from an average of one 
statement per year in Period 1 to 4.5 statements per year between 1987 and 1992, and from 
1998 to 2005.
With the exception of four statements on the violation of Convention 87 (one on 
Algeria and one on Liberia in 1977, and two on the UK in 1989 and 1991), the Nordic 
group did not make statements in the Part 2 CAS meetings until the mid-1990s. However, 
from 1994 onwards the Nordic bloc spoke on violations to core standards in a wide range 
of countries. From 1997 onwards the Nordic bloc spoke on behalf of an increasingly broad
163 Interview: Copenhagen, 3 March 2005
164 Since these periods were chosen on the basis of there relevance to the EU it is only for comparative purposes (and for 
methodological consistency) that the periods are used again here. However, the Nordic group has remained strong 
despite the gradual encroaching of EU membership on its own membership.
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group of states, all of which came from the IMEC group, (with the exception of Turkey, 
which nonetheless frequently coordinates with the group).165 When looking at the countries 
the Nordic group has coordinated statements for one notices that they are both broader in 
their range than EU common statements, but that when the EU does make a statement it 
is a year or more behind the Nordic group (for example the Nordic group made statements 
on Belarus in 2001 and 2003 before an EU statement in 2005) and that with a few 
exceptions, when an EU statement is made a Nordic one is not. The Nordic group is 
therefore a trendsetter, leading on issues that the EU follows on, and there is very litde 
duplication of statements, with the EU statements taking precedent. Table 9.5 gives a list 
of all Nordic statements between 2000 and 2005 (to match the corresponding period in 
which EU statements were drafted). As can be seen, the Nordic bloc is prolific and 
attracted like-minded EU states such as the Netherlands and the UK in six of its 23 
statements made since 2000 (while in the opposite direction Norway has been aligned with 
all 14 EU statements since 2000 and Iceland with six of them).
Interviews with diplomats from outside the Nordic states show that outside 
observers note that the number of Nordic statements decreases when the number of EU 
statements increases.166 In support of this impression, a diplomat from a Nordic and EU 
state confirmed that their government placed greater significance on EU common 
statements than Nordic group statements.167 The relationship between the two was 
characterised as zero-sum, implying that increased cooperation between EU states meant 
fewer common statements prepared by the Nordic bloc, which were described as being ‘up
165 The 1998 statement on Indonesia (C98) was on behalf of the Nordic bloc and Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, the UK, Canada, Japan, the US and Turkey.
166 Interview; Geneva, 21 & 22 June 2005
167 Interview: Geneva, 24 June 2005
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the sleeve’, in case the EU did not produce one.168 Coupled with this we have the other 
evidence gathered above, pointing to a group of predominandy Northern- and Westem- 
European states within the EU leading the way in producing common statements in the 
CAS. The process began in 1997, when non-Nordic EU Member States began speaking on 
behalf of the Nordic group, and vice versa. In 1998 the Nordic statement on Indonesia 
(C98) represents ten of the fifteen EU Member States, while in 1999 the UK statement on 
Myanmar (C29) did the same. From this base the first EU statement was drafted in 2000, 
and through the processes set out in Section 4, this practice became entrenched.
6. Summary
This chapter has presented the empirical evidence gathered from a survey of the 
participation of EU Member States in the Committee on the Application of Standards 
(CAS) between 1973 and 2005. The chapter has shown that the emergence o f EU 
common statements since 2000 was an evolutionary process bome out of an increased 
tendency to produce common statements by a group of predominandy Northern 
European states. The trendsetting nature of these states was reiterated by the broad pattern 
of statements on particular countries originating from this group (either Nordic States or 
individual EU Member States such as Germany and the Netherlands) that a year or more 
later became the subject of an EU common statement. The Geneva-based coordination 
network of diplomats that drafts these instruments has been shown to have a set of norms 
of procedure that socialise members into the working of the network, and through this 
system the diplomats from the Member States that strongly support CAS involvement 
have been able to build support for EU-level statements.
168 Interview; Geneva, 24 June 2005
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Yet the findings also point in the direction of intergovernmental explanations of 
behaviour. The case of Colombia showed that a Member State still had veto power over 
the drafting o f a common statement and used it successfully. As this chapter has shown, 
every EU common statement has had an extremely high threshold for acceptance. The 
most stringent was the first case, that of forced labour in Myanmar, when the ILO took 
action never taken before in terms of actively seeking economic sanctions against a 
member (Article 33). The severity of rights violations in Colombia and Belarus was also 
extremely high, while Sudan was simultaneously the subject of a UN Security Council 
resolution. Arguably Zimbabwe had the lowest threshold of severity for action, although 
Zimbabwe (like Sudan, Belarus and Myanmar) was subject to EU Common Positions. The 
second statement against Myanmar’s continued violation of C87 came in 2005, 11 years 
after the Netherlands first made a statement on the subject in the CAS. While on the one 
hand these statements can be argued to represent an emerging acquis politique in the CAS, 
on the other (more sceptical) hand they could be regarded as the bare minimum any actor 
that proclaims itself to be concerned with human tights would act on. From this 
perspective the achievement remains modest in comparison to the expectations of the 
trend-setting EU Member States.
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Table 9.1a: E U  Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application o f Standards,
independently and on behalf o f other states: 1973-1980
EU Member State Independent Statements Statements made on behalf of 
other states
Total
France 3 0 3
Germany 6 1* 7
Italy 1 0 1
UK 16 0 16
Total 26 1 27
* 1977: Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands; statement on Ethiopia, C87
Table 9.1b: E U  Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application of Standards, 
independently and on behalf of other states: 1981-1986
EU Member State Independent Statements Statements made on behalf o f  
other states
Total
Belgium 3 0 3
France 1 0 1
Netherlands 6 0 6
Total 10 0 10
Table 9.1c: E U  Member State statements made in the Committee 
independently and on behalf of other states: 1987-1992
on the Application of Standards,
EU Member State Independent Statements Statements made on behalf o f Total 
other states
France 2 0 2
Germany 9 0 9
Netherlands 2 0 2
Portugal 1 0 1
UK 1 0 1
Total: 15 0 15
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Table 9.1d: E U  Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application o f Standards,
independently and on behalf o f other states: 1993-1997
EU Member State Independent Statements Statements made on behalf of 
other states
Total
Austria 2 0 2
France 1 0 1
Germany 10 0 10
Netherlands 4 0 4
UK 2 3* 5
Total: 19 3 22
*  UK on behalf o f Germany, Nordic countries, Canada and US: Sudan C29 (1997)
UK on behalf o f Austria, Belgium, Germany, Nordic countries, Canada and Switzerland: Myanmar C87 (1997) 
UK  on behalf o f Germany and Netherlands: Nigeria C87 (1997)
Table 9.1 e: EU  Member State statements made in the Committee on the Application of Standards, 
independently and on behalf of other states: 1998-2005
EU Member State Independent Statements Statements made on behalf of 
other states
Total:
Germany 5 0 5
Netherlands 0 1* 1
UK 0 2* 2
EU Presidency 14** - 14
Total: 19 3 22
*  UK on behalf o f  Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Nordic countries and Canada: Myanmar C87 (1998)
UK on behalf o f Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Nordic countries and Canada: Myanmar C29 (1999) 
Netherlands on behalf o f Germany, Swaziland C87 (2000)
** Various candidate, associated, EFTA and SAP states were aligned to these statements at various times. See Appendix 3.
Table 9.2: Countries about which EU  Member States made statements, divided by regions and across the 
jive periods: 1973-2005
Region Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Total
1973-80 1981-86 1987-92 1993-97 *98-2005
Africa 7 0 2 4 4 17
Asia 2 3 1 8 9 23
Central America 1 2 3 1 0 7
South America 1 1 0 2 4 8
Soviet Bloc /  Former* 16 4 3 0 3 26
Western States 0 0 6 7 2 15
Total 27 10 15 22 22 96
* Former Soviet Bloc includes Belarus, from 2001 onwards
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Table 9.3: E U  Presidency statements in the C AS (Country and Convention) 2000-2005
2000
Portugal
2001
Sweden
2002
Spain
2003
Greece
2004
Ireland
2005
Luxembourg
Myanmar C29
Colombia C87 
Myanmar C29 Myanmar C29 Myanmar C29
Colombia C87 
Myanmar C29
Belarus C87 
Colombia C87 
Myanmar C29
Zimbabwe C98
Myanmar C87 
Sudan C29 
Zimbabwe C98
Table 9.4: Nordic Group statements in the CAS Part 1 Committee 1973-2005
Period 1 Period 2 
1973-1980 1981-1986
Period 3 
1987-1992
Period 4 
1993-1997
Period 5 
1998-2005
No. O f Statements 8 15 27 19 36
Conferences 8 6 6 5 8
Average per year 1 2.5 4.5 3.8 4.5
Table 9.5: Nordic Group statements in the CAS (Country and Convention) 2000-2005
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Belarus C87 Belarus C87**
Colombia C87* Colombia C87 Colombia C87 
Ethiopia C87
Colombia C87 
Ethiopia C87
India C29
Colombia C87 
Guatemala 87 Guatemala 87 
Mauritania 29
Myanmar C87
Sudan C29
Myanmar C87 Myanmar C87 
Sudan C29
Venezuela C87 Venezuela C87 Venezuela C87
Zimbabwe C98 Zimbabwe C98 Zimbabwe C98
* Nordic Group plus Netherlands
** Nordic Group plus Netherlands and United Kingdom.
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C h a p t e r  10
POLITICAL COORDINATION: SYNOPSIS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter provides a summary of Chapters 7 to 9 and serves to tie together the 
analysis of political coordination in the annual labour conferences. The guiding questions 
for this chapter are: has a change in behaviour in the EU Member States taken place in the 
political issues surveyed? Has there been a change in the level of common representation, 
and how does that relate to the level of cohesive voting in record votes? If so, what can be 
said about the effectiveness of EU Member State coordination in the ILO? The statistical 
analysis of the data on representation and voting cohesion indicated that there was a 
positive association between the two variables. The next question to tackle in this chapter 
is which theory or theories best explain the observed behaviour?
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the evidence that a 
change in EU Member State behaviour took place, and defines what the change was. The 
second section explores the most recent example of change, the development of EU 
common statements in the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) by 
considering to what extent it is an example of norm-entrepreneurship in action. The final 
section reviews the evidence that supports and refutes the five different theories 
considered in this section and evaluates their usefulness.
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1. Changing behaviour o f  E U  M em ber States
The literature on EU Member State voting cohesion in the UN General Assembly 
that was reviewed in Chapter 7 contains a number of works that conclude that there has 
always been some degree of voting cohesion between the EU Member States. (Hurwitz, 
1975; Foot, 1979; Lindemann, 1982; Luif, 2003; Johansson-Nogues, 2004) The authors all 
identify issue areas where the EU Member States do not agree, inter alia the Middle East 
and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Added to this, Luif notes that the France and the 
UK are the ‘outliers’ that most often break cohesion by being the EU Member States most 
likely to vote differendy from the majority. These states act in accordance to their national 
interests if they are not shared with the majority of EU Member States. The picture that 
this builds of EU Member State cohesion in the UN General Assembly is one where 
particular issues are divisive, and particular Member States are most likely to be divided 
from the EU majority. In relation to the specific case of the ILO, this points towards one 
key issue. The agenda of the ILC is an important exogenous variable in determining 
whether there will be voting cohesion or not.169 The tabling of resolutions concerned with 
the situation of Arab Workers in the Occupied Territories in the 1970s was driven by 
sympathetic tripartite members of the ILO putting them on the conference agenda. 
Similarly, the scrutiny of action taken against the South African government was 
undertaken by a Committee sympathetic to black workers (as demonstrated by the 
repeated criticism of the common EU reply that was suspected of masking pro-South 
Africa governments’ actions).
169 The same point was raised in relation to technical coordination, and the agenda-setting power o f the Governing Body.
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Chapter 8 focused on the empirical data gathered from record votes and 
Presidency statements in plenary and committee meetings between 1973 and 2005. There 
was too little data to disaggregate into the five periods used elsewhere in the thesis because 
most of the voting data fell between 1973 and 1981. The small number of record votes also 
meant that the appearance of a causal relationship between common representation and 
voting cohesion (i.e. that after coordination to produce a common statement there was a 
much higher chance of cohesive voting) needed secondary verification. The method 
chosen to do this was to look at the two political issues that dominated the EPC 
coordination of the Member States in the 1970s and the 1980s, the situation of Arab 
workers and apartheid in South Africa. The two cases provided a comparison between the 
early and middle period of the survey, as well as testing the alternative explanations 
suggested for the observed behaviour, such as an inversion of high and low politics or a 
reversal of the causal relationship (that EU Member States only spoke as one when they 
knew they could agree to).
i. Arab workers
The first case study of the situation concerning Arab workers in the Occupied 
Territories spanned an early period between 1973 and 1980, and then a second period 
between 1988 and 2005. All of the voting took place in the early period and more time was 
spent looking at it. Within this period there were two issues under discussion; the first was 
whether the PLO should be allowed to participate as an observer in the ILO, and the 
second was whether the consequences of the Arab-Israeli dispute on Arab workers was a 
justifiable concern of the ILO. We know from other work done on UN General Assembly 
voting cohesion that the EU Member States were deeply divided over this issue during the 
1970s. Only on one occasion were they divided in the ILO however, and that was in
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relation to the participation of the PLO. No statement was prepared and the EU Member 
States voted in two separate groups. This appears to confirm the intergovernmental logic 
of diversity, and also lends weight to the argument that EU Member States only speak 
together when they are going to vote together (and this is an example of the reverse 
causality where common statements only come about if all the Member States are in 
agreement prior to the start of coordination).
The other issue concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute performed better under the 
EPC mechanism. While it is clear both from the PLO vote and the research on the 
General Assembly that there were considerable differences in national policy to this issue, 
on the question of whether the ILO was the right place to discuss it, they unanimously 
agreed that it was not. In all record votes they were cohesive, and spoke frequently through 
the Presidency expressing the view that it was a subject to be discussed in the General 
Assembly and the UN Security Council. This constitutes a success for the EPC, since the 
position was agreed in 1973 and maintained until the last record vote on the issue in 1980. 
It also took place early in the life of EPC and so should be considered as the benchmark 
from which change over the length of the survey will be measured. If the level of voting 
cohesion and common representation differs from this initial level we will be able to say 
that a change has taken place.
ii. Apartheid in South Africa
The second case study was apartheid in South Africa, which was on the agenda of 
the ILC from 1978 to 1993. Once again, the literature on EU Member State coordination 
in the General Assembly tells us that South Africa was a divisive issue, on which Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Ireland took the strongest line on using UN institutions to put
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pressure on the Pretoria government to end the regime. This became apparent in the ILO 
too when looking at the annual national submissions to the conference on the measures 
taken to economically isolate South Africa. Denmark, followed by the Netherlands and 
eventually Ireland sent individual submissions, while the remainder of the EU Member 
States maintained a common line on submitting a single report in keeping with the 1977 
Council Code of Conduct. Despite their additional reports, the three gave their names to 
Presidency statements reiterating the right of the Twelve to submit a joint reply in the face 
o f growing frustration from the ILC standing committee.
The most significant point to note is that the single report to the ILC through the 
European Code of Conduct reporting procedure was believed by trade unionists to be 
used by EU Member States still dealing with South Africa to hide their actions from the 
ILO. In the 1987 record vote on the adoption of the report, only four governments voted 
against the report; Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the US. This vote pointed to the 
continued financial and commercial ties between the South Africa and the Germany170 and 
the UK, and assuming the claims by trade unionists were true, it meant that the policy of 
submitting a single report was in the interest of two of the three large Member States. 
Simon Nuttall’s analysis agreed with this appraisal, noting that the UK was ‘the country 
known to have been principally responsible for the failure to adopt sanctions’ (Nuttall, 
1992: 235) in general and therefore it follows that the ILO the UK was the least willing of 
the Twelve tb report on the extent of economic ties with South Africa.
What does this case study say about EPC in the 1980s? The fact that the EU 
Member States continued to submit their common report and that the Presidency
170 One-third o f South Africa’s coal production was exported to West Germany. (Nuttall, 1992: 236)
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continued to defend their right submit one shows that there was a high level of cohesion 
despite the very clear signs that three EU Member States (Denmark, and the Netherlands) 
undermined this strategy through their own unilateral actions (submitting reports). 
Interpreting the 1987 vote is more difficult, because it was split three-ways, with Denmark, 
Greece and Ireland voting for the adoption of the report, Germany and the UK against, 
and the remaining seven states abstained. From this vote it is clear that the national 
positions of the Member States were deeply divided, but nonetheless they upheld their 
obligations to the common reporting system. This points to a situation in EPC very similar 
to Moravcsik’s theory of liberal intergovernmental bargaining, where the three large states 
use their power to get what they want. This was not a purely intergovernmental situation, 
because if it were Denmark, the Netherlands or Ireland would have withdrawn from the 
common statements. Commenting on EPC in general Simon Nuttall says that the
difficulties the Ten, later Twelve, experienced in reaching agreements on  sanctions 
detracted from the considerable achievement o f  their South Africa policy. The positions o f  the 
Member States were wide apart, and yet EPC provided a mechanism which resulted in a substantial 
European position. The position was less advanced that the Dutch, for example, would have wished, 
but more so than the British or the Germans ever intended. (Nuttall, 1992: 237)
Hi. Committee on the Application of Standards
Chapter 9 looked at the EU Member States’ statements in the Committee on the 
Application of Standards (CAS), both individually and collectively, between 1973 and 2005. 
The distribution of statements was sufficiently even so as to be able to return to the five 
periods used in the earlier chapters.171 The EU Member States began to speak on behalf of
171 The periods were determined with reference to the changing Treaties o f the European Community. If one considers 
that the London report o f 1981 roughly corresponds to the beginning o f Period 2, then the other key dates are 
significant for political coordination too (SEA in 1986, Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997).
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each other from 1997. The development of these common statements was traced from the 
early trend-setting by a group of north-west EU states comprising of Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Denmark, Finland and Sweden (as three of the five states in the 
Nordic bloc). This group was joined by Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain, none of 
which had a long history of speaking in the CAS, when the trend-setting country spoke for 
them. However, it was argued that there was a very high threshold on EU common action 
in the CAS. The threshold was measured by the severity of the violation, the reporting of a 
complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, the referral from the Governing Body 
to the Director General, and the frequency with which a violating state is called to speak 
before the CAS. It was argued that the high threshold for EU action made the EU more 
reactive than proactive, and also points to the intergovernmental decision-making 
procedure for agreeing to speak collectively.
In order to substantiate these claims, the first common statement was on forced 
labour in Myanmar in 2000. The case has been the subject of a dedicated sitting of the CAS 
for six years (2000-2005) and was referred to ECOSOC under Article 33 of the ILO 
Constitution, something that had never happened before or since. The cases of Colombia 
(C87) and Belarus (C87) were the subject of Article 26 complaints and were referred to the 
Governing Body and both had appointed a Special Representative of the Director General 
to oversee the situation. In the cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan the EU moved more quickly 
and did not require the impetus from an ILO Special Representative to act, although both 
were the subject of existing EU common positions on the basis of concerns for human 
rights violations taking place in them, of which violations of core labour standards form 
part of the ILO’s contribution to the global human rights regime.
284/381
A high threshold of action is set by the EU Member States. The cases listed above 
represent situations in which it would be difficult to justify not acting, especially in the first 
case concerning forced labour in Myanmar. However, national interests have prevented 
statements being made, as happened with Colombia in 2002 and 2003, when the Spanish 
government vetoed the presentation of a Presidency statement. In this respect the 
Colombian case is an exception among those studied. In all other cases a statement has 
been reissued the following year, pointing to the development of an acquis politique in the 
CAS. The first statement on Colombia was prepared by the Swedish Presidency in 2001, 
but it was only after the return of a left-wing government in the Spanish elections in March 
2004 that another statement was issued in 2004.172 It would appear that a strong case could 
be made for the influence of the intergovernmental decision-making process over the 
drafting of CAS statements.
There is one glaring flaw in the case study that prevents the intergovernmental 
explanation from holding water. When the membership of the EU increased from 15 to 25 
Member States, the number of common statements increased from 1 in 2003, to 3 in 2004, 
and 6 in 2005. These figures challenge the basic assumption that as the number of states 
increases, the likelihood of making a decision decreases when all participants wield a veto. 
The discussion in Chapter 9 on the virtual coordination network explained exacdy how the 
growing si2e of the EU from 15 to 25 was not only accommodated without producing 
gridlock in the CAS decision-making process, but may have even made it easier to reach 
agreement. The argument will be presented in full in Section 2 below, but put simply it is 
that the pressure on one Member State to ‘unblock’ a common statement by removing 
their veto increases as the size of the EU increases. Rather than making decision-making
172 This is based on interview material See Chapter 9 for full discussion. Interview: Geneva, 24 June 2005.
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more cumbersome, enlargement has the opposite effect of making the blocking of a 
decision more cosdy because of the greater pressure exerted by the group consensus.
In summary, the overview of political coordination in the ILC from 1973 to 2005 
has been presented in three phases. In the first and second EPC was tested, and found to 
be effective even in issues where there was a clear division between the EU Member States. 
Its effectiveness was tempered by removing problematic issues from the EPC coordination 
mechanism, (e.g. PLO vote), or by the actions of small and medium states that did not 
agree with the EPC position and pursued a separate national strategy in a discrete manner 
in parallel (e.g. Denmark in the South Africa reports). In the example of the CAS from 
2000, common action has grown although the EU has been slow to react and required a 
high threshold of severity to engage into gear. Evidence from both cases rejects the 
intergovernmental explanation, although elements of its explanatory power still have some 
purchase. The CAS example shows that an alternative explanation for the pressure on 
Member States to conform to a consensus view is worth exploring, and this is presented in 
Section 2.
2. Socialisation of diplomats and opportunities for norm entrepreneurship
How can we explain an increase in the number of common statements at the same 
time as an increase in the number of EU members? In 2004, six weeks after enlargement, 
three common statements were agreed, (while in previous years only one had been), and in 
2005 the number doubled to six statements. The enlargement from 15 to 25 Member 
States did not seem to have an adverse effect on the outputs of the EU in the CAS, on the 
contrary they increased. In this section the empirical evidence from Chapter 9 on the 
virtual coordination network in Geneva will be expanded upon, and two ideas presented;
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firstly, that diplomats are socialised into the Geneva system, and secondly that and norm 
entrepreneurship by existing members of the network takes place. In order to do this I will 
divide the section into three parts, each addressing a particular question. They are:
• Who is involved in the socialisation process?
• What is the mechanism and how does socialisation work?
• Why is Geneva special and how does it facilitate norm entrepreneurship?
i. Who is involved?
The coordination meetings in preparation for the CAS are comprised of the 
Geneva-based diplomats responsible for ILO affairs. The staff at the meetings represent 
the same parties as one would find in a Council meeting in Brussels (Commission, Council, 
Presidency, Member States’ missions), but the Presidency of the Union has a certain 
amount of flexibility to determine how much of a role the Council Secretariat and the 
Commission have in the coordination process. Their role is to ‘feed in’ to the system 
relevant information from the Council or Commission, such as common positions and 
Community laws, but neither the Commission nor the Council staff in Geneva have any 
greater resources than the Member States’ missions. For this reason they are on an 
equivalent level to those of the other Member States in the correspondence network and 
are effectively the 26th and 27th members of the network. The fact that the institutional 
actors are smaller than they would be in Brussels means that the diplomats in the network 
have a high degree of personal influence on the outcome of the coordination process.
The Presidency plays an important role in producing CAS statements, because it 
determines to what extent the Commission and the Council Secretariat will be involved in 
the negotiations, as well as the amount of time that will be spent on coordination. As 
mentioned at the end of Chapter 9, there is a compromise to be struck between email
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coordination and a physical meeting. The Presidency is responsible for preparing draft 
statements that will accommodate the full spectrum of Member States’ concerns, and 
requires skill and diplomacy. On the one hand the credibility of the Presidency as a neutral 
arbitrator is important for reaching agreements, but on the other hancl an assertive 
Presidency can take the initiative and set the agenda.173 Sweden, Ireland and Luxembourg 
all used their Presidencies to increase the number o f statements made, but relied too on 
like-minded states to support them in their actions.174
The final part of the answer to the question of who is involved in the group that is 
socialised into a coherent identity lies with states outside the EU. Prior to the May 2004 
enlargement, the ten accession states were admitted to the coordination network, albeit at a 
later stage when the preliminary draft of the statement was agreed. Through this the new 
Member States became familiar with the procedures and practices, and the diplomats got 
to know each other. Through this the diplomats learnt about the national interests of other 
EU states and discovered the permissible limits of cooperation, facilitating a smooth 
transition from 15 to 25 states in the Union. The model was described as concentric circles 
around the EU, with Romania and Bulgaria one step outside, the Balkan states in the 
stabilisation and association process (SAP) beyond them, following a hierarchical order 
based on degrees away from membership.175 One issue that was not clear from interviews 
is when non-applicant like-minded states such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Canada 
are informed about the EU statement This point is interesting because it highlights the
173 Interviews: Geneva, 21,22 and 24 June 2005
174 The Swedish Presidency took the initiative to promote CAS cases that were o f concern to the Nordic group to the EU 
group, and had Colombia included. Ms Jacqueline Ancel worked in the ILO department responsible for monitoring 
standards (NORMES) for a number o f years before becoming First Secretary for the Luxembourg mission in Geneva. 
A number of diplomats from other EU Member States were aware o f her previous job and questioned whether it 
influenced the decision o f the Luxembourg Presidency to coordinate six statements. Interviews: Geneva, 21,22 and 24 
June 2005
175 Interviews: Geneva, 21 June 2005. The diplomat interviewed semi-joked that Romania and Bulgaria had no choice but 
to agree to the statement.
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fact that the concentric circle model is about socialisation into the network, while other 
important states that are not interested in joining are contacted at some point by the 
Presidency. Networks beyond the EU (such as IMEC) are important in shaping the wider- 
consensus building function of EU statements.176
it. How does socialisation work?
Socialisation into the Geneva coordination network is based on two pillars. The 
first is a set of shared aims and objectives, and the second is a unique method of achieving 
their objectives based on local (Geneva) autonomy. The aim of the work of the diplomats 
in Geneva has been clearly defined in Brussels, during the July 2003 General Affairs and 
External Affairs Council meeting:
The EU should promote, within the ILO, the reinforcement o f  the effectiveness o f  ILO  
supervision, including better publicity, more effective follow-up and more widespread use o f  the 
findings o f  the ILO supervisory mechanism throughout the international system. The E U  itself 
should take the findings o f  the supervisory mechanism into account more systematically in its 
international relations.
The EU  should promote, inter alia within the ILO, the existing implementation and 
incentive mechanisms and look for ways to strengthen these mechanisms, promoting respect for 
core labour standards and social policy at the country level. (EC-Council, 2003c: IX  §5-6)
While oversight from Brussels, the European Commission liaison office in Geneva and the 
Council Secretariat in Geneva can ensure better lines of communication from the ILO into 
EU policy, these vertical lines of communication between Brussels and Geneva do not 
help create an effective EU policy between UN agencies in Geneva.
176 This is a point raised by Smith in the UN CHR and Lindemann in the UN GA that too much time is spent 
coordinating and more effective networking outside the EU might better promote EU interests. (Lindemann, 1982; 
Smith, 2006c)
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Promoting coordination across UN agencies is where the Geneva coordination 
network demonstrates its unique strengths. The diplomats from the EU Member State 
missions in Geneva have a variety of portfolios that place the ILO in the same dossier as a 
variety of other UN bodies, some stressing the human rights dimension (UN CHR), some 
the social welfare dimension (World Health Organisation) and some with closer links to 
trade (WTO). As more states join the EU, the wider the range of knowledge becomes, 
including the smaller states that have fewer diplomats who cover more UN bodies. 
Therefore every exchange in the coordination network incorporates a broad knowledge of 
the UN system agenda. There is a homontal network across Geneva that the local 
diplomatic staff are uniquely able to provide.
The structure of the diplomatic staff in Geneva is important in shaping the 
socialisation in another way. Each of the members of the network is direcdy accountable to 
their superiors in their national capital In the case of the European Commission liaison 
office it is to DG External Relations in Brussels, and the Council Secretariat to their 
superiors in Brussels too. The network is not as formal as the COREU telex network 
between national capitals, but its strength is that each local diplomat is responsible for his 
or her own contribution, allowing for a considerable amount of individual initiative on the 
ground by the diplomat. In contrast to the layers of diplomatic coordination between the 
permanent mission staff in Brussels, Geneva is much more compact and individual 
diplomats have a lot of room for manoeuvre. The codes of conduct in the email system 
mentioned in Chapter 9 (e.g. the silent procedure and when it is broken) are significant 
because the diplomats appreciate that each one has personal responsibility for ensuring 
their governments are happy about the content. The common situation that all network 
members find themselves in establishes why the normative rules are binding on members, 
because each benefits from them being upheld.
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Hi. What is special about Geneva?
Another way of asking this question is how is Geneva different from Bmssels? It is 
my contention that norm entrepreneurship takes place in the ILO CAS because the 
environment in Geneva permits it, based on the fact that there is more room for individual 
initiatives to be undertaken in Geneva than in Bmssels. In May 2003 the European 
Commission produced a communication entided ‘The EU and the UN: the choice of 
multilateralism, (COM, 2003) and in November 2003 the European Council produced a 
response, based on inputs from the Council’s UN Coordination group (CONUN) in 
Bmssels and a number of contributions from staff in Geneva and New York. (EC-Council, 
2003b) The most important part of the report in relation to norm entrepreneurship is its 
explanation of what sort of coordination takes place in Geneva. The report states that 
‘when time does not permit to arrive at a common position in Bmssels, such positions are 
elaborated in Geneva.’ (EC-Council, 2003b: 22) This statement tells us that Geneva is the 
second-choice location for decision-making, and that in an ideal situation a common 
position would be agreed in Bmssels first. In ‘Bmssels there is usually no preparation of 
EU positions to be taken at ILO meetings but on political issues, common positions are 
elaborated on the basis of Bmssels positions.’ (EC-Council, 2003b: 33) If this is the case, it 
means that the amount of coordination taking place in Geneva is determined by the 
amount of coordination that has (not) taken place in Bmssels. However, the argument I 
am making here is opposed to this, which is that some decisions are better made in Geneva 
than they would be in Brussels, and that the amount of coordination taking place in 
Geneva should be determined independently of what has happened in Bmssels.
The report contains opinions from the CONUN in Bmssels, but also contributions 
from the field, including Council staff working on EU Member State coordination in the
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ILO in Geneva. The report notes two reasons why coordination in Geneva has advantages 
over Brussels based coordination. The first is that the EU needs to reach out to states 
outside the EU in order to build consensus more widely. Despite the claim that ‘there is a 
long tradition of regular contacts at Heads of Mission an expert level, between the EU an 
third countries/regional groups’ (EC-Council, 2003b: 21), the T±U is still too often 
criticised by third parties for being too rigid in its positions and for not sufficiently taking 
into account the views expressed by its partners.’ (EC-Council, 2003b: 24) This can only be 
alleviated by work in Geneva rather than work in Brussels. The second is that the UN 
system is increasingly multidisciplinary and that cooperation takes place between UN 
bodies. CONUN acknowledges that ‘Geneva-based activities are of an increasingly 
crosscutting, interrelating and interdependent nature’ (EC-Council, 2003b: 19) and the 
multi-agency portfolios of the Geneva diplomats makes them best-suited to coordinating 
EU positions that take these linkages into account.
The view from Geneva on EU Member State coordination in the UN system is 
rosier than the one presented in Brussels. Rather than being a back-up plan for dealing 
with failures to coordinate common positions in Brussels, the Geneva staff are positioned 
to carry out important roles. However, the report paints the picture that these roles have 
come about more through adaptation than through conscious design.
E U  activity in Geneva has developed in a pragmatic and ad hoc way out o f  the need to 
exchange information (only 4 Member States are GB (permanent) members and 3 are deputy 
members) and to co-ordinate on labour issues on which there is an internal E U  acquis, and on  
political issues that form part o f  the CFSP (Myanmar, Middle East, Colombia). (EC-Council, 2003b: 
32)
The origins o f the coordination system in Geneva might be ‘pragmatic and ad hod, but the 
way in which it is being used, according to the interviews undertaken and the substantiated 
by the data collected, is purposeful and planned. The coordination network of diplomatic
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staff are uniquely positioned to perform two jobs that cannot be done in Brussels, which 
are cross-agency policy integration and extra-EU coordination and networking. These two 
jobs, and the small circle of socialised diplomats performing them, have allowed norm- 
entrepreneurship to take place through agenda-setting and demonstrating linkages (e.g. UN 
CHR and ILO CAS). The fact that this happened in a political issue area means that 
socialisation in the network is a more important factor than the policy issue. Turning this 
around, the lack of a network between technical experts noted in Chapter 6 is a reason for 
the frequent failure of technical coordination. This shows that the actors (diplomats or 
experts) involved in coordination are more important for determining the outcome than 
the issue area.
3. Five theories considered
In this section the five theories considered as relevant to explaining the behaviour 
of EU Member States in the ILO are considered in order. Evidence that supports or 
refutes the validity of each one is taken from the empirical data and arguments presented in 
this chapter and the previous three.
i. Neofunctional theory
In Chapter 7 a framework for assessing the usefulness of neofunctional theory was 
set out. One of its primary assumptions of neofunctionalism is that integration is a 
dynamic process of closer union over time. The first question posed at the beginning of 
this chapter asked whether there has been any change in the behaviour of the EU Member 
States over the course of the survey. Since 2000 there has been an increase in the 
representation of the EU in the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS), but in
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the plenary and committee meetings surveyed there has been very litde change in 
behaviour. There are two ways of interpreting this; the first is that the development of EPC 
and later CFSP coordination has been very ineffective, with no progress made over 30 
years. The second way it that EPC coordination in the ILO was far more effective during 
the 1970s than is widely assumed (for example compared to the UN General Assembly), 
and that the level of effectiveness has been consistendy high. The other theoretical 
perspectives also address this point. Either way, the expectation o f progress over time has 
not been met. The usefulness of neofunctionalism is therefore limited in the area of 
political coordination.
ii. Intergovernmental theory
The intergovernmental decision-making procedures in both the EPC and CFSP 
have traditionally meant that this is the ‘default’ theory for explaining political cooperation 
between the Member States, or the lack thereof. Its limited use in relation to technical 
issues was to be expected, but its limited use in relation to political issues is a surprise. This 
statement requires substantiating, because there are a number of issue areas that are 
political (especially in the ‘negative’ definition of not technical) that have not been looked at 
in this thesis. The most important of these is the area of the budget, where one of the three 
large Member States (the UK) advocates zero nominal growth while the majority of EU 
Member States takes a position supporting zero real growth.177 This is an example of 
different national interests precluding the possibility of an EU common position being 
taken. The other cases excluded such as the admission of new members or the granting of
177 Zero nominal growth means that each ILO member pays an identical sum o f money each year, with the cumulative 
effect on the ILO o f a budget reduction by the rate o f inflation. Zero real growth means that the biennial dues to the 
organisation increase by the rate o f inflation. The interviewee was not sure what position the 10 new Member States 
would take on the issue. This is a difference between the EU Member States that cuts across all UN bodies since it is 
part of a UK Foreign Office position on UN funding. Interviews: London, 21 September 2004; Geneva, 22 June 2005.
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voting tights to delegations that have not paid ate adopted by 90% or more of the vote and 
there is no split voting between EU Member States. There are also no common EU 
Presidency statements and therefore no evidence of coordination, and inclusion of these 
into the survey would not yield any insight into the coordination mechanism and its 
outputs. In the political issue areas studied, which it has been argued were salient and 
considered across the UN system, there is in all three cases evidence that EU Member 
States altered their behaviour due to EPC or CFSP coordination.
The 1970s coordination over situation concerning Arab workers worked very well, 
keeping the clear differences between Member States outside the ILO, through the 
common agreement that the UN General Assembly was the appropriate discussion forum. 
The participation of the PLO is a case of divided national interests preventing a common 
position being sought, which is the return of the logic of diversity. As I argued above, this 
record vote demonstrated that the Arab-Israeli issue was highly divisive (as the literature on 
EU Member State coordination in the UN in the 1970s concurs) and emphasises the 
impact of EPC on the other five statements and three cohesive votes between 1973 and 
1980.
The 1980s coordination through the EPC and the annual report to the committee 
on Apartheid in South Africa was another case where the behaviour predicted by 
intergovernmental theory does not match the observed behaviour. The practice of 
submitting a joint report, and the Presidency statements defending them were maintained 
throughout the lifetime of the reporting process, from 1981 to 1992. This was despite the 
fact that the Member States were deeply divided among themselves, as seen in the national 
reports submitted by Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland, the 1987 record vote and the 
increased tendency of Member States to speak in committee alongside the Presidency. In
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the face of such extreme differences, intergovernmental theory would predict the 
disintegration the EPC coordination. The fact that it did not, as noted by Nuttall, leads us 
to reject the intergovernmental assumption that EPC policies were lowest common 
denominator and survived only as long as the Member States did not walk away.
The final case of EU statements in the CAS did have a couple of pieces of 
evidence in support of this approach. The Spanish blocking of a common statement on 
Colombia showed the defence of a national interest, and the generally high thresholds for 
action is also a sign that there was resistance to expanding the acquis politique too rapidly. 
However, the evidence also showed how as the number of Member States grew, so too did 
the number of outputs, something that cannot be explained easily within the 
intergovernmental framework. In all three periods we have found evidence of political 
coordination having an effect on EU Member State behaviour, and the detailed case 
studies supported the original statistical evidence of an association between common 
representation and voting cohesion.
Hi. Liberal Intergovernmental theory
To what extent are the intergovernmental agreements on common representation 
and voting cohesion in political issues in the ILO based on mutually acceptable outcomes 
for the big three states? Has this always been the case? If so, how do states agree to adhere 
to the agreements without an institutional lock-in? Turning first to the question o f the 
influence of the big three, it was shown most clearly in the case study on apartheid in 
South Africa where Germany and the UK remained strongly committed to the common 
representation through the Code of Conduct, even after French support lessened. In the 
CAS Germany and the UK were also very influential in shaping common representation
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for three reasons. Firstly, Germany and the UK were the first and the second most active 
EU Member States in the CAS over the course of the survey respectively. Secondly, the 
two Member States were instrumental in starting the practice of issuing joint statements in 
the 1997 ILC and thereafter. Finally, the UK’s change of government in May 1997 led to 
an immediate change in UK policy in the CAS to one of active engagement, which swung 
the balance of power within the big three behind Anglo-German support for strong 
participation in CAS. Finding evidence from the 1970s to support the argument is more 
difficult. The 1975 vote concerning the admittance of the PLO into the annual conference 
as an observer divided Germany (against admittance) from France and the UK (for 
admittance, pursued by abstaining and thus preventing the blocking motion from gaining 
quorum). However, no statement was made and thus the issue was not subject to a 
common position.
The major difficulty in applying the LI approach is to note the impact made by the 
treaties. Although the SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties all contained changes 
to the decision-making processes in EPC and CFSP, there is insufficient data to pinpoint 
change in relation to these treaties, to show either their positive impact or their lack of 
impact. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 7, LI is not able to explain adherence to an 
intergovernmental agreement without impartial regulatory mechanisms. This was where the 
institutional logic of appropriateness filled in the gaps left by following a rational choice 
logic of consequences.
iv. Consodational theory
Consociational theory is based on a duality between integration into the 
Community and the national identities of the Member States, and their continuous
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development in parallel while seemingly antagonistic to the other. In Chapter 2 the 
prediction was made that technical issues would constitute the Community element of 
integration and political issues would reiterate the differences in national identity of the EU 
Member States. In this way, consociational theory would span both halves of the thesis, 
however it became apparent that the logics of integration and diversity coincide in 
technical issues and that the consociational theory was able to explain this very well. The 
following question therefore arises: can consociational theory explain political coordination 
as well, and if so, does it also contain elements of integration and diversity?
The answer is ‘yes’, if one accepts that intergovernmental theory explains some 
areas where there is no political coordination but not others, and where it falls down the 
institutional explanation of a common identity forged by diplomats working together helps 
to fill in the blanks. Groups holding the majority position inside the Union refrain from 
acting against the basic interests of the minority groups, knowing that in the long-run 
positions will be reversed. The socialisation of diplomats is part o f the larger picture of a 
European elite needed to maintain the overall equilibrium in the system.
In many ways this is similar to the answer given in Chapter 6, where national 
identities are bolstered through occasional voting deviation based on national interests or 
ideological concerns. One of the strengths of consociational theory previously raised was 
that it identified the Presidency as an important actor in the EU, and situated it between 
the two poles of European Community and Member States. Once again, in the political 
coordination the Presidency plays an important role in preparing draft statements and 
chairing coordination meetings between the Member States. Overall, through the lens of 
consociational theory what we see is that technical and political issues are similar, insofar as 
there is EU Member State coordination leading to representation and voting cohesion, and
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there are also times when the Member States act independently. This reflects the 
conclusion delivered by consociational theory, which is that European integration is not a 
zero-sum equation that takes sovereignty away from the Member States, but pools it in 
new ways. This means that despite 50 years of integration they retain their national 
identities and sometimes decide to pursue their national interests alone.
v. Institutional theoiy
The work of Finnemore and Sikkink on norm entrepreneurship has been shown to 
be very useful when explaining the common statements issued by the EU Presidency in the 
CAS, both how it originated and how it continued to work after the enlargement of the 
EU. As was discussed earlier, the model is based on following the logic of appropriateness, 
where actors learn the norms of acceptable behaviour in a social group, and evidence 
discovered in the empirical research of this thesis provides a clear case study of norm 
entrepreneurship in operation, and of Europeanization according to the logic of 
appropriateness taking place. Chapter 9 presented data showing which CAS cases were 
selected, what measures had been taken in the ILO and what CFSP Common Positions 
already existed. The virtual (email) coordination network was explained and the norms of 
operation described. In this chapter the explanation went one stage further, exploring the 
processes of socialisation and how they led to norm entrepreneurship in the unique policy­
making environment of Geneva. How these statements started being made, how they have 
grown in number and how the enlargement of the EU has not effected their production 
can be explained by looking at the norms of the coordination institution in Geneva.
To what extent are the socialised networks in Geneva a new phenomenon, or have 
diplomats worked closely on CFSP and EPC coordination in the past? The two cases
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studies on the Arab-Istaeli dispute and apartheid in South Africa presented empirical 
evidence supporting the existence of a socialised group of EPC officials in the 1970s and 
1980s. Secondary literature by Simon Nuttall and Philippe de Schoutheete, both o f who 
worked in EPC and give an insider’s view on the process, (de Schoutheete, 1987; Nuttall, 
1992) Simon Nuttall focuses on the role of individuals making policy and how socialisation 
works in practice during the informal years of EPC (1970-1986), describing political co­
operation as ‘a private club, operated by diplomats, for diplomats’. (Nuttall, 1992: 11) In 
contrast to the assumption that intergovernmental meetings inevitably leads to lowest 
common denominator outcomes, ‘median lines’ were the policy outputs. Philippe de 
Schoutheete agrees saying that ‘the embarrassment of being singled out’ was too great for 
states to derail decisions, (de Schoutheete, 1987 p.65)
Michael E. Smith’s detailed investigation into EPC institutionalisation devised a 
four-stage process of socialisation, from (1) informal customs, to (2) explict norms, to (3) 
rules (found in EPC reports), and finally (4) formal laws. (Smith, 2004: 117) The earliest 
example of a fourth stage formal law was the ‘treaty status’ EPC was given in 1986 with the 
SEA. (Smith, 2004: 120) Thus prior to 1986 the customs, norms and rules of EPC were 
being developed, in the same time period as the survey. This evidence fits the final part of 
the puzzle, which is how did the EU Member States uphold the intergovernmental 
agreements of foreign policy coordination. A logic of appropriate action was in 
development, fitting Tonra’s description cited in Chapter 2, where a transformation took 
place ‘in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which 
professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms 
and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy-making.’ 
(Tonra, 2000: 229)
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4. Summary
The objective of the last four chapters has been to look for evidence of a change in 
behaviour of the EU Member States in the ILO in political coordination, and whether that 
change in behaviour amounts to closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged on other grounds, such as inter alia a common foreign policy or a common 
European identity. The answer is that there has been a change in behaviour, but it is more 
significant for its change in direction of coordinated policy, rather than its frequency or 
intensity. There is evidence of foreign policy coordination in the conference plenary and 
from the mid 1970s onwards, and the research has found that the EU Member States are 
doing more political coordination in the Committee on the Application of Standards. The 
exogenous influence of the ILC agenda must also be taken into account, which during the 
1980s held annual committee meetings to discuss the actions of ILO members in their 
relations with the government of South Africa. No comparable meetings were held for 
other issues, and the EU Member States’ common representation there cannot be 
compared to other cases. Furthermore, the scope of issues being discussed has not 
changed significantly and most notably the ILO budget and finance remains beyond the 
scope of an EU common position. The list of non-technical issues that nonetheless are not 
the subject of political coordination has remained the same, with the exception of the CAS 
statements.
Considering the evidence leads to the conclusion that there has been litde change 
over the survey in the level of political coordination. The question is whether the level of 
coordination was high to begin with and remained significant, or whether the level was 
initially low and has remained low. The theoretical frameworks used to assess the 
performance of the EU Member States influence the answer one gives. Intergovernmental
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theory stresses that the EU Member States will not be bound by EPC or CFSP common 
positions when they are opposed to their national interests, and this is corroborated by the 
data on common representation and cohesive voting. The strong association between the 
two can be interpreted as meaning where no common interests existed, no attempt at 
producing common statements was made.178
Consociational theory stresses the need for equilibrium between the Community 
and the Member States, and thus finding areas of coordination and non-coordination 
existing simultaneously is consistent with the theory, as is the relative stability over time of 
the equilibrium position. However, the successful application of the theory requires a 
European elite to agree on the importance of maintaining the EU over the long term.
One crucial question needing answering is why do EU Member States adhere to 
the intergovernmental bargains struck in the absence of a regulatory authority? We turned 
to institutional theory, and in particular the application of sociological institutionalism (the 
logic of appropriateness) to explain EU Member State behaviour. With a combination of 
new research and secondary literature the institutional explanation for coordination appears 
to be applicable to all the case studies. The close network of diplomats working together, 
as was the case in the EPC and is the case in Geneva today, and their personal loyalty to 
the group, effects their actions so as to strike a balance between national interests and 
group interests. The institutional answer to the question of effectiveness is that the system 
worked well from the beginning, and continued to do so as the size of the EU increased, 
most significandy in 2004. It should be reiterated, however, that the level of action
178 This is an example o f the logic of diversity in action, although Karen E. Smith found evidence o f common statements 
being substitutes for voting cohesion in her study o f EU Member States in the UNCHR, where the statement serves as 
an explanation. (Smith, 2006a: 157)
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achieved in the CAS is still low, and the example of forced labour in Myanmar that 
triggered the first EU common statement was the most severe case ever considered in the 
ILO. There remains a high threshold for common statements, testimony to the different 
national interests within the 25 Member States.
303/381
C h a p t e r  11,
CONCLUSION
In this final chapter we return to the four questions set out at the beginning of the 
thesis. They were:
• Have the European Union Member States changed their behaviour over the period 
of study (1973-2005) in order to have a common representation of the EU in the 
ILO?
• Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged in the Community pillar, despite the absence of European Community 
membership of the ILO?
• Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being 
forged on other grounds, such as inter alia a common foreign policy or a common 
European identity?
• Based on this, which theory tells us most about the behaviour of EU Member 
States and the role of EU institutions within the ILO?
In order to do this we will summarise the findings of the eight empirical chapters using the 
framework set out in Chapter 2, which identified four primary ‘threads’ running through 
the work. They were: (1) the Member States and the Community; (2) the institutions; (3) 
technical and political issues; (4) elites and diplomats.
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1. The Member States and the Community
i. Change in behaviour of Member States
There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence gathered 
concerning the coordination of EU Member States and the representation of the European 
Community in the ILO. The first conclusion is that there has been a change in the 
behaviour of Member States during the course of the survey observed in both technical 
and political issues. However it has not been linear in its direction or consistent over time. 
EU Member State representation in technical committees rose during the first three 
periods of the survey (1973-1992 inclusive) and then fell afterwards. The nature of the 
decline depends on whether we look at the frequency or intensity of representation, as was 
measured in Chapter 4. However, both indices show that the level of EU representation in 
the ILC between 1998 and 2005 was very similar to the levels between 1973 and 1980. 
Voting cohesion on technical issues tells the same story, with Period 1 (1973-1980) and 
Period 5 (1998-2005) being very similar and the level of cohesion fluctuated during the 
years in between. In political issues there was litde change in behaviour during the EPC 
period (1973-1992), where both the Arab-Israeli and South African case studies showed 
that the process of coordination worked to produce a common position. The case study in 
Chapter 9 looking at the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) did show an 
increase over time in the level of EU representation, measured in common statements. 
However, the common representation in the CAS took place instead of major coordination 
in other political items on the agenda.
Observing whether any change in EU Member State behaviour takes place over 
time and noting its direction tells us which of the theories being tested are supported by
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the evidence. Intergovernmental theory predicts that EU membership will not change 
behaviour over time because the Member States remain bound by the logic of diversity and 
the pursuit of national interests. Alternatively, neofunctional theory predicts integration 
over time leading to an ever closer union, in which we would expect to see more common 
representation and more cohesive voting. Neither prediction matches the observed 
behaviour during the survey, although both consociational theory and liberal 
intergovernmental theory can incorporate the patterns of behaviour identified most easily. 
Consociational theory’s concern for an equilibrium position between integration and 
diversity is supported by the variation in the level of representation and voting cohesion 
that appears to oscillate around a constant level. The observation that the levels of 
representation and voting cohesion changes in relation to alterations to the treaties of the 
Community supports a liberal intergovernmental explanation of EU integration. The 
development of an EU position in the CAS is predicted by institutional approaches that 
focus on the role of diplomats and bureaucrats being socialised into the EPC and CFSP 
decision-making apparatus.
ii. Large and small Member States
The second conclusion is that large Member States behave differently to small 
Member States, and therefore general statements about behaviour need to take into 
account this difference. EU Member States belong in a hierarchical order in which France, 
Germany and the UK are more assertive than small Member States in their pursuit of 
national interests when in conflict with European interests. The evidence for this is found 
in both technical and political issue areas. In the technical issues national interests played an 
important role in shaping voting preferences, with consequential effects on voting 
cohesion. The basic point that big and small states behave differently has important
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implications for theoretical modelling and for explaining empirical data on technical 
coordination. On a theoretical level these findings once again cast doubt on both 
neofunctional and intergovernmental explanations for Member State behaviour. On the 
one hand, the institutional framework built through European integration does not bind all 
states into a supranational union as predicted by a logic of integration. On the other hand, 
not all EU Member States are equally likely to assert their sovereign autonomy, as predicted 
by the logic of diversity. The hierarchical position of a Member State inside the EU 
determines how likely it is to pursue its national interests, as well as how capable it is of 
using EU policies as vehicles for national interests (as the Code of Conduct was for 
Germany and the UK, and to a lesser extent France too). EU institutions are not equally 
binding on all Member States, contra both neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism, 
and leaves the liberal intergovernmental position as a credible explanation.
Why has neither integration nor enlargement significantly altered the level of 
representation or voting cohesion? The importance of a hierarchy among EU Member 
States helps to explain why the empirical evidence shows fairly constant levels of 
representation and voting cohesion over the length of the survey, which contradicts the 
logic of integration bringing Member States together, as well as the logic of diversity 
brought about by an enlargement from 9 to 25 Member States. The major source of voting 
deviation in technical issues comes from the UK and France, and they have been members 
of the EU since the beginning of the survey in 1973. Furthermore, of the 16 new Member 
States to have joined since 1973, only Portugal has deviated in its voting on technical issues 
(and only once unaccompanied by one of the ‘big-three’). In the field of technical 
coordination voting cohesion has been kept constant because the UK, France, and to a 
lesser extent Germany have been willing to act in pursuit of their national interests.
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In political issues the three large Member States remain important, but act to 
maintain cohesion rather than reduce it. In the case study on ILO monitoring of economic 
links with South Africa during the apartheid regime, EPC coordination produced a single 
report and Presidency statements defending their joint submission. It was shown that 
Germany and the UK favoured this policy, while small Member States like Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Ireland challenged the common EPC position through the submission of 
additional reports, but did not break the cohesion of EPC activities. Strong support for 
EPC cohesion backed by two of the *big three’ (and France was also a supporter of the 
South African government in the 1984 state visit by President Botha) ensured that it was 
maintained. The three loudest dissenting voices from small Member States did not 
withdraw from the EU common position. One can also see the same effect in the norm 
entrepreneurship from Germany and the UK in creating EU common positions in the 
CAS, where the concerted efforts of both countries, along with a group of like-minded 
small states drafted common statements in 1997, 1998 and 1999 before the 2000 EU 
Presidency statement. Interviews identified Germany and the UK as important members 
of the Geneva diplomatic coordination network favouring EU common statements.
iii. European Community membership
Finally, the third conclusion in this section concerns the role of the European 
Community (EC) in the ILO. There has been no significant change in the legal position of 
the EC, and it remains an observer although the 1981 Governing Body did grant additional 
rights to regional organisations in technical committee meetings. There has been no 
progress on amending the ILO Constitution to allow the EC to accede to the organisation, 
and the workers’ and employers’ groups have stressed the importance of national tripartite
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coordination in accordance to the convention concerning tripartite consultation. (Cl44).179 
Workers and employers used their membership of the European Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) to criticise the proposals from the Commission to strengthen the role of 
the Council in coordinating EC positions in the ILO. (ESC, 1995) A further blow to the 
aspirations of the Commission came in the ECJ Opinion 2/91 that established the need 
for the Member States to coordinate and represent the Community collectively, while 
firmly reiterating that the Member States are the members of the ILO. (ECJ, 1993)
What has been the impact of the EC Community on the representation and voting 
cohesion of the Member States? The level of representation peaked during the 1980s 
(Periods 2 and 3) and while attributed to the SEA and changes brought about by it, the 
ILC agenda during these periods was shown to be highly conductive to intense 
representation. However in other areas (especially those where Council decision-making 
remains unanimous under Article 137) there has been very little common representation, 
such as social security reform, or migrant workers. Overall, the Member States have 
adapted to represent the European Community as they deemed it necessary, and although 
they speak in many technical committees as one, there is no evidence to show that the 
levels reached in Periods 2 and 3 will be returned to while relying exclusively on the 
Presidency to speak for the Member States.
Although the European Community has expanded its competencies over the 
course of the survey, the assumption that it would supersede the Member States has not
179 The Commission proposals are set out in Proposal for a Council decision on the exercise of the Community's external competence 
at International Labour Conferences in cases falling within the joint competence of the Community and its Member States. (EC, 1994) 
C144 sets out to ensure that tripartite ‘consultations on government replies to questionnaires concerning items on the 
agenda o f the International Labour Conference and government comments on proposed texts to be discussed by the 
Conference’ (Article 5, §la o f Cl 44) Council coordination o f replies to the ILO Secretariat would be seen as a violation 
of the national tripartite consultation process.
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transpired. The ‘closer union’ between Member States remains selectively engaged in, 
limited by external variables and determined by Member States’ interests. Community 
membership of the ILO is no nearer a reality than at the start of the survey.
2. The Institutions
i. The European Commission
The European Commission’s role in representing the EU Member States in the 
ILC has diminished during the course of the survey. Far from being the sole representative 
of a Community membership in the ILO that was envisaged by the European Parliament 
in the late 1970s (EP, 1977a), the role of the Commission has been in decline since the 
early 1990s. The traits of decline are twofold; the first is it the number of interventions 
made in the ILC, and its lack of visibility (only one intervention since 1993).180 The second 
is in the way the Commission has become an assistant to the Presidency, and the level of 
assistance given is at the discretion of the Presidency. The level of Commission assistance 
varies according to Presidency, and this has led some Member States to regard particular 
Presidencies as being ‘too close’ to the Commission, while others have sought to keep the 
intrusion from the Commission to a minimum.181 In the field of political coordination, the 
Commission also plays a role, as seen in the virtual coordination network.
iso Over the last five years the Commission has taken an active role in participating in the ILO’s research work on the 
Social Dimension on Globalisation on behalf of the European Community. The ILO has a Working Party on the Social 
Dimension on Globalisation attached to its Governing Body that meets twice a year, and the European Commission 
has participated regularly since it began in November 2000. Interview; Brussels, 21 November 2005 (ILO, 2000j) 
During the consultation period during 2003-2004 when the ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension on Globalisation 
(WCSDG) gathered material for its report, the Commission held a two-day working group meeting in Brussels for the 
World Commission members on the European Model of Society. (3-4 February 2003)
181 Interviews: Geneva, 21 & 22 June 2005
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it. The Presidency
The Presidency has a very important role to play in representing the EU Member 
States in the ILO, and is the central component in the customised system of representation 
that copes with the unique circumstances of devolved competency and no Community 
membership. The Presidency speaks for the EU Member States in the political areas 
coordinated through the EPC/CFSP where one would expect it to act, and also in the 
Community pillar where one would expect to see a Commission official. Consociational 
theory’s concern for balancing the drive for integration with those of diversity result in a 
synthesis, and the position of the Presidency is also a synthesis between the two poles, on 
the one hand representing the Community and its institutions while on the other hand 
remaining a Member State and having its own prerogative on the direction it would like its 
semester to go.
Hi. The European Court of Justice
The ECJ has played a major role since its Opinion in 2/91 established the limits of 
Commission involvement in the negotiation of EU representation in the ILO. The 
Opinion reiterated the fact that the Member States were the members of the ILO, and this 
led to the re-establishment of the Presidency as the sole communicator of EU 
representation after a number of years of Commission co-representation in the field of 
occupational health and safety. This can be seen in the sudden demise of the Commission 
after 1993, although the Commission staff in Geneva continue to provide logistical support 
for the Presidency staff while working there. The impact of the ECJ Opinion is also highly 
insightful in terms of explaining the behaviour of the Member States. While the outcome 
of the Opinion has been strengthening of the Member States’ position at the expense of
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the Commission, this does not straightforwardly conform to an intergovernmental reading 
of the situation. Instead, a Community institution has been used to affirm the primacy of 
the Member States, and this has not been subsequently challenged, even though from the 
Opinion it is clear that the Member States were divided among themselves over the issue 
of Community competency. The decision by the ECJ serves as the ‘institutional choice’ 
found in the third stage of liberal intergovernmental theory, where the bargain between 
Member States is guaranteed by an independent supranational agency. Although this did 
not result out of a treaty negotiation, the consultation of the ECJ and the binding nature of 
its decision illustrate the willingness of Member States to adhere to supranational authority.
iv. The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee
These two institutions have had little direct impact on EU-ILO relations, although 
over the course of the survey they have been at times supportive of the Community’s 
potential membership of the ILO, and at other times critical of the Commission’s attempts 
to organise Community representation. The support is most obvious during the 1970s and 
1980s when the European Parliament published a number of reports favouring EC 
membership of the ILO and more coordinated action by EU Member States, including the 
ratification of conventions. However, the Council was not obliged to take note of their 
concerns and did not permit the Commission to keep up its monitoring of ratifications 
after 1975. (EC, 1975; EP, 1977a; EP, 1984; EP, 1986) As will be discussed in more detail 
below, the ESC shares a number of members with the ILO, including its Governing Body. 
This means that it is both very supportive of the work of the ILO, yet also very concerned 
about the possibility of national workers’ and employers’ becoming marginalised in the 
consultation process.
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3. Technical and Political Issues
i. Technical
The division of the ILC agenda into technical and political areas was intended to 
sort issues into those which are coordinated through the European Community pillar 
(including in Brussels the Working party on Social Questions) and those coordinated 
through the EPC and CFSP (Pillar 2). The working assumption of the thesis was that 
evidence would be found of a positive correlation between representation and voting 
cohesion between the EU Member States in technical issues. This was based on the 
predictions of both neofunctional and liberal intergovernmental theory, which although 
not sharing the same assumptions about the motor of integration, agree that cooperation 
can take place in low salience technical issues between nation states. The empirical 
evidence gathered found the opposite to be the case, and that no statistically significant 
association exists between common representation and voting cohesion over the 
aggregation of the 33-year survey.
Two broad reasons for this where identified. The first was a structural reason in the 
EU, which was that the dynamic processes of spillover, log-rolling and side payments that 
according to neofimctional theory drive the European integration through the linking of 
issue areas, does not take place in the ILC. The national experts that arrive in Geneva to 
represent the Member States are from national governments and often do not have direct 
experience of EU negotiations. Furthermore, they have narrow negotiating mandates that 
can make it difficult to agree EU positions, as well as having rival coordination groups such 
as IMEC, Nordic or linguistic networks (e.g. Spain and Latin America). Thus the model of 
integration based on an expanding agenda of issue-areas does not match the reality of
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compartmentalised coordination in the ILC. It was shown how issues such as occupational 
health and safety and working conditions that meet regularly achieve higher levels of 
representation and voting cohesion. These examples were presented as evidence of how 
established networks of negotiations could become able to agree common EU positions 
when they were socialised into the culture of EU negotiations.
The second reason why technical coordination does not lead to the high levels of 
common representation and voting cohesion expected was because EU Member State 
national interests still play an important role in shaping voting behaviour. Two 
circumstances were identified when this factor plays an important role. The first was when 
a Member State wishes to position itself as ideologically opposed to the instrument, most 
frequently as being in favour of market liberalisation (and against regulation). By voting 
against the adoption of an instrument onto the ILO statute they do not alter their 
obligations to the ILO in terms of ratifying the instrument (which remain non-obligatory), 
but do signal their national position vis-a-vis the content. Given that the over 96% of the 
votes cast by EU Member States during the survey were for the adoption of technical 
instruments, the four per-cent of votes cast as either abstentions or against an instrument 
represent a positioning of the Member State outside of the EU consensus position. 
Consociational theory was used to explain this behaviour as a Member State seeking to 
maintain the separate identity of the Member States (the ‘segments’) from the Community, 
while institutional theory considered it as evidence of a continued misfit between EU-level 
and national policy preferences (which may remain unaltered without socialisation) even 
once adaptation has occurred.
The other way in which national interests influenced voting on technical issues was 
through using the technical record vote as a protest against an issue elsewhere on the ILC
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agenda. Under these circumstances the vote does not reflect on the national interest vis-a- 
vis the content of the instrument, and technical issue becomes politicised. The registering 
of political protest through the record vote on a technical instrument has virtually no 
chance of leading to the instrument failing to be adopted, since the level of consensus is 
usually high enough to carry all instruments through.182 Thus the inertia of the organisation 
adopting technical instruments means they can be used to vent protest against the ILO 
without actually damaging the effectiveness of the organisation (which would be counter­
productive to governments).
it. Political
In contrast to the results found in the area of technical coordination, political 
coordination was found to lead to a correlation between representation and voting 
cohesion. The small size o f the data set meant that the findings were possibly inaccurate, so 
a number of explanations for why the results had turned out the way they had were 
considered. These were that the causal link between representation and voting cohesion 
ran in the opposite direction, and that the political issues chosen were uncontroversiaL 
Through two case studies and reference to the existing literature in the field it was argued 
that the statistically significant association found was valid, despite the small sample of 
data.
Theories were then applied to explain the phenomenon observed, through which it 
was found that the institutional approach to understanding EPC and CFSP was most 
applicable. The area in which the most interesting results came was in the application of
182 The one exception out o f 102 recotd votes in the survey was the convention concerning the fishing sector (2005) that 
failed to be adopted.
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sociological approach within the institutional theory literature to the Geneva coordination 
network of EU Member State diplomats in their drafting of statements for the Committee 
on the Application of Standards (CAS) (described in detail below). Despite this it was 
shown that an intergovernmental element remained, seen most clearly in the high threshold 
for collective action.
4. Elites and diplomats
i. Elites
The role of European elites are important in two of the theories tested in the 
thesis, neofunctionalism and consociational theory, although they make very different 
predictions about whether pan-European elites support the integration project. According 
to neofunctional theory national elites, such as those in the workers’ and employers’ 
organisations, will re-orientate their focus of influencing decision-making taking place at 
the European level. This is because they recognise the institutional authority held at the 
supranational level and seek to have their interests represented there. During this process, a 
trans-European elite develops interests at the European level. Consociational theory 
recognises business leaders and trade unionists as members of the European elite, but 
argues that their position (like all members of the elite) is dependent on them representing 
national constituencies. Instead of accelerating the process of integration, consociational 
theory sees the workers’ and employers’ groups as part of the institutional framework 
preserving the diversity of the segments.
This research identified two institutions in which the pan-European workers’ and 
employers’ elites influence EU-ILO relations. The first is in Economic and Social
316/381
Committee (ESC) noted above, and the other is through the tripartite structure of the ILO. 
What is interesting is that both institutions have a number of individuals serving in both 
capacities, including Ms Ursula Engelen Kefer and Ms Renate Homung-Draus, who serve 
as the respective German workers’ and employers’ representatives on the ILO Governing 
Body as well as on the ESC. (ILO, 2005f) A former French workers’ representative on the 
Governing Body, M. Briesch, served as the chairman of the ESC from 2003 to 2005 and 
was the first chairperson of the ESC to be invited to speak to address the ILC plenary.183 
The ESC has always been hostile to the idea that the Commission should orchestrate closer 
cooperation between the EU Member States through the Council (such as the submission 
of common replies) which it sees as cutting national tripartite consultation out of the 
circuit. Inside the ILO the repeated concerns of the workers’ and employers’ delegates in 
the CEACR on the status of European ratifications was based on a concern for the 
expansion of European level decision-making at the exclusion of national elites. (ILO, 
1983g; ILO, 1984i; ILO, 1993g; ILO, 1994d) To this end, consociational theory appears to 
be far more applicable in the case study of tripartite support for the EU integration that 
neofunctionalism.
ii. Diplomats
Diplomats are the other group to be considered in the thesis in relation to the 
question of what role individuals play in the coordination process. Given the fact that the 
legal structure of the ILO prevents the EC being a member, the success of the EC in 
establishing a de facto working method requires agents to ‘work around the problem’.
183 The invitation was made by Lord Brett, who served as President o f the ILC in 2003 and is a personal friend o f M. 
Briesch. In return Lord Brett was invited to give evidence to the ESC in their heating in preparation for an own- 
initiative report on the ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension on Globalisation and the Commission response, 
COM (2004) 383 Final The Social Dimension of Globalisation - the EU's policy contribution on extending the benefits to all 
Interview: London, 5 July 2004.
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The evidence presented in Chapters 9 and 10 argued that the development of EU 
common statements in the CAS was the product a logic of appropriateness by Geneva- 
based diplomats. It was argued that the environment in which they work, with its local 
network of ILO dossier holders covering a wide range of other UN bodies in Geneva is a 
unique decision-making system. The virtual coordination network with its norms of 
behaviour and rules of conduct socialises diplomats into the system, either newly arrived 
from outside Geneva on rotation to the post, or accession states joining the EU. Through 
the application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, it was argued that the EU Presidency 
statements in the CAS came about through a process of norm entrepreneurship by a 
number of diplomats from Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic states and the UK.
The success of the coordination in political issue areas was attributed to the 
network of staff, their working relationship and familiarity with each other. This was 
argued to be the case in Geneva in relation to CAS, where archival evidence and interviews 
covered the necessary six-year time period. However, this finding is in keeping with the 
work done on EPC coordination in the 1980s by Simon Nuttall and Philippe de 
Schoutheete. Michael E. Smith’s work has added an extra dimension by showing how the 
group developed its ideas and changed over time, thus giving it a dynamic quality which 
critics argued the earlier literature by practitioners lacked. In this thesis, in the case o f CAS, 
I have shown how the process began (through the development of a critical mass of norm- 
supporting diplomats) and how it cascaded through the EU Geneva coordination network, 
to the point where it has been internalised as part of the acquis politique. Furthermore, 
contrasting political coordination with technical coordination highlights the lack of 
socialisation between technical experts on their fortnightly secondment from their national 
capitals to Geneva.
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5. Summary
Have the European Union Member States changed their behaviour over the period of study 
(1973-2005) in order to have a common representation of the EU  in the ILO?
Assessing the change in behaviour must be done both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. There has been an increase in the number of common representation 
statements made in both technical and political agenda items in the ILO during the course 
of the survey, although separate assessments should be made for each. In technical issues 
the increase in the intensity of EU common representation in some areas (such as OSH) is 
sporadic across the survey, and there are issue areas where no significant change in 
behaviour has occurred, principally those set out in the TEC Article 137 as being decided 
by unanimity in the Council. The frequency with which the EU is represented in technical 
committees has increased, although this includes occasions when the Presidency only 
makes opening and closing remarks. Overall, common representation in technical areas 
remains inconsistent in terms of intensity and frequency, and is dependent on issue area, 
the ILO agenda, the Presidency, as well as the national interests of the EU Member States.
In political issues there has been a change in behaviour, but it has been a change in 
direction of coordinated policy, rather than its frequency or intensity. There is evidence of 
foreign policy coordination in die conference plenary and from the mid 1970s onwards, 
which has continued since. From the empirical evidence gathered the difference between 
the EPC and CFSP periods is small, as is the difference over time. I conclude that the EPC 
was particularly successful during its early years because the EU Member States had plenty 
of time to agree a common position that was acceptable to all, in this example not to 
discuss the Arab-Israeli issue in the ILO. The nature o f the position did not require
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changing over time once agreed. In contrast the CFSP has not substantially built on what 
EPC achieved, with no EU common positions on the important question of the ILO’s 
budget. The only recent sustained action is in the Committee on the Application of 
Standards (CAS), but it has been slow and requires a high threshold for collective action. 
This leads to the conclusion that the CFSP has underperformed when compared to the 
promising start made by EPC.
The qualitative changes in Member State behaviour are limited in scope; the 
European Community has not become a member of the ILO, and the increased role of 
European Commission staff in representing the Member States was stopped for a decade 
after the ECJ Opinion of 1993. The Presidency continues to speak for the EU Member 
States, as was the case in 1973, and both the IMEC and Nordic groups continue to feature 
prominendy as alternative coordination forums in the place of the EU.
In Chapter 1 the question was asked whether the EU Member States have incurred 
costs by coordinating, and possible examples of costs included a diminished influence in 
networks beyond the EU such as IMEC because of ‘navel gazing’. There has been litde 
substantive change in the nature of EU Member State coordination over the course of the 
survey, and the Member States have not made any considerable sacrifices in the way they 
operate as a result of EU coordination. This leads to the second related question, of 
whether the EU Member States adopted a new style of multilateralism. The answer is no, 
and that in the ILO they continue to operate according to the logic of 
intergovemmentalism, rather than supranationalism.
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Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being forged in the 
Community pillar, despite the absence of a European Community membership of the ILO ?
The thesis began by making an assumption that technical issues corresponded to 
Community pillar policies. The traditional label of these policies as low  politics’ proved to 
be misleading because not all technical issues have equal salience to all EU Member States. 
Evidence was found of varying degrees of common representation and voting cohesion in 
different technical issues. Technical issues in which there is a high degree of coordination 
have been Europeanized through mechanisms described by the logic of appropriateness. 
Technical issues where there is less coordination and instances of voting deviation have 
been Europeanized through the mechanisms of the logic of consequences. This logic, 
based on power and not normative socialisation, leaves some Member States unconvinced 
of the EU-level policy and they instead seek to upload their preferred national policy into 
an ILO standard.
Overall, the two most useful theories considered were liberal intergovernmental 
and consociational theory. In support of the former was the noticeable impact of the Single 
European Act (SEA) on improving coordination, the continued preservation of national 
interests and the impact of the ECJ Opinion 2/91. In support o f the latter were the 
fluctuations around an equilibrium level of common representation over the length of the 
survey and the identification of the important role of the Presidency.
Can evidence be found of closer coordination between the Member States being forged on other 
grounds, such as inter alia a common foreign polity or a common European identity?
The intergovernmental character of foreign policy coordination between the EU 
Member States is traditionally assumed to make arriving at a common position difficult.
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The evidence provided by this thesis challenges this assumption, instead showing a strong 
commitment by EU Member States to maintaining a common position on issues of foreign 
policy. Statistical evidence about the strong association between common representation 
and voting cohesion was backed up by case studies.
One of the three case studies looked at the Arab-Israeli dispute as it has been 
addressed in the ILO, and the common position of the EU Member States has been 
grounded in preserving the functional mandate of the ILO and insisting that discussion of 
the issue belongs in the General Assembly and the Security Council. This was a minimalist 
position, an agreement to express their disagreements elsewhere in the UN.
In the case of South Africa the common position repeated asserted the right of the 
EU Member States to submit a single report based on the Council monitored Code of 
Conduct. This case exemplifies the intersecting multilateralisms discussed in Chapter 1, 
where the EU’s supranational structure conflicted with the intergovernmental procedures 
for states in the ILO. The EU upheld its position, although the support of Germany and 
the UK was critical, and non-supportive Member States (Denmark, Ireland and the 
Netherlands) submitted supplementary national reports.
Finally, in the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) it was shown that 
a group of EU Member States acted as norm entrepreneurs by instigating a practice of 
common representation. Geneva-based diplomats work to produce the statements and 
have established rules and procedures for interacting, which the diplomats of new Member 
States are socialised into. The development of CAS representation is a shift from ‘negative 
agreements’ (such as the agreement not to use the ILO to debate the Arab-Israeli dispute)
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to ‘positive agreements’ about raising the profile of labour standard violations and holding 
states accountable for those violations.
Does the empirical evidence suggest the forging of a common identity? 
Throughout the analysis of political coordination two recurring issues challenged the 
dominant logic of diversity. The first was that increased membership of the EU did not 
have a noticeable adverse impact on coordination, and the second was that in every case 
study an agreement between the Member States was reached and upheld without a higher 
sovereign authority compelling them. Institutional theory, and in particular the sociological 
approach within it, was used to provide an explanation for why EU Member States 
remained committed to these agreements. The answer is that EPC and CFSP socialised the 
Member States into the expectation of a collective EU policy.
Based on this, which theory tells us most about the behaviour of E U  Member States and the role 
ofEU institutions?
The three theories that are most useful in explaining the behaviour of EU Member 
States in the ILO are liberal intergovernmental theory, consociational theory and 
sociological approach in institutional theory.
Liberal intergovernmental theory is the best fit for explaining EU Member State 
behaviour in technical issues, based on the following points. EU Treaty revisions had a 
noticeable impact on the level of common representation and voting cohesion, especially in 
Tsebelis’ ‘second epoch’ between 1987 and 1992, during the preparation of the Single 
Market. The change in voting procedures in the Council in areas related to ILO technical 
issues increased the intensity of representation, and saw the nature of representation 
change too, with the European Commission playing a stronger role. The second point in
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support of LI is the abrupt end of the European Commission’s involvement in committee 
meetings following the publication of ECJ Opinion 2/91 in 1993. This was likened to the 
institutional securing of an intergovernmental bargain, illustrating the intergovernmental 
basis of common positions but at the same time accepting supranational oversight and 
regulation. The third point is the continued importance of national interests, with the 
related issue of Europeanization through the logic of consequences (of which LI is one 
example) leading to some EU Member States continuing to try and upload their preferred 
national policies into the ILO (the UK was an example of this).
Consociational theory performed well in both technical and political issue areas. 
Firsdy, the need to balance the identities of the Community and the Member State 
(segments) accommodates variation over time in one area or the other, but overall there is 
no long term departure from an equilibrium position. Technical coordination 
demonstrated this tendency in the cycles of increased and decreased levels of 
representation over the five periods. In political issues there was also evidence of common 
representation and separate action at the same time, and this reiterated the dualism 
between acting to give the EU a presence in the ILO, with the upholding of the national 
identities. Secondly, the role of the Presidency is also recognised, as it served as an 
important variable in explaining the changes in the degree of coordination between 
different years, both in technical and political issues. The role of a supranational elite with 
homogeneous interests in maintaining the system appeared more credible in the 
EPC/CFSP, while in technical issues national workers’ and employers’ were generally 
hostile to closer EU coordination because they feared marginalisation in the policy-making 
process.
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Institutional theory using the ‘logic of appropriateness’ was the best fitting 
explanation for political coordination. The primary reason was that it provided an answer 
for why evidence was found showing the EU Member States speaking collectively and also 
voting cohesively, while evidence was found of different underlying national positions. It 
also explained how the EU moved into a new area of coordination (CAS), and how the 
enlargement of the EU on successive occasions had not caused grid-lock in the 
intergovernmental decision-making process. Patterns of socialisation, the norms and rules 
through which it took place and its impact on EU policy were clearly shown in Chapter 10 
on Geneva diplomats, while secondary literature argued it has been taking place since the 
1970s in EPC. Thus, the explanation of political coordination is incomplete without the 
sociological dimension.
Overall, these findings are contrary to what was expected at the beginning. 
Technical coordination remains influenced by intergovemmentalism, despite the 
development of the acquis communautaire, while political coordination has always been more 
successful than its intergovernmental character suggests it should be. The EU Member 
States remain first and foremost members of the ILO, and speaking for Europe remains a 
secondary concern.
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ILO Instruments EU Voting and Interventions
YEAR
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
ILC Presidency Instrument Type of Conventi Recomm Record Vote: EU States EU States Number of Number of Length of EU Partici­
Discussion on endation For/Against/Abstain Against Abstaining Statements Statements discussions pation level*
For as % of total Presidency Comm’sion paragraphs
58 Belgium Minimum Age Second 138 146 328:0:24 (C) 93.2 % 0 UK 2 0 81§ 0.025
329:0:13 (R) 96.2% 0 0
Occupational Cancer First 139 147 - - 0 0 - **
59 Germany Occupational Cancer Second 139 147 376:0:0 (C) 100.0% 0 0 1 0 129§ 0.008
370:0:0 (R) 100.0% 0 0
Paid Educational Leave 140 148 295:43:38 (C) 78.5% 0 0
342:6:25 (R) 91.7% 0 0
Migrant Workers First 143 151 - - 0 0 - -----
60 Ireland Rural Workers 141 149 359:0:10 (C) 97.3% 0 0
347:0:4 (R) 98.9% 0 0
Human Resources 142 150 351:0:4 (C) 98.9% 0 0
351:0:2 (R) 99.4% 0 0
Migrant Workers Second 143 151 265:0:81 (C) 76.6% 0 D,F,G,NL,UK 3 0 159§ 0.019
288:0:62 (R) 82.3% 0 D.G.NL.UK
Equal Opportunities General - - - - - 0 1 123§ 0.008
61 Luxemb’g Tripartite Consultation 144 152 305:0:70 (C)81.3% 0 0
354:0:7 (R) 98.1% 0 0
Working Environment First 148 156 - - 0 0 - -----
62 NL Seafarers Protection Single 153 223:0:2 (R) 99.1% 0 0 1 0 68§ 0.015
(Maritime)
Employ’t Continuity Single 145 154 213:4:10 (C) 93.4% 0 0 2 0 85§ 0.024
207:0:11 (R) 95.0% 0 0
Seafarers’ Leave Single 146 183:25:18 (C) 81.0% 0 0 7 0 132§ 0.053
Merchant Shipping Single 147 155 160:0:67 (C) 67.5% 0 0 10 0 138§ 0.072
211:0:15 (R) 93.4% 0 0
63 UK Working Environment Second 148 156 405:0:6 (C) 98.5% 0 0 5 0 130§ 0.038
399:0:3 (R) 99.3% 0 0
Nursing Personnel 149 157 332:0:64 (C) 83.8% 0 NL.UK
363:0:36 (R) 91.0% 0 0
64 Denmark Labour Administration 150 158 408:0:0 (C) 100.0% 0 0
396:0:0 (R) 100.0% 0 0
Labour Relations 151 159 331:0:54 (C) 86.0% 0 0
349:0:33 (R)91.4% 0 0
Road Transport First 153 161 - - 17 0 253§ 0.067
Key:
Bold text indicates EU Representation took place.
* EU Participation level is calculated by dividing the total number of EU representation statements (Presidency + Commission) by the number of paragraphs.
** In cases where there was no EU representation in one of the two years'of a technical committee the participation data is recorded as blank. This prevents the skewing of the analysis of participation.
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ILO Instruments EU Voting and Interventions
YEAR ILC Presidency Instrument Type of Conventi Recomm Record Vote: EU States EU States Number of Number of Length of EU Pai
Discussion on (C) endation For/Against/Abstain Against Abstaining Statements Statements discussions pation
(R) For as % of Total Presidency Comm’sion paragraphs level*
1979 65 France OSH: Dock Work 152 160 387:0:3 (C) 99.2%
378:0:4 (R) 99.0%
Road Transport Second 153 161 276:59:43 (C) 73.0% 0 0 35 0 369§ 0.095
282:57:26 (R) 77.3% 0 0
Older Workers First 162 29 0 241 § 0.120
1980 66 Italy Older Workers Second 162 420:0:2 (R) 99.5% 0 Q 22 0 155§ 0.142
Family Responsibility First 156 165 1 0 342§ 0.003
1981 67 NL Collective Bargaining 154 163 332:0:108 (C) 75.5% 0 UK
417:0:7 (R) 98.3% 0 0
OSH Single 155 164 408:1:8 (C) 97.8% 0 0 27 0 145§ 0.186
397:0:5 (R) 98.8% 0 0
Family Responsibility Second 156 165 324:0:92 (C) 77.9% 0 0 7 0 439§ 0.016
346:0:78 (R) 81.6% 0 0
Termination Employ’t First 158 166 2 0 250§ 0.008
1982 68 Belgium Social Security Rights 157 404:0:29 (C) 93.9% 0 0
Termination Employ’ Second 158 166 356:9:54 (C) 85.0% 0 0 1 0 191 § 0.005
417:0:3 (R) 99.3% 0 0
Disabled Persons First 159 168 3 0 127§ 0.024
1983 69 Germany Disabled Persons Second 159 168 344:0:77 (C) 81.7% 0 0 1 0 192§ 0.005
417:0:3 (R) 99.3% 0 0
Social Security Rights 167 419:0:8 (R) 98.1% 0 0
Employment Policy First 169 8 0 170§ 0.047
1984 70 France Employment Policy Second 169 374:1:34 (R) 91.4% 0 UK 17 0 188§ 0.090
Labour Statistics First 160 170 0 0
Evaluation of PI ACT General 1 0 146§ 0.007
Key:
Bold text indicates EU Representation took place.
* EU Participation level is calculated by dividing the total number of EU representation statements (Presidency + Commission) by the number of paragraphs.
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ILO Instruments EU Voting and Interventions
YEAR ILC Presidency Instrument Type of Conventi Recomm Record Vote: EU States EU States Number of Number of Length of EU Pai
Discussion on (C) endation For/Against/Abstain Against Abstaining Statements Statements discussion pation
(R) For as % of Total Presidency Comm’sion paragraphs level*
1985 71 Italy Health Services First 161 171 22 0 218§ 0.101
Labour Statistics Second 160 170 422:0:7 (C) 98.4% 0 0 14 0 139§ 0.101
414:0:3 (R) 99.3% 0 0
Health Services Second 161 171 399:1:12 (C) 96.8% 0 0 30 1 106§ 0.292
354:0:55 (R) 86.6% 0 0
Safety in Asbestos First 162 172 13 0 163§ , 0.080
Equal Opportunities General 0 1 92§ 0.011
1986 72 NL Safety in Asbestos Second 162 172 419:0:1 (C) 99.8% 0 0 31 3 299§ 0.114
406:0:5 (R) 98.8% 0 0
Youth Employment General 15 0 130§ 0.115
1986 73 Denmark Seafarers’ Welfare Single 163 173 214:0:3 (C) 98.6% 0 UK
Maritime 207:0:4 (R) 98.1% 0 UK
Sea’ Health Protection Single 164 214:0:0 (C) 100.0% 0 0 18 0 121 § 0.149
Sea’ Social Security Single 165 198:3:4 (C) 96.6% 0 France 3 0 73§ 0.041
Seafarer Repatriation Single 166 174 214:0:3 (C) 98.6% 0 0 4 0 117§ 0.034
207:0:4 (R) 98.1% 0 0
1987 74 Belgium Safety in Construct’n First 167 175 59 2 219§ 0.279
Employ’t Promotion First 168 176 36 0 157§ 0.229
1988 75 Germany Safety in Construct’n Second 167 175 421:0:1 (C) 99.8% 0 0 31 1 276§ 0.116
394:0:0 (R) 100.0% 0 0
Employ’t Promotion Second 168 176 366:0:26 (C) 93.4% 0 0 21 0 219§ 0.096
375:0:17 (R) 95.7% 0 0
1989 76 Spain Safety in Chemicals First 170 177 58 0 236§ 0.246
Night Work First 171 178 18 0 305§ 0.059
Indigenous Peoples 169 328:1:49 (C) 86.8% 0 France
Key:
Bold text indicates EU Representation took place.
* EU Participation level is calculated by dividing the total number of EU representation statements (Presidency + Commission) by the number of paragraphs.
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ILO Instruments EU Voting and Interventions
YEAR ILC Presidency Instrument Type of Conventi Recomm Record Vote: EU States EU States Number of Number of Length of EU Pai
Discussion on (C) endation For/Against/Abstain Against Abstaining Statements Statements discussion pation
(R) For as % of Total Presidency Comm’sion paragraphs level*
1990 77 Ireland Safety in Chemicals Second 170 181 391:0:1 (C) 99.7% 0 0 20 11 310§ 0.100
389:0:0 (R) 100.0% 0 0
Night Work Second 171 182 348:24:15 (C) 89.9% 0 UK 26 0 196§ 0.133
341:22:17 (R) 89.7% 0 UK
Hotels/ Restaurants First 172 182 44 0 170§ 0.259
Night Work (Women) Protocol 183 323:7:27 90.5% 0 Portugal
1991 78 Luxembo’g Hotels/ Restaurants Second 172 262:0:113 (C) 69.9% 0 NL, UK 24 0 255§ 0.094
272:0:116 (R) 70.1% 0 Port, UK
Insolvency Protection First 173 36 0 345§ 0.104
1992 79 Portugal Insolvency Protection Second 173 184 293:52:48 (C) 74.6% 0 0 16 0 376§ 0.043
281:65:42 (R) 72.4% 0 0
Industrial Accidents First 174 184 18 1 116§ 0.164
1993 80 Denmark Industrial Accidents Second 174 177 355:5:23 (C) 92.7% 0 0 17 1 150§ 0.120
351:4:19 (R) 93.9% 0 0
Part-time Work First 175 178 28 0 367§ 0.076
1994 81 Germany Part-time Work Second 175 179 258:88:43 (C) 66.3% UK Fra, Port 0 0 270§
291:35:71 (R) 73.3% 0 Port, UK
Safety in Mines First 176 27 0 178§ 0.152
1995 82 France Safety in Mines Second 176 179 378:9:34 (C) 89.8% 25 0 223§ 0.112
377:6:26 (R) 92.2%
Labour Inspection Protocol 180 330:7:62 82.7% 0 Fra, Port 5 0 462§ -----
Home Work First 177 180 0 0 380§ -----
1996 83 Italy Home Work Second 177 181 246:14:15 (C) 89.5% Germ, UK 0 1 0 343§ 0.003
303:4:11 (R) 92.4% UK 0
Key:
Bold text indicates EU Representation took place.
* EU Participation level is calculated by dividing the total number of EU representation statements (Presidency + Commission) by the number of paragraphs.
** In cases where there was no EU representation in one of the two years of a technical committee the participation data is recorded as blank. This prevents the skewing of the analysis of participation.
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ILO Instruments EU Voting and Interventions
YEAR ILC Presidency Instrument Type of Conventi Recomm Record Vote: EU States EU States Number of Number of Length of EU partic
Discussion on (C) endation For/Against/Abstain Against Abstaining Statements Statements discussion pation
(R) For as % of Total Presidency Comm’sion paragraphs level****
1996 84 Denmark Labour Inspection Single 178 185 205:1:10 (C) 94.9% 0 Fra, UK
Maritime 210:0:9 (R) 95.9% 0 Fra, UK
Recruitment Seafarers Single 179 186 197:5:17 (C) 90.0% UK 0
201:4:10 (R) 93.5% UK 0
Hours of Work Single 180 187 209:1:13 (C) 93.4% 0 UK
197:11:16 (R) 87.9% UK 0
1997 85 NL Revision ofC96 Single 181 188 347:5:30 (C) 90.8% 0 Luxembourg 35 0 543§ 0.064
314:13:67 (R) 79.7% 0 Luxembourg
Job Creation First 189 11 0 223§ 0.049
Contract Labour First * * 40 0 186§ 0.215
1998 86 UK Job Creation Second 189 403:0:4 (R) 99.0% 0 0 11 0 207§ 0.053
Contract Labour Second * *
Child Labour First 182 190 3** 0 336§ 0.009
1999 87 Germany Child Labour Second 182 190 415:0:0 (C) 100.0% 0 0 0** 0 426§ _ __
382:0:0 (R) 100.0% 0 0
Maternity Protection First 183 191 8 0 466§ 0.017
2000 88 Portugal Maternity Protection Second 183 191 304:22:116 (C) 68.8% 0 UK 0 0 704§ * * *
315:16:108 (R)71.8% 0 UK
Safety in Agriculture First 184 192 68 0 273§ 0.249
2001 89 Sweden Safety in Agriculture Second 184 192 402:2:41 (C) 90.3% 0 0 73 0 829§ 0.088
418:0:33 (R) 92.7% 0 0
Promote Cooperative First 193 0 0 328§ -------
Key:
* The committee on Contract Labour was suspended during the second discussion because of irreconcilable differences between the negotiating parties. A resolution was passed to revisit the issue 
within 5 year, and was included on the agenda in 2003 in the general discussion on the Scope of the employment relationship.
** In the discussions on Child Labour the EU participated in a large group of developed states totalling around 40 under Dutch coordination, hence little explicit mention of the EU.
*** EU Participation level is calculated by dividing the total number of EU representation statements (Presidency + Commission) by the number of paragraphs.
**** In cases where there was no EU representation in one of the two years of a technical committee the participation data is recorded as blank. This prevents the skewing of the analysis of participation.
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ILO Instruments EU Voting and Interventions
YEAR ILC Presidency Instrument Type of Conventi Recomm Record Vote: EU States EU States Number of Number of Length of EU Partici­
Discussion on endation For/Against/Abstain Against Abstaining Statements Statements discussions pation level’
For as % of total Presidency Comm’sion paragraphs
2002 90 Spain Promote Cooperative Second 193 436:0:3 (R) 99.3% 0 0 1 0 325§ 0.003
Occupational Disease Single 194 436:0:3 (R) 99.3% 0 0 47 0 627§ 0.075
2003 91 Greece Seafarer Documents Single 185 392:0:20 (C) 95.1% 0 0 1 1 736§ 0.003
Occupational Safety General 7 0 197§ 0.036
Employment Relation General 6 0 143§ 0.042
Human Resources First 195 1 0 688§ 0.001
2004 92 Ireland Human Resources Second 195 338:93:14 (R) 76.0% 0 0 1 0 999§ 0.001
Fishing Sector First * * 4 0 789§ 0.005
Migrant Workers General 10 0 292§ 0.034
2005 93 Luxembo’g Fishing Sector Second * * 288:9:139 (C) 66.1% 0 0 0 0 1002§ ___
292:8:135 (R) 67.1% 0 0
Occupational Health First 186 196 52 0 300§ 0.173
Youth Employment General 20 0 422§ 0.047
Key:
Bold text indicates EU Representation took place.
* The Fishing Sector convention failed to be accepted onto the ILO statute because quorum was not reached in the record vote. The accompanying recommendation was passed, but has not been added 
due to the fact it refers to the missing convention.
** EU Participation level is calculated by dividing the total number of EU representation statements (Presidency + Commission) by the number of paragraphs.
*** In cases where there was no EU representation in one of the two years of a technical committee the participation data is recorded as blank. This prevents the skewing of the analysis of participation.
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ILO Political Resolutions and Record Votes when EU Common Statements Made EU Member States’ Voting
YEAR ILC
1973 58
1974 59
EU
Presidency
Belgium
Germany
1975 60 Ireland
1976 61
1977 63
Luxemb'g
UK
Agenda Item Statement Given Record Vote: Outcome EU States For
For/Against/
Abstain
Resolution concerning the policy of 1: Drafting 64:0:128* Rejected 0
discrimination, racism and violence of Committee Quorum: 200
trade union freedoms and rights
practices by the Israeli authorities in 2: Plenary
Palestine and the Occupied Territories
Resolution concerning the policy of Drafting 224:0:128 Passed 0
discrimination, racism and violence of Committee Quorum: 208
trade union freedoms and rights
practices by the Israeli authorities in
Palestine and the Occupied Territories
Resolution concerning human and trade Drafting 224:1:124 Passed Bel, Den, Ire, Ita,
union rights in Chile Committee Quorum: 208 Lux, NL. UK
Clause inserted into Standing Orders NONE 74:0:305 Rejected Denmark, NL,
Committee referring to the PLO Quorum: 216 Germany
Resolution concerning human and trade NONE 236:0:106 Passed Bel, Den, Fra,
union rights in Chile Quorum: 216 Ger, Ire, Ita, Lux,
NL. UK
Proposal to invalidate the credentials of NONE 128:1:164 Rejected Denmark
the Chilean Workers’ delegation Quorum: 215
Proposal to invalidate the credentials of NONE 136:2:152 Rejected Denmark
the Chilean Workers’ delegation Quorum: 231
Record vote on whether the objections NONE 178:12:110 Rejected Denmark
to the nominations of the Workers’ Quorum: 230
delegation of Chile are receivable
Record Vote on the adoption of the In Committee on 135:0:197 Rejected Bel, Den, Fra,
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Quorum: 227 Ger, Ire, Ita, Lux,
the Application of Conventions and Standards NL. UK
Recommendations (CEACR)
Committee on Structure of the ILO In committee . . .
EU States 
Against
EU States 
Abstaining
Bel, Den, Fra, 
Ger, Ire, Ita, Lux, 
NL. UK
Bel, Den, Fra, 
Ger, Ire, Ita, NL. 
UK
France, Germany
Bel, Fra, Ire, Ita, 
Lux. UK
Bel, Fra, Ger, Ire, 
Ita, Lux, NL. UK
Bel, Fra, Ger, Ire, 
Ita, Lux, NL. UK
Bel, Fra, Ger, Ire, 
Ita, Lux, NL. UK
Data from the record vote on the Preamble of the Resolution concerning the policy of discrimination, racism and violence of trade union freedoms and nghts practices by the Israeli authorities in 
Palestine and the Occupied Territories
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ILO Political Agenda Items: Resolutions, Record Votes and Committee Meetings
YEAR
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
ILC
64
EU
Presidency
Denmark
65
66
France
Italy
67
68
NL
Belgium
Agenda Item
Record vote on whether the objections 
to the nominations of the Workers' 
delegation of Chile are receivable
Resolution concerning the policy of 
discrimination, racism and violence of 
trade union freedoms and rights 
practices by the Israeli authorities in 
Palestine and the Occupied Territories
Declaration concerning the Policy of 
Apartheid in the Republic of S. Africa
Declaration concerning the Policy of 
Apartheid in the Republic of S. Africa
Secret Ballot in the Resolution 
concerning the implications of Israeli 
settlements in Palestine and other 
Occupied Territories, in connection with 
the situation of Arab Workers
Declaration concerning the Policy of 
Apartheid in the Republic of S. Africa
Apartheid in South Africa, including the 
updating of the 1964 Declaration 
concerning the Policy of Apartheid in 
the Republic of S. Africa
Standing Committee on Action taken in 
the Declaration concerning the policy of 
Apartheid in South Africa
Statement Given
NONE
Drafting
Committee
Plenary
Plenary
Drafting
Committee
Plenary
1. Drafting 
Committee
2. Plenary 
Committee
Record Vote:
For/Against/
Abstain
185:0:149 
Quorum: 238
211:0:139 
Quorum: 238
249:15:156 
Quorum: 257
434:0:7 
Quorum: 260
Plenary adoption of Report on the Plenary
Committee on Apartheid
EU Member States’ Voting
Outcome
Rejected
Rejected
Passed
Passed
EU States For EU States EU States
Against Abstaining
Demark 0 Bel, Fra, Ger, Ire,
Ita, Lux, NL. UK
Bel, Den, Fra, 
Ger, Ire, Ita, Lux, 
NL. UK
No data No data No data
Bel, Den, Fra, 0 0
Ger, Gre, Ire, Ita,
Lux, NL. UK
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ILO Political Agenda Items: Resolutions, Record Votes and Committee Meetings
YEAR
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
ILC EU
Presidency
69 Germany
70 France
71 Italy
72 NL
74 Belgium
75 Germany
Agenda Item
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Resolution concerning the protection of 
Workers and Employers’ rights and 
freedoms in Palestine and other 
occupied territories
Statement Given Record Vote: 
For/Against/ 
Abstain
Plenary
Committee
Plenary
Committee
Plenary
Committee
Plenary
Committee
Plenary 331:27:47
Quorum: 248
Committee
Plenary
Committee
Outcome
Passed
EU Member States’ Voting
EU States For EU States EU States
Against Abstaining
Den, Gre, Ire Germany, UK Bel, Fra, Ita, Lux,
NL, Port, Spn
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ILO Political Agenda Items: Resolutions, Record Votes and Committee Meetings EU Member States’ Voting
YEAR
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
ILC
76
77
78
79
80
EU
Presidency
Spain
Ireland
Luxemb’g
Portugal
Denmark
Agenda Item
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Common position concerning delegates 
of Serbia and Montenegro to the ILC
Action taken in the Declaration 
concerning the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa
Plenary adoption of Report on the 
Committee on Apartheid
Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Statement Given Record Vote: 
For/Against/ 
Abstain
Committee
Plenary
Plenary
Plenary
Committee
Plenary
Plenary
Plenary
Plenary
Committee
Plenary
Plenary
Outcome EU States For EU States 
Against
EU States 
Abstaining
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ILO Political Agenda Items: Resolutions, Record Votes and Committee Meetings
YEAR ILC EU
Presidency
Agenda Item Statement Given
1994 81 Germany Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Plenary
1995 82 France Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Plenary
1996 83 Italy NONE
1997 85 NL NONE
1998 86 UK Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Plenary
1999 87 Germany Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Resolution on the widespread use of 
forced labour in Myanmar
Plenary
Plenary
2000 88 Portugal NONE
2001 89 Sweden Situation of Workers, in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Plenary
2002 90 Spain NONE
2003 91 Greece Situation of Workers in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
Plenary
2004 92 Ireland NONE
2005 93 Luxemb’g NONE
Record Vote:
For/Against/
Abstain
333:27:47 
Quorum: 267
EU Member States’ Voting
Outcome
Passed
EU States For EU States EU States
Against Abstaining
Aus.Bel, Den, 
Fin, Fra, Ger, 
Gre, Ire, Ita, Lux, 
NL, Port, Spn, 
Swe, UK
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EU Member State Statements Nordic Bloc Statements*
YEAR ILC Presidency EU States making statements EU speaking on behalf of: About country: Convention Part 1: 
Statements
1973 58 Belgium - 0
1974 59 Germany France
Germany
UK
USSR
USSR
USSR
C29
C29
C29
0
1975 60 Ireland - 0
1976 61 Luxemb’g Germany
UK
USSR
USSR
Czechoslovakia
C87
C29, C87
cm
1
1977 63 UK Germany
Germany
UK
Belgium, France, Italy, NL Ethiopia
USSR
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
USSR
C87
C87
cm
C87
C87
1
1978 64 Denmark UK USSR
Uruguay
Cuba
Uganda
C29
C87
C105
C105
1
1979 65 France France
Italy
UK
Algeria
Liberia
Czechoslovakia
Algeria
Liberia
Czechoslovakia
C87
C87
cm
C87
C87
cm
2
1980 66 Italy Germany
UK
Indonesia
USSR
Czechoslovakia
Indonesia
USSR
Czechoslovakia
C29
C29
cm
C29
C29
cm
3
Part 2: Part 2: Part 2 
Convention
Algeria
Liberia
C87
C87
1981 67 NL
Key:
* Nordic Bloc states between 1973-1979 were: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland was represented in common statements from 1980.
The Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) consists of one committee reviewing the report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) 
and a second committee that holds hearing in which governments that have been considered to have violated standards give evidence. In this table all EU statements come from the second part of 
the committee stage, (there have been no statements made in the first committee) while Nordic statements are divided into Part 1 (review of CEACR report) and Part 2 (hearings).
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EU Member State Statements Nordic Bloc Statements*
YEAR ILC Presidency EU States making statements EU speaking on behalf of: About country:
1992
Key:
79 Portugal Germany
Convention Parti: Part2: Part 2:
Statements On Behalf County
1982 68 Belgium Belgium Poland C87
Netherlands Uruguay C87
Czechoslovakia cm
1983 69 Germany France Nicaragua C87
Netherlands Czechoslovakia cm
1984 70 France Belgium Philippines C87
Haiti C105
Netherlands Iran cm
* USSR cm
1985 71 Italy Netherlands Iran cm
1986 72 NL - -
1987 74 Belgium France Poland C87
1988 75 Germany - -
1989 76 Spain France UK C87
Germany Romania cm
UK C87
Portugal UK C87
Netherlands UK C87
1990 77 Ireland UK Czechoslovakia cm
1991 78 Luxemb’g Germany Dominican Republic C87
Angola C87
Netherlands UK C87
Thailand C29
Ethiopia C87
Honduras C87
UK C87
Dominican Republic C111
Part 2: 
Convention
UK C87
UK UK
* Nordic Bloc states are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Nonway and Sweden
The Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) consists of one committee reviewing the report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) and a second committee that holds hearing in which governments that have been considered to have violated standards give evidence. In this table all EU statements come from the 
second part of the committee stage, (there have been no statements made in the first committee) while Nordic statements are divided into Part 1 (review of CEACR report) and Part 2 (hearings).
Appendix 
3.2 
EU 
M
em
ber State 
and 
com
m
on 
statem
ents 
and 
voting 
in 
Com
m
ittee 
on 
the 
Application 
of Standards 
ILC 
1973-2005
339/381
EU Member State Statements Nordic Bloc Statements*
YEAR ILC Presidency EU States making statements EU speaking on behalf of. About country: Convention Part 1: 
Statements
Part 2:
On Behalf
Part 2: 
Country
Part 2 
Convention
1993 80 Denmark Germany Brazil
Cuba
Japan
Turkey
C29
C29
C87
C98
0
1994 81 Germany Germany
Netherlands
UK
India
New Zealand 
Myanmar 
New Zealand
C29
C100
C87
C100
0 Myanmar C87
1995 82 France Austria
France
Germany
Netherlands
Myanmar
UK
UK
India
Thailand
UK
C29
C87
C87
C29
C29
C87
4 India
Thailand
Myanmar
C29
C29
C87
1996 83 Italy Germany
Netherlands
Brazil 
Myanmar 
Nigeria '
C29
C87
C87
8 Myanmar
Nigeria
C87
C87
1997 85 NL Germany 
UK. Germany
UK. Austria, Belgium, Germany 
UK, Germany, Netherlands 
UK
Nordic, Canada**, US** 
Nordic, Canada**, Switz**
Indonesia
Sudan
Myanmar
Nigeria
Swaziland
C98
C29
C87
C87
C87
5 NL, UK 
Switz
Indonesia
Nigeria
Turkey
C98
C87
C87
1998 86 UK France, Germany, Port, NL, UK 
UK. Austria, Germany, Ita, Port
US**. Nordic, Canada** 
Nordic, Canada**
Sudan
Myanmar
C29
C87
6 Aust, Ger, 
Ire, UK,
Colombia C87
Key:
Can, US 
Aust.Bel, 
Ger, Ita, 
NL, Port, 
UK, Can, 
Jap, US, 
Turkey
Indonesia C98
* Nordic Bloc states are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
** Canada, Switzerland and the US are included in this table since they were part of the group statements issued by an EU Member State on behalf of other states.
Underlined state denotes Member State giving statement
The Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) consists of one committee reviewing the report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) and a second committee that holds hearing in which governments that have been considered to have violated standards give evidence. In this table all EU statements come from the 
second part of the committee stage, (there have been no statements made in the first committee) while Nordic statements are divided into Part 1 (review of CEACR report) and Part 2 (hearings).
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EU Member State Statements Nordic Bloc Statements*
YEAR
1999
2000
2001
2002
ILC
87
88
89
90
Presidency EU States making statements EU speaking on behalf of: About country:
2003 91
2004 92
Germany
Portugal
Sweden
Spain
Greece
Ireland
UK. Aus, Bel, Ger, NL, Por, Spn Nordic, Canada 
Germany
Portugal: EU (15) 
Germany
Netherlands and Germany
Sweden: EU (15)
Sweden: EU (15)
Germany
Spain: EU (15)
Greece: EU (15) 
Germany
Ireland: EU (25) 
Ireland: EU (25) 
Ireland: EU (25)
Associated States*
Associated States* 
Croatia, Norway 
Iceland, Norway
Associated States", Nor, 
Iceland, Switzerland
Candidate and Associated 
States, Norway, Iceland
EFTA States 
EFTA, SAP, Candidate 
EFTA, SAP, Candidate
Myanmar
Australia
Myanmar
UK
Swaziland
Myanmar
Colombia
Belarus
Myanmar
Myanmar
Belarus
Colombia
Colombia
Myanmar
Zimbabwe
Convention Parti: Part 2: Part 2:
Statements On Behalf Country
C29 7
C29
Part 2 
Convention
C29
C29
C87
C29
C87
C87
C29
C29
C87
C87
C87
C29
C98
NL
NL
NL
NL, UK 
NL
NL, Can
Colombia C87
Belarus
Myanmar
Colombia
Ethiopia
Sudan
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
India
Belarus
Colombia
Ethiopia
Myanmar
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Colombia
Guatemala
Myanmar
Sudan
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
C87
C87
C87
C87
C29
C87
C98
C29
C87
C87
C87
C87
C87
C98
C87
C87
C87
C29
C87
C98
Key:
* Nordic Bloc states are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
"Associated states are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.
EFTA States: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland
SAP (Stabilisation and Association Process) States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro 
Underlined state denotes Member State giving statement
The Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) consists of one committee reviewing the report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) 
and a second committee that holds hearing in which governments that have been considered to have violated standards give evidence. In this table all EU statements come from the second part of 
the committee stage, (there have been no statements made in the first committee) while Nordic statements are divided into Part 1 (review of CEACR report) and Part 2 (hearings).
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EU Member State Statements Nordic Bloc Statements*
YEAR
2005
ILC
93
Presidency EU States making statements EU speaking on behalf of:
Luxemb’g Luxembourg: EU (25) 
Luxembourg: EU (25) 
Luxembourg: EU (25) 
Luxembourg: EU (25) 
Luxembourg: EU (25) 
Luxembourg: EU (25)
SAP, Accession** states 
Candidate*** States, Switz, 
Norway, Ukraine 
SAP, Accession** states 
Candidate*** States, Switz, 
Norway, Ukraine 
SAP, Accession** states 
Candidate*** States, Switz, 
Norway, Liechtenstein 
SAP, Accession** states 
Candidate*** States, 
Canada, Norway, Ukraine 
SAP, Accession** states 
Candidate*** States, 
Canada, Nonway, Ukraine 
SAP, Accession** states 
Candidate*** States, Switz, 
Norway, Ukraine, US
About country:
Belarus
Colombia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Sudan
Zimbabwe
Convention Part 1: Part 2: Part 2: Part 2
Statements On Behalf Country Convention
C87
C87
C29
C87
C29
C98
Guatemala C87 
Mauritania C29
Key:
* Nordic Bloc states are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 
** Accession States: Bulgaria and Romania 
*** Candidate States are: Croatia and Turkey 
EFTA States: Iceland, Nonway, Switzerland
SAP (Stabilisation and Association Process) States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro 
Underlined state denotes Member State giving statement
The Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) consists of one committee reviewing the report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) and a second committee that holds hearing in which governments that have been considered to have violated standards give evidence. In this table all EU statements come from the 
second part of the committee stage, (there have been no statements made in the first committee) while Nordic statements are divided into Part 1 (review of CEACR report) and Part 2 (hearings).
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EU Member States 1973-1980 1981 1986 1995
Year Instrument Bel Den Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux NL UK Greece Port Spain Aust Fin Sweden
1973 C138: Minimum Age 1988 1997 1990 1976 1978 1981 1977 1976 2000 1986 1998 1977 2000 1976 1990
1974 C139: Occupational Cancer 1996 1978 1994 1976 1995 1981 1999 1977 1975
1975 C143: Migrant Workers Abst Abst Abst 1981 Abst Abst 1978
1976 C145: Employ’t Continuity 1978 1981 1979 1983 1978 1978 1981
1976 C146: Seafarers’ Leave 1978 1981 2005 1980 1984 1979 1990 1978
1976 C147: Merchant Shipping 1982 1980 1978 1980 1992 1981 1991 1979 1980 1979 1985 1978 1978 1978
1977 C148: Working Environment 1994 1985 1993 1985 1979 1981 1980 1979 1978
1979 C153: Road Transport 1985
1981 C155: Occupational H&S 1995 1995 2001 1991 s 1985 1985 1985 1982
1981 C156: Family Responsibility 1989 1988 1988 1985 1985 1983 1982
1982 C158: Termination Employ’t 1989 2001 1985 1985 1992 1983
1983 C159: Disabled Persons 1985 1989 1989 1986 2000 2001 1988 1985 1999 1985 1985 1984
1985 C161: Occ. Health Services 1994 1987 1986
1986 C162: Safety in Asbestos 1996 1993 1999 1999 1990 1988 1987
1987 C164: Seaf Health Protect 2004 1994 2002 1990 1995 1990
1987 C165: Seaf Social Security Abst 1991 1991
1987 C166: Seafarer Repatriation 2004 1991 1990 1990
1988 C167: Safety Construction 1990 1990
1988 C168: Employment Protect 1992
1990 C170: Safety in Chemicals 2002
1990 C171: Night Work 1997 Abst 1995
1991 C172: Hotels/Restaurants 1998 1993 1992
1992 C173: Insolvency Protection 1995 1996 1994
1993 C174: Industrial Accidents 2004 1997 1994
1994 C175: Part time Work Abst 2000 2001 2001 Aa’s t Abst 1999 2002
1995 C176: Safety in Mines 1998 1998 2002 1997 1999 1997 1997
1996 C177: Homework Aa’st 1999 2002 Aa’s t 1998
1997 C181: Private Agencies 2004 2000 Abst 1999 2002 1999 1999
1999 C182: Child Labour 2002 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2000 2001 2001 2000 2001
2000 C183: Maternity Protection 2001 Abst 2004
2001 C184: Safety in Agriculture 2003 2004
2003 C185: Seafarer Identity Doc 2004
Key:
Bold Text refers to abstentions or votes against the adoption of the instrument. Only the UK has ratified an instrument it previously did not vote for the adoption of, C138 in 2000.
Appendix 
4.1: EU 
M
em
ber State 
ratifications 
of ILO 
Conventions 
drafted 
while 
EU 
representation 
took 
place 
1973-2005
343/381
Year Instrument Bel Den Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux NL UK Greece Port Spain Aust Fin Sweden
1974 C140: Paid Education Level 1993 1975 1976 1976 1975 1978 1992 1975
1975 C141: Rural Workers 2003 1978 1984 1978 1979 1977 1977 1989 1978 1978 1977 1976
1975 C142: Human Resources 1981 1984 1980 1979 1979 2001 1979 1977 1989 1981 1977 1979 1977 1976
1976 C144: Tripartite Consult 1982 1978 1982 1979 1979 1979 1978 1977 1981 1981 1984 1979 1978 1977
1977 C149: Nursing Personnel 1988 1981 1984 1985 1987 1985 1979 1978
1978 C150: Labour Administrate 1981 1981 1985 2001 1980 1980 1985 1981 1982 1980 1979
1978 C151: Labour Relations 1991 1981 1985 2001 1988 1980 1996 1981 1984 1980 1979
1979 C152: OSH Dock Work 1989 1985 1982 2000 1998 1982 1981 1980
1981 C154: Collective Bargaining 1988 1993 1996 1985 1983 , 1982
1981 C157: Social Security Right 1985 1984
1986 C163: Seafarers’ Welfare 1993 2004
1989 C169: Indigenous People 1996 Abst
1996 C178: Labour Inspection 2004 1999 2005 2003 1999 2000
1996 C179: Recruitment Seafarer 2004 1999 1999
1996 C180: Hours of Work 2003 2003 2004 1999 2005 2003 2001 2002 2004 2002 2000
Key:
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Appendix 5: Chi-square test for the association between E U  representation and E U  Member State voting
cohesion in IL C  technical issues 1973-2005.
Observed Frequency:
Cohesive MS 
Voting
One or more 
MS abstaining
One or more 
MS voting against
Total
EU Representation 53 15 3 71
No EU representation 19 9 3 31
Total 72 24 6 102
Expected Frequency:
Cohesive MS 
Voting
One or more 
MS abstaining
One or more 
MS voting against
Total
EU Representation 50.1 16.7 4.2 71 (0.696)
No EU representation 21.9 7.3 1.8 31 (0.304)
Total 72 24 6 102 (1.000)
Note:
The expected frequencies o f each cell are calculated by multiplying the total number in that column by 0.696 and then by 
0.304 (e.g 72 x 0.696 = 50.1) This shows the expected frequency o f each outcome if there was no association between the 
independent variable (representation) and the dependent variable (voting cohesion).
to fc foL (£o-Q2 (CrQVfc
Observer Expected Deviation Square Dev. SD /  expected
53 50.1 2.9 8.41 0.168
19 21.9 -2.9 8.41 0.384
15 16.7 -1.7 2.89 0.173
9 7.3 1.7 2.89 0.396
3 4.2 -1.2 1.44 0.343
3 1.8 1.2 1.44 0.800
Sum: 2.264
The chi-square test tests the null hypothesis, which in this case is that there is no association between EU Member State 
representation in a technical committee and EU Member State voting cohesion in the record vote to adopt the drafted 
instrument onto the ILO statute, (Le. they are independent).
At 2 degrees o f freedom (df) calculated by (r-1) x (c-1) when r=rows (2) and c=columns (3) the test result is 2.264.
The Chi Square value o f 2.264 is between the p-value 0.20 (3.219) and 0.30 (2.408).
To refute the null hypothesis we would look for a p value of 0.05 (with a Chi Square value o f 9.210), and therefore cannot 
reject the hypothesis that there is NO association between the two variables.
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Appendix 6: Chi-square testfor the association between E U  representation and E U  Member State voting
cohesion in ILCpolitical votes 1973-2005.
Observed Frequency:
Cohesive MS voting One or more MS 
abstaining /  voting against
Total
EU Representation 6 1 7
No EU representation 1 6 7
Total 7 7 14
Expected Frequency:
Cohesive MS voting One or more MS 
abstaining /  voting against
Total
EU Representation 3.5 3.5 7 (0.500)
No EU representation 3.5 3.5 7 (0.500)
Total 7 7 14
Note:
The expected frequencies o f each cell are calculated by multiplying the total number in that column by 0.500 and then by 
0.500 (e.g 7 x 0.500 = 3.5) This shows the expected frequency o f each outcome if there was no association between the 
independent variable (representation) and the dependent variable (voting cohesion).
(o 4 Srfc M 2 (fo-L)2/L
Observer Expected Deviation Square Dev. SD /  expected
6 3.5 2.5 6.25 1.786
1 3.5 -2.5 6.25 1.786
6 3.5 2.5 6.25 1.786
1 3.5 -2.5 6.25 1.786
Sum: 7.143
The chi-square test works by testing the null hypothesis, which in this case is that there is no association between EU 
Member State representation (the Presidency giving a common statement) on a political issue and EU Member State 
voting cohesion in the record vote to adopt the drafted instrument onto the ILO statute, (they are independent variables)
At 1 degrees o f freedom (df) calculated by (r-1) x (c-1) when r=rows (2) and c=columns (2) the test result is 7.143.
The Chi-Square value o f 7.143 lies between the p values 0.01 (6.635) and 0.001 (10.827).
To refute the null hypothesis we would look for a p value o f 0.05, and with a result o f < 0.01 we can reject the hypothesis 
that there is NO association between the two variables.
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